This particular thread amused and disappointed me, and I don't want you to pardon my rant, if the shoe fits, then it yours to wear. Based on some of the comments, you should be wearing it proudly.

I'll only point out one my name, since he has a habit of frequently calling those who disagree with him stupid throughout the council. It would be nice to see some credential beyond studies military history if you're going to call those who do this for a living stupid. I really don't mind it when the shoe fits, as my wife calls me stupid at least once a week, so the term is no longer overly offensive. On with the rant,

William Owen thinks he has an accurate grasp of history; therefore, he apparently "thinks" he has the credentials to call anyone who doesn't agree with his dumbed down version of "war is war" explanation.

Others who have been brain washed by simplistic concepts at CGSC seem to have lost the ability to think critically and challenge their own ideas.

I think I just read that irregular warfare will morph into conventional warfare? This was outdated thinking when Special Forces doctrine first developed the seven phases of unconventional warfare. The seven phases continue to be interpreted as some sort of doctrinal history, but it completely fails to identify how to utilize irregular forces effectively, instead it focuses on developing a large guerrilla force into 5th column to support conventional maneuver forces with their "decisive' battle. It is clear the communists (both the Maoists and Leninists and those inbetween) had a much clearer grasp on to achieve victory utilizing full spectrum unconventional warfare that had little to do with conventional warfare. They focused on the populace and established control over them (making the government irrelevant in those areas) through infiltration, subversion, conversion (mobilization), select terrorist and other psychological means to gradually bring the government to a culminating point.

You can't defeat this type of strategy with a conventional warfare strategy, because the enemy is effectively blended into the masses. Unless you're fighting a fool you will largely be punching into the air when you attack with overwhelming force. So you kill 20 here, and 20 there, or on a good day maybe a few hundred. If the insurgents still hold sway over the populace you still have gained no additional legitimacy for the government, and you simply further eroded your nation's will to continue on with the fight.

I misspoke when I said you couldn't win with a conventional strategy, because that is not the whole story. If you simply declare the populace as a whole hostile and declare war on them, you can engage in operations that border genocide or at least forcably dislocate whole population groups from an area, then you win with conventional tactics. Needless to say American Soldiers wouldn't do that even if the ROE permitted such a strategy, so we're back to square one where you can't win with conventional tactics.

The opposite of irregular warfare in our lexicon is not regular warfare it is conventional warfare, and I explained that in my previous post. If you want to develop your own terms that is fine, but unless you define them they don't have any meaning. What the hell is regular warfare?

It would seem to be that the correct definition of stupid would be repeating the same behavior after it has demonstratedly failed. At least it has clearly failed for those who are capable are perceiving the world as it instead of the way they desire it to be.

Fortunately we have some great officers in our ranks in the Army, and I guess a few in the Marine Corp who clearly understand that IW is very much different than conventional warfare. Yes it is still warfare, but that is like stating farming is farming, but I think an argument may be able to be made that growing corn and growing rice are just a wee bit different? Maybe not, maybe farming is just farming. However, we tried the conventional warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan (after phase III where conventional warfare tactics were needed and appropriate), and for some reason our "drive by" COIN operations didn't facilitate anything resembling success. After several months/years of failing to make any headway with missions simply focused on finding and killing insurgents (of course everyone is a high value target today, it is the new version of the Vietnam body count) some officers were "finally" able to move into position who effectively learned the lessons of the past, and then adapted those lessons appropriately to the realities of today. These officers focused on controlling and securing the populace, which greatly reduced or denied insurgent influence on these protected souls. The military effectively created a window of opportunity for a political victory. The military can't win this alone, the political leaders have to skillfully and courgeously exploit temporary military successes, if that doesn't happen (or won't happen), then we are pee'ing in the wind, and we all know it. However, that is the only effective strategy and it is not conventional warfare. That doesn't mean conventional forces don't do it, it is a matter of who does it, but rather what they do.

My rant deals with my frustration of our failure to consistently fail to apply the lessons of history when we go to war. Why do we have to relearn the basics each time? This is a failure of our officer corp, not just our politicians. Politicians are elected, they may or may not be wise, but our officers are developed over a period of years through experience and education, and yet that professional development system seems to be failing our nation.

Now that we live in an information age unlike any other in our past, though I'm sure Clausewitz somehow addressed this also according to some of you, the key take away is that public perceptions are shaped by multiple media venues and speakers, and failures we could have overcome in the past with time, we cannot overcome now, because we deal with a better informed (probably not the right choice of words) and less patient public. Our mistakes erode public will quicker than they have in the past. They can see when we're making progress and when we're not (what they see is reality to them, so there is no use arguing they don't get it). If we're not they wonder why we're wasting precious resources on a fight we're not going to win. The insurgent can survive forever if we use conventional warfare tactics, we can't. Adapting a proper irregular warfare strategy where we live in the streets face to face with our invisible foe is tougher, more demanding, and more dangerous (unless you're fighting a peer competitor in conventional warfare) than drive by COIN, but at least there is some benefit in the cost:benefits ratio when we lose our brothers. I'm not sure that is the case when we lose them to IEDs when we're simply driving by, our massing forces to hit some mystical center of gravity.

Failure to understand the difference the between IW and conventional warfare in my mind borders on incompetence and treason if you're a professional officer. Many get it, and don't realize they get it, because they don't understand the differences. That doesn't bother me so much, as the definitions are broad and sufficient gray areas for broad interpretation. However, not getting it bothers me, because next up in the arena is our kids, and I know that is the case for many of you already. We have every right to demand the best from our leaders.