Insurgency Defined and COIN Principles

[Jedburgh]

The only issue not specifically addressed by this list is the idea of a "grievance" which is central to any insurgency.

The emergence of an insurgency - or of a terrorist group - is more complex than a single grievance or even a stated list of grievances. Regarding analysis of factors central to the emergence of a politically-motivated campaign of violence, I personally like Dr. Sprtzak’s Indicators for Radical Groups at Risk for Terrorism (which is just as applicable to nascent insurgent movements as it is to emerging terrorist groups):

• The intensity of delegimitization: The degree to which the radical group challenges the legitimacy of its opponents. The more intense the delegitimization, the greater the risk for violence.
• Moral inhibitions and non-violence taboos: Societal strictures on the legitimacy of violence. Radical groups operating in fragmented political cultures with a history of violence.
• Previous experience with violence: A radical group whose members have experience with violence, conflict, and weapons.
• Rational assessment of risks vs opportunities: The degree to which the radical group has calculated the necessity and feasibility of confronting its enemies with violence.
• Organizational, financial, and political resources: The degree to which the radical group has the resources, or can access the resources, to support a campaign of violence.
• Sense of imminent threat: The degree to which a radical group feels threatened by its enemies. The more imminent and catastrophic the threat is believed to be, the greater the risk the group will resort to armed violence.
• Intergroup competition: The degree to which a radical group is in competition with another group for a shrinking constituency and terrorism is perceived to be the path to keeping the group on top.
• Age of activists: The degree to which the radical group is composed of young activists. The greater the concentration of activists between the ages of 18 and 25, the greater the potential for recruitment.
• External influence and manipulation: The type and level of support provided to radical organizations.
• Sense of humiliation and need for revenge: The degree to which the radical group is subjected to physical repression or torture, or perceives itself to be humiliated by its enemies. The greater the sense of humiliation, the greater the risk that the radical group will take revenge.
• Presence of violent leaders: The degree to which the leader or leadership of the radical group demonstrates a history of violent behavior. The more violent the leaders, the greater the risk.

[Strickland]

The emergence of an insurgency - or of a terrorist group - is more complex than a single grievance or even a stated list of grievances. Regarding analysis of factors central to the emergence of a politically-motivated campaign of violence, I personally like Dr. Sprtzak’s Indicators for Radical Groups at Risk for Terrorism (which is just as applicable to nascent insurgent movements as it is to emerging terrorist groups):

Agreed. I was simply pointing out that gentlemen such as Kitson, Galula, Thompson, Mao, Marks, etc., all reference a grievance or grievances, whether perceived or real.

[Steve Blair]

Agreed. I was simply pointing out that gentlemen such as Kitson, Galula, Thompson, Mao, Marks, etc., all reference a grievance or grievances, whether perceived or real.

Very true. As was pointed out in an earlier post, this is something that most insurgent groups have in common with terrorist groups. They all have an axe of some sort to grind. The justification of this axe isn't as important as the presence of the axe itself.

[Strickland]

The emergence of an insurgency - or of a terrorist group - is more complex than a single grievance or even a stated list of grievances. Regarding analysis of factors central to the emergence of a politically-motivated campaign of violence, I personally like Dr. Sprtzak’s Indicators for Radical Groups at Risk for Terrorism (which is just as applicable to nascent insurgent movements as it is to emerging terrorist groups):

We should take caution in mixing up terms such as insurgency and terrorism. Terrorism is a strategy and terror is a tactic. The fundamental fact of ANY insurgency is a grievance(s) that give rise to the vision of a counter-state.

[Jedburgh]

We should take caution in mixing up terms such as insurgency and terrorism. Terrorism is a strategy and terror is a tactic. The fundamental fact of ANY insurgency is a grievance(s) that give rise to the vision of a counter-state.

However, not every people with a grievance against existing authorities attempt to change - or secede from - the state by violence. What the list of indicators that I cited provides is a method of analytic forecasting for the emergence of such politically-motivated violence against the state. Whatever form it may take.

However, for those observing nascent political (whether based on factional politics or ethnic/tribal/sectarian issues) groupings within a given state, those indicators do not stand alone. The nature of the state itself plays a significant part, and each potential indicator for the emergence of violence must be taken into consideration with whatever characteristic of the state in question either exacerbates or mitigates the particulars of that indicator.

[M. J. Dougherty]

I can't tell you how much reading I have done on this subject, but I think the best definiton for insurgency is the one Bard O'Niell uses in Terrorism & Insurgency: Insided Modern Revolutionary Warfare.

Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group conciously uses political resources (e.g. organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics

[Bill Moore]

While interesting to debate, do we really need to define insurgency to develop a successful strategy to counter one?

The danger of a definition, especially one that doesn't fit the situation you're dealing with, is that our American planners are prone to fall back on a doctrinal answer book to look for cues on what their courses of action will be. It precludes a detailed non-bias examination of the present security challenge by pre-disposing the planners to see it as a "classical" insurgency, then they fall back on the wrong set of solutions.

There are unique factors in every insurgency, or conflict, due to personalties, social factors, political factors, economic factors, and the list goes on and on. Sometimes our search for clear cut definitions reminds me of senior officers sitting around trying to explain why Clausewitz was all knowing and seeing, and then attempt to drive a square peg into a round hole in an attempt to demonstrate their point by using Clausewitz to explain a modern day security problem. The nature of a conflict is unique to itself, even if it may have many factors in common with similiar conflicts.

Does a security problem really a definition for us to address it? Why?

I'm not arguing that this type of discussion doesn't have value, but is it germane to solving the problem at hand in Iraq?

[SWJED]

29 Nov. AP - Don't Call it an 'Insurgency': Rumsfeld.

U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld argued on Tuesday that the guerrillas fighting U.S.-led foreign forces and the American-backed government in Iraq do not deserve to be called an "insurgency."

Asked at a Pentagon news conference why he did not think the word insurgency applied to enemy forces in Iraq, Rumsfeld said he had "an epiphany."

"I've thought about it. And, over the weekend, I thought to myself, you know, that gives them a greater legitimacy than they seem to merit," Rumsfeld said.

Rumsfeld instead referred to the guerrillas in Iraq as "the terrorists" and "the enemies of the government." U.S. military statements also have referred to insurgents as "anti-Iraqi forces."

Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines an insurgent as "a person who revolts against civil authority or an established government."...

[Bill Moore]

Our SECDEF has a unique ability to concisely summarize the situation; however, he may have over simplifed it this time. Saying we shouldn't call it an insurgency because it gives too much legitmacy is like saying you can't call the ocean blue because you don't like the color blue. However, for reasons stated previously I think Secretary Rumfield is right, these guys are not a true insurgency. I know it can be argued effectively they are based on some definitions out there, but lets see where we're at once we get a Iraqi government in place. Let's see what the so-called insurgents are fighting for then. They're going to have to put alternative plan on the table, hell they have been fighting for almost three years. We know they don't have one, and will soon simply be recognized is wacked out, semi-sophisticated, anarchists.

Even though I'm currently leaning towards they're not insurgents, I still think much of our COIN doctrine is applicable in dealing with the problem. Don't throw the baby out with the bath water.

[SWJED]

30 Nov. Washington Post - Rumsfeld's War On 'Insurgents'.