Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
I would just offer not to get too wrapped up about the flavor of the ideology employed. Islam-based ideologies work in the south, Communism-based ideologies are more effective in the north. The common factor are populaces dissatisfied with the status quo of governance.

The Philippines has been in a near constant state of insurgency since the first European sat foot there. How it manifests over time and by region varies.
True in the broadest sense, but as is so often the case, the broadest possible sense is too superficial to be of any real use. It's easy to point to "the status quo of governance" and there is certainly much there to fault, but when you get down to assessing the specific actions or policies needed to address the different insurgencies the differences become very significant indeed.

There are similarities of course. In both cases local and regional governance and non-government power structures are the key drivers of conflict, and changes in Manila are only relevant to the extent that they allow Manila to disrupt (and hopefully improve) entrenched patterns of local governance. The levers that Manila could (but will not) use to do this are similar in both cases, and overlooked in both cases by parties focused on leader-leader negotiations. There are, however, very distinct differences that need to be considered.

I personally think the NPA issue should be fundamentally easier to address and should be a priority. It will certainly take time, but in most areas where the NPA have strength it is at root a conflict between populace and local governance, often with clear local grievances that can be addressed. Focusing on areas where the NPA is strongest and taking direct, visible action to resolve the issues that drive the footsoldiers, most of whom wouldn't know Karl from Groucho, can effectively disaggregate fighters from leaders and reduce the leaders to irrelevance: it has worked in some areas and it can work in others.

The Muslim issues are distinctly harder to manage, since particularly in Cotabato, Lanao, and Basilan they are fundamentally not a government/populace dispute but a fight between two populaces with irreconcilable expectations, neither of which trusts or is fully controlled by government. It's easier for government to alter the equation when government is one side of the equation.

I've only had time to read the summary and conclusions of the ICG piece. Initial impression is that it places too much emphasis on leader/leader negotiation and not enough on the need to directly target the nexus of dominant families and the military/police collaboration with those families that create the feudal environment that in turn supports the NPA. More comment after detailed reading.