Hi Steve,
I found his (LTG Duik's) presentation and philosophical framing of it as an enterprise pretty interesting, and I think spot on - I'd known some PRT folks, but I'd yet to see thinking on building the required institutional bureaucracy, until now. MNSTC-I is working to get the right type of senior level / ministry type advisors in place to help the Iraqis work through this. As many have mentioned before, under Saddam's regime they had a bureaucracy that was not designed to tell the emperor he had no clothes. When the regime was torn/fell apart even those linkages were dissolved.

JCISFA is trying to help them out by providing an advisory course POI (the actual teaching of that would probably go to somebody else with capacity) targeting the skill sets for that level of advising. This is not easy. For a job of such importance you have to start with someone with a level of technical education appropriate to evaluate the existing system, the environment in which the system is supposed to work, how the system will facilitate and sustain the desired endstate - or a combination of all three simultaneously. We're talking high art here I think. This is not something that can be minted and sent out the door.

One of the best analogies I've heard is that of a gardener. Before you can advise somebody on how to garden in a manner that theperson being advised stands a good chance of being successful, the advisor needs to understand gardening pretty well himself. Nobody wants advice on a topic from someone who really has no practical experience in the area he's advising on. At the tactical level, this is challenging enough, but for the most part we get it about right, we and the Iraqis have enough capacity in that area that when a TT goes down range they can at least advise on the technical aspects. These ministry level advisors though are of a different nature - a strategic one.

Not only do they require someone saavy on politics, and the culture of the politics at work, but a senior level mis-step can have far reaching and enduring ill effects. Also, the longer it takes the Iraqis to build their institutional bureaucracy, the less stable, less effective and more vulnerable the overall governmental structure will be to internal and external pressures. Unfortunately the uniformed side does not have allot of experience in this, in fact most of our culture goes far out of its way to stay out of it.

I think his observation is right on, but getting the right people, with a sufficient amount of professional experience in a personnel system that struggles to meet "made to order" requests is going to be tough. Most of the folks I would think best suited to do this level of advising would be OSD SES types, and people who'd served as -Ds, etc. We (the big JIIM "we") can provide them with the skills to "advise", but the core competencies, cannot be built in a short term nature, they are either the product of long term experiences (best case & requiring hand selection based on professional assignments), or potentially a series of courses and schools that at least introduce them to the technical skills (maybe an adequate solution, but will mean selection early and a good deal of supplemental preparation in the technical areas).

Another one of those things with "no easy answers".

Best, Rob