Research RFI

[SWJED]

Got the following e-mail request from LTC Ike Wilson and would appreciate any assisstance our Council members can provide.

I am wondering if any of you could help me and a research colleague of mine in our effort to answer a couple of reviewer questions we are trying to address for an article we are trying to publish currently under review.

To summarize, our research concentrates on the question of what I call the "paradox within the American ('modern' Western) Way of War and Peace," that is, the propensity to 'fall short of victory" in our wars of insurgency/counterinsurgency ("small wars"; type-3 wars) in spite of an unparalleled prowess at winning all the military battles on behalf of winning our wars/peace. I have partnered with a statistician at Princeton University and for the past two-years we have been conducting a mixed-method collaborative research program, studying this phenomenon (to include testing for its true presence versus 'mythology') through qualitative case study analysis mixed with large-N longitudinal analysis. We have designed a new database that records and analyzes the determinants of 'victory' in 278 "small wars" between the period 1800 to 2005.

Our preliminary observations show that this "paradox" is more real than modern-mythology (it persists) and more intriguingly, that the trend defies some of the traditional explanations, such as that non-democratic regimes do not suffer this phenomenon as do democratic ones.

Our database is unique in the fields of conflict studies and strategic studies in that we have incorporated modern (western) military doctrinal concepts and indices into the models -- oddly, something that is not done or present in most if not all of the "seminal" correlates of war-type data bases out there. Perhaps most importantly, we have partitioned the so-called "modern period" into five epochs, incorporating military history and conflict studies measures of periods of evolution/revolution in military-tech-political affairs. It is in regard to this last issue that my questions to you lie.

One of our reviewers is questioning the relevance of the WWI period (and specifically, our dating of c.1917) as a demarcation between the foraging/magazine-based system of warfare and the rise/dawn of the "machine" era of warfare (advanced industrial mechanized). There are basically two questions here, and any suggestions for books, articles, whatever, that address this distinction would be great. First, the reviewer wants to know why we choose 1917 (or WWI more generally) as the cutoff point between foraging and machine war. We have cast a response that notes that a majority of military scholars and practitioners recognizes that WWI was a watershed, and that the battle of Cambrai is generally considered the birth of the modern system (first time large number of tanks, aircraft, and artillery are working together as combined arms; and later, the Allied counteroffensive at Amiens, in August, 1918, recognized as the true genesis of combined arms--500 tanks, 13 infantry divisions, 2 cavalry divisions, 2000 artillery pieces, 800 aircraft). Second, the reviewer does not ``get'' why the foraging era needs to be divided into foraging and early industrialization (with foraging still key). The "paradox" trend line for wins dips down around 1880 or so, and we attributed this decline to the introduction of railways, magazine-based logistics, rather than ``pure'' foraging like earlier in the 19th Cent.

So, any suggestions for work that tackles the logistics of these eras, or the importance of the railway (in addition to works by Showalter and van Creveld), would be great.

Again, any thoughts you have on this, and specifically any works you might have that emphasize the "relevance" of differentiating between the period of forage-based warfare from magazine-based to mech-based (distributed logistics) would help us immensely.

Ideally, if you could send me an email (SWJ: post responses here) with some thoughts and a short list of relevant works to reference/cite within the next couple of days, that would be great.

Thanks.

Ike.

[CR6]

One of our reviewers is questioning the relevance of the WWI period (and specifically, our dating of c.1917) as a demarcation between the foraging/magazine-based system of warfare and the rise/dawn of the "machine" era of warfare (advanced industrial mechanized). There are basically two questions here, and any suggestions for books, articles, whatever, that address this distinction would be great. First, the reviewer wants to know why we choose 1917 (or WWI more generally) as the cutoff point between foraging and machine war.

Imagining Future War by Antulio J. Echevarria

[Ron Humphrey]

Two from Combat Studies Institute which might be helpful:

The Brigade: A History
It's Organization and Employment in the US Army (John J. Mcgrath)

and

Armed Diplomacy
Two Centuries of American Campaigning
TRADOC compilation from 2003 Symposium

Hope it's helpful

[slapout9]

"The Third Wave" by Alvin Toffler

"War and Anti-War" also by Toffler

These two books talk a great deal about some of the things you have mentioned. Also Toffler used to have a website, should be easy to find. I would contact him directly if possible, he would probably have alot of research as it relates to passing from an Agrarian Society,to an Industrial Society,to an Information Society.

[John T. Fishel]

Ike--

I don't mean to be facetious but from your post it appears to me that trucks as a means of land supply make a lot of the difference. Essentially, WWI marks the time that the internal combustion engine is first used in war ito any great extent. Trucks, tanks, and taxis (Gen. Galieni and the miracle of the Marne) along with aircraft make the point.

As to sources, perhaps, simply looking in some of the standard historical works would serve your purpose - I mean non-military history or perhaps histories of technology.

I'd be very interested in seeing the entire article as the subject is very intriguing but your short description leaves me wondering exactly the nature of your thesis. PM me - with a bit more I could maybe be of more help.

Cheers

JohnT

[marct]

I'd second John on that - try Headrick's "The Tools of Empire" as a start. If trucks were the shift for WW I, then breachloaders were for the earlier period, hence the magazine aspect tied together with railroads.

[William F. Owen]

So, any suggestions for work that tackles the logistics of these eras, or the importance of the railway (in addition to works by Showalter and van Creveld), would be great.
.

You need to find a copy of Victor Wallace Germains, The Mechanization of War. Germains was the genius Liddell-Hart wanted to be. He is mostly unread to this day.

I would also suggest sifting through Delbruck in terms of how a society methods of sustaining themselves seem to drive their methods of combat. - something we forget at our peril.

To summarize, our research concentrates on the question of what I call the "paradox within the American ('modern' Western) Way of War and Peace," that is, the propensity to 'fall short of victory" in our wars of insurgency/counterinsurgency ("small wars"; type-3 wars) in spite of an unparalleled prowess at winning all the military battles on behalf of winning our wars/peace.

If I might venture an opinion, the "paradox" is based on a recurring conceptual and doctrinal mis-understanding of the application of military force. Personally I have never seen this as a paradox. I see it as the product of failed training and doctrine.

[wm]

In addition to looking at the Western Front, I suggest reviewing the campaign in Palestine in 1917-18. Pretty straightforward requirements for the EEF (Egyptian Expeditionary Force) to rely on rails and other mechanized transport to win at Beersheba and beyond. Another significant aspect was the efforts to cut the Turkish Hejaz rail line by Lawrence and Faisal as well as the abortive British attempts to take Amman and interict that same line, the latter largely failing I believe due to an inability to push adequate supplies forward using camels and mules.

Sources:
Woodward, David R. Hell in the Holy Land: World War I in the Middle East.
Reid, Frank. The Fighting Cameliers: The Exploits of the Imperial Camel Corps in the Desert And Palestine Campaign of the Great War.

[marct]

Hi Ike,

Sorry about the rushed response yesterday.

One of our reviewers is questioning the relevance of the WWI period (and specifically, our dating of c.1917) as a demarcation between the foraging/magazine-based system of warfare and the rise/dawn of the "machine" era of warfare (advanced industrial mechanized). There are basically two questions here, and any suggestions for books, articles, whatever, that address this distinction would be great. First, the reviewer wants to know why we choose 1917 (or WWI more generally) as the cutoff point between foraging and machine war.

It would help if we could see your period layout. I have one that I have used before, not for warfare per se but, rather, for socio-cultural changes. I used WW I (roughly) as a break point for several reasons, which may help. First, there was a very rapid development of mechanization and centralization of production, finance and distribution. In the US, you can see it with the deployment of Taylor's Scientific Management, Ford's Assembly line and the creation of the central banking system in 1913.

Second, there was a massive spread of communications and transportation infrastructure in both Canada and the US, and a deepening of centralizing tendencies in Europe. One of the key outcomes was to change the perceptions of people about the world; basically breaking the insularity of many national populations. At the same time, and certainly by 1917, the entire perceptual ediface that allowed European colonialism to operate - a sense that "we" are civilized and the height of social evolution - was drowned in the trenches along with beliefs in government "patriotic" propaganda (see the poetry of Seigfried Sasoon for some good illustrations of this, especially Counter-attack and Other Poems).

Third, look at the demographics in Europe and Canada (the US didn't suffer enough casualties for it to matter at the population level). The casualties in the war completely changed the entire gender balance as well as changing the class structures.

Fourth, look at how the war ended; not in a military "victory" but with a series of worker and soldier revolts.

Let's get back to your distinction for a minute. "Machine war" is dependent not only on the development of the machines themselves but, also, on the industrial infrastructure that can produce, maintain and supply them. The core shift that seems to happen in WW I is a shift away from fixed logistics lines (e.g. controlled by magazines and railroads and telegraphs) to flexible logistics lines (e.g. controlled by trucks and roads and telephone/radio/air drop).

Second, the reviewer does not ``get'' why the foraging era needs to be divided into foraging and early industrialization (with foraging still key). The "paradox" trend line for wins dips down around 1880 or so, and we attributed this decline to the introduction of railways, magazine-based logistics, rather than ``pure'' foraging like earlier in the 19th Cent.

Personally, I wouldn't say that there has been a "pure foraging" system operational since the 30 years war or, possibly, earlier. I would suggest that a better description would be the frequency distribution between foraging and issued supply (i.e. specially produced items that are not readily available for forage).

Again, I'm not quite sure of your era distinctions, but I would split it along the following lines (each with a number of sub-divisions):

Early Industrial Age: 1763 - 1848
Middle Industrial Age: 1849 - 1914
Late Industrial Age: 1914 - 1982

On why it might be dipping down in the 1880's, I would tend to agree, but you should also consider that breachloaders were being generally issued and you have the first mass deployments of early machine guns. This has several implications. First, it's really hard to forage for specialty equipment. Second, industrial production has reduced the cost of this equipment significantly which, in turn, changes the relative combat value of an individual soldier significantly. Third, the wars in Europe were mostly noyeaux combat, i.e. highly stylized and designed to avoid mass disruption by localizing conflict as much as possible (the US civil war was an anomaly that, for most Europeans, just didn't matter much).

I hope this helps a bit and I'll be glad to send you the reasoning and breakdowns I've used if you want them.

Marc

[sandbag]

Some Cautionary Thoughts About Information Warfare by DiNardo and Hughes is a classic.

[SWJED]

... to all. Ike, you out there?