Communist Insurgency in the Philippines (catch all)

[davidbfpo]

A short commentary that seeks to:

Given the recent rise in violence, it seems pertinent to make a realistic assessment of the ongoing Communist violence – considered the longest-running Communist insurgency in Asia – its impact on the larger socioeconomic and political fabric of the country, the direction of the movement since its inception, and future prospects.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensec...ist-insurgency

[Dayuhan]

Some valid points here, but a few question marks as well.

It's suggested here that the NPA have at some point received significant aid from China, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union. I've seen and heard no evidence of that. There were a couple of abortive attempts to ship arms from China in the '70s, beyond that very little. Most external financial support has come from left groups in Europe. Cutting that support off was the main point of designating the NPA a terrorist organization (a rather awkward designation, as it really isn't one), which appears to have been pretty successful.

A bigger question mark, for me, revolves around this claim:

It needs to be understood that left-wing extremism in Philippines is not a national security issue in its current shape; rather it is a localized problem, which can be solved by local governments in coordination with Manila.

and subsequent suggestions that a "solution" would revolve around delivery of infrastructure, services, and "development" in general. This seems to me an adoption of a flawed premise that recurs often in US approaches to insurgency.

People don't go to war because the government fails to deliver infrastructure and services. They complain, but they don't fight. They fight because they see the government as a threat. The issue to me is less delivery of development than delivery of justice, and local governments aren't part of the solution, they are the core of the problem.

The NPA typically flourishes in places where local governance is dominated by powerful families controlling political dynasties. These families typically dominate all political, judicial, and economic life and operate above the law. They are abusive, exploitive, and oppressive, frequently operating their own private armies (a glorified name for gangs of armed thugs) and frequently co-opting state security forces through shared profits from illegal business.

Infrastructure and service delivery is not a bad thing, but for me the key element in reducing the influence of the NPA is a concerted effort to bring local governing elites within the rule of law. Local elites will resist, as they rely on impunity to sustain their power, but as long as these elites remain above the law the NPA will be able to cast itself as the only alternative to their dominance.

The Philippine Government is actually lucky that the leadership of the CPP/NPA and its assorted splinter factions is generally incompetent, obsessed with infighting and absorbed in their anachronistic mantras and incomprehensible rhetoric. A capable opponent could make matters much more difficult for the government. The NPA has declined as much due to its own ineptitude as to anything the government has done to fight it.

I see no need to address the NPA's claims about the US-Philippine relationship. These issues only matter to the core ideologues, who are not going to convert under any circumstances. The most effective way to reduce NPA influence is to resolve the issues that lead the fighters to fight, and those issues are overwhelmingly local. The average NPA fighter knows little and cares less about the relationship between the national elites and the US, they care about the local boss and his henchmen taking their land, exploiting their labor, and generally kicking them around.

[Bill Moore]

Dayuhan,

Have to agree with you on this one. Increased infrastructure and other economic development won't hurt, but won't resolve the real issues. This is the persistent dumbing down effect our COIN doctrine has on its fans who believe if you simply sprinkle some economic development around the conflict area the insurgents will simply turn their weapons into plows and reintegrate into society peacefully.

The other flaw was the author's claim that the threat was localized and local government should be able to deal with it. The CPA and their armed wing the NPA are a national movement, and more often than not, as you pointed out, local government is the problem.

It was my understanding also that most of their external support which was very limited came from leftists in Europe in the form of donations. Every now and then in the 80s I recall seeing a report in the press of low level contacts from PRC, North Korea and Cuba, but the NPA never desired to become a puppet for another state, it is mostly, if not entirely, a nationalist movement.

[max161]

Bill and Dayuhan,

Your comments remind of the the meeting we had with MILF spokesman Moqtadar Iqbal a few years ago. As we discussed the conflict in Mindanao he made two points that were very interesting. First he said you Americans can solve the problem in Mindanao by forcing the Philippine government to give in to the MILF political and ancestral domain demands. (I think he misreads US power and influence and he was in effect telling us we should step all over Philippine sovereignty for his benefit!)

But more germane to both your points and one with which I do agree is that he said the Philippine and US governments and military forces can do all the development they want, the MILF is happy to receive development aid but he said, if the political problems are not solved the insurgency will continue. Development is useful as Bill says but it is certainly not the key to conflict resolution or the end of or even prevention of insurgency unless there are acceptable political accommodations that can made (acceptable to both sides). Otherwise regardless of the ability to physically suppress the insurgency the seeds of conflict will remain to be germinated later.

[Dayuhan]

A little window into left infighting...

Just as background... Akbayan is a group that used to be hard left but split away from the Sison-led movement, rejected Sison and the NPA, and moved into the political realm, though still well on the left side of the political spectrum. They've attained some influence under the Aquino administration and have some members appointed to significant posts. Bayan Muna and associated groups are closely associated with Sison and the NPA and are widely regarded (not entirely without reason) as above-ground agents of the NPA. Both groups have members in Congress through a highly fragmented "party list" scheme intended to provide representation for marginalized sectors. These Congressmen receive government funding intended for development projects for their constituents through a rather bizarre pork barrel scheme. The hard line left groups are widely suspected of channeling these funds back to the NPA. They fight a lot, the current incarnation of the fight being described here:

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/296296/...-party-listers

Akbayan hits back, seeks ouster of Red party-listers

Groups allied with the Akbayan party-list group are urging the Commission on Elections (Comelec) to disqualify “communist party-list groups” from the 2013 elections, claiming that some P770 million in pork barrel funds were being channeled to the operations of the communist New People’s Army (NPA).

In the latest escalation of the increasingly acrimonious quarrel between the well-connected Akbayan on one hand and rival progressive groups, the People’s Advocacy for Collaboration and Empowerment (PEACE) Friday reiterated a letter-complaint it filed in the Comelec last month calling for the delisting of Bayan Muna and other groups that it said were creations of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)...

[Dayuhan]

A few times in the past I've made the point that the most important security-related challenge facing the Philippine Government is not confronting the NPA, the MILF, or the Abu Sayyaf, but cleaning up its own security services. This little vignette illustrates why:

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/336805/...uthern-tagalog

This story broke a few days ago: a van and an SUV were stopped at a checkpoint and fired on police and military operatives; all 13 occupants of the vehicles were killed on the spot (no wounded, no survivors, nobody taken to a hospital). The dead were immediately described as members of a criminal syndicate.

Then it got more complicated: it turned out that among the dead were 3 policemen, one of them a Superintendent (equivalent to a military Colonel), and either 1 or 3 military personnel (one confirmed, 2 others may or may not have been carrying false ID).

The complications are escalating: it's now claimed that the people killed were members and protectors of a major illegal gambling syndicate, and that the people at the checkpoint were associated with a rival syndicate. There's also talk that a large amount of cash was being transported in the vans, though none was reported recovered.

Perhaps significantly, there's very little public surprise at all this: it's simply accepted, all over the country, that virtually every kind of organized crime in the Philippines operates with some degree of official collusion. It's well known, for example, that criminals, rebels, and terrorists typically acquire their arms and ammunition by buying them from the police... yet how many military and police officers have ever been prosecuted for disappearance of arms and ammunition?

This to me raises some questions about US aid to and cooperation with the Philippine security services... we talk about "capacity building", but what capacity are we talking about? Not saying that every apple in the barrel is rotten, but until the ones that aren't rotten stop looking the other way and and take action against the one that are, I can't see how progress is going to be made.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan

This to me raises some questions about US aid to and cooperation with the Philippine security services... we talk about "capacity building", but what capacity are we talking about? Not saying that every apple in the barrel is rotten, but until the ones that aren't rotten stop looking the other way and and take action against the one that are, I can't see how progress is going to be made.

This is a point several have made, especially Bob's World. In many cases our assistance, both training and financial aid, simply reinforces bad behavior, but if our goal is retain access and influence then maybe we get what we actually want (realpolitik), then progress is made? If we want to actually address corruption I suspect we would have to step back and completely re-evaluate how we provide assistance.