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Thread: Is Irregular Warfare Really "Irregular" Anymore?

  1. #41
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Exactly. That's my point. I would submit "Combat Operations" and "Security Operations" - nothing to do with any supposed nature of conflict. Your/our conduct is what matters, not what the other clown is up to, or where or how he is up to it, because that will differ vastly.

    Hi Wilf, you said something else on another post (and I can not find it)so I will paraphrase....so if I get it wrong it is my fault. You said something to the effect that we should not worry so much about the End State as we should just install a good Process and the End State will take care of itself.

    Whenever you deal with living systems that is all you can do or should want to do....as long as we are alive there is no End only adaption. As long as the system is alive it will adapt and you have to be prepared for that from the beginning. Law Enforcement is a process to suppress crime, we cant, nor could we ever stop crime, because we are dealing with a living system that adapts. So as long as everyone is alive the End State can only be continuous improvement....always strive to maintain the initiative. If we do this we will find that situations will not be perfect but they will be better than before and that will be rather pleasant if we give it a chance to work.

  2. #42
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default This is taking that Welsh stuff too far...

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    If the leek is very small, then a normal plumber, ( a policeman) might suffice.
    I too can kill me too...
    Exactly. That's my point. I would submit "Combat Operations" and "Security Operations" - nothing to do with any supposed nature of conflict. Your/our conduct is what matters, not what the other clown is up to, or where or how he is up to it, because that will differ vastly.
    However, on a serious note, I think you and Slapout are on to something. Add to that my Son's advisory that any Manual over 100 pages is likely full of garbage and, regardless of worth, is unlikely to be read and / or used by most...

    The two-manual process would work. Apply it to echelon, two for individuals, two for Platoon / Company, two for Bn / Bde, etc. Seriously.

    ADDED:
    "...always strive to maintain the initiative. If we do this we will find that situations will not be perfect but they will be better than before and that will be rather pleasant if we give it a chance to work."
    True dat, Slap...
    Last edited by Ken White; 03-22-2009 at 03:26 PM. Reason: Addendum

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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    Whenever you deal with living systems that is all you can do or should want to do....as long as we are alive there is no End only adaption. As long as the system is alive it will adapt and you have to be prepared for that from the beginning.
    I can dig that. Makes sense and improves upon my "do it right and you'll get it right," schtick.

    For sure, the enemy will adapt, so being better at the fundamentals is pretty much the only way forward, and hopefully you can stop adapting when the other system is dead!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

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    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    I too can kill me too...However, on a serious note, I think you and Slapout are on to something. Add to that my Son's advisory that any Manual over 100 pages is likely full of garbage and, regardless of worth, is unlikely to be read and / or used by most...

    The two-manual process would work. Apply it to echelon, two for individuals, two for Platoon / Company, two for Bn / Bde, etc. Seriously.

    ADDED:True dat, Slap...
    Ooops. Me and spelling ... or is that swelling... selling...

    I think your son sounds a smart as his Dad. However there is a huge "human bye-in" to lengthy manuals. It think FM3-24 maybe demonstrative of that. FM23-10 (Sniper Training) is at least 150 pages too long, while the 1965 FM7-15 (Rifle Platoon and Squad) may not have been great of even useful, but it covered what had to be covered - albeit not well - but is shorter than the current FM23-10!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Default Proving that

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Ooops. ... or is that swelling ...

    but is shorter than the current FM23-10!
    bigger is not always better...

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    Default Bob's World

    BW, I don't disagree with many of your points, but I don't think they apply as widely as you apparently do. I offer the following to see how your theory stands up against these criticisms.

    defeating the insurgent alone has never been sufficient to actually defeat an insurgency; and second that in today's information environment tactics of isolation and control are ineffective due to the speed and availability of global information to virtually any person, any where, any time.
    1. Defeating the insurgent requires defeating the insurgency, which in the West is usually more than military in nature, but in some parts of the world they are effective at suppressing an insurgency with a repressive military approach. Syria and Iraq both put down insurgencies with brutal military operations. You can argue that the underlying motivation of the insurgents still exists, but they were effectively defeated and could not act on their desire to force political change. There were no effective insurgencies within the USSR, PRC, Cuba or North Korea. Brutality and total control may not be politically correct, but it works. We ignore it because it isn't the Western way of waging war (nor should it be), but I offer these examples to simply challenge your theory that such an approach doesn't work.

    2. As for information being available worldwide 24/7 at the speed of light or sound, I think this is a critical consideration, but it is over hyped. India probably has more information techs than any other country, but I read that less than 15% of the population had access to the internet. What information is available to the people in Burma, DROC, etc.? In many places information is spread the old fashion way, at the grass roots level, face to face.

    The reason for this is simple, it’s because insurgency happens when governments fail, and rare is the government that wants to even admit its failures, let alone be forced to change their mode of conduct simply because some aspect of the populace doesn't like it. Crush the squeaky wheel, and the rest of the populace will typically fall back into line; particularly when the government can largely shape and control the information available to that populace.
    In some cases, and maybe most, there is some truth to this argument, but more accurately it is the perception of the insurgents that the government has failed. Therefore, those key "leaders" that fan the flames of discontent are critical, and the fact remains that some insurgencies are based on personality cults. Populations are not prone to raise up against their government without leadership to motivate it to do so. Someone(s) must provide a plan that convinces the population they can force change effectively, otherwise why assume the risk? Frustration in many countries is simply not acted upon.

    So my theory is that in today's world governments no longer have the luxury of this time proven tactic, and that today they must actually listen to their populace and truly attempt to address legitimate grievances in addition to crushing the squeaky wheel if necessary (adding oil may be all that is required if addressed soon enough).
    I'm going to narrow my counter argument to Islamist insurgencies. It "appears" to me that the majority of people in Muslim countries have no desire to live under Taliban like rule. Most Islamist insurgencies have failed over the years because they do not have a viable political plan (unlike the communists who were very good in this respect). The real underlying issue in many of these cases is that the government fails at the most basic level, and that is providing security for its people. I think the way you phrased your arguments points at the government always being at fault, and too easily dismisses the power of coercion (terrorism at the village level, join us or suffer dearly). While the government may not be ideal, that isn't always the issue, the issue is much more immediate (safety). That is why our find, fix, finish approach is deeply flawed. The first line of operation "must" be providing security to the population, then as you state establishing or re-establishing legitimacy between the gov and the governed, THEN the find and destroy the enemy piece is relatively easy. We let some individuals in the SOF community shape this fight the wrong way (focus on capture/kill), defeating an Islamist insurgency should have been relatively easy. We got it right in Iraq late, and Afghanistan we don't have it right.

    The military should not be a hammer brought in to punish the populace for being dissatisfied, which makes "problems" go away so that the civil government can continue merrily along with its family of failed conduct that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place. This is why governments tend to blame insurgency on the insurgent leadership or on "radicalism" or some "ideology." Total BS.
    In some cases this is correct, but in a place in Afghanistan where the people are begging to live in relative peace (the term relative is important), the insertion of security forces is critical. I think we tend to rely too much on our dated UW and COIN doctrine which was designed to counter communist insurgencies, what we're facing now in "some" parts of the world is different, and our approach needs to be modified accordingly.

    Food for thought, eager to see your responses.

  7. #47
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    Default Bill, good points all, I'll try to clarify.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    BW, I don't disagree with many of your points, but I don't think they apply as widely as you apparently do. I offer the following to see how your theory stands up against these criticisms.



    1. Defeating the insurgent requires defeating the insurgency, which in the West is usually more than military in nature, but in some parts of the world they are effective at suppressing an insurgency with a repressive military approach. Syria and Iraq both put down insurgencies with brutal military operations. You can argue that the underlying motivation of the insurgents still exists, but they were effectively defeated and could not act on their desire to force political change. There were no effective insurgencies within the USSR, PRC, Cuba or North Korea. Brutality and total control may not be politically correct, but it works. We ignore it because it isn't the Western way of waging war (nor should it be), but I offer these examples to simply challenge your theory that such an approach doesn't work.

    2. As for information being available worldwide 24/7 at the speed of light or sound, I think this is a critical consideration, but it is over hyped. India probably has more information techs than any other country, but I read that less than 15% of the population had access to the internet. What information is available to the people in Burma, DROC, etc.? In many places information is spread the old fashion way, at the grass roots level, face to face.



    In some cases, and maybe most, there is some truth to this argument, but more accurately it is the perception of the insurgents that the government has failed. Therefore, those key "leaders" that fan the flames of discontent are critical, and the fact remains that some insurgencies are based on personality cults. Populations are not prone to raise up against their government without leadership to motivate it to do so. Someone(s) must provide a plan that convinces the population they can force change effectively, otherwise why assume the risk? Frustration in many countries is simply not acted upon.



    I'm going to narrow my counter argument to Islamist insurgencies. It "appears" to me that the majority of people in Muslim countries have no desire to live under Taliban like rule. Most Islamist insurgencies have failed over the years because they do not have a viable political plan (unlike the communists who were very good in this respect). The real underlying issue in many of these cases is that the government fails at the most basic level, and that is providing security for its people. I think the way you phrased your arguments points at the government always being at fault, and too easily dismisses the power of coercion (terrorism at the village level, join us or suffer dearly). While the government may not be ideal, that isn't always the issue, the issue is much more immediate (safety). That is why our find, fix, finish approach is deeply flawed. The first line of operation "must" be providing security to the population, then as you state establishing or re-establishing legitimacy between the gov and the governed, THEN the find and destroy the enemy piece is relatively easy. We let some individuals in the SOF community shape this fight the wrong way (focus on capture/kill), defeating an Islamist insurgency should have been relatively easy. We got it right in Iraq late, and Afghanistan we don't have it right.



    In some cases this is correct, but in a place in Afghanistan where the people are begging to live in relative peace (the term relative is important), the insertion of security forces is critical. I think we tend to rely too much on our dated UW and COIN doctrine which was designed to counter communist insurgencies, what we're facing now in "some" parts of the world is different, and our approach needs to be modified accordingly.

    Food for thought, eager to see your responses.

    First, while I do believe there are fundamental underlying principles rooted in the relationship between the governed and the government; every case is different based on the "environmentals": terrain, weather, culture, nature of the government, dissident leadership, effective ideologies, outside influence to either side, etc.

    So, yes, if you run a dictatorship form of governance you can simply keep crushing the opposition every time it raises its head. But when you lose the wherewithal to do this look out, because if never went away, and ever act of repression intensified the brew. We often are the ones who take that lid off and look inside. Yugoslavia and Iraq both come to mind. All that released pressure blew up in our faces. Number one country we should be looking at today is Saudi Arabia. The King plays us like a fiddle and crushes rebellion at home under our conveniently provided label of "terrorists." He also doesn't do much to stem these nationalist dissidents from acting on their belief that they must break the support of the US to the King in order to have success at home. Thus why 15 of 19 9/11 attackers and 40% of foreign fighters in Iraq being Saudis. We make it all about us. Typical American hubris. We're just in the way.

    Next on key leaders and ideology. I chalk this up to the difference between "causation" and "motivation." The American Revolution is a good case study for this. Causation was largely the British belief that a British citizen born in the Colonies was a lower class than one born in England. Certainly this rubbed the upper class in the colonies harder than it did the average working Joe, and without the efforts of men like Sam Adams, Thomas Paine, and Patrick Henry to stir up the emotions; or men like John Adams, Thomas Jefferson and Ben Franklin to provide the intellect that designed a new form of governance; or men like George Washington, denied the opportunity to serve in the Regular Army due solely to his place of birth, to lead a long fight; we would have most likely been like the rest of the commonwealth. Acts like the Stamp Tax, the Boston Massacre, and Concord Square served as catalysts and also aided the words in providing motivation to the masses. When everything comes together things flare up quicker and perhaps with more violence, but when the underlying conditions persist, populace driven change is inevitable.

    Perception is in fact key. Facts and truth are early casualties, and it is perception that drives such conflicts. Today's communications accelerate this tremendously, and where computers are rare, cell phones are often quite common. Still some dark spots out there, Burma is a good example, and North Korea a better one. But they are exceptions.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Number one country we should be looking at today is Saudi Arabia. The King plays us like a fiddle and crushes rebellion at home under our conveniently provided label of "terrorists." He also doesn't do much to stem these nationalist dissidents from acting on their belief that they must break the support of the US to the King in order to have success at home. Thus why 15 of 19 9/11 attackers and 40% of foreign fighters in Iraq being Saudis. We make it all about us. Typical American hubris. We're just in the way.
    Yep!!

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    "Irregular Warfare is the term the Pentagon is running with, and not particularly concerned with how a world-wide audiance with no access or inclination to check the joint pub definition will interpret it. They will judge through all of their own respective national or institutional lenses applying lay definitions of "irregular" and "warfare"

    We changed the name of the "War Department" to the Department of Defense because we apparently felt the old name sent the wrong message. Now we adopt a term that says we are coming to town once again to conduct "war." Probably still not a good idea. I stand by my contention that tossing a "counter" in front of it improves the narrative, regardless of the audiance.
    I understand your point, and concede its possible, maybe even likely, that the narrative will improve for some, but I think it's equally possible/likely that you'll lose people on the way as well. We're in our 8th year of fighting an "irregular" opponent and I don't see how changing terminology does much at this point for us unless CIW represents something much more than a name change.

    This is a bit of a soap-box topic for me, and upon rereading what I wrote earlier, I see that I probably came across more harshly than I intended - so my apologies for that. For me, changing terminology is a big pet peeve of mine that causes all sorts of problems and confusion. The best example I can think of is the various acronyms for the people we're fighting. In Afghanistan specifically, I've seen the following used as general terms for the violent opponents to the government of Afghanistan and the coalition: Taliban, ACF, ACM, AOG, AQAM, OF, OMF, TB, Militants, Insurgents, Terrorists. I think there are some I'm forgetting. Why do we need so many terms? Why do can't we pick a term and stick with it? What is the functional difference between anti-coalition militants, anti-coalition force, armed opposition groups and opposing militant forces, for example? There isn't any.

    FOB names are another example. I know of a couple of FOB's that have changed names a few times over the years in Afghanistan. A lot of people still use the "old" names, which creates a lot of confusion. "Kamp Holland," FOB Ripley and Tarin Kowt are all the same thing and people regularly use all three to represent the same grids. Some places have "unofficial" names as well. Eventually, everyone who deploys to Afghanistan figures out what all the names mean.

    And that gets to my point - changing IW to CIW risks creating more confusion, not less since a lot of people (being creatures of habit) will probably keep using IW regardless, or will make false assumptions about what the new terminology means. IOW, what may be clearer terminology to me and you may only confuse things for others.

    Finally, I think there's a lot of wisdom in your last comment to Bill Moore. Good food for thought there.

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    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Default Ignorance leads to confusion, confusion leads to uncertainty

    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    I understand your point, and concede its possible, maybe even likely, that the narrative will improve for some, but I think it's equally possible/likely that you'll lose people on the way as well. We're in our 8th year of fighting an "irregular" opponent and I don't see how changing terminology does much at this point for us unless CIW represents something much more than a name change.

    This is a bit of a soap-box topic for me, and upon rereading what I wrote earlier, I see that I probably came across more harshly than I intended - so my apologies for that. For me, changing terminology is a big pet peeve of mine that causes all sorts of problems and confusion. The best example I can think of is the various acronyms for the people we're fighting. In Afghanistan specifically, I've seen the following used as general terms for the violent opponents to the government of Afghanistan and the coalition: Taliban, ACF, ACM, AOG, AQAM, OF, OMF, TB, Militants, Insurgents, Terrorists. I think there are some I'm forgetting. Why do we need so many terms? Why do can't we pick a term and stick with it? What is the functional difference between anti-coalition militants, anti-coalition force, armed opposition groups and opposing militant forces, for example? There isn't any.

    FOB names are another example. I know of a couple of FOB's that have changed names a few times over the years in Afghanistan. A lot of people still use the "old" names, which creates a lot of confusion. "Kamp Holland," FOB Ripley and Tarin Kowt are all the same thing and people regularly use all three to represent the same grids. Some places have "unofficial" names as well. Eventually, everyone who deploys to Afghanistan figures out what all the names mean.

    And that gets to my point - changing IW to CIW risks creating more confusion, not less since a lot of people (being creatures of habit) will probably keep using IW regardless, or will make false assumptions about what the new terminology means. IOW, what may be clearer terminology to me and you may only confuse things for others.

    Finally, I think there's a lot of wisdom in your last comment to Bill Moore. Good food for thought there.
    The past several years have been a run up a tremendous learning curve for everyone. Even within the SOF community there are several divergent perspectives as to what exactly we are dealing with and how to best do so. For the conventional community even more so; with Iraq being one tough school of hard knocks, but with the lessons being largely attributed to "CT" and "COIN", when if fact we have been through a wide range of operations against multiple opponents with an even broader range of motivations in that conflict.

    As the guys at the very top attempt to sort this out, and to create a classification of operation that allows them to adjust budget priorities the concept that stuck was "Irregular Warfare." While it will probably serve that purpose well enough, it is the second and third order effects that concern me. How those outside DoD perceive IW; how those outside the US perceive IW, etc.

    The main concept driving this is the belief that while we must always be prepared for conventional, state on state conflict, we expect that the majority of operations in the forseeable future will be dealing with some aspect of other peoples insurgencies: dealing with non-state actors conducting unconventional warfare like AQN; and dealing with quasi-state actors like Hezbollah that happily takes advantage of new form of "status sanctuary" that we grant them because we haven't figured out what to do with them yet. All of this is bundled as "irregular."

    So, my take upon seeing the 'Counterirregular warfare' term this past week was that it was a good compromise between the proponents for IW and those who have grave, and legitimate concerns. Better to make it as good as possible now, to avoid another messy name change a couple years from now when those higher order negative effects begin to manifest.
    Last edited by Bob's World; 03-22-2009 at 10:11 PM.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    Bob,

    Thanks for the reply and thoughtful comments, as always.

    As the guys at the very top attempt to sort this out, and to create a classification of operation that allows them to adjust budget priorities the concept that stuck was "Irregular Warfare." While it will probably serve that purpose well enough, it is the second and third order effects that concern me. How those outside DoD perceive IW; how those outside the US perceive IW, etc.
    Serious question here: Do you know how they will perceive CIW? How can you be sure those outside DoD will understand that better than what we currently have and how can you estimate the relative impact of making that change in terminology versus something else or even the status quo?

    So, my take upon seeing the 'Counterirregular warfare' term this past week was that it was a good compromise between the proponents for IW and those who have grave, and legitimate concerns.
    How do you know that?

    If the goal is to bring everyone into the same tent, then why not include those who have "legitimate concerns" in the process of crafting new terminology? Maybe what is needed is not new DoD definitions and terminology, but new definitions and terminology at the inter-agency level.

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    I think in this case, the name was selected fairly high up the food chain, along with a rough concept of what it described. It was then tossed down to the AO level to define and describe in detail. There as been plenty of discussion about the problems with both the name and the definition as this snow ball has picked up both mass and momentum; and frankly I think at this point there isn't anyone with the required combination of rank, position and inclination to change it.

    As to "how do I know," well, this isn't some objective item that can be measured, weighed, and truly "known," so reasonable minds can differ.

    It is, however, something falls fairly near to my area of expertise, and I do interact with the gentlemen tasked to breath live into this concept on a fairly regular basis (some have even stopped cringing when they see me coming). So, its just my opinion, but it is a thoughtful and informed one.
    Robert C. Jones
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    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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    I guess at my low level there is a lot I'm missing and perhaps my skepticism is therefore unwarranted. Nothing unusual there. If your efforts can bring more coherence at all levels, then that is a good thing.

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    This thread is over lapping on another thread so I am linking my response here. If we fail at the US Constitutional System level of what war is and is not it doesn't matter what we call the rest of it.



    http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...8948#post68948

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    Default Admiral Eric T. Olson on Irregular Warfare

    From the current issue of the Journal of International Security Affairs, the U.S. Special Operations Commander lays out what he thinks IW is, and why he thinks its important.

    " To successfully deter and confront the global insurgency threatening the world and our nation today, the U.S. military must be able to employ a balanced approach to warfare, carefully blending the full spectrum of military, para-military and civil action to achieve success. It is an approach I refer to as “balanced warfare.” It is the manner in which our nation’s Special Operations Forces are combating terrorism today, and it is the guiding principle behind the Department of Defense’s campaign plan to combat global terrorism."

    Full article:

    http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/16/olson.php
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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