Communist Insurgency in the Philippines (catch all)

[pinoyme]

Hi:

A case can be made that macArthur's refusal to recognize the contribution of the Huks to the anti-Japanese resistance in World War 2 contributed greatly to the start of the rebellion. Or at least to the tensions leading to it.

The old Communist Party's original agenda was to engage in parliamentary struggle after World War 2. And most of the Huk leaders were peasant socialists, not Communists.

The latter were mostly Manila intellectuals and professionals.


As for the 1972 to late 1970s MNLF rebellion? Somebody still has to write a book on Marcos' Machivellian tactics to beat them.

Clever rogue that Marcos. No wonder he fooled a lot of people then. This included a lot of American policymakers.

As for the NPAs? Jose Ma. Sison is a very interesting fella.

Cheers.

[charter6]

Pinoyme,
I'd disagree with your first statement that MacArthur's antipathy towards the Huks contributed greatly to the start of the Huk Rebellion.

I think that the basic motivating factor behind what became the Huk movement was the changing nature of the tenancy system in Central Luzon -- traditional relationships between tenants and their hacenderos broke down over the issue of non-contractual benefits as the Philippines began to modernize governmentally and legally under American control, and the firm grip the landowning class had on most organs of government and the courts led to peasants seeking alternative means of addressing their grievances, first in the form of striking and general unrest, and later in the form of armed revolution.

You do bring up the point that Communist Parties, and the PKP in particular, were committed to competing politically rather than militarily after World War II. The PKP did in fact compete politically in the form of Popular Front politics in the 1946 elections. It was only after their failure in these elections, at least partially due to widespread voter fraud and corruption, that they turned military struggle.

Also worth noting that the Manila faction was essentially wrapped up in 1950 when Lava and the rest of the Secretariat was captured. After that you have peasant leaders like Taruc running the show almost exclusively.

[pinoyme]

Hi Charter 6:

The Popular Front did not fail in Central Luzon. That was where they got Congressment elected through the Democratic Alliance Party.

These Congressmen were unseated, allegedly by deft maneuvers by then-President Manuel Roxas. The DA opposed amendments to the Philippine Constitution , which would grant Americans parity rights in the economy.

I shall not argue with you over economic theory, as I personally believe economic protectionism has what has stalled the Philippines from fulfilling its potential.

Nonetheless, the fact remains that with the DA out, the way was paved for amendment of the Philippine Constitution.

On the social tensions prevailing in Central Luzon beginning the 1930s, I agree with you on this.

But non-recognition of the Huks' contributions to the guerrilla effort was a grave historical injustice and contributed greatly to tensions in Central Luzon immediately after World War 2.


Rascal though he was, it was to Marcos' credit that he finally recognized the Huks in the mid-1970s shortly after he declared martial law.

Incidentally, the incident which finally sparked the Huk rebellion was the murder of a popular Left-leaning peasant/labor leader in Central Luzon.

The Cold War is over now. The Huk rebellion can now be examined for what it was: yet another peasant rebellion in a country full of such rebellions.

Cheers.

[charter6]

Right, but overall the PKP did not accomplish its goals in the '46 elections, and that was when party leaders began to look towards armed struggle as the answer.

I'm not arguing over your characterization of non-recognition of the Huks' contribution in World War II -- it was an injustice. I just don't think that injustice really played too great a role in causing the Huk Rebellion, regardless of the public statements made to that effect by the PKP. Central Luzon was a powder keg, and had been since the 1930's. The Roxas government did nothing to diffuse the tension there after the war, and paid the price.

[pinoyme]

Charter 6:

In 1946, the goal of the PKP was parliamentary struggle. This was to be done through Popular Front tactics. The Democratic Alliance was made up of left-inclined liberals, agrarian populist/socialists, intellectuals, and a faction of the hard line nationalist movement.

The PKP had no illusions about its overall strength. Its base was confined to Central Luzon, and parts of the Southern Tagalog region also in Luzon. It had small pockets of influence in Manila--among left-leaning intellectuals and a labor federation, the Congress of Labor Organizations. It had a toehold among port workers in the in the Western Visayas in the central islands of the Philippines.

The decision to overthrow the government through armed struggle was made in 1950. However, between 1946 and 1950, there were several skirmishes between the Huks and the Philippine Constabulary, town policemen, and armed civilian guards of landowners.

In 1946, the Huks registered with the government. In the 1960s, Maoist leader Jose Ma. Sison pointed this out as a glaring example of the inept leadership of the PKP by the Lavas.

I am anti-Communist. But historical facts are historical facts. After all, the Cold War is over.

Cheers.

[charter6]

We're not really disagreeing on too much here, except I take serious issue with the idea that between '46 and '50 there were only "several skirmishes". By '48, Quirino had committed the regular army to the Huk fight after the failure of the constabulary to control the situation -- the Huks it should be noted more than held their own. Aurora Quezon was killed in April '49. Most of the literature on the Huk Rebellion marks the events of 1950, particularly Magsaysay's appointment, as the turning point of the war, not the beginning of the war.

[pinoyme]

Hi:

From 1946 to 1950, the PKP was still trying to broker a modus vivendi with the national government.

It was only in 1950 when the PKP politburo decided to call for a revolution which would put them in Malacanang, the presidential palace within two years.

The skirmishes were localized incidents, but they were several. President Quirino called in the Philippine Army, because the incidents were already too many. Besides, the Philippine Constabulary had the bad habit of cozying up with local power brokers.

Let it be pointed out that the PC was basically a police force with M1 Garands and a few 30 caliber machine guns.

Meanwhile, it seems you are citing Philippine literature of the Cold War. This must be now be taken with some skepticism and a more sober examination of the facts.

Quirino had been demonized, but it turns out he was a very capable leader even if aristocratic.

Magsaysay will always be revered. However, historical evidence shows that had he not died in a plane crash in 1957, his shortcomings as an administrator while President would have finally been coming home to roost.

[Jedburgh]

ICG, 14 Feb 11: The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks

The Philippine government is unable to control and develop large parts of the country because of the longstanding communist insurgency. The conflict has lasted more than 40 years and killed tens of thousands of combatants and civilians. Planning their attacks and securing weapons and funds locally, the insurgents have strong roots in the different regions where they operate and have proved hard to defeat. The government’s counter-insurgency strategy has diminished their numbers but has not been able to destroy the organisation. Neither side will win militarily. As peace negotiations resume under the Benigno Aquino administration, the parties to the talks should immediately commit to making existing human rights monitoring mechanisms work, while they try to reach the more difficult long-term goal of a durable political settlement.....

[Bob's World]

I would just offer not to get too wrapped up about the flavor of the ideology employed. Islam-based ideologies work in the south, Communism-based ideologies are more effective in the north. The common factor are populaces dissatisfied with the status quo of governance.

The Philippines has been in a near constant state of insurgency since the first European sat foot there. How it manifests over time and by region varies.

[Dayuhan]

I would just offer not to get too wrapped up about the flavor of the ideology employed. Islam-based ideologies work in the south, Communism-based ideologies are more effective in the north. The common factor are populaces dissatisfied with the status quo of governance.

The Philippines has been in a near constant state of insurgency since the first European sat foot there. How it manifests over time and by region varies.

True in the broadest sense, but as is so often the case, the broadest possible sense is too superficial to be of any real use. It's easy to point to "the status quo of governance" and there is certainly much there to fault, but when you get down to assessing the specific actions or policies needed to address the different insurgencies the differences become very significant indeed.

There are similarities of course. In both cases local and regional governance and non-government power structures are the key drivers of conflict, and changes in Manila are only relevant to the extent that they allow Manila to disrupt (and hopefully improve) entrenched patterns of local governance. The levers that Manila could (but will not) use to do this are similar in both cases, and overlooked in both cases by parties focused on leader-leader negotiations. There are, however, very distinct differences that need to be considered.

I personally think the NPA issue should be fundamentally easier to address and should be a priority. It will certainly take time, but in most areas where the NPA have strength it is at root a conflict between populace and local governance, often with clear local grievances that can be addressed. Focusing on areas where the NPA is strongest and taking direct, visible action to resolve the issues that drive the footsoldiers, most of whom wouldn't know Karl from Groucho, can effectively disaggregate fighters from leaders and reduce the leaders to irrelevance: it has worked in some areas and it can work in others.

The Muslim issues are distinctly harder to manage, since particularly in Cotabato, Lanao, and Basilan they are fundamentally not a government/populace dispute but a fight between two populaces with irreconcilable expectations, neither of which trusts or is fully controlled by government. It's easier for government to alter the equation when government is one side of the equation.

I've only had time to read the summary and conclusions of the ICG piece. Initial impression is that it places too much emphasis on leader/leader negotiation and not enough on the need to directly target the nexus of dominant families and the military/police collaboration with those families that create the feudal environment that in turn supports the NPA. More comment after detailed reading.

[Rachamim]

The Communist Insurgencies (there are more than 1 in the Philippines) are for the most part devoid of ideology on the ground. There is very little political development within the NPA with the ideologues almost entirely relegated to the insurgency's political echelon, the CPP (Communist Party of the Philippines"). Part of the reason is that the movement follows tight control on the political side but lack of centrality on the military side, a necessity in a nation comprised of 7,107 islands.

Though the Peace Process is at its highest point in well over 7 years it still won't produce much in the way of tangibility. Aside from the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) shifting gears with its new COIN Programme (Oplan Bayanihan), a move actually adopted unofficially in the summer of 2010 with the hard veer towards CMO Deployment (PDTs,Transparency in Media Relations and a more cohesive tactical programme) there is not a whole lot happening (the shift is not radical when examined). The government is setting an 18 month window for these latest talks (it opened at New Year) and while the NPA/CPP/NDF (the last being the National Democratic Front aka National Democratic Front of the Philippines) is trying to depict itself as receptive its goals haven't changed, it is all or nothing.

I do think that IF the government were able to pose a sincere offer of limited regional autonomy in Mindanao within NPA AOR, to allow the CPP to employ its social-welfare programmes more fully, openly without interference it would produce much more progress than anything the government has done to date. If we look at Luzon and the now defunct CLA (Cordilleran Liberation Army), and Northcentral Mindano's RPM-M (Revolutionary People's Movement of Mindanao, translated from the Tagalog) another defunct Communist entity we can learn an important lesson. Both these CPP/NPA spin-offs had a message and fought to see it expressed. When both were brought to the table and offered a very real chance to put their vision into play what happened? Communism is not rooted in reality. When implemented, Human Nature ALWAYS wins out.

"Each according to his needs" does not work with humans. The vast bulk of humanity wants an increasingly larger piece of the pie. Without getting into a riff about Communism itself, I believe that it is an inassailible reality that it runs counter to extremely basic Human Nature. If implemented to any real degree it is rejected and tossed out on the rubbish heap. The exception is constant re-inforcement by brutal force. Ergo, allowing the implementation under controlled parameters (say state:substate, or the more likely regional autonomy actually given to the CLA) allows an irrefutable demonstration to both concerned entities and their mass base, both potential and realised.

Unfortunately, this is not possible with the CPP/NPA. When discussing the NPA Insurgency we are essentially discussing the NPA's "Insurgency in Mindanao." The 2 largest island is home to the largest number of NPA "Fronts" and has been home to the highest number of contacts since the mid-1980s. At the same time the island had seen an extreme shift towards resource-based development, particularly mining. Simply examining the "Tampakan Project" shows one what's at stake, and that is just the tip of the iceberg (in what will be the country's largest mine Tampakan will be an open pit standing over the borders of 4 provinces. Primarily concentrating on copper and gold it is ranked as the world's 2nd largest gold mine if and when developed though its window for commencement, 2016, seems to be right on schedule despite tremendous local opposition). The government will never take its fingers over some of the most lucrative mineral concessions in the world, to say nothing of the nation's largest source of timber, and its main source of rice and corn. Had the government had the fore sight to try and implement limited autonomy before 1995, the year the island was "opened up" things might be very different.

The power of the NPA on Mindanao lies with the island's Lumad (a Cebuano word meaning "Born of the land" and synonymous with "Hill Tribes," refers to the Animist Tribes inhabiting the up country, except Negritos). The Lumad, like their counter parts on Luzon (Igorot, Tingurians) and Palawan remain the least served ethnic groups in the nation. IF the government truly concentrated on SUSTAINABLE Development and dug in for the long haul they could turn this 42 year travesty around. Instead the government engages in Development Aggression. This only acts as a source of power for the NPA. The only time most Lumad meet a state representative is at the wrong end of a barrel wielded by uniformed people who don't even speak the same language.

As for the other areas of the country, there needs to be regional SPs (Security Plans), not a single programme because the nation has more than 110 ethno-lingustic groups spread almost from Taiwan to Indonesia and Malaysia. It has dozens of different religions and cultural perspectives. There is no "one size fits all" Bandaid. It needs to concentrate on properly training its security personnel, with an emphasis on restraint and should include sufficient Cultural Sensitivity Training before deploying or re-deploying personnel into new regions. The re-deployment of the 82 IB for example. In autumn 2010 they were re-deployed from Central Luzon to the 10ID in the Davao Region of Mindanao. Not only are they taking troops who are ignorant of the languages and customs of Mindanao but they brought them south primarily to man. PDTs! Peace and Development Teams are supposed to represent the best side of the military. Wouldn't it be nice then if they could hold the most basic of conversations with the locals they are dealing with?

Anyway, too many different things to discuss when trying to asses the direction and performance of the NPA facet of the AFP COIN Programme.

(Edited for spelling)

[Dayuhan]

Diin ka sa Caraga? Dugay ako didto, kaniadto...

That language has gone all rusty, been north way too long...

The Communist Insurgencies (there are more than 1 in the Philippines) are for the most part devoid of ideology on the ground. There is very little political development within the NPA with the ideologues almost entirely relegated to the insurgency's political echelon, the CPP (Communist Party of the Philippines").

Agree on the absence of ideology on the ground. I wouldn't say there's been much ideological development among the ideologues either, even on the CPP level the discourse often seems a repetitive collection of 70s-vintage mantras.

Though the Peace Process is at its highest point in well over 7 years it still won't produce much in the way of tangibility.

Agree on that one too...

Aside from the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) shifting gears with its new COIN Programme (Oplan Bayanihan), a move actually adopted unofficially in the summer of 2010... there is not a whole lot happening (the shift is not radical when examined).

Yes. Certainly on the ground where i am (Cordillera) there's no visible change.

the NPA/CPP/NDF (the last being the National Democratic Front aka National Democratic Front of the Philippines) is trying to depict itself as receptive its goals haven't changed, it is all or nothing.

Agree again.

I do think that IF the government were able to pose a sincere offer of limited regional autonomy in Mindanao within NPA AOR, to allow the CPP to employ its social-welfare programmes more fully, openly without interference it would produce much more progress

An autonomous region (or regions) in north/east Mindanao, then, apart from the (rather hypothetical) autonomy of ARMM? Interesting idea, but don't you think it would be dominated by the same crop of politically connected families that dominate now? Those guys aren't exactly concerned with social welfare, nor are they going to be receptive to anything that might shake their power.

If we look at Luzon and the now defunct CLA (Cordilleran Liberation Army), and Northcentral Mindano's RPM-M we can learn an important lesson. Both these CPP/NPA spin-offs had a message and fought to see it expressed. When both were brought to the table and offered a very real chance to put their vision into play what happened?

What happened with the CPLA was largely a devolution into competing factions breaking down largely among tribal lines. The glue holding the fight together here came from the Chico Dam and Cellophil projects, along with the subsequent resort to state terror and military abuse, but once the projects were terminated and the military presence scaled back there wasn't that much to hold the coalitions together. I'm not sure there's a single symbolic project in the south that would sum up the target of resistance in the south the way the Chico Dam did here (though Cellophil would have impacted more people).

Ergo, allowing the implementation under controlled parameters (say state:substate, or the more likely regional autonomy actually given to the CLA) allows an irrefutable demonstration to both concerned entities and their mass base, both potential and realised.

The political grant of theoretical autonomy to the Cordillera is pretty much invisible on the ground, except for another layer of bureaucracy. What keeps the Cordillera effectively autonomous is the very limited in-migration from lowlanders (opposite of Mindanao) and the generally successful effort to keep land and business ownership local (where I live they won't allow anyone not from here to own land or do business). That's kept political control in the hands of Igorots: all elected officials here are Igorot, a lowlander wouldn't have a chance.

Unfortunately, this is not possible with the CPP/NPA. When discussing the NPA Insurgency we are essentially discussing the NPA's "Insurgency in Mindanao." The 2 largest island is home to the largest number of NPA "Fronts" and has been home to the highest number of contacts since the mid-1980s.

True as well... there's NPA activity elsewhere, but in both quantity and quality Mindanao is where it's happening.

At the same time the island had seen an extreme shift towards resource-based development, particularly mining. Simply examining the "Tampakan Project" shows one what's at stake, and that is just the tip of the iceberg (in what will be the country's largest mine Tampakan will be an open pit standing over the borders of 4 provinces. Primarily concentrating on copper and gold it is ranked as the world's 2nd largest gold mine if and when developed though its window for commencement, 2016, seems to be right on schedule despite tremendous local opposition). The government will never take its fingers over some of the most lucrative mineral concessions in the world, to say nothing of the nation's largest source of timber, and its main source of rice and corn. Had the government had the fore sight to try and implement limited autonomy before 1995, the year the island was "opened up" things might be very different.

Would autonomy have prevented resource-based development? It's true that opposition to mining has been more effective in the north, but I'm not sure that's a function of political autonomy. Certainly the regional "autonomous" government hasn't been a major factor opposing mining, it's been more NGOs and people's organizations, with very effective linkages to international groups and media. Also, except for some parts of the Abra River valley, the lack of settlement from outside has prevented the development of a potential pro-mining constituency competing with the anti-mining tribal units, and tribal leaders here have proven very difficult to bribe or coerce. Again, that's due to strength of culture, a fairly high educational level among the tribal people, and local unity, not political autonomy granted from above.

While the big resource extraction projects get most of the attention, there's a lot of abuse of lumad populations coming from much smaller sources, or at least there used to be when I was down there. That was typically violent land-grabbing by powerful local families who have close relationships with military and police, along with control and exploitation of economic activity by locally connected armed groups. It used to seem to me that the military were more closely connected to local elites than to the national chain of command (that was some time ago, may have changed). I suspect that unless the local elites could be brought within the rule of law, they would end up dominating an autonomous region and using it for their own interests, which are very different from those of the lumad. The state is a problem for the lumad, but isn't it true that the politically dominant factions of the settler population are also a problem, amd a much closer one?

Could be pointed out that while not too many people (certainly not on the left) complain about the unchecked "large scale small scale" mining in the east, both the exploitation and environmental destruction are huge. Of course the left won't complain because they share the proceeds, but that kind of extractive industry doesn't seem very preferable to the big mines.

I've always felt that one of the keys to peace on Mindanao, both in the North/East and the Muslim areas, would be imposing the rule of law on the local elites, who have enjoyed and abused immunity for way too long.

As for the other areas of the country, there needs to be regional SPs (Security Plans), not a single programme

Agree there, though I'd repeat that targeting predatory local elites has to be a priority... yes, it's a bit of a fetish of mine.

It needs to concentrate on properly training its security personnel, with an emphasis on restraint and should include sufficient Cultural Sensitivity Training before deploying or re-deploying personnel into new regions.

Training would help but there also needs to be attention paid to the tendency of military units in the field to get into bed with the local powers, often to the personal profit of both. Can't keep the peace when you're taking sides and doing business.

The re-deployment of the 82 IB for example. In autumn 2010 they were re-deployed from Central Luzon to the 10ID in the Davao Region of Mindanao. Not only are they taking troops who are ignorant of the languages and customs of Mindanao but they brought them south primarily to man. PDTs! Peace and Development Teams are supposed to represent the best side of the military. Wouldn't it be nice then if they could hold the most basic of conversations with the locals they are dealing with?

Same problem up here, we get units coming in from Mindanao that haven't got a clue. The police are pretty careful to staff this area with people from this area. I guess military could try to do the same, but that might have complications too. Certainly it would make sense to staff PDTs with troops from the area though.

Anyway, too many different things to discuss when trying to asses the direction and performance of the NPA facet of the AFP COIN Programme.

Pretty broad, yes, but not entirely useless to discuss bits and pieces of the picture!

[Rachamim]

You are right on the stale ideology within the CPP as well, but that is a given considering the human AND ideological cost of the Great Rectification. While Joma was sitting in stir the movement was increasing exponentially and since he'd kept such a tight leash on things the party had stayed within very narrow parameters. With him away things got nice and loose. EDSA comes along, unleashes Joma and lo and behold there is a very real schism in all 3 Komisyons (Manila-Rizal in Luzon, Negros in Visayas and West Central in Mindanao). Ergo the rebound with the deep humam cost, using the "DPA" myth as his raison d'etre for the mass purge (actually purges). Not only is Joma on his game now in terms of ideological control, the veterans still remember their comrades being executed with tree limbs to the head. They also used the schism in other ways, still hunting the RJs. Anyway, it is to be expected with people who still persist with 19th Century Chinese terminology, "Semi-Feudal," haha, like people are binding feet and smoking opium.

On the IS not changing despite the name...PDTs in the context of AFP utilisation are simply a guise for the same old game. In fact, they are ratcheting it up a bit. The first thing a PDT does is survey a sitio, taking a complete demographical census. Intel is Intel even when you claim it is for a Needs Assesment and as unsophisticated as many of the targeted communities are they easily see through the charade. If you are still wrapping their heads in packing tape or Waterboarding them it really doesn't matter if you smile and address them as "Sir."

An Autonomous Region in NE Mindanao. First, it will never happen because Caraga is the #1 Timber Region. In addition it is extremely rich in mineral wealth with the largest variety of exploitable minerals. South Cotabato, Zamboanga and ComVal might have produced more gold historically (and when Tampakan takes off, and it will, S.Cotabato will be the nation's richest gold producer), but Caraga pumps out every mineral worth extracting. The government would never let that out of their hands. And yet Caragan Autonomy isn't a new idea; In the 1960s and early 70s there was the push for Northern Mindanowan independence centered in the Cagayan del Oro/Iligan City corridor. The 1980s saw that same region give birth the the CMLO, Christian Mindanao Librtation Organization [sic], then the Teduray-Bisaya group that was little more than Re-formed Ilaga but who claimed to desire a Federalised island with Moro, Lumad and Bisaya all having their own fully autonomous zones (that group being the one that lasted until the mid-90s and had run around Metro-Manila planting IEDs that had practically no payload). Col.Noble in 1989 (AFP COIN Specialist who was training Higaon-on into a COIN paramilitary but was himself seduced by the local environment and went "native" before stirming out of the jungle and leading a coup attempt against Manila, directing it from Caraga), and today BULIF but they seem to be losing steam.

All saw Caraga autonomous, though in different contexts.

Yes, your region, Cordillera is a great example of the wind being takren out of an insurgency when the political objectives are partially met. If a group has no real ethnic narrative, like the "Moros." A group that exists only in the mind of fantasists, a stab at autonomy works wonders. Look at Misuari in 1996 and then in 2000. In 96 he was iconic, could easily bring 20,000 Regulars to the field . Then he is handed ARMM and within 3.5 years he becomes a man who barely rates 3 lines 2 or 3 times a year. So, if I was ever king for a day? I would give the CPP a couple of provinces with a set time limit for full implementation of their Socio-Economic Platform, in exchange for majority disarmament as was the case with the MNLF and the Integration Package though with very different parameters. Time and space being what they are I will leave them unsaid.

I think it would be highly effective in marginalising the NPA in its most active theater.

"Cordillera Pacification"...But of course and that is my main point. Remove the impetus. You say "Kandi," in Baguio? If so I am suprised because, well you have a decent head on your shoulders. It would be rare, all things considered (no offence to the PMA but it is too wound up with Batch nonsense and into politicking and clique building). Though I do speak Bisaya I am not Pinoy hahaha, but in your defence it is a mistake often made. Its my work, though I love the island.

On the Cordillera and Igorot Control...Yes it is very different in that sense. It is the only 1 of the 3 major Hill Tribe Regions where the Indigenous are empowered. Palawan is a travesty (being #2). Here in Mindanao there is a modicum of individual empowerment but by and large they are the lowest rung on every ladder. BULIF (Bungkatol Liberation Front, a Higaon-on Tribal paramilitary now sublimated to 4ID under Oplan Alsa Lumad (ISP-IP, which of course hasn't changed despite the supposed ISP metamorphis from Tactical to CMO) was a step in that direction but they were neutered when they allowed their own sublimation to the AFP. BULIF being the group that used to kidnap DENR and CENRO personnel over timber issues but now kidnaps grammar sschool tudents (re the latest Agusan del Sur hostage crisis last week, etc).

Mining...I guess, to that end I need only say "Tampakan" and "TVIRDP." The former being the afore mentioned gold (and silver) project that is currently on the table that envisions an open pit spanning parts of 4 provinces. It will be the largest for the Philippines and the 2nd largest in the world. LGU opposition is stiff but in the end Manila will get its way (what a travesty). The latter is the Makati-registered branch of a Canadian Mining corporation (TVI, well actually TVIRDP is a subsidiary of the Hong Kong-based subsidiary of TVI but you get the point). This company has the largest amount of land under permit of any other single mining corporation. The "Divide and Rule" game is alive and well and I have not seen a single multi-national that hasn't ripped a tribe or 2 apart. One the largest engines here is Development Aggression. The conundrum of Peace and Order, Investment, Exploitation and Prosperity is a vertiable Gordian Knot. They want to pacify the island so that it can be developed and exploited ("exploited" in the neutral sense and not the negative, as in exploitation of resources ,not people). However, their drive to develop is 1 of the most effective engines driving th various insurgencies so...

That segues directly into your point about the AFP getting in bed with the local power base. I don't know how familiar you are with the CAAs, CAFGU, CVO, etc (the unique form in Sulu escapes my memoury at the moment). There is a particular element, the SCAA (Special Citizens Active Auxiliary) that is dedicated to business interests. They aren't utilised much outside of the South. They are directly funded by a specific business. For example, a timber company pays the AFP a significant amount of money, the AFP then forms a local detachment, trains and arms them with the cost, including soldiers' pay, stipends, bonuses and benefits coming from the businessmen. These local men dictate even up to the tactical level. How can the military NOT lie in bed with the local power base then? Even more so now that there is a moratorium on CVO formation (the CAA sublimated to the PNP), thanks to the Ampatuan CVO(s) handiwork in 2009. Municipalities are now forming SCAAs in the place of those CVOs. SCAA's, which were never designed for this utilisation, thus bring the LGU and local AFP detachment into a partnership and this is extremely problematic given the volatile nature of Mindanowan politics.

[Rachamim]

Dayuhan: When we speak of Bisaya (Visayans) nowadays we tend to be talking about Cebuanos but from Oroquita City all the wat aropund the island, moving east, until the border of Davao Oriental and Davao del Sur was populated by Bisaya. Indigenous languages like Suriganon and Butanon are Bisaya languages. Though Bisaya are traditionally coastal dwelling the also settled along rivers such as the Agusan, into Agusan del Sur as far as Esperanza. In terms of the historical record the Jesuits and Recolects both had missions at key points and more than a couple of priest slash missionaries recorded local languages and cultural mores to a high degree. If we include Bohalanos as Bisaya, we have Dapitan on the Zamboangan Peninsula who migrated to Dapitan in thevery early 16th Century, before the arrival of Islam. The Tausug in Sulu are Islamicised Butuanons who migrated south at least 2 centuries before the Spanish Era and so there really is no question of Bisaya being indigenous to Mindanao.

The Maguindanowan and Maranaw (Maranaon) are both subsets of the Iranun (Illanun). The Iranun are from Sulawesi. The Kalagan (another Muslim tribe) converted in the early 20th Century. The Kalimbugan are merely Subanon (Subanen) who also converted in the early 20th Century. On Mainland Mindanao not a single Muslim claim predates the Bisaya. This isn't negating Muslims' right to exist in Central and Western Mindanao, only showing that the entire Bangsamoro narrative is bogus.

"History is sketchy...": The British, Dutch, French, Spanish, China, Brunei, and various petty principalities like the Sultanate of Johor all offer historical records. There is a fair amount of knowledge about this side of the island. In 1902 when the first Colorum insurrection tookplace the Americans as well talk about the Bisaya in the north and east. Even Magellan, when he celebrated Easter did so with 2 local chiefs , blood relations of Cebuano chiefs so no, the Bisaya aren't newcomers. The Ilonggo in Central Mindanao are an entirely different dynamic. Magsaysay transplant entire Illokano and Tagalog communities into the central part of the island. I remember operating in the Surallah Valley and finding entire barangays speaking Tagalog as it was spoken in Bulacan 50 years ago, as if in a time capsule.


"Karaga...": It is corroborated by Maguindanaw Tarsila, but OK, for the sake of discussion, what about the Tausug, Butanon, Suriganon, all Bisaya Tribes from Caraga. It is a fact.

"In 1500 there was neither Muslims NOR Christians...": But THAT is exactly my point. Both are foreign imports. The Bangsamoro narrative holds that when the Spanish arrived Islam was firmly established and that Christianity is entirely foreign, a relic of colonialism. This despite Islam having been introduced by a a man from Johor. The Maguindanowan and Maranaw didn't even exist! When de Figueroa sailed up the Pulangi Buayan hadn't even converted. This narrative is then used to disenfranchise people who are more often than not just as indigenous to the island as any Muslim.

"Govt. sponsored settlement scemes upset the demographic balance and created the strife.": As I noted in another recent thread, Datu Ali was slaughtering Christians (and Lumads) at the turn of the 20th Century. In the 17th, 19th and early 19th Centuries Muslims from Central and Western Mindanao were attacking, killing and enslaving Christians in wholesale fashion. Did the Government's exercise of its sovereign rights to utilise Public Lands as it saw fit exacerbate this bloodshed? No. You pick an era and I can gie you lists of massacres and campaigns by Muslims against non-Muslims on the island. The Government didn't evict Muslim families or plow under their rice paddies. It used vacant, non-productive land to create new communities. The newcomers were of a different faith and culture and more importantly, they wouldn't even condider paying obesiance to local datus as some semi-enslaved Lumad Tribes had been compelled to. The Lambangians, Tedura, B'laan, and T'boli Tribes all lived as sub-humans and in exchange for giving the majority of their crops were allowed to remain on ancestral lands. The problem isn't Christians.


"Agusan 79 to 81.": Admittedly before my time but yes, many say the same thing. 78 was the year the NPA finally took hold on the island but due south in Davao del Norte, in what is now ComVal (Compestela). Leonicio "Ka Parago" Pitao and Edwin "Ka Julie" Brigano were among the first recruits in that sector as a matter of fact but the centre of gravity was Agado District in Davao City. In Agusan 1983 was the lynchpin year.

"Col.Lademora acquiring land.": You were in Agusan when he first moved there. You are correct that he was deployed in Cotabato, he was the 3rd PC liason with the Ilaga after making Captain. It was he who steered them away from Muslims and towards the NPA. He came to Agusan after Marcos retired him because of the Samar incident. The opposition in Manila was screaming about War Crimes. After that early retirement Conjuangco, one of the Rolex clique, hired him to "convince" land owners to sell to Guthrie, the huge palm oil plantation one sees on both sides of Agusan-Davao National Hiway soon after passing the San Franz rotunda.

Conjuangco gifted Col.Lademora with 20ha just south of the plantation, on the right hand side. That's where he built his house and headquarters of his para. That is the same para that laid the barrel of an M16 on the hood of an SUV bring the Secretary of Agriculture to the plantation in 2008 and told him to turn around. It caused a national incident but after the AFP admonished the Secretary there wasn't much he could do. The Colonel's son and daughter alternate with an uncle of my wife's as mayor of San Franz so the Colonel certainly found a home.

"San Franz looks like a Wild West town.": Hahaha, absolutely correct. Still does despite the Jollibee the put on Roxas in 2008. It has come a long way though. The NPA ran parallel governments in the farthest outlying barangays but by 1993 they were gone and today, despite operating in Lianga, Trento, and Prosperidad (the towns surrounding it) they won't raise their voice in San Franz. Maoist dogma teaches the path of least resistance. Between the Lademora and Beldad paraas in addition to the Bungkatoal (BULIF) there is just too much fire power running contrary. However, move 4 klicks south of the rotunda, a klick south of the Colonel's tract and the NPA is running the show. The set up checkpoints in daylight on National Hiway though only for 1 to 2 hours at a time, hoping to capture another soldier or cop.

"Is Lademora alivel: Yes but sadly, not for long. He has had a very long life though, as you know. His son, though not as charismatic, runs things day to day.

"Luces as Teduray.": No, you got it right the first time, definitely from Panay. At the time many poor Bisaya Christians were duped in scam land deals like the one that victimised his family. Most of his men were Teduray though so that could be why some confuse him as a Teduray. Another one who is still living. Like Kumander Dante, a relic who just wants to farm.

[Dayuhan]

I'm going to discuss some of that on another thread (one of these days), and try to keep this one focused on the NPA and the east of Mindanao.

78 sounds about right... when I was in Trento (79-81) everyone knew they were around in Davao Norte (now ComVal), but there was very little fighting, mostly they were lying low and organizing. When it did kick off, it gained momentum very fast.

Having been there at the time, I'd point to 3 reasons. NGPI, had an impact well beyond the immediate area. Rumors went all over that new areas were being targeted for plantation development and more farmers were going to be chased off the land. The people who were evicted scattered and brought their stories with them. The NPA could not have asked for a better entry point.

Lademora... engaging conversationalist, comes off as benign as your favorite uncle. The stories aren't fiction, though, whether from Cotabato, Samar, or Agusan. Call him war criminal, serial human rights violator, whatever you want; there's a history there and it's an ugly one. The evictions and the way they were carried out were a major boost to the NPA and a major factor in the rapidity of their rise in the east.

When I talked to Lademora he never admitted a thing. I also talked quite a bit with some of his guys, who were a lot less circumspect, especially after a few drinks. They weren’t the least bit ashamed; quite the opposite… the idea that a communist (very loosely defined), or still more a Muslim, had “rights” would have struck them as completely absurd.

The second major factor was the farcical 1981 election, which had an enormous impact in Davao. Marcos called that election after the (very nominal) lifting of martial law, to put a little democratic veneer on the whole mess. The opposition boycotted it, and they couldn't find a candidate to run against Marcos. Finally they drafted a retired general named Alejo S. Santos.

The campaign in Davao was a joke. In those days the newspapers all called Marcos "FM", by his initials; Imelda was "FL", for First Lady. The papers in Davao all referred to Santos by his initials as well, which happened to be ASS. Every night kids would go out and paint BOYCOTT in big red letters on every available surface, every day obedient government employees would paint it out in white. We all called the ritual "sa pula/sa puti, like at a cockfight. Everyone joked that ang manalo sa Davao ay si Boy... sino pa kundi si Boy Cott.

Then Time and Newsweek ran features playing up the humor. FM (or maybe it was FL) got inis and told his crony on the spot to get it under control. He had access to his own equivalent of the lost command: the prisoners at Davao Penal Colony worked on his plantations in Tagum, and performed odd jobs on the side.

Suddenly kids were getting picked up on the street at night and their bodies were turning up in the morning on Times Beach. Sometimes shot, sometimes stabbed, sometimes just hogtied and thrown in the water to drown. Escalated very quickly, pretty soon it was open season on anyone even vaguely connected to the political opposition. Of course the main beneficiaries of all that were the NPA; within a few months Agdao was Nicaragdao and the Sparrows ruled the streets. Of course they abused their power every bit as thoroughly, setting up the rise of Jun Pala (another quintessential Mindanao lunatic that I managed a few conversations with) and the Alsa Masa.

Another thing that helped kick it off was that by ’82 Marcos was really and truly losing his grip. That sounds far away from Mindanao, but there were real repercussions. Marcos may have been a scumbag, but he knew how to keep his boys in the field balanced and under control… like any good feudal lord, he played his barons against each other and used the pork barrel to good effect. When he fell apart the barons went out on their own, complete free-for-all, with the military and police running with whoever promised them the biggest payback. After the Aquino assassination in ’83 the loan guarantee circus shut down and the pork barrel dried up; with nobody in charge the level of abuse and exploitation shot through the roof. You had all the psycho sects, Tadtads and Rock Christ and 4k and Pulahan. Putian, killing anyone who couldn’t fight back and trying to carve out reputations as the nastiest guy in town.

Yes, it started in the late 70s but took off in the early 80s, with NGPI, the Davao debacle, the collapse of central authority. Of course the NPA was growing at a similar rate in a lot of other places at the same time. A lot of the factors that torpedoed NPA growth elsewhere were also present in Mindanao, most notably the internal purges… so why were the eastern Mindanao NPA able to resurge after the 90’s retrenchment?

Partly money, of course. Small scale miners, plantations, logging, all easily “taxable”, and the area has a long tradition of submission to extortion. Money makes it a lot easier to sustain a rebellion.

Then of course there are the Lumad, a ready-made source of footsoldiers, with the grievance but not the organization to try and redress the grievance on their own. As you’ve pointed out before, without the Lumad the NPA in Mindanao would be crippled; they’d have leaders but no followers, officers but no soldiers, drastically reduced support base in the hills. In theory, by resolving the issues driving the Lumad to affiliate with the NPA you could deprive the NPA of manpower and mass base and weaken them. That worked in the Cordillera: when the dam, logging, and mining projects were dropped the indigenous population backed away from their (always rather tentative) alliance with the NPA and stopped fighting. They’d won, why keep fighting?

I don’t see that working for the Lumad, because the Lumad aren’t going to win. As far as I can see the Lumad are stuffed. They waited way too long to fight and when they did they didn’t control their own fight, but supported a group that has no real concern for their interests. The NPA are ultimately just another bunch of intrusive outsiders using the Lumad, if they ever won (unlikely) the Lumad would be just as screwed as they are now.

Where do the Lumad have real control over their own ancestral domain, in anything but miniscule fragments? Where do they have control over resources? Are there any Lumad congressmen or governors? How many mayors? How many barangay captains, especially if you don’t include those who are tools of some settler politician?

The Lumad are toast, gone, swept aside by the settler tide. They’ve lost control of their land and they are too scattered and fragmented to regain it. They’ll end up like the Aeta or the Mangyan; powerless, scattered, marginalized.

Of course, as you say, the State has the sovereign prerogative of allowing settlement wherever it wants. The state has a bunch of other sovereign prerogatives as well. They can dam the river and flood you out, they can strip every tree from every hill, they can throw you out and turn the land over to a mining company, they can seize your land for a plantation and shoot you if you don’t want to leave. The only way indigenous communities can survive the sovereign prerogatives of the state is armed resistance, and the only way to succeed is to resist from the start.

The Igorot core communities have kept control of their land and resources through a policy of zero tolerance: don’t accept ANY settlers, don’t let Manila get a foothold. The local attitude toward settlers taking over land is that that if you allow one in, tomorrow there will be ten, in a week a hundred, in a month a thousand and in a decade they’ll be the majority and you’ll be on your way to perdition. They’re right, and the only reason they still have what they have is that they’ve fought for it, from the start. If they’d taken the “just get along” route they’d be in the same boat as the Lumad. In places around the periphery where they have taken that route, that’s what happened.

If you want an example, look what’s happening right now in the islands north of Palawan, in the ancestral domain of the Tagbanua. Visayan settlers are moving in… starts with a temporary hut on the beach for passing fisherman, then the hut is permanent, then there’s a family there, then there are more families. Pretty soon the dynamite fishing starts, and the cyanide, and the deforestation and all the other things that the settlers did to destroy the places they came from. The Tagbanua are not aggressive people; they just try to co-exist. As a consequence, they are chased back from the seashore, crowded off their fishing grounds, left with the scraps. If they go to town they are treated like subhumans. Government does nothing for them; even when the areas being settled are legally restricted to Tagbanua. That’s what co-existing gets you.

So in theory, you could disable the NPA in eastern Mindanao by addressing and redressing the grievances of the Lumad. In practice, this will be very difficult to do, because, as you say, the settlers aren’t going away, and there’s little or no chance of the Lumad ever regaining control of their land or resources. If they won, they could stop fighting, as the Igorot did… but they’ve already lost.

[Dayuhan]

http://af.reuters.com/article/worldN...7820JA20110903

Maoists want Manila to free more rebels before talks resume

MANILA (Reuters) - Maoist rebels Saturday demanded the release of at least five more detained guerrilla leaders before peace negotiations could resume with the Philippines government, the chief negotiator of the communist-led National Democratic Front said.

Luis Jalandoni, a former Roman Catholic priest, said his group had also offered a truce and power-sharing deal with the government of President Benigno Aquino, opening a second track of negotiations to speed up the slow and tedious peace process.

"It's a bold and innovative proposal," Jalandoni said, adding his group sent a confidential letter to Aquino on January 18, proposing an alliance and truce with government.

He said the proposed political deal envisions social and economic reforms and nationalising industries, including mining and oil-and-gas projects.

Always amusing when people with no power offer a "power-sharing deal". I don't know what Jalandoni is smoking in that peace pipe, but I suspect it's fragrant...

[davidbfpo]

A short commentary that seeks to:

Given the recent rise in violence, it seems pertinent to make a realistic assessment of the ongoing Communist violence – considered the longest-running Communist insurgency in Asia – its impact on the larger socioeconomic and political fabric of the country, the direction of the movement since its inception, and future prospects.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensec...ist-insurgency

[Dayuhan]

Some valid points here, but a few question marks as well.

It's suggested here that the NPA have at some point received significant aid from China, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union. I've seen and heard no evidence of that. There were a couple of abortive attempts to ship arms from China in the '70s, beyond that very little. Most external financial support has come from left groups in Europe. Cutting that support off was the main point of designating the NPA a terrorist organization (a rather awkward designation, as it really isn't one), which appears to have been pretty successful.

A bigger question mark, for me, revolves around this claim:

It needs to be understood that left-wing extremism in Philippines is not a national security issue in its current shape; rather it is a localized problem, which can be solved by local governments in coordination with Manila.

and subsequent suggestions that a "solution" would revolve around delivery of infrastructure, services, and "development" in general. This seems to me an adoption of a flawed premise that recurs often in US approaches to insurgency.

People don't go to war because the government fails to deliver infrastructure and services. They complain, but they don't fight. They fight because they see the government as a threat. The issue to me is less delivery of development than delivery of justice, and local governments aren't part of the solution, they are the core of the problem.

The NPA typically flourishes in places where local governance is dominated by powerful families controlling political dynasties. These families typically dominate all political, judicial, and economic life and operate above the law. They are abusive, exploitive, and oppressive, frequently operating their own private armies (a glorified name for gangs of armed thugs) and frequently co-opting state security forces through shared profits from illegal business.

Infrastructure and service delivery is not a bad thing, but for me the key element in reducing the influence of the NPA is a concerted effort to bring local governing elites within the rule of law. Local elites will resist, as they rely on impunity to sustain their power, but as long as these elites remain above the law the NPA will be able to cast itself as the only alternative to their dominance.

The Philippine Government is actually lucky that the leadership of the CPP/NPA and its assorted splinter factions is generally incompetent, obsessed with infighting and absorbed in their anachronistic mantras and incomprehensible rhetoric. A capable opponent could make matters much more difficult for the government. The NPA has declined as much due to its own ineptitude as to anything the government has done to fight it.

I see no need to address the NPA's claims about the US-Philippine relationship. These issues only matter to the core ideologues, who are not going to convert under any circumstances. The most effective way to reduce NPA influence is to resolve the issues that lead the fighters to fight, and those issues are overwhelmingly local. The average NPA fighter knows little and cares less about the relationship between the national elites and the US, they care about the local boss and his henchmen taking their land, exploiting their labor, and generally kicking them around.

[SWJ Blog]

The Leadership Crisis in the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army

Copied for reference

[Dayuhan]

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/588186/...aders-captured

Benito Tiamzon, the head of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), and six other members of the CPP central committee were arrested on Saturday in Carcar City, south of Cebu City.

That's pretty much the entire core leadership taken in one operation.

It will be interesting to see what impact this has on the ongoing conflict. I would expect an acceleration of the existing trend toward decentralization, with NPA units in different regions operating autonomously. There may also be some conflict over filling those spaces: there will still be national leadership, though it may be increasingly nominal.

Overall, though, I have to hold to my view that a long term solution to Communist insurgency has to match a focus on degrading the insurgents with a focus on bringing the rural oligarchs who nurture insurgency within the rule of law.