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Thread: IW and Stability Operations - in your own words - what is the difference?

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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default IW and Stability Operations - in your own words - what is the difference?

    Lots of terms moving about these days. Two of them that have some weight are "Irregular Warfare" and "Stability Operations". At the SWC we have a pretty good group that is confident, well read, inter-active and interested to expend grey matter in pursuit of getting it right. So lets open up a discussion on the matter. I suspect that if this thread does take off, it will go in some unexpected directions. No need to limit yourself to IW and SO - there seem to be many other terms out there that conflict, parallel or intersect at points. I'd also say it is worthwhile to consider what the implications are for favoring one term over another.

    Another good reason to do it here is our diversity - as definitions build, they may use other terms or contain ideas which seem out of context to particular disciplines or cultures - this is one of those cases where the discussion is probably worth more then the definition itself.

    Not to avoid initiating the discussion while avoiding any “published” doctrinal definitions in order to consider the nature of the words:

    For myself, I'm suffering from the component of the terms themselves - IW contains the term "warfare", which to me means a "way" or manner of waging war. E.G. – “irregular” could mean something out of character to the norm - which could mean everything from the type of means used to wage the war that then drive irregular tactics, operations and strategy, or just an "irregular" use of the "regular" means to wage war.

    Stability Operations sort of hits me the same way - the key word being "operations" which to me indicate a type of undertaking to achieve an objective - in this case "stability" of something - a state, an area, a group, a problem, etc.


    I recently read a definition of a "term" that because it used other like terms in its definition limited the utility of the term it was defining to a point that put the original term at odds where it has been used elsewhere in the greater lexicon.

    While there is goodness in defining things, I think the real value in this case is probably the discussion about how they are perceived. Its not too hard to find out discussions or speeches where the multiple terms are used to describe the same things, and others where the same terms are used in ways that put them outside the context of an accepted definition.

    Best, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 03-03-2008 at 11:35 PM.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default I waited. Crickets. So I'll step up with a simplistic stab,

    noting that all my stabs are simplistic...

    I think when the 1 MarDiv was tracing down the remnants of the fleeing North Korean Army north of Wonsan in 1950, we were engaged in IW. We were again in early '51 when we and the 5th RCT [1] hunted down the remnants of the same Army left behind in far south near Pusan due to the US / ROK push northward in the fall of '50. They had reverted to using guerrilla TTP [2] and were not attempting to move north [3].

    When I went to Laos in 1960, I was engaged in a Stability Operation (which entailed a very minimal amount of IW). In Viet Nam in early '66, prior to the bulk of the buildup, same situation. Later in that year, it morphed for several reasons into more IW and less SO. When I returned in 1968, we had CW (generally less Tanks), pure and simple and little concern in units for SO. That, after Tet, pulled down rapidly to IW as opposed to CW -- and SO was ramped up [4].

    To me, the 'classic' definitions are appropriate, simple and not ambiguous. CW is major military force using current technology in moderately to highly intensive combat. IW is characterized by one or both opposing sides using what are conventionally called guerrilla TTP. Stability Operations are as you described and may also involve a spectrum of force through none to simple Police or constabulary effort through Paramilitary Constabulary effort to IW in varying intensity and, rarely, up to CW. That said, it must be acknowledged that variances in that are, IMO, of small concern. Most words in the English dictionaries have multiple definitions and that seems to be acceptable [5].

    NOTES:

    [1] The 5th RCT in 1950-51 contained then CPT Hank Emerson, who from that experience probably developed his Checkerboard Theory of COIN Warfare. IIRC, he refined that theory and published it while at Leavenworth in 1963-64. It should be in the Archives there.

    [2] I use the phrase 'guerrilla TTP' as shorthand for any combat effort by a force (organized, uniformed or not) that uses stealth, evasion, clandestine operations and short sharp actions while avoiding decisive commitment against superior force as a combat norm. Their actions may include infrastructure destruction (human and machine), attacks solely on opposing military forces, attacks on any opponents to include civilians, terror, intimidation and other tactics short of fully engaging major forces in combat.

    [3] Sort of an aside to your question but somewhat appropos, I think. With 1 MarDiv and with the US Army in Korea, note the changes in a short period from full bore conventional warfare involving defense against Armored attack to a major offensive operation entailing full bore urban warfare to IW to CW against a different enemy with very different TTP to IW and back to CW. This is why I contend that the Armed Forces of the US are completely capable of conducting full spectrum warfare. If a marginally trained crowd could do it reasonably well in 1950, with todays training we should be able to do it very well at a high performance level.

    [4] Again, note the sliding between categories of combat. US units translated between the various forms of combat and other operations relatively painlessly and generally fairly effectively. Most failures I observed were not at the unit level but were command failures at Division and above. Something to ponder is that most Bdes did well; most Divisions did not.

    [5] Reasonable people could disagree with me on some of that transitioning between forms of warfare -- and warfare itself is constant evolution. For those two reasons, I think that a quest for excessive accuracy in terminology is probably not possible. That does not mean we should not try to be more precise, simply that accord may be difficult.

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    i pwnd ur ooda loop selil's Avatar
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    I hadn't answered because I was thinking "cyber wafare" is a form of irregular warfare. Conflict through other means than normal warfare. But, then I was thinking maybe I'm missing the point since that has nothing to do with stability operations.
    Sam Liles
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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default I think you're on track

    Sam. Seems to me that cyber warfare is, in most senses IW -- though it could be a technique or line of operation in a conventional war as well.

    By the same token it doesn't need to involved in Stability operations -- though it could be and is possibly today in Afghanistan and /or Iraq to one degree or another. I can envision a SO wherein the only warfare component is cyber war.

    That's why I say that trying to be very specific in definition will difficult

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
    Lots of terms moving about these days. Two of them that have some weight are "Irregular Warfare" and "Stability Operations".
    Not with me, they don't!

    Warfare is defined by the aims sought and means employed to achieve the aim.

    To sound like a stuck record, "Why are we seeking to define conflict?" "So that we may better understand it?"

    So here is the question. "What do we not understand about conflict that causes us so much angst?"

    Conflict is conflict. War is War. What's the problem? To be a proper army, you have to be able to fight any sort of conflict. Otherwise you're just a one trick pony.
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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Hi Sam - I think you are on track. I did not really bring it up looking for a "right" answer - I brought it up to discuss it. Its really the discussion that matters. Lots of things going on out there that don't fit neatly in a box - not that they should necessarily, just that we often seem intent on putting them there. If "cyber-war" for example is used in conjunction with other means and ways, or maybe even used on its own because that is the best means and ways available to the belligerent, maybe we need to consider it.

    If we get too wedded to defining something as it currently is, do we miss the shift in conditions which change the nature of it. Ken had went through the events in the 60s in SE Asia and discussed how it changed from one thing to another - the ability to perceive not only that the nature of a change but why and "so what" are important.

    Hi William,

    Certainly dissent is encouraged here The reason I picked up on those two terms is because they are featured in some policy debate about where effort is placed. This should be no secret, lots of ongoing publications in the journals and MSM - and maybe for the reason you state,
    "What do we not understand about conflict that causes us so much angst?"
    and since it was never the intention of this thread to limit discussion, be it conflicting terms, or broader questions - I hope folks will wade in and we'll see where it goes.

    Its an important and related question, and I think it gets beyond just military power, so its not just a one trick pony military, it may be national power geared toward confronting one thing, vs. being adaptive. Since we employ military power (and other forms of national power) ideally to achieve a political objective, then the lateral discussion with other JIIM folks, and the vertical discussion with Legislative and Executive folks matters. The discussion is going to take place via multiple means and is going to be influenced not just by the direct participant, but by external folks from the media, think tanks, other governments, the public and constituents just to name a few. So I think terms, and their definitions do matter, as do the means by which participants in the discussion receive the definition, the means will place context around the content.

    For a variety of reasons not everyone seems to be comfortable with
    Conflict is conflict. War is War.
    . Some are political reasons, some are cultural, some are probably just the almost universal human desire to name things (Marc - you symbology work got me thinking about that), and organize them.

    If you buy into Clausewitz, and I do - you are probably prepared to live with ambiguity, and understand that by doing so you are offered a certain latitude and freedom in how you view things - it helps you consider the nature of things in a different light. However, there are plenty of folks that don't seem to want that freedom, they come from backgrounds where that level of freedom has been viewed as counter productive, or an impediment to progress on an issue, etc. For them, often everything is a "problem" with a solution, and the conditions don't matter. Many of these folks are in government, and they were elected on the basis of promises, and they picked people to serve in important positions based on their support of a specific view - to get their policies and promises fulfilled. Example - few people are comfortable with the idea that "drawdown" or "gradual withdrawal" from Iraq is contingent on anything other then our domestic will to make it so - so while the commander on the ground may be acutely aware of the effects of the conditions there in accomplishing the mission, he is also aware of the political pressure to demonstrate progress that can be measured and publicized - either to discuss it with the political leadership, or for the political leader to discuss with the public in order to manage expectations.

    Which sort of brings me back to why I started the thread in the first place - it was to begin a discussion on what terms mean, and hopefully get to why their meaning matters.

    Best, Rob

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    Default Random thoughts before earning my paycheck

    Interesting topic, though dangerous to deal with without sufficient caffeine in the system.

    To my mind, there is a fundamental divide in ways of applying organized violence - though actually it's not so much a divide as a fuzzy grey area.

    Conventional (or regular) war is an artificial construct in which force is directed at the avatar of an opposing body politic. In its purest form, 'civilians' and their works are not affected except incidentally, mostly among those unfortunate enough to be located on or near the battlefield. Both sides have essentially abandoned rationality and entrusted the issue to brute strength. The two avatars contend until one side is either completely destroyed or concludes that it can no longer shield the body politic. Since this construct is completely artificial (and in many ways counter-intuitive), it has to be hedged about by the many laws and rules of war to ensure that it remains a non-rational contest of intellectual, spiritual, and material strength, unrelated to the actual issues at stake.

    Unconventional (or irregular) war, on the other hand, is the application of organized violence directly to the body politic - or attempts to shield the body politic from such violence. In other words, at least one side is purposefully evading the opponent's avatar to starve, kill, rob, persuade, energize, terrorize, liberate, etc, the 'civilian' sector. Attacks on the opposing avatar are limited to what is necessary to allow access to the body politic.

    No war is an unalloyed example of one or the other, of course.

    Victor Davis Hanson alert: I will now use questionable and simplistic historical examples to illustrate.

    The Hundred Year's War was largely irregular. It consisted mostly of raids, pillaging expeditions, massacres, and the like, designed to enrich one side directly at the expense of the other. On the flip side, each side was also trying to prevent the enemy from inflicting such harm. The key was that any fighting was directly aimed at gaining access to the body politic. Both sides were manned, trained, and equipped for this type of war - the medieval army was a supremely fit tool for irregular warfare in every sense. From time to time, conventional war was resorted to in the form of pitched battles (Agincourt et al), but this was the rare exception.

    The American Civil War was originally purely and consciously conventional, but it was won by the north when they began to employ irregular warfare directly against the body politic of the south - and it was the vulnerability of the south to direct attacks on its body politic that in the end ensured there would be an actual surrender rather than a resort to a continuing guerilla campaign.

    World War II had aspects of irregular war in ways obvious (partisans, saboteurs) and less obvious (terror bombing) I say less obvious because terror bombing employed the same tools used in regular warfare (bombers, fighters) in very similar ways as those used to attack the opponents avatar. The difference is that it was aimed directly at the body politic, rather than the material strength of the enemy.

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    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
    Which sort of brings me back to why I started the thread in the first place - it was to begin a discussion on what terms mean, and hopefully get to why their meaning matters.
    Rob,

    In order to decide what terms mean, we need to set a context in which they are being used. As you noted in the post from which I lifted the above quotation, folks engage in discussion across multiple contexts. Until one sets the context, one probably cannot be sure which definition is most apropros to the discussion. This is not to say that terms have no fixed meanings, that everything is relative. What I am trying to say is that I suspect the best we can hope for as an end result of the discussion will be a list of possible components that apply when one is taking about IW or SO, depending on the context.

    I doubt seriuously that these lists will be mutually exclusive nor that we will be able to identify much, if anything that is either necessary or sufficient to be able to point out when we are faced with IW versus CW or SO. It will be like the old saying about pornography, " I know it when I see it." Ken's post to this thread exemplifies my belief.) When someone says that they see an IW event, discussion will allow others to unpack what in that event justifies calling it IW. I do not see this discussion producing a "bright line test" for discriminating between appropriate uses of the terms. By the way, I also would prefer not to have such a bright line test. I suspect that would cause pigeonholing and stultify creative thought at a time when that is what we really need.

    However, I do think the exercise will be worth it. It should have a liberating effect, provided the interlocutors are open-minded and there is a sufficiently broad involvement in terms of the participants' background and experience. Without policy wonks from State who have never seen a day in uniform, legal beagles from the world of Constitutional and Federal administrative law freshly admitted to the bar after their three years at Georgetown, Harvard or Dickinson Law, and even a bunch of knuckle-dragging old military guys like many of us who contribute already, the debate will not have a broad enough basis of discussion to bring out as many of the ways that we can see what Wittgenstein called family resemblances in the various language games we play using the two terms. (I can't believe I wrote a sentence that long! Sorry, I must be channeling for Joyce or Becket.)

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Unlike some, I do see a certain utility in "naming" various levels of conflict...if for no other reason than to restrain the instincts of some to run right for the big red button every time something untoward happens.

    To me, the difference between IW and SO lies in the amount of open conflict. For example, I'd label the Indian Wars as IW, and an operation like the occupation of Germany after Word War II (or even the limited occupation of regions after World War I) as SO. Note that there is a certain amount of SO carry-over into IW (for example, the Army often performed what might be considered law enforcement-type missions during the Indian Wars, although the main focus remained on combat). Resource allocation also comes into play, although the Indian Wars sucked up almost all the active Army component at the time. Still...there was no extra mobilization (except in very limited circumstances) and no real testing of the national will or motivation (again, with a handful of very specific incidents running counter to this trend).

    These are all somewhat general concepts, but again for me they serve more as a basic framework. War is war is war at the sharp end of the stick, but once you get past that I do strongly feel that there are levels of conflict and that having an understanding of them can prevent slides into a "massive retaliation" mindset.

    Warfare is always in flux, and what we consider IW now might have actually been an all-out conflict by the standards of previous systems. Personally I think stability operations have the best chance to remain consistent, since they tend by nature to be more limited involvements (at least on the part of an outside power...assuming that an IW scenario isn't running at the same time - Iraq is a good example of this).

    IW does not tend to be a conventional force-on-force engagement, either. There will be more limits (resources, political restrictions, weapons systems deployed or usable, etc.) and (in my mind) less tolerance for error. It's also more prone to "sliding" from one end of the scale to the other (from what seems to be SO, for example, into a larger theater-based conflict like Vietnam became) with little or no warning and possibly no action by one (or more) of the major players in the conflict.

    Terms are important not just for the military, but for the people who commit that military to action. There is always flux in them (and there should be), but it's still useful to have a scale of reference.
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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Hi Wayne,

    What I am trying to say is that I suspect the best we can hope for as an end result of the discussion will be a list of possible components that apply when one is taking about IW or SO, depending on the context.
    and that is really all I was hoping to do - to get people engaged, and thinking, and hopefully discussing it. Context does matter, sometimes more, sometimes less - probably more when the application results in real decisions about ends, ways means (as an ex.), and maybe less when it is just theory - but I think it always matters.

    Even here - the discussion goes beyond the people we respond to, who challenge us and get us to question a particular definition or belief - so there is a two part audience - the intended recipient and th unintended recipient - again the context of which the response is made matters.

    Lots of other terms that often get used in an almost ubiquitous manners - COIN, UW, CW (incidentally I recently saw a piece that substituted the word traditional for conventional - which changes the context), asymmetric, symmetric, etc.

    Steve, great points, but I have to head to work now (which in its own way, this is also kind of like work - it just doesn't always feel that way)
    Best, Rob

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    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    I've attached a quick analysis that may be a start to a methodology for analysis. Comments are greatly appreciated.
    Attached Files Attached Files

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    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Rob,

    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
    So I think terms, and their definitions do matter, as do the means by which participants in the discussion receive the definition, the means will place context around the content.

    For a variety of reasons not everyone seems to be comfortable with . Some are political reasons, some are cultural, some are probably just the almost universal human desire to name things (Marc - you symbology work got me thinking about that), and organize them.
    You know, I've been toying with the idea of trying to put something together on the Symbology of Conflict and its ties into neurophysiology. Personally, I think that definitions matter especially shared definitions (aka inter-subjective).

    I think the issue of "naming" is, strangely enough, absolutely crucial. First off, Judaism, Christianity and Islam all recognize the act of naming to have powerful implications for control over that which is named (cf Gen 2:19). Second, "naming" is an act of discriminating in the sense that it defines X, Y, and Z as members of that named and excludes others. Not surprising, it's how our brain neurology works and all of our social and cultural institutions reflect that.

    Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
    Which sort of brings me back to why I started the thread in the first place - it was to begin a discussion on what terms mean, and hopefully get to why their meaning matters.
    Well, terms have no inherent meaning in and of themselves (although some magicians and theologians would disagree with me, but that's for another thread ). "Meaning" is arbitrary, but with fuzzy limits (as opposed to crisp limits) and subject to change in relation to "experience" (cultural, social, historical, linguistic and personal).

    One of the better ways to arrive at fuzzy definitions is to create what Max Weber called "ideal types" and use those, and other data, to construct a series of "dimensions" with the ideal types as the end points. (If anyone is into the math, the dimensions define the specific space of a particular cluster of topological manifolds; cf General Topology by John Kelley.)

    If we take this approach, the first thing we see is that while the term "conventional warfare" can easily be made into an ideal type based on the agreement of combatants to follow an agreed upon convention, unconventional, irregular, etc. are useless as ideal types since they are defined solely by one negative dimension, i.e. not following a convention. While useless as ideal types, they do help to establish one dimension: the degree to which a given conflict follows an agreed upon convention (aka the presence or absence of actions which meet that convention).

    So, we have one ideal type and one dimension. Let's try for another dimension: TTPs. Let us assume, for the moment, that TTPs fall into broad categories. TTPs, as a class, will cross with conventional warfare - indeed we could argue that any given "convention" will be defined by which TTPs are included and excluded from the convention. What other "clusters" of TTPs do we find, since the clustering of them appears to be one of the prime definitions of he one ideal type we have? Well, we have one cluster that seems to be defined as a "classic Maoist insurgency". As a note, if you look at the Peasant Wars in Europe of the 15th - 17th centuries, you will note that they also use very similar TTPs, so this ideal type is not "new" or "oriental". I would suggest that we could call this ideal type by Mao's original name for it: a People's War. One of the key dimensions is that this is an intra-culture war based on the violent "re-negotiation" of social system(s).

    I'm going to leave it at that for the nonce .

    Marc
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    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hey Wayne,

    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    I've attached a quick analysis that may be a start to a methodology for analysis. Comments are greatly appreciated.
    Looks like we're thinking along similar lines .

    Marc
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    I think any attempt to define the terms we are dealing with by examining the tools used, or how the opposing forces organize, train, and support themselves, or the tactics they use, is doomed to failure.

    I think the only useful way to differentiate kinds or styles of war is by looking at the targets of force and the desired proximate outcome of the use of force.

    Conventional armies can fight across the spectrum of war, to include employing terrorism. Insurgents can employ terrorist tactics, or traditional "Maoist" insurgency tactics, or they can fight conventionally. Both sculptors and demolition teams use hammers and chisels. So defining the type of war by looking at who shows up to fight it, or by the weapons employed, seems to me to be an exercise in futility.

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    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Eden,

    Quote Originally Posted by Eden View Post
    Conventional armies can fight across the spectrum of war, to include employing terrorism. Insurgents can employ terrorist tactics, or traditional "Maoist" insurgency tactics, or they can fight conventionally. Both sculptors and demolition teams use hammers and chisels. So defining the type of war by looking at who shows up to fight it, or by the weapons employed, seems to me to be an exercise in futility.
    It strikes me that you are confusing the event - "war" - with the players . I was trying to define types of "war" (events) rather than types of players. Iraq is a good example of a situation where types have segued into each other, so being able to name and recognize the different types allows for the employment of a segued doctrine and actions based on what is actually happening.

    Marc
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    Stability ops are when no one is shooting at you but violence may increase if you leave.

    I'm not sure that I can say that in lingo, but I'll try. "Insurgent activity has been neutralized but the threat of future insurgent activity must be deterred with the threat of kinetic operations so that the political process can produce a political agreement that leads to long term stability. Cooperation with other operational and institutional JIIM community members is necessary to further support economic/societal rebuilding and the political process."
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Sometimes it takes someone without deep experience to think creatively.

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    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Question I've always felt that

    Conventional wars general equate to when there is a set or known outcome with fair certainty as to what should be accomplished. Straight shootin so to speak.

    Anything else immediately starts filtering into other forms from irregular all the way to unrestricted warfare.

    It really seems to be about what you seek to accomplish and then varies in how it gets done. Aside from that I really tend to agree with WILF.

    A fight's a fight. What the opponents are willing to do to win it is defined almost in a progressively downward trend.

    1- Conventional - stand and fight

    2- Irregular- What? he ducked, then swing lower this time rather than straight at him.

    2- IW2- What? He moved out of the way then swing where he's going to move to next time

    3- UW- What? he didn't show up on time for the fight- Then kill the %$##% in his sleep.

    SO- fix up the house, pay the family for their food, and call for a ticket home
    (Human Decency Standards) even in kinetic operations this still should be being considered)
    Last edited by Ron Humphrey; 03-04-2008 at 07:39 PM. Reason: Add SO

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Not so. The Stability Op

    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    Stability ops are when no one is shooting at you but violence may increase if you leave.
    is designed to assist a State (generally) in achieving stability. Such ops include all forms of support and that may or may not include combat operations of various types conducted concurrently. A decent example is Viet Nam post 1968 when the stability operation was paramount but there were still requirments for combat (albeit at an ever declining level). Whether violence would increase or not due to your departure is irrelevant to the description (though not to the outcome).
    I'm not sure that I can say that in lingo, but I'll try. "Insurgent activity has been neutralized but the threat of future insurgent activity must be deterred with the threat of kinetic operations so that the political process can produce a political agreement that leads to long term stability. Cooperation with other operational and institutional JIIM community members is necessary to further support economic/societal rebuilding and the political process."
    Weird... but maybe so. if so, that's just one example. it may be pertinent to current situations but it will not always apply.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    A decent example is Viet Nam post 1968 when the stability operation was paramount but there were still requirements for combat
    You were there, so I'll defer to your experience, but I'd call that a war: a big messy complicate one with all types of combat.

    I say if you're using kinetic weapons "breaking stuff," then it can't be a "stability operation" because by definition when you break stuff it becomes more unstable: albeit the instability is often temporary.

    So I still think that the time between when you stop breaking stuff and stability is a good definition and your objective is to get to stability as fast as possible. Intuitively, that definition explains why during stability ops you often need to spend time rebuilding what you broke.

    Building some stuff, while breaking other stuff happens all the time, but I'd call the building "getting a head start on stability operations" not stability operations per say. (If the shooting in the AO around the school you built never stops is that because your COIN efforts failed or your stability ops failed? To me, it sounds more like the former.)
    Last edited by Rank amateur; 03-04-2008 at 08:28 PM.
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Sometimes it takes someone without deep experience to think creatively.

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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    Hi Eden,



    It strikes me that you are confusing the event - "war" - with the players . I was trying to define types of "war" (events) rather than types of players.

    Marc
    Actually, I think we were saying the same thing. A 'conventional' army - such as the US Army - can fight a conventional war, or it can take the part of an insurgent, or it can employ terror. The Viet Cong could fight a conventional war; the NVA could act as an insurgent. Thus, while certain armies are better suited to certain types of war, you cannot define a 'type' of war by, as you say, who the players are.

    Instead, you must examine the targets selected by the opposing force. As you slide down the spectrum from conventional war to whatever we call the other end, the opposing force expends progressively less energy on attacking the enemy's military shield and progressively more on trying to influence/kill/terrorize/rob the society itself. Thus, tactics do not define the 'type' of war - rather the 'type' of war dictates what tactics are likely to be effective.

    The implications of this is that the weaker force is able to dictate what 'type' of war will be fought - with the very important caveat that at lower intensities it becomes progressively more difficult to defend one's culture, infrastructure, material wealth, national territory, or way of life.

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