Communist Insurgency in the Philippines (catch all)

[charter6]

We're not really disagreeing on too much here, except I take serious issue with the idea that between '46 and '50 there were only "several skirmishes". By '48, Quirino had committed the regular army to the Huk fight after the failure of the constabulary to control the situation -- the Huks it should be noted more than held their own. Aurora Quezon was killed in April '49. Most of the literature on the Huk Rebellion marks the events of 1950, particularly Magsaysay's appointment, as the turning point of the war, not the beginning of the war.

[pinoyme]

Hi:

From 1946 to 1950, the PKP was still trying to broker a modus vivendi with the national government.

It was only in 1950 when the PKP politburo decided to call for a revolution which would put them in Malacanang, the presidential palace within two years.

The skirmishes were localized incidents, but they were several. President Quirino called in the Philippine Army, because the incidents were already too many. Besides, the Philippine Constabulary had the bad habit of cozying up with local power brokers.

Let it be pointed out that the PC was basically a police force with M1 Garands and a few 30 caliber machine guns.

Meanwhile, it seems you are citing Philippine literature of the Cold War. This must be now be taken with some skepticism and a more sober examination of the facts.

Quirino had been demonized, but it turns out he was a very capable leader even if aristocratic.

Magsaysay will always be revered. However, historical evidence shows that had he not died in a plane crash in 1957, his shortcomings as an administrator while President would have finally been coming home to roost.

[charter6]

I just don't buy into the fact that the violence from '46 to '50 wasn't organized at a higher than local level. That just does not mesh with the facts. Stalin University was reopened in '46, Taruc re-formed the General Headquarters at Mount Arayat in the spring of '47. The assassination of Aurora Quezon wasn't a random act of localized violence -- it was a calculated escalation (one that it should be noted was disastrous for the Huk cause).

I disagree with your characterization of Quirino as capable. Quirino's failure to react in a timely fashion to the Huks, and his unwillingness to clear out dead-wood and corruption from his government were major catalysts of the rise of the Huks.

I agree with you on Magsaysay, his strength was never his administrative ability. His personal, charismatic leadership style though and his ability to connect with the peasants contributed tremendously to the fight against the Huks, and his leadership more than any other factor turned the tide of the rebellion.

[pinoyme]

Hi:

The fact that the Huks registered themselves at risk of being subject to being killed by guns for hire of the landlords shows there was no central decision to launch a revolt before 1950.

The PKP also openly supported the Nacionalista Party in the 1949 elections. Taruc, the Huk Supremo, had enough time to plead their case such as the Manila Rotary Club is further proof.

Also, none of the PKP members, the politburo out in Manila had still gone underground.

The murder -ambush of the late President Quezon's widow was done by new Huk recruits.

The Huk clashes were traditionall village vendettas. Both the civilian guards and the Huks claimed to be acting in self-defense.

AS FOR Quirino? There were other problems than the Huk rebellion. The Philippines was devasted by World War 2. In fact, only Warsaw could beat manila's destruction. Yet, Quirino was able to make the government function in spite this.

To say that Quirino could stop graft and corruption is to betray your shallow knowledge of Philippine culture and history. No offense meant when I say this.

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo is a capable President. But she is being sunk right now by her husband, who allegedly is engaged in influence peddling left and right.

Magsaysay BTW also had a number of crooks in his adnimistration. Sadly, a number of these were allegedly also military men he had brought into his watch.

Incidentally, the clashes between the civilian guards and the PC were what led to the rebellion.The landlords were demanding back rentals for the war years when they had fled their townhouses and sought refuge in Manila.

The decision to launch the rebellion took place in 1950 shortly after the Korean War's start. The PKP'S theoreticians mistakenly thought a new world war would start and so would a new economic depression.

Hence, their analysis of a revolutionary situation obtaining in the Philippines.

Cheers and Happy Weekend.

[charter6]

Hi:

The fact that the Huks registered themselves at risk of being subject to being killed by guns for hire of the landlords shows there was no central decision to launch a revolt before 1950.

Why is that? I don't follow the logic of your point.

The PKP also openly supported the Nacionalista Party in the 1949 elections. Taruc, the Huk Supremo, had enough time to plead their case such as the Manila Rotary Club is further proof.

Again, I don't see why this is proof of a lack of central coordination in the violence that took place before 1950. If Taruc wasn't already waging war, then why was he camped out on Arayat instead of campaigning in Manila?

Also, none of the PKP members, the politburo out in Manila had still gone underground.

Well, you're right, some of the political leadership of the PKP was still above-ground, but the military leadership of the Huks had reestablished HQ at Arayat, and squadrons were being reassembled all across Central Luzon.

The murder -ambush of the late President Quezon's widow was done by new Huk recruits.

Nope, not true. She was offed by a 200-strong detachment led by Alexander "Stalin" Viernes, an experienced commander who had served during world war II. Taruc may have disavowed the attack after the fact, but there's no doubt that it was carred out by "real" Huks.

The Huk clashes were traditionall village vendettas. Both the civilian guards and the Huks claimed to be acting in self-defense.

I don't disagree; I'm just saying that the pattern of Huk violence across Central Luzon speaks to a degree of central planning and sanction that you're refusing to recognize.

AS FOR Quirino? There were other problems than the Huk rebellion. The Philippines was devasted by World War 2. In fact, only Warsaw could beat manila's destruction. Yet, Quirino was able to make the government function in spite this.

To say that Quirino could stop graft and corruption is to betray your shallow knowledge of Philippine culture and history. No offense meant when I say this.

The degree to which the government was able to "function" under Quirino is debateable. The Huk situation steadily got worse than it had been under Roxas or even Osema.

I don't deny that my knowledge of Philippine culture and history is shallow. Every metric we have though indicates that there was a sharp drop-off in corruption at almost every level of government after Magsaysay took office, just as there had been in the army after he was appointed defense minister. Stop it altogether, of course not. There's corruption in every country, and always will be. But Quirino could have done better, and deserves criticism for that.

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo is a capable President. But she is being sunk right now by her husband, who allegedly is engaged in influence peddling left and right.

Okay.

Magsaysay BTW also had a number of crooks in his adnimistration. Sadly, a number of these were allegedly also military men he had brought into his watch.

Yes he did, but corruption dropped off significantly under Magsaysay, and popular approval of every level of government rose significantly.

Incidentally, the clashes between the civilian guards and the PC were what led to the rebellion.The landlords were demanding back rentals for the war years when they had fled their townhouses and sought refuge in Manila.

Wait, you're saying that the hired guards of the landowners and the PC fighting led to the war? Where do the Huks fit into that equation? I just don't think that's true.

The decision to launch the rebellion took place in 1950 shortly after the Korean War's start. The PKP'S theoreticians mistakenly thought a new world war would start and so would a new economic depression.

At this point, I don't even know where you're getting the 1950 date. The name change to Hukbong Magapalaya ng Bayan was in November '48. That's the latest date I've seen cited for the "start" of the rebellion. There was a drop-off in attacks after the Quezon assassination, and around the time of the '49 general election, but to say that the rebellion didn't start until 1950 is not something that appears anywhere in the literature as far as I've seen.

Cheers and Happy Weekend.

You too.

[pinoyme]

charter 6:


You do not get the logic of my point.

When the Huks registered, the assumption was that they were a legal organization. They gave out their names, addresses, and names of immeidate relatives.

In other words, they were giving out to their potential killers all the vital information needed for the job.

The fact that the Huks started going out to Arayat and that they were re-organizing was in reaction to the intensified clashes. They were doing so for self-defense.

As for Quirino, he became President in April 1948. At that time the Philippine treasury was empty. Salaries for government employees and worse the military were not paid on time.

War brutalized the Philippines and the Filipinos. Guns were everywhere. It was also easy to make a quick buck. Much of it by outright stealing and graft.

It is to Quirino's credit that he got the government to function somehow. He also negotiated for US aid. The import controls he put up, a necessary stopgap then, had the unintended consequence of spurring the import substitition policy--which gave short run economic benefits up until the start of the term of President Diosdado Macapagal's father.

Again, the Huks were but one of the numerous problems a post-war and newly-independent Philippines faced. There were several others.

As for the Huk commander who killed Aurora Quezon, he was a renegade leader. The province of Quezon was a marginal base for the Huks. Its strength was basically Pampanga and parts of Bulacan in Central Luzon and parts of Laguna.

It seems you are unfamiliar with Philippine culture and that is why you assume the Huks were as highly disciplined and organized as the Viet Minh.

No, Filipinos are not that way. And that is why Filipinos will never tolerate a Communist-led regime. Too much discipline which goes against the Filipino penchant for inspired improvisation and a more creative approach to problems.

If you are citing US military texts, they are then sadly outdated. Which is dangerous. Because if you will be citing lessons learned from these texts to craft strategies for another COIN campaign elsewhere, you shall be coming to grief.

Again, the top leaders of the Communist underground were out in the open. The incoherent reaction of the Huks to the 1946 to 1950 clashes shows there was no overriding strategic goal.

That goal happened when the decision to launch a revolution in 1950 finally took place. "See you in Malacanang," then became the greeting Huks gave to each other.

And the series of attacks against government units finally began.


Addendum:

Wait, you're saying that the hired guards of the landowners and the PC fighting led to the war? Where do the Huks fit into that equation? I just don't think that's true.

This is a copyediting issue, not an issue of fact.I committed an error most Filipino English writers are prone to.

What I meant was that Huks were clashing with either the PC, civilian guards, or municipal policemen. The last were under the control of mayors.

[charter6]

You do not get the logic of my point.

When the Huks registered, the assumption was that they were a legal organization. They gave out their names, addresses, and names of immeidate relatives.

In other words, they were giving out to their potential killers all the vital information needed for the job.

I think you're conflating "Huks" with CPP or the Communist political leadership more generally. I think if you took your average Huk trigger-man in the barrios, they were not openly participating in the political process even if some of their leaders were. What I've been trying to say is that even if there were elements in the Communist leadership pursuing the political track as late as 1950, organized and directed violence against the Philippine state had begun far earlier, 1948 at the latest and I would argue as early as 1946.

The fact that the Huks started going out to Arayat and that they were re-organizing was in reaction to the intensified clashes. They were doing so for self-defense.

So they had to defend themselves despite the fact that they weren't at war? I think you're being internally inconsistent. Either these were isolated incidents of constabulary vs. Huk violence, in which case the leadership cadres who you say were participating in the political process would have nothign to fear; or there was a war going on, in which case moves to fortified positions from where they would be safe from government reprisal would be logical for the leadership cadres.

As for Quirino, he became President in April 1948. At that time the Philippine treasury was empty. Salaries for government employees and worse the military were not paid on time.

War brutalized the Philippines and the Filipinos. Guns were everywhere. It was also easy to make a quick buck. Much of it by outright stealing and graft.

It is to Quirino's credit that he got the government to function somehow. He also negotiated for US aid. The import controls he put up, a necessary stopgap then, had the unintended consequence of spurring the import substitition policy--which gave short run economic benefits up until the start of the term of President Diosdado Macapagal's father.

Again, the Huks were but one of the numerous problems a post-war and newly-independent Philippines faced. There were several others.

I agree completely. I think there were many faults with the Quirino administration, and with Quirino himself, but nobody can argue that he faced an unenviable situation on taking office.

As for the Huk commander who killed Aurora Quezon, he was a renegade leader. The province of Quezon was a marginal base for the Huks. Its strength was basically Pampanga and parts of Bulacan in Central Luzon and parts of Laguna.

I'm pretty sure Quezon's convoy was ambushed in Neuva Ecija, one of the strongholds of Huk power from the earliest days of peasant organization in the 1930's through until the end of the Huk Rebellion.

Viernes wasn't a renegade. There's a significant amount of information on him. Nicknamed "Stalin", he had been a respected Huk squadron commander through World War II. His first split with the leadership came after Taruc disavowed the attack in response to popular disapproval of the attack.

It seems you are unfamiliar with Philippine culture and that is why you assume the Huks were as highly disciplined and organized as the Viet Minh.

No, Filipinos are not that way. And that is why Filipinos will never tolerate a Communist-led regime. Too much discipline which goes against the Filipino penchant for inspired improvisation and a more creative approach to problems.

I don't deny that I don't have your familiarity with Filipino culture. I don't think I've compared the Huks to the Viet Minh though, I don't know where you're getting that.

That doesn't mean that the four years of concerted Huk efforts to roll back governmental influence throughout Central Luzon weren't centrally organized or endorsed by the Huk leadership.

If you are citing US military texts, they are then sadly outdated. Which is dangerous. Because if you will be citing lessons learned from these texts to craft strategies for another COIN campaign elsewhere, you shall be coming to grief.

I'm a college student, I have no affiliation with the US military. My interest in the Huk Rebellion is recent. A large part of my thesis is based on a comparison of the Huk Rebellion with the Malayan Emergency in terms of how experience from both were applied to Vietnam pre-1964. Based on what I've seen here, I don't think you'd disagree with the thrust of my paper.

As for the sources I've used on the Philippines: I've done a significant amount of archival work here stateside, but I'm also leaning heavily on sources like a couple RAND Corporation econometric studies of the conflict, SSI papers, some Huk-sympathizer works like Benedict Kerkvliet's The Huk Rebellion and contemporary publications.

Again, the top leaders of the Communist underground were out in the open. The incoherent reaction of the Huks to the 1946 to 1950 clashes shows there was no overriding strategic goal.

That goal happened when the decision to launch a revolution in 1950 finally took place. "See you in Malacanang," then became the greeting Huks gave to each other.

And the series of attacks against government units finally began.

Some of the CCP leadership was out in the open. What became the Manila cadre was out in the open. The military command was operating out of Arayat as early as '46.

I think your terming the pattern of violence from '46 to '50 incoherent is off base. The Huks steadily rolled back government influence in congruent, strategically important blocs of Central Luzon through this period. A Huk squadron captured Nueva Ecija in the summer of '46 after fairly intense firefights with government regulars. Through 1947 you've got a patterns of raids and ambushes in Bulacan, Tarlac, and Pampanga. These weren't isolated instances of localized violence, these are full Huk squadrons engaging in operations aimed at denying entire provinces to the Philippine army and constabulary.

This is a copyediting issue, not an issue of fact.I committed an error most Filipino English writers are prone to.

What I meant was that Huks were clashing with either the PC, civilian guards, or municipal policemen. The last were under the control of mayors.

Okay, sorry for the misunderstanding.