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Thread: Is Irregular Warfare Really "Irregular" Anymore?

  1. #21
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default WHY Bother?

    Sorry folks, but why is this important? Seriously? I argue it is not. The important thing is the political objective of the operations, and how to achieve them. Ways and means, not who and where.

    Irregular or regular is mostly utterly irrelevant, if you have thought the problem through. Focussing on the question just forgives pre-conceived ideas and some stupidity. Your own forces conduct is far more important than the conduct of the enemy.

    It may help to codify certain distinctions between the two, as concerns conduct at the tactical level, but ultimately that is where it stops.

    I now think, that for people at the policy level to be debating this stuff is verging on the embarrassing. It strongly implies that folks don't understand the problem.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    William,

    A quick fire response, over my morning Joe. I feel that you have missed the point by some significant margin. Perhaps still early in the morning?

    <The important thing is the political objective of the operations, and how to achieve them. Ways and means, not who and where.>
    If you don't understand who, then you don't understand why.

    <Your own forces conduct is far more important than the conduct of the enemy.>
    Seriously? Is that where we are at?

    <concerns conduct at the tactical level, but ultimately that is where it stops>
    In this age of Strategic Compression, the 24/7 Media, etc what happens tactically has significant implications at the Political level.

    We have armies that are good at beating other armies... without an understanding of the Operational and Tactical implications of our opponents, we won't get the right capabilities into the field.

    LP

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    Chapter Two of the 27 Jan 09 RAND pub, Assessing Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Intelligence Analysis, is focused on defining Irregular Warfare in the context of DoD efforts to define the term. Following a review of current doctrine, the authors present this conclusion:
    ...When one steps back from the details of a review of IW definitions, operation types, and LLOs, IW can be thought of in terms of two stylized, ideal types. The first of these, which we call population-centric IW, is perhaps best evidenced by typical counterinsurgency operations, such as those being conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the focus is primarily on building indigenous public support (or tolerance) for U.S. aims. As described above, this type can involve a wide range of military missions, including, among others, combat and training of host nation security; but the outcome most often depends on the success of intrinsically political efforts to reach a stable political equilibrium underwritten by improvements to personal security for the population, restoration of essential services, and economic development and good governance. In this ideal type, the weight of effort is focused less on military than on political, psychological, informational, and related efforts, less on defeating enemy forces than on persuading those who can be persuaded to support the U.S.-supported aims and government.

    As described in the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the second ideal type is IW against “dispersed, global terrorist networks that exploit Islam to advance radical political aims.” This type focuses on the Al Qaeda organization umbrella of ideologically connected, cellular-structured groups; it targets specific individuals or small cells widely dispersed across the globe and requires an exquisite level of precision and timeliness in intelligence, targeting, and striking capability. This form of IW is highly tactical and technical in nature and generally does not rely on general-purpose forces. Instead, the principal application of military power consists of direct action by small numbers of SOF and, presumably, precision strikes by manned or unmanned aircraft. It also can be prosecuted by non-military partners, including law enforcement or paramilitary direct action.....

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    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi LP,

    Quote Originally Posted by TheLapsedPacifist View Post
    If any of you are at a particular meeting next week discussing this, perhaps we can chat over a beer?
    You wouldn't happen to be talking about a meeting in sunny Monterey on Tuesday and Wednesday, would you? If so, the I suspect we could definitely chat over a few pints.

    Cheers,

    Marc
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
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    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by charter6 View Post
    I would argue that calling "regular" warfare "regular" has always been a misnomer. Over the course of human history, what we now term irregular or asymmetric is in fact far and away the dominant form of conflict. That's a throw-away point in the context of this discussion though.

    More importantly to my way of looking at things is the fact that our division of warfare into regular and irregular is itself entirely artificial and very, very modern. The idea that armies only fight armies within a limited sphere of engagement and that anything else constitutes an aberration only dates back a few centuries, and has only ever been applied selectively. Before that, the distinction between regular and irregular breaks down, and, more importantly, people didn't seem to have been thinking about warfare as being divisible in that way.
    Some good stuff here.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by TheLapsedPacifist View Post
    William,
    Lapsed, called me Wilf
    A quick fire response, over my morning Joe. I feel that you have missed the point by some significant margin. Perhaps still early in the morning?
    Perhaps. I wrote my response over a cup of Turkish coffee and a mouthful of sweet hala.
    <The important thing is the political objective of the operations, and how to achieve them. Ways and means, not who and where.>
    If you don't understand who, then you don't understand why.
    So explain to me how this differentiates the Viet Cong from the North Vietnamese Army, the INLA from the IRA, or Hamas from Hezbollah? With limited resources, the ways and means of applying military force are not that varied.
    <Your own forces conduct is far more important than the conduct of the enemy.>
    Seriously? Is that where we are at?
    If you are concerned about the moral dimension to conflict, of course it does. There was never any doubt the US was going to win in Fallujah. Enemy conduct was largely irrelevant (what could they really do?). The only question mark was who died, when and by cause.
    It has more or less been conclusively proved that the IDF's not so great performance in the Lebanon in 2006 was due to their failings, not anything Hezbollah ever managed to do.
    To paraphrase Foch, you don't so much win as the other guys looses.
    To paraphrase the Chief of Staff of the Provisional IRA, "we only have to get lucky once," meaning their entire MO was predicated on detecting lapses in British Army tactical doctrine, not an attempt to compete with it.

    <concerns conduct at the tactical level, but ultimately that is where it stops>
    In this age of Strategic Compression, the 24/7 Media, etc what happens tactically has significant implications at the Political level.
    Not true. Very rarely, some tactical action, have disproportionate effect when moral questions are framed around them. It's not a new phenomena, to anyone with a solid grounding in military history. I can cite numerous examples.
    We have armies that are good at beating other armies... without an understanding of the Operational and Tactical implications of our opponents, we won't get the right capabilities into the field.
    I'm not sure who the WE is here, but WHAT tactical and operational implications? That's THE game. It's not new. That IS the history of warfare. How you beat other armies is how you beat anybody. Only the detail changes.
    The US couldn't beat the North Koreans and the PLA (big armies) and the if the US lost in Vietnam they lost to Main Force NVA, not the "VC", who they basically wiped out.
    How you defeat a Motor Rifle Regiment is basically the same as how you defeat a Machine Gun Artillery Brigade, yet your enemy is using substantially varying methods. Insurgents on the other hand have very limited means and thus limited aims.
    Last edited by William F. Owen; 03-20-2009 at 03:53 PM. Reason: misspelled Fuch
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Wilf,

    I don't want to pick a fight, but I disagree with quite a few things you said. I'll argue one point and let's see where it takes us...

    My point: We have armies that are good at beating other armies... without an understanding of the Operational and Tactical implications of our opponents, we won't get the right capabilities into the field.

    Your comment: I'm not sure who the WE is here, but WHAT tactical and operational implications? That's THE game. It's not new. That IS the history of warfare. How you beat other armies is how you beat anybody. Only the detail changes.

    If I ignore the the 'only the detail changes' cos you could hide a whole heap under that one statement...

    Let's think about how we beat conventional forces. Two armies manoeuvring, attempting to secure a superior position on the battlefield. Terrain is important - there are key pieces of terrain to hold or seize. Say we're the offense, we need to dislodge an enemy force that is defending a hill, which overlooks some key town. I want to be able to suppress the enemy, close with him, and remove him from his defensive position. I want lots of firepower going down range - to keep his head down - I want machine guns, I want my soldiers to shoot a lot, I want grenades and bayonets for the trenches. So let's look at our soldier's rifle...this piece of kit is now optimised for a force on force conflict...get lots of rounds down range accurately. Effective fire, especially volume of it, is very important. We have, at least in the NATO nations, standardised to a 5.56mm round. It's a compromise - there's a presumed range that it will be used at, the size of the round means that our soldiers can carry lots of it (it might take a long time to dislodge our opponent), it's lethality assumes that a wounded enemy is as good - if not better - than a dead one.

    Now let's look at an urban counter insurgency...predominately the enemy isn't holding any ground, so a rifle with capability to suppress is potentially pointless. If he is suppressed, he'll flee. We win the street. He comes back later. He's fleeting, if we get the chance to shoot at him, we must hit and we must incapacitate or kill. A wounded insurgent doesn't think he's going to be a POW, he isn't going to ask for quarter or wave a white flag. This calls for a different kind of rifle. It needs to be very accurate and highly lethal - we don't need to carry lots of ammunition. This might lead us to thinking about larger calibres... perhaps we can drop the bayonet.

    There are lots of things that our soldiers have that are useful for force-on-force situations and much less beneficial for COIN. So beating armies and beating the anyone else might require quite different capabilities.

    So we need to understand how our enemy manifests itself on the battlefield because this drives capability requirements...

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by TheLapsedPacifist View Post
    I don't want to pick a fight, but I disagree with quite a few things you said. I'll argue one point and let's see where it takes us...
    I don't want to to pick a fight either, I just believe in holding arguments to rigour.
    This calls for a different kind of rifle. It needs to be very accurate and highly lethal - we don't need to carry lots of ammunition. This might lead us to thinking about larger calibres... perhaps we can drop the bayonet.
    Very happy talking light weapons doctrine.
    a, this is not true, and b, history and operational analysis does not support it. No army I know of, has ever had a COIN rifle. Bayonets are largely irrelevant, and have been since about 1918. No army has ever suffered tactically through lack of bayonets. There is an extensive thread on Bayonets here. Nothing in the conduct of the Northern Ireland conflict changed when the British Army swapped it's 7.62mm L1A1 for the 5.56mm L85.

    There are lots of things that our soldiers have that are useful for force-on-force situations and much less beneficial for COIN. So beating armies and beating the anyone else might require quite different capabilities.
    Like what? The British Army has fired it's entire war store of Javelin Missiles (an ATGM) doing "COIN" in Helmand province. 35 years of operations in Northern Ireland saw virtually no specialised (with the exception of EW and search kits) equipment or weapons on general issue.

    So we need to understand how our enemy manifests itself on the battlefield because this drives capability requirements...
    We understand our insurgent enemies capabilities very well. There is no area of debate or mystery. Actually China is a bit more of a mystery, but not a big mystery.
    Again the idea that "the enemy" drives our capability requirements, does not support characterising enemies as regular and irregular. What is more, I do not believe it to be true, unless you want to get into very simplistic equipment comparisons, like M1A2 v T-80U.
    Warfare drives capability requirements, and the "enemy" is one tiny part of that. What is more you never know where and who you are going to fight, so the capabilities have to be pretty broad. This article tackles that very issue.

    The simple fact is that no army can afford to have COIN equipment and WAR equipment. It's nonsensical, intellectually flawed and doctrinally lazy - so the grounds for making this A & B differentiation of Regular and Irregular, serves no purpose, once the basic flaws have been recognised. Are there differing conditions of warfare? Very much so, but they do not line up along regular v Irregular. They line up across every possible conflict.

    How come the UK's excellent set of COIN skills did not translate into overwhelming operational success in Basra? All conflicts are different. I just can't see why saying "Irregular threat" or "regular threat" helps, especially as the latest fad of "hybrid" seems to blur the distinction to irrelevance.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member max161's Avatar
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    The Lapsedpacifist said:
    "My point: We have armies that are good at beating other armies... without an understanding of the Operational and Tactical implications of our opponents, we won't get the right capabilities into the field."

    As we enter into the QDR period again, I would be interested in knowing what capabilities we need to "get right". Please tell me what unique capabilities we need to buy based on our understanding of the "operational and tactical implications of our opponents?"

    More to the point what are the platforms that we need to buy that are unique to Irregular Warfare, Complex Operations, Hybrid Warfare, etc, that we do not need for Major Combat Operations or "Regular" warfighting? Please enlighten us and you might find you have a job at OSD developing the new QDR requirements. Do you really believe there is such a thing as a "COIN rifle"?
    David S. Maxwell
    "Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    "Counter-Irregular Warfare"

    I participated in a TRADOC-run conference this week to discuss the Future Operating Environment (FOE); what it is, and the ramifications. Their work will work to inform the army senior leadership, just as the JOE (Joint Operating Environment and son of earlier army FOEs) informs the joint community; and Strategic Appreciation informs the SOF community. Good eclectic group of presenters and feisty breakout sessions. During the brief backs on the final day one of the groups had incorporated the term "counter-irregular warfare". No discussion, just a phrase buried in a slide; and I didn't participate in that breakout, so I don't know what led to it being used. But it works.

    IW is a sound concept being promoted by talented and informed leaders (Sec Gates, ASD Vickers, and ADM Olson to name a few) for good and valid reasons. But it is as yet horribly named (you have to get your narrative right so that your principles, intent, actions and words all line up, and this "narrative" is considerably off azimuth in the minds of most of the larger interagency and within DoD for that matter. God know how it is perceived by those who live where we intend to bring it to "help" them...) and poorly defined (the current definition, viewed through a Clauswitzian lens, could define virtually all warfare).

    Sage experts like Huba Was de Cega also are very concerned, and quick to point out, that this is a term that already has a widely accepted and negative meaning. Somali pirates conduct irregular warfare. Most insurgents conduct irregular warfare. We, as representatives of a State, and agents of her populace, operating under a legal mandate of legitimacy do not. I think the concept of "Counter-Irregular warfare" is one workable way to address the flaws in the current naming convention.

    1. It doesn't throw the baby out with the bath.

    2. It converts the current term to one that does not propose a state of continual, WOG warfare (which, no one wants). Just like COIN, CIW would be something done both in conflict and in peace (conflict prevention) and largely civil led and always civil enabled.

    3. It does not paint us with a brush of illegitimacy by naming our conduct as "irregular." I think Huba would probably be able to get on board with CIW. I think our Ambassadors will have an easier job explaining why they would like to bring in US capabilities to a partner to work with their government to build capacities in the name of CIW far easier than under the name of IW. (Our SOF guys run into the same problems when we show up at an embassy and try to explain a proposal for some unconventional warfare named activity. Horrible narrative. "You want to overthrow the government???" asks the Ambassador. "No, no, no, just the opposite," explains the well intentioned operator. Then say "just the opposite" in the first place and avoid the confusion. SOF could profit from developing "Counter unconventional warfare" as a tool in our kitbag.

    So, as the environment continues to change (become more irregular?), at an ever accelerating pace on the back of globalization driving technologies, we do need some new constructs to guide our future engagement and our current planning, organizing, and equipping to support those future engagements. Perhaps a couple of 'Counter-concepts" will help us get there.

    Any thoughts on either Counter-IW or Counter-UW??
    Last edited by Bob's World; 03-21-2009 at 11:46 AM.
    Robert C. Jones
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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Somali pirates conduct irregular warfare.
    No they do not. They are criminals. They have no interest in gaining any political power other than that which helps them conduct piracy.
    The RUF in Sierra Leone, were criminals sometimes masquerading as insurgents, and sometimes actually having to be insurgent in that they were aiming to take and hold ground to exploit carbon resources. In the end they screwed up by becoming a political threat, and thus attracted an international military response.
    If the Somali pirates seek to hold ground of over throw local government for the exercising of policy rather than criminality, then they'll be conducting warfare. Piracy is a land based problem, so they may have to hold ground, but no political aim, no warfare.

    IW is a sound concept being promoted by talented and informed leaders (Sec Gates, ASD Vickers, and ADM Olson to name a few) for good and valid reasons.
    Why is it sound? How does this help? Why do you want binary code all the possible threats on the planet into two boxes? What good does it do you?

    (the current definition, viewed through a Clauswitzian lens, could define virtually all warfare).
    Correctomundo! It does. Why is it so important to define warfare in a way different to that which Clausewitz, did, when it has served military thought so well?

    You have one army, with one set of equipment, and limited time and budget to train. Within that it has to able to fight every type of armed force on the planet. Who, where and why is irrelevant to answering the exam question.

    The British Army answered this question in 1961, when they said there would be enemies with tactical nuclear weapons, conventional capability, and some very limited capability. They all had to be dealt with using the equipment and weapons in the stores, and the range of training available. Over the next 22 years, that proved generally correct.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default So did we...

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    The British Army answered this question in 1961, when they said there would be enemies with tactical nuclear weapons, conventional capability, and some very limited capability. They all had to be dealt with using the equipment and weapons in the stores, and the range of training available. Over the next 22 years, that proved generally correct.
    at about the same time with the same result. Difference is our memory is impaired...

    Or ignored.

  13. #33
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    No they do not. They are criminals. They have no interest in gaining any political power other than that which helps them conduct piracy.
    The RUF in Sierra Leone, were criminals sometimes masquerading as insurgents, and sometimes actually having to be insurgent in that they were aiming to take and hold ground to exploit carbon resources. In the end they screwed up by becoming a political threat, and thus attracted an international military response.
    If the Somali pirates seek to hold ground of over throw local government for the exercising of policy rather than criminality, then they'll be conducting warfare. Piracy is a land based problem, so they may have to hold ground, but no political aim, no warfare.



    Why is it sound? How does this help? Why do you want binary code all the possible threats on the planet into two boxes? What good does it do you?

    Correctomundo! It does. Why is it so important to define warfare in a way different to that which Clausewitz, did, when it has served military thought so well?

    You have one army, with one set of equipment, and limited time and budget to train. Within that it has to able to fight every type of armed force on the planet. Who, where and why is irrelevant to answering the exam question.

    The British Army answered this question in 1961, when they said there would be enemies with tactical nuclear weapons, conventional capability, and some very limited capability. They all had to be dealt with using the equipment and weapons in the stores, and the range of training available. Over the next 22 years, that proved generally correct.

    WILF, good catch, Piracy may not be the best example. Agree that they are a criminal enterprise and also that the solution for dealing with them must include a decisive land aspect. We'll have to differ though (as usual) that all war is war. State war is simply very different from populace war. Defeat a state's military and you may well win the war (though as we learned in WWI when all you do is defeat the military but leave a very undefeated populace, it can come back to life again once boths sides breed a new generation of soldiers). In populace/insurgency based wars, though also for political purpose, you simply cannot win an enduring solution by simply conducting military operations to defeat the military arm of the insurgency. I know I can't think of a good example of where this has worked, and by worked, I mean where it did not erupt back into insurgency again some 10-20 years later.

    The 60s taught us a lot of great lessons, but with the information tools of globalization in play, many of those tactical lessons must be modified to take this into account. The Malaysian model of isolating the populace from the Insurgent is largely obsolete as it simply is not feasible anymore. It is also harder to simply suppress the military arm for the same reasons. Now more than ever populace-based conflict must be addressed by identifying and repairing the underlying casuation (not to be confused with the most recent motivation) for conflict.

    War doesn't change much. Neither does Insurgency. The environment has made a major change though, and we need to recognize this and adjust. I believe that COIN is still something that demands Civil leadership; but I also believe that military today can no longer assume the luxurious position of saying "not my job" in helping with addressing those underlying causes. We're in this together; and yeah, I think CIW helps us wrap our brains around that concept.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    In populace/insurgency based wars, though also for political purpose, you simply cannot win an enduring solution by simply conducting military operations to defeat the military arm of the insurgency.
    I agree, but that's not the issue. If you don't suppress/disrupt/defeat the military side of the insurgency, you can't do anything else. In the end the insurgency is be defeated because power resides with the government. The insurgency has not power and isn't even an insurgency if it has no MILITARY means.
    Now more than ever populace-based conflict must be addressed by identifying and repairing the underlying casuation (not to be confused with the most recent motivation) for conflict.
    ...but this assumes their is an underlying causation, that can be addressed or repaired. It assumes a snap shot of only one type of insurgency. Insurgencies are sometimes just bad people doing bad things for political aims. Sometimes the peoples perception of being victims is a invented narrative to justify their own failings.
    I believe that COIN is still something that demands Civil leadership; but I also believe that military today can no longer assume the luxurious position of saying "not my job" in helping with addressing those underlying causes.
    For me all leadership is Civil, because the military is an instrument of policy. No argument there. If you want the military to engage in social services and the provision of social structures and political administration, then you are going to have to have a very large part of the US Army, not being an Army any more, and that will cost you when it comes to doing other things.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    I think our Ambassadors will have an easier job explaining why they would like to bring in US capabilities to a partner to work with their government to build capacities in the name of CIW far easier than under the name of IW. (Our SOF guys run into the same problems when we show up at an embassy and try to explain a proposal for some unconventional warfare named activity. Horrible narrative. "You want to overthrow the government???" asks the Ambassador. "No, no, no, just the opposite," explains the well intentioned operator. Then say "just the opposite" in the first place and avoid the confusion. SOF could profit from developing "Counter unconventional warfare" as a tool in our kitbag.
    I learned a long time ago that using "guild" terminology with people who aren't in your "guild" is going to breed misunderstanding despite one's best intentions. I would submit that the Ambassador doesn't need to know about your doctrine or the specific terminology you use and isn't likely to understand CIW any better than another term. This is a case where knowing your audience is important (actually, when is it not important?). Therefore, I think a SoF team in the example you give needs to explain it to the ambassador without jargon in a way that he/she will clearly understand. Maybe that SoF team needs to learn DoS jargon so they can effectively communicate what they want to do. Once that is done, THEN you can add at the end, "btw, if you hear us mention CIW/IW amongst ourselves, that term is our short hand for what I just explained to you."

    My point in all this is that I don't think it ultimately matters what term is used in your doctrine as long as there is a consensus of meaning among the stakeholders of that doctrine. To relay those concepts in concise terms to outside groups and organizations has always been problematic and probably always will be. In such cases, jargon should be minimized or eliminated to facilitate understanding. On the other hand, perhaps what really needs to happen is to get a bunch of DOS, DOD, academics, NGO's and others together to hash out a common taxonomy that everyone understands.

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Default When "Jargon" becomes policy, you need to get it right

    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    I learned a long time ago that using "guild" terminology with people who aren't in your "guild" is going to breed misunderstanding despite one's best intentions. I would submit that the Ambassador doesn't need to know about your doctrine or the specific terminology you use and isn't likely to understand CIW any better than another term. This is a case where knowing your audience is important (actually, when is it not important?). Therefore, I think a SoF team in the example you give needs to explain it to the ambassador without jargon in a way that he/she will clearly understand. Maybe that SoF team needs to learn DoS jargon so they can effectively communicate what they want to do. Once that is done, THEN you can add at the end, "btw, if you hear us mention CIW/IW amongst ourselves, that term is our short hand for what I just explained to you."

    My point in all this is that I don't think it ultimately matters what term is used in your doctrine as long as there is a consensus of meaning among the stakeholders of that doctrine. To relay those concepts in concise terms to outside groups and organizations has always been problematic and probably always will be. In such cases, jargon should be minimized or eliminated to facilitate understanding. On the other hand, perhaps what really needs to happen is to get a bunch of DOS, DOD, academics, NGO's and others together to hash out a common taxonomy that everyone understands.
    "Irregular Warfare is the term the Pentagon is running with, and not particularly concerned with how a world-wide audiance with no access or inclination to check the joint pub definition will interpret it. They will judge through all of their own respective national or institutional lenses applying lay definitions of "irregular" and "warfare"

    We changed the name of the "War Department" to the Department of Defense because we apparently felt the old name sent the wrong message. Now we adopt a term that says we are coming to town once again to conduct "war." Probably still not a good idea. I stand by my contention that tossing a "counter" in front of it improves the narrative, regardless of the audiance.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Default Then we're back to conventional warfare

    Posted by Bob's World,
    The Malaysian model of isolating the populace from the Insurgent is largely obsolete as it simply is not feasible anymore. It is also harder to simply suppress the military arm for the same reasons. Now more than ever populace-based conflict must be addressed by identifying and repairing the underlying casuation (not to be confused with the most recent motivation) for conflict.
    Why is it unfeasible? Furthermore, if you think you can reduce war to a debate over ideas you're wrong. I can sit in my castle and espouse the grand values of democracy and free markets, while my opponent can espouse the values of Sharia Law, by the way my opponent is holding a knife to the neck of the audience, while we sit back and dismiss the most basic rule of COIN which is protecting the populace. If you can't protect the populace from coercive elements within the society, then you can't win. This is exactly what population centric means. Of course we're not going to completely drain the swamp, or provide 100% protection (we don't do that in the U.S.), but our set backs in Afghanistan were largely due to our inability to separate the insurgent from the populace. We made empty promises, and the insurgent delivered upon his threats. We are talking about a war, not an election.

    Wilf,

    What's the purpose of IW? Once again it is a forcing mechanism to expand our concept of war. Unfortunately our professional military education institutions have intentionally or unintentionally failed to address IW, and we habitually perform in a substandard manner when we are in an IW conflict. It is unexcusable that we fail to learn and apply the lessons of the past. You're right, IW is just warfare, but it a slice of the whole we are not good at. We need this concept to get past our traditional mindsets.

    BW,

    I think the idea of organizing our doctrine around C-IW our C-UW is useful on many levels. Hopefully it will gain some traction.

  18. #38
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    How about 2 manuals are all you need for the whole Army. Stabilizing Operations and Destabilizing Operations. From a Systems perspective those are the only 2 things you can do or need to do to the target system. You add positive energy to the system or you delete negative energy from the system until it Stabilizes or Destabilizes which ever you prefer. We should have a race to see how many terms and manuals could be deleted and still accomplish all missions.

  19. #39
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Default Information can be shaped, but not controlled

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Posted by Bob's World,

    Why is it unfeasible? Furthermore, if you think you can reduce war to a debate over ideas you're wrong. I can sit in my castle and espouse the grand values of democracy and free markets, while my opponent can espouse the values of Sharia Law, by the way my opponent is holding a knife to the neck of the audience, while we sit back and dismiss the most basic rule of COIN which is protecting the populace. If you can't protect the populace from coercive elements within the society, then you can't win. This is exactly what population centric means. Of course we're not going to completely drain the swamp, or provide 100% protection (we don't do that in the U.S.), but our set backs in Afghanistan were largely due to our inability to separate the insurgent from the populace. We made empty promises, and the insurgent delivered upon his threats. We are talking about a war, not an election.
    Bill,

    In no way am I suggesting that there is not a requirement for military operations against the insurgent both to defeat his military capacity and to secure the populace. My point is two fold: first, that defeating the insurgent alone has never been sufficient to actually defeat an insurgency; and second that in today's information environment tactics of isolation and control are ineffective due to the speed and availability of global information to virtually any person, any where, any time.

    Fact is that historically the counterinsurgent has rarely even wanted to truly address the underlying causation for the insurgency and has simply wanted to make the insurgent stop conducting a disruptive level of violence so that they can keep on with business as usual. The reason for this is simple, it’s because insurgency happens when governments fail, and rare is the government that wants to even admit its failures, let alone be forced to change their mode of conduct simply because some aspect of the populace doesn't like it. Crush the squeaky wheel, and the rest of the populace will typically fall back into line; particularly when the government can largely shape and control the information available to that populace.

    So my theory is that in today's world governments no longer have the luxury of this time proven tactic, and that today they must actually listen to their populace and truly attempt to address legitimate grievances in addition to crushing the squeaky wheel if necessary (adding oil may be all that is required if addressed soon enough).

    Where Wilf and I appear to depart is that he sees insurgency as just the conflict portion of this disagreement between a populace and its governance. I believe that it is more constructive to take a more holistic view and see insurgency and counterinsurgency as a continuous spectrum of friction between every populace and every governance every day. Most are bumping along happily down in what the 1980 State Department COIN manual calls "Phase 1 Pre-insurgency" (with phase 2-4 being Mao's 3 phases). Call it that or call it "Phase 0 Peace," the concept is the same. Populaces will always have grievances, needs, and wants; and governments must always be working to address them. As governments fall behind in this mission the tension rises into more active and more organized dissent, ultimately, if unchecked, resulting in violence. The goal of good governance and good counterinsurgency (the same thing in this view), is to work to stay as low in Phase 0 as possible. The military is only called in to assist in COIN when the governmental failures become so great that they require the added capacity of the military to create conditions that allow the civil elements to regain sufficient control to be able to implement the changes required to address the populaces concerns.

    The military should not be a hammer brought in to punish the populace for being dissatisfied, which makes "problems" go away so that the civil government can continue merrily along with its family of failed conduct that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place. This is why governments tend to blame insurgency on the insurgent leadership or on "radicalism" or some "ideology." Total BS.

    All of those are critical enablers of the violent movement, but the causation of insurgency is always some real or perceived failure of the government in the eyes of the governed, that the populace feels they have no recourse to resolve through peaceful means.

    America's, and perhaps the world's, most successful COIN campaign ever was the passing and enacting of the Civil Rights Act. Certainly it is the most successful of all the widely touted COIN efforts of the 1960s. The government recognized that it was wrong and made major concessions and changes to address the legitimate grievances of a major segment of its populace. That is good COIN. I personally thought that operation was over until I saw how the African American populace reacted to President Obama's election, and I realized that it was low into "Phase 0," but not nearly as low as most of us thought it was. COIN operations are never over. They are continuous, and are usually done in Peace.

    (As to our challenges in Afghanistan, that is a whole other chapter, but think about this theory presented here, and how it might apply to what has happened there to date, and how it could inform what we do as we move forward)
    Last edited by Bob's World; 03-22-2009 at 08:03 AM.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  20. #40
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Where Wilf and I appear to depart is that he sees insurgency as just the conflict portion of this disagreement between a populace and its governance. I believe that it is more constructive to take a more holistic view and see insurgency and counterinsurgency as a continuous spectrum of friction between every populace and every governance every day.
    You may be right, so to revert to an analogy, I see Insurgency as being the burst pipe that requires the emergency plumber. I need to stop the flood, not think about what the builder and decorator are going to do, because while water still flows, nothing else can be done. No plumber, no builder or decorator will be able to work. So, Stop the killing, as in provide security, all else will follow.

    If the leek is very small, then a normal plumber, ( a policeman) might suffice.

    SLAPOUTHow about 2 manuals are all you need for the whole Army. Stabilizing Operations and Destabilizing Operations. From a Systems perspective those are the only 2 things you can do or need to do to the target system. You add positive energy to the system or you delete negative energy from the system until it Stabilizes or Destabilizes which ever you prefer. We should have a race to see how many terms and manuals could be deleted and still accomplish all missions.
    Exactly. That's my point. I would submit "Combat Operations" and "Security Operations" - nothing to do with any supposed nature of conflict. Your/our conduct is what matters, not what the other clown is up to, or where or how he is up to it, because that will differ vastly.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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