When my colleagues and I interviewed EPWs at Camp Bucca in April 2003, we couldn't get anyone to tell us whether they were Shia or Sunni. Of course, the reason was that Shia had learned to downplay sectarianism as a survival mechanism. Plus, Iraqis knew who was what so there was no need to even say it.
No doubt American actions exacerbated sectarian tensions. The notion that we somehow created it is ridiculous.
True and the Iraqi Army was structured accordingly in 1990 and 1991. Regime survival units were Sunni. Army cannon fodder units were mainly Shia.When my colleagues and I interviewed EPWs at Camp Bucca in April 2003, we couldn't get anyone to tell us whether they were Shia or Sunni. Of course, the reason was that Shia had learned to downplay sectarianism as a survival mechanism. Plus, Iraqis knew who was what so there was no need to even say it.
My own instructors at DLI were Iraqi and they were still sensitive on this issue. Notably my main instructor was female Christian married to a Sunni who had high Baath connections. The other Iraqis who were Shia avoided him; all of the other Christians shunned her. They still do after 28 years.
Inside the Muslim community, the Sunni-Shia bubbled up from time to time.
You have to remember, however, that the Iran-Iraq War was raging at the time so the Arab versus Persian nationalism also served to dampen discord. No one wanted to make waves in any way that could possbly affect their longevity in the States because no one wanted to go home.
Best
Tom
Another consideration is that if you take Robert Kaplan's argument in The Coming Anarchy that when democracy is introduced to a society with significant ethnic/racial/religious tensions there is the possibility that entrepreneurial politicians, seeking votes and other support, have an incentive to foment differences and to exaggerate problems between groups as a way of gaining office.
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