IW and Stability Operations - in your own words - what is the difference?

[wm]

I've attached a quick analysis that may be a start to a methodology for analysis. Comments are greatly appreciated.

[marct]

Hey Wayne,

I've attached a quick analysis that may be a start to a methodology for analysis. Comments are greatly appreciated.

Looks like we're thinking along similar lines .

Marc

[Eden]

I think any attempt to define the terms we are dealing with by examining the tools used, or how the opposing forces organize, train, and support themselves, or the tactics they use, is doomed to failure.

I think the only useful way to differentiate kinds or styles of war is by looking at the targets of force and the desired proximate outcome of the use of force.

Conventional armies can fight across the spectrum of war, to include employing terrorism. Insurgents can employ terrorist tactics, or traditional "Maoist" insurgency tactics, or they can fight conventionally. Both sculptors and demolition teams use hammers and chisels. So defining the type of war by looking at who shows up to fight it, or by the weapons employed, seems to me to be an exercise in futility.

[marct]

Hi Eden,

Conventional armies can fight across the spectrum of war, to include employing terrorism. Insurgents can employ terrorist tactics, or traditional "Maoist" insurgency tactics, or they can fight conventionally. Both sculptors and demolition teams use hammers and chisels. So defining the type of war by looking at who shows up to fight it, or by the weapons employed, seems to me to be an exercise in futility.

It strikes me that you are confusing the event - "war" - with the players . I was trying to define types of "war" (events) rather than types of players. Iraq is a good example of a situation where types have segued into each other, so being able to name and recognize the different types allows for the employment of a segued doctrine and actions based on what is actually happening.

Marc

[Rank amateur]

Stability ops are when no one is shooting at you but violence may increase if you leave.

I'm not sure that I can say that in lingo, but I'll try. "Insurgent activity has been neutralized but the threat of future insurgent activity must be deterred with the threat of kinetic operations so that the political process can produce a political agreement that leads to long term stability. Cooperation with other operational and institutional JIIM community members is necessary to further support economic/societal rebuilding and the political process."

[Ron Humphrey]

Conventional wars general equate to when there is a set or known outcome with fair certainty as to what should be accomplished. Straight shootin so to speak.

Anything else immediately starts filtering into other forms from irregular all the way to unrestricted warfare.

It really seems to be about what you seek to accomplish and then varies in how it gets done. Aside from that I really tend to agree with WILF.

A fight's a fight. What the opponents are willing to do to win it is defined almost in a progressively downward trend.

1- Conventional - stand and fight

2- Irregular- What? he ducked, then swing lower this time rather than straight at him.

2- IW2- What? He moved out of the way then swing where he's going to move to next time

3- UW- What? he didn't show up on time for the fight- Then kill the %$##% in his sleep.

SO- fix up the house, pay the family for their food, and call for a ticket home
(Human Decency Standards) even in kinetic operations this still should be being considered)

[Ken White]

Stability ops are when no one is shooting at you but violence may increase if you leave.

is designed to assist a State (generally) in achieving stability. Such ops include all forms of support and that may or may not include combat operations of various types conducted concurrently. A decent example is Viet Nam post 1968 when the stability operation was paramount but there were still requirments for combat (albeit at an ever declining level). Whether violence would increase or not due to your departure is irrelevant to the description (though not to the outcome).

I'm not sure that I can say that in lingo, but I'll try. "Insurgent activity has been neutralized but the threat of future insurgent activity must be deterred with the threat of kinetic operations so that the political process can produce a political agreement that leads to long term stability. Cooperation with other operational and institutional JIIM community members is necessary to further support economic/societal rebuilding and the political process."

Weird... but maybe so. if so, that's just one example. it may be pertinent to current situations but it will not always apply.

[Rank amateur]

A decent example is Viet Nam post 1968 when the stability operation was paramount but there were still requirements for combat

You were there, so I'll defer to your experience, but I'd call that a war: a big messy complicate one with all types of combat.

I say if you're using kinetic weapons "breaking stuff," then it can't be a "stability operation" because by definition when you break stuff it becomes more unstable: albeit the instability is often temporary.

So I still think that the time between when you stop breaking stuff and stability is a good definition and your objective is to get to stability as fast as possible. Intuitively, that definition explains why during stability ops you often need to spend time rebuilding what you broke.

Building some stuff, while breaking other stuff happens all the time, but I'd call the building "getting a head start on stability operations" not stability operations per say. (If the shooting in the AO around the school you built never stops is that because your COIN efforts failed or your stability ops failed? To me, it sounds more like the former.)

[Eden]

Hi Eden,



It strikes me that you are confusing the event - "war" - with the players . I was trying to define types of "war" (events) rather than types of players.

Marc

Actually, I think we were saying the same thing. A 'conventional' army - such as the US Army - can fight a conventional war, or it can take the part of an insurgent, or it can employ terror. The Viet Cong could fight a conventional war; the NVA could act as an insurgent. Thus, while certain armies are better suited to certain types of war, you cannot define a 'type' of war by, as you say, who the players are.

Instead, you must examine the targets selected by the opposing force. As you slide down the spectrum from conventional war to whatever we call the other end, the opposing force expends progressively less energy on attacking the enemy's military shield and progressively more on trying to influence/kill/terrorize/rob the society itself. Thus, tactics do not define the 'type' of war - rather the 'type' of war dictates what tactics are likely to be effective.

The implications of this is that the weaker force is able to dictate what 'type' of war will be fought - with the very important caveat that at lower intensities it becomes progressively more difficult to defend one's culture, infrastructure, material wealth, national territory, or way of life.