IW and Stability Operations - in your own words - what is the difference?

[Ken White]

Stability ops are when no one is shooting at you but violence may increase if you leave.

is designed to assist a State (generally) in achieving stability. Such ops include all forms of support and that may or may not include combat operations of various types conducted concurrently. A decent example is Viet Nam post 1968 when the stability operation was paramount but there were still requirments for combat (albeit at an ever declining level). Whether violence would increase or not due to your departure is irrelevant to the description (though not to the outcome).

I'm not sure that I can say that in lingo, but I'll try. "Insurgent activity has been neutralized but the threat of future insurgent activity must be deterred with the threat of kinetic operations so that the political process can produce a political agreement that leads to long term stability. Cooperation with other operational and institutional JIIM community members is necessary to further support economic/societal rebuilding and the political process."

Weird... but maybe so. if so, that's just one example. it may be pertinent to current situations but it will not always apply.

[Rank amateur]

A decent example is Viet Nam post 1968 when the stability operation was paramount but there were still requirements for combat

You were there, so I'll defer to your experience, but I'd call that a war: a big messy complicate one with all types of combat.

I say if you're using kinetic weapons "breaking stuff," then it can't be a "stability operation" because by definition when you break stuff it becomes more unstable: albeit the instability is often temporary.

So I still think that the time between when you stop breaking stuff and stability is a good definition and your objective is to get to stability as fast as possible. Intuitively, that definition explains why during stability ops you often need to spend time rebuilding what you broke.

Building some stuff, while breaking other stuff happens all the time, but I'd call the building "getting a head start on stability operations" not stability operations per say. (If the shooting in the AO around the school you built never stops is that because your COIN efforts failed or your stability ops failed? To me, it sounds more like the former.)

[Ron Humphrey]

You were there, so I'll defer to your experience, but I'd call that a war: a big messy complicate one with all types of combat.

I say if you're using kinetic weapons "breaking stuff," then it can't be a "stability operation" because by definition when you break stuff it becomes more unstable: albeit the instability is often temporary.

So I still think that the time between when you stop breaking stuff and stability is a good definition and your objective is to get to stability as fast as possible. Intuitively, that definition explains why during stability ops you often need to spend time rebuilding what you broke.

Building some stuff, while breaking other stuff happens all the time, but I'd call the building "getting a head start on stability operations" not stability operations per say. (If the shooting in the AO around the school you built never stops is that because your COIN efforts failed or your stability ops failed? To me, it sounds more like the former.)

But what if the what you are breaking is the what that is currently de-stabilizing the situation

[Rank amateur]

But what if the what you are breaking is the what that is currently de-stabilizing the situation

Then you are fighting with the objective of getting to your stability phase. (Which makes sense, because you can not create stability until the destabilizers are gone.)

Ken, you make many good points, but I'd say that just because somebody tried to both at the same time - and it didn't work - doesn't prove that they can successfully happen at the same.

The actual process is relatively straight forward. Control the population. That takes away the bad guys "cover." You kill some of the bad guys. Some put their guns away and pretend to be civilians. You make sure the bad guys can't pick up the guns they've hidden, while easing up on the population. (You don't need to control them anymore.) Sooner or later everyone figures out some way they can live together.

I've seen no evidence that trying to stabilize a population, before you control it - before it has been cleansed of insurgents - can be successful. (But I am sure that if such evidence exists, someone will bring it to my attention and it won't be the first time that I've been wrong.)

what you suggest is abandoning an attempt to improve the stability until combat ceases. Ain't gonna happen and should not.

I suggest that you're confusing population control with stability. I suggest that the reason for similar confusion here is because you guys are too darn nice. You want to liberate and stabilize. You don't want to control. But that's the way it works. The iron fist comes first, then you can wrap a velvet glove around it. (If you wrap the velvet glove around it too soon, the iron fist becomes less effective.)

[Ken White]

Then you are fighting with the objective of getting to your stability phase. (Which makes sense, because you can not create stability until the destabilizers are gone.)

Not so. Depends on the geographical size of the nation involved, demographics and a host of other factors. Again, look at the Philippines and Malaya. Look at Iraq -- parts of it are now stable, others are not.

Ken, you make many good points, but I'd say that just because somebody tried to both at the same time - and it didn't work - doesn't prove that they can successfully happen at the same.

Where did it not work? The three I cited are places where a degree of combat and stability operations occurred concurrently and all were nominally successful -- and before you say Viet Nam was not, I'd urge you to consider it in some detail and not resort to the distorted US media version of what happened.

The actual process is relatively straight forward. Control the population. That takes away the bad guys "cover." You kill some of the bad guys. Some put their guns away and pretend to be civilians. You make sure the bad guys can't pick up the guns they've hidden, while easing up on the population. (You don't need to control them anymore.) Sooner or later everyone figures out some way they can live together.

In an ideal situation, that would happen -- what do you do if, as in both the Philippines and Malaya, the bad guys are sort of 'on again - off again?' Do you start 'stabilizing' when they slack off --and then stop when a few of them stir up hate and discontent in one small area of the country? How long does that 'figuring out' take? Do you do nothing until there's tranquility to get a functioning government and services during that time?

I've seen no evidence that trying to stabilize a population, before you control it - before it has been cleansed of insurgents - can be successful. (But I am sure that if such evidence exists, someone will bring it to my attention and it won't be the first time that I've been wrong.)

I gave you three -- four counting Greece -- and there are others.

I suggest that you're confusing population control with stability. I suggest that the reason for similar confusion here is because you guys are too darn nice. You want to liberate and stabilize. You don't want to control. But that's the way it works. The iron fist comes first, then you can wrap a velvet glove around it. (If you wrap the velvet glove around it too soon, the iron fist becomes less effective.)

I suggest that you just proved you don't know what you're talking about.

You've just gotten it totally backwards -- you're the one advocating population control. As you said above and I again quote:

"The actual process is relatively straight forward. Control the population. That takes away the bad guys "cover." You kill some of the bad guys. Some put their guns away and pretend to be civilians. You make sure the bad guys can't pick up the guns they've hidden, while easing up on the population. (You don't need to control them anymore.)"

You said that, I didn't.

Stability negates the need for control.

I'm saying you cannot do what you suggest. First, you can't control all of anyone's population, absolutely impossible to do. Second, in a large nation, no other nation is likely to have the available manpower to even attempt control the population (how many people would it take to control 25M Iraqis in an area the size of California?). Thirdly, if you go into full combat only mode -- as we did in Iraq early on -- all you'll do is antagonize the relatives of those you kill -- and you will kill people that do not need to be killed with that approach. Lastly, to provide stability and ongoing effort is generally required and you cannot start it when it's peaceful and stop it at a hint of violence; it has to be an ongoing effort.

I have no problem using force, not a bit -- but promiscuous use of excessive force does more harm than good. I think you might want to do a little more research, perhaps...

You are correct on one thing in that last paragraph. "...You want to liberate and stabilize. You don't want to control." Not due to being too nice, that's a really, really bad misapprehension. The Armed forces don't want to 'control' (though that's a bad word if you'll give it some thought) or do stability ops because they're tedious, thankless and an absolute pain to do. Not to mention they take a long time (waiting for everyone else to "...figure (sic) out some way they can live together.")

Then this:

To make sure that the violence doesn't come back. (While my definition may be wrong, it is logical consistent.) First you stop the violence. Then you use different TTPs to make sure it doesn't come back.

Logical? If you say so...

I'd be really interested to know what you propose to do to make sure the violence doesn't come back. Seriously.

Your plan is excellent -- what, precisely do you call what you're doing with those different TTPs?

Yes, but only in the area where the violence breaks out. (The population has proven that they can't be trusted with their new freedom, so you reestablish control.)

There you go again with that control you say I'm advocating. Heh.

It's just like retreat/advance. Some troops can be advancing, others retreating. That doesn't mean a single soldier/unit/platoon can do both at the same time.

I'm sorry but I truly do not understand what you're trying to say here. Could you amplify that a bit?

[Rob Thornton]

What about “stabilization” as a political objective to which military means independent of, or along with other elements of national power are applied? The resulting “stability operation” might have components of offense & defense, lethal and non-lethal in support of “stability” as an objective. The environmental conditions (METT-TC) within which the operation takes place drives the use of force.

It gets beck to my hangup on the word “operation” which means it is not just a set of tasks within a mission statement, but is term used to define the nature of an operation that may include the full spectrum of operations.

I’d also bring up that we use the word “stability” allot with regards to bilateral, and regional objectives. We say we want “regional stability in the ME” and that drives strategy and operations. The idea of “stability” I think fits how we see ourselves in the world from a strategic perspective (others may not) in that it creates conditions for potential political redress at a number of levels - and take some of the tension out of the bow string.

Marc, I enjoyed the post on “regular” and “traditional” – what are your thoughts on the word “stability” as to how it fits in western sense of culture?

Best, Rob

[marct]

Hi Rob,

I’d also bring up that we use the word “stability” allot with regards to bilateral, and regional objectives. We say we want “regional stability in the ME” and that drives strategy and operations. The idea of “stability” I think fits how we see ourselves in the world from a strategic perspective (others may not) in that it creates conditions for potential political redress at a number of levels - and take some of the tension out of the bow string.

Marc, I enjoyed the post on “regular” and “traditional” – what are your thoughts on the word “stability” as to how it fits in western sense of culture?

Well, quote he looking up from his Oxford Etymological Dictionary, the word derives from Latin stabilis - "standing firmly" - and remains pretty much with the same meaning through Old French and Middle English. What is interesting is that it has shifted somewhat over the past 100 or so years from standing firm to something closer to "unchanging". I suspect that part of the shift came about as a reaction to both the sweeping effects of nationalism and the encroaching discussions on evolutionary theory, but that's just a guess.

If we look at some of the sideband connotations, there are some really weird ones. First, it is associated with a firmly fixed social pattern - a "stable system" as it were - rather than either a homeostatic or adaptive one. While here are associations with fixed social systems, there's nothing about the content of those systems except for a long temporal depth to them; I'd toss it out as about 500+ years for an oral culture and longer for a literate culture.

Remember in that 10 questions paper when I was talking about the difference between a required institution and a desired one (aka function vs. form)? There has to be some way for a group to achieve certain basic needs but how they do it may be radically different. So, I would argue that a "stability operation" may be viewed as a way of tinkering with social and cultural institutions.

The second weird sideband connotation is when the term gets applied to a linear process. First off, there will probably be a lot of disagreement as to what the end state should be. Most democracies have handled that by having a fairly stable (constant) method of deciding desired end states while keeping the discussion of what is and is not an acceptable end state somewhat fluid or dynamic. Then again, most tribal societies have also developed "stable" institutions at that level; they're called feuds and they all include ways to end feuds.

Shifting out of theory and into reality, there are some other questions about "stability" and "stability operations" that are, I think, important to ask. What is the required end state of the people conducting those operations? Will "imposing" that end state lead to greater or lesser social stability? Given that we operate in a globally interconnected system, what are the states "at home" that contribute to the "instability" abroad that the operation is supposed to "fix"?

[Rank amateur]

You've just gotten it totally backwards -- you're the one advocating population control. As you said above and I again quote:You said that, I didn't.

Stability negates the need for control.

I don't. Kilcullen does.

The key activity is to stand up viable local security forces in partnership with Iraqi Army and Police, as well as political and economic programs, to permanently secure them.

them = the population in an area.

Stability is not the key activity. Again, according to Kilcullen. Of course, I'm just a amateur theorist, talking about COIN theory. That's all I can do. But if you want to convince me personally that the theory doesn't work in reality, you'll need to come up with a better example than the successes of Vietnam. (I could be wrong, but I'm not accepting anything there as successful.) Besides I seem to remember you saying that Vietnam was fought as a land battle not a counter insurgency.

In an ideal situation, that would happen -- what do you do if, as in both the Philippines and Malaya, the bad guys are sort of 'on again - off again?' Do you start 'stabilizing' when they slack off --and then stop when a few of them stir up hate and discontent in one small area of the country?

Works for me. (You only stop in that one small area. Just like a platoon can temporarily retreat while the brigade is advancing.) It doesn't mean that my definition is wrong - or that Kilcullen is wrong - it just means that COIN is a lot harder in practice than theory.

The Armed forces don't want to 'control' (though that's a bad word if you'll give it some thought)

I agree but that's what the experts say is necessary. (According to Google the word Kilcullen and population control is on the net 281 times)

I'm saying you cannot do what you suggest.

That why I am highly skeptical of our ability to win in Iraq, even if we adopt a new field manual and a new strategy.

I'm sorry but I truly do not understand what you're trying to say here. Could you amplify that a bit?

Just because some people are sleeping and some are awake, doesn't mean they're the same thing. Just because some are doing stability and some are fighting doesn't mean they're the same thing. (Which goes back to the original argument - way back when - that my definition must be wrong becaise I define them as two separate things, but they can't be people are doing them at the same time.) So, my definition could be wrong, but if it is it's not because they are both happening at the same time.

Thirdly, if you go into full combat only mode -- as we did in Iraq early on -- all you'll do is antagonize the relatives of those you kill

Right, but according to the theory, if you control the population the relatives can't pick up arms, or at least the ones that do end up dead.

Stability negates the need for control.

I believe this is what we tried in Iraq for the first few years. Rebuild the economy, turn the lights on, everything will stabilize, people will stop shooting at us because they're happy. Didn't work.

Maybe Dr. Metz can jump in, but I believe this is more or less the belief that he felt needed to be changed when he started writing about COIN in 2004. (Don't worry steve. I'll still buy your book if you tell me am completely out to lunch.)

I'd be really interested to know what you propose to do to make sure the violence doesn't come back. Seriously.

When I was in grade 7, I bloodied a kid's nose. No one bothered me again. Once people know they can't hide in the population they are easily deterews by "the visible presence of kinetic weapons and a demonstration of the will to use them if necessary."

[Ron Humphrey]

If we step back from the context of operations in another place and simply use somewhere close to heart like home.

1- Do you suppose that government entities provide safety, security, empowerment, assistance, enhanced stability, and Kinetic operations against elements who choose to threaten that stability, safety, etc at the same time.

As this is a somewhat rhetorical question I have but one more

Why would it be any less important , let alone possible for the military to do the same in counter insurgency ?

[Ken White]

I don't. Kilcullen does.

Then either he's wrong or it's taken out of context. As I said, it is not possible to control the population in any mid size nation. Over 1.5M allied troops in Viet Nam, a population of 15M in an area the fourth of the size of Iraq and the population was never controlled.

In both nations -- most nations -- all most people want it to be left alone to get on with their lives. Only a small percent will engage in an insurgency; they need controlling or killing -- every one else needs to be left alone within reason.

Stability is not the key activity...

Over course it's not. it's not even an activity -- it's a goal. operations of VARIOUS types are conducted to attain that goal.

...Again, according to Kilcullen. Of course, I'm just a amateur theorist, talking about COIN theory. That's all I can do. But if you want to convince me personally that the theory doesn't work in reality, you'll need to come up with a better example than the successes of Vietnam. (I could be wrong, but I'm not accepting anything there as successful.) Besides I seem to remember you saying that Vietnam was fought as a land battle not a counter insurgency.

I don't really care if you're convinced or not, I'm merely pointing out that your theory is mssing a couple of points.

As to Viet Nam, you'd be wrong. you've been reading to much left wing scholarship and revisionist history (in fairness, there's a lot of bogus right wing stuff out there as well). For a pretty balanced account of what happened after the media lost interest in Viet Nam, check this out LINK. It tells of the success of the effort after we stopped fighting a land war in Europe. The land war phase was 1962-68, seven long years of doing the wrong thing by the command and many -- not all --units. The book at the link portrays the last three years when the right things were done, when it was a COIN operation fighting an insurgency and working to attain stability at the same time. That stability was achieved and it lasted for two more years before the North launched a major conventional attack on the South.

Works for me. (You only stop in that one small area. Just like a platoon can temporarily retreat while the brigade is advancing.) It doesn't mean that my definition is wrong - or that Kilcullen is wrong - it just means that COIN is a lot harder in practice than theory.

It is far harder in practice than in theory -- as are most things. I said you were wrong in my previous comment but I was not clear that referred only to your comment on my being confused. The rest of your stuff wasn't right or wrong, it was your opinion. You and Kilcullen are entitled to your opinions and they are no more right or wrong than are my opinions. Though mine are backed with more than theorizing...

I agree but that's what the experts say is necessary. (According to Google the word Kilcullen and population control is on the net 281 times)

Typical metric, proves nothing. The key is in what sense or context does he use that phrase. I don't know and don't really care. I know what I've done and I have a broad idea of what he's done. He's a smart guy. so am I. We can differ. I'm not an expert and I'm broadly distrustful of those that are purported to be...

That why I am highly skeptical of our ability to win in Iraq, even if we adopt a new field manual and a new strategy.

We were never going to 'win' in Iraq. Never were and never will. All we could -- and can -- hope for is an acceptable conclusion. That's all anyone can hope for in any insurgency (and Saddam told us before we went that's what we would face). Nobody wins or loses, they just get a decent ending. That's all the Brits got in Malaya, an acceptable conclusion. That's all we got in the Philippines.

Just because some people are sleeping and some are awake, doesn't mean they're the same thing. Just because some are doing stability and some are fighting doesn't mean they're the same thing. (Which goes back to the original argument - way back when - that my definition must be wrong becaise I define them as two separate things, but they can't be people are doing them at the same time.) So, my definition could be wrong, but if it is it's not because they are both happening at the same time.

Well, you got there, part way, anyhow. To get all the way there, just realize they are both happening at the same times, with different people doing different things. Something like the Venn diagram below.

Right, but according to the theory, if you control the population the relatives can't pick up arms, or at least the ones that do end up dead.

How did that theory work out in Iraq -- or Afghanistan? Both places where it's being applied. As I said, it is impossible to control an entire population. also recall that in both cultures, we very wisely allowed folks to keep weapons for self defense.

I believe this is what we tried in Iraq for the first few years. Rebuild the economy, turn the lights on, everything will stabilize, people will stop shooting at us because they're happy. Didn't work.

Yes and no. You have a point but that's where another theory met reality. Don't you hate it when that happens?

Maybe Dr. Metz can jump in, but I believe this is more or less the belief that he felt needed to be changed when he started writing about COIN in 2004. (Don't worry steve. I'll still buy your book if you tell me am completely out to lunch.) ...When I was in grade 7, I bloodied a kid's nose. No one bothered me again. Once people know they can't hide in the population they are easily deterews by "the visible presence of kinetic weapons and a demonstration of the will to use them if necessary."

Hate to tell you this nut there's a difference between the 7th grade and people with guns; particularly when they're 18 or 19 and immortal.

How do you keep the bad guys from hiding in the population? Really. That's the question.

[Ken White]

You were there, so I'll defer to your experience, but I'd call that a war: a big messy complicate one with all types of combat.

fact that there was an ongoing stability operation (pursued over the years with greater or lesser effort and ability -- as was the combat portion) at the same time. That is absolute fact.

I say if you're using kinetic weapons "breaking stuff," then it can't be a "stability operation" because by definition when you break stuff it becomes more unstable: albeit the instability is often temporary.

You can say that and we can disagree on it. My guess is that most people involved in either type of operation would like to have it your way but realize that's not always possible. If it was, why would there be a need for any stability operation?

So I still think that the time between when you stop breaking stuff and stability is a good definition and your objective is to get to stability as fast as possible. Intuitively, that definition explains why during stability ops you often need to spend time rebuilding what you broke.

How then do you account for the times when you're in full, non combat stability enhancing mode and some churlish demagogue stirs up a minor or major bit of combat? Do you stop the stabilization effort? That doesn't seem very smart...

No reason in the world that both states cannot exist concurrently; they did in Viet Nam, they did in Malaya, they did in Greece and in the Phillipines from 1900-1913.

Building some stuff, while breaking other stuff happens all the time, but I'd call the building "getting a head start on stability operations" not stability operations per say...

Again, we can disagree. While that would be an ideal state, life isn't that neat.

(If the shooting in the AO around the school you built never stops is that because your COIN efforts failed or your stability ops failed? To me, it sounds more like the former.)

Could be both. Accepting that it is more likely the former what you suggest is abandoning an attempt to improve the stability until combat ceases. Ain't gonna happen and should not.

[Rank amateur]

If it was, why would there be a need for any stability operation?

To make sure that the violence doesn't come back. (While my definition may be wrong, it is logical consistent.) First you stop the violence. Then you use different TTPs to make sure it doesn't come back.

minor or major bit of combat? Do you stop the stabilization effort? That doesn't seem very smart...

Yes, but only in the area where the violence breaks out. (The population has proven that they can't be trusted with their new freedom, so you reestablish control.)

It's just like retreat/advance. Some troops can be advancing, others retreating. That doesn't mean a single soldier/unit/platoon can do both at the same time.