IW and Stability Operations - in your own words - what is the difference?

[Ron Humphrey]

You were there, so I'll defer to your experience, but I'd call that a war: a big messy complicate one with all types of combat.

I say if you're using kinetic weapons "breaking stuff," then it can't be a "stability operation" because by definition when you break stuff it becomes more unstable: albeit the instability is often temporary.

So I still think that the time between when you stop breaking stuff and stability is a good definition and your objective is to get to stability as fast as possible. Intuitively, that definition explains why during stability ops you often need to spend time rebuilding what you broke.

Building some stuff, while breaking other stuff happens all the time, but I'd call the building "getting a head start on stability operations" not stability operations per say. (If the shooting in the AO around the school you built never stops is that because your COIN efforts failed or your stability ops failed? To me, it sounds more like the former.)

But what if the what you are breaking is the what that is currently de-stabilizing the situation

[Ken White]

You were there, so I'll defer to your experience, but I'd call that a war: a big messy complicate one with all types of combat.

fact that there was an ongoing stability operation (pursued over the years with greater or lesser effort and ability -- as was the combat portion) at the same time. That is absolute fact.

I say if you're using kinetic weapons "breaking stuff," then it can't be a "stability operation" because by definition when you break stuff it becomes more unstable: albeit the instability is often temporary.

You can say that and we can disagree on it. My guess is that most people involved in either type of operation would like to have it your way but realize that's not always possible. If it was, why would there be a need for any stability operation?

So I still think that the time between when you stop breaking stuff and stability is a good definition and your objective is to get to stability as fast as possible. Intuitively, that definition explains why during stability ops you often need to spend time rebuilding what you broke.

How then do you account for the times when you're in full, non combat stability enhancing mode and some churlish demagogue stirs up a minor or major bit of combat? Do you stop the stabilization effort? That doesn't seem very smart...

No reason in the world that both states cannot exist concurrently; they did in Viet Nam, they did in Malaya, they did in Greece and in the Phillipines from 1900-1913.

Building some stuff, while breaking other stuff happens all the time, but I'd call the building "getting a head start on stability operations" not stability operations per say...

Again, we can disagree. While that would be an ideal state, life isn't that neat.

(If the shooting in the AO around the school you built never stops is that because your COIN efforts failed or your stability ops failed? To me, it sounds more like the former.)

Could be both. Accepting that it is more likely the former what you suggest is abandoning an attempt to improve the stability until combat ceases. Ain't gonna happen and should not.

[Rank amateur]

But what if the what you are breaking is the what that is currently de-stabilizing the situation

Then you are fighting with the objective of getting to your stability phase. (Which makes sense, because you can not create stability until the destabilizers are gone.)

Ken, you make many good points, but I'd say that just because somebody tried to both at the same time - and it didn't work - doesn't prove that they can successfully happen at the same.

The actual process is relatively straight forward. Control the population. That takes away the bad guys "cover." You kill some of the bad guys. Some put their guns away and pretend to be civilians. You make sure the bad guys can't pick up the guns they've hidden, while easing up on the population. (You don't need to control them anymore.) Sooner or later everyone figures out some way they can live together.

I've seen no evidence that trying to stabilize a population, before you control it - before it has been cleansed of insurgents - can be successful. (But I am sure that if such evidence exists, someone will bring it to my attention and it won't be the first time that I've been wrong.)

what you suggest is abandoning an attempt to improve the stability until combat ceases. Ain't gonna happen and should not.

I suggest that you're confusing population control with stability. I suggest that the reason for similar confusion here is because you guys are too darn nice. You want to liberate and stabilize. You don't want to control. But that's the way it works. The iron fist comes first, then you can wrap a velvet glove around it. (If you wrap the velvet glove around it too soon, the iron fist becomes less effective.)

[Rank amateur]

If it was, why would there be a need for any stability operation?

To make sure that the violence doesn't come back. (While my definition may be wrong, it is logical consistent.) First you stop the violence. Then you use different TTPs to make sure it doesn't come back.

minor or major bit of combat? Do you stop the stabilization effort? That doesn't seem very smart...

Yes, but only in the area where the violence breaks out. (The population has proven that they can't be trusted with their new freedom, so you reestablish control.)

It's just like retreat/advance. Some troops can be advancing, others retreating. That doesn't mean a single soldier/unit/platoon can do both at the same time.

[Ken White]

Then you are fighting with the objective of getting to your stability phase. (Which makes sense, because you can not create stability until the destabilizers are gone.)

Not so. Depends on the geographical size of the nation involved, demographics and a host of other factors. Again, look at the Philippines and Malaya. Look at Iraq -- parts of it are now stable, others are not.

Ken, you make many good points, but I'd say that just because somebody tried to both at the same time - and it didn't work - doesn't prove that they can successfully happen at the same.

Where did it not work? The three I cited are places where a degree of combat and stability operations occurred concurrently and all were nominally successful -- and before you say Viet Nam was not, I'd urge you to consider it in some detail and not resort to the distorted US media version of what happened.

The actual process is relatively straight forward. Control the population. That takes away the bad guys "cover." You kill some of the bad guys. Some put their guns away and pretend to be civilians. You make sure the bad guys can't pick up the guns they've hidden, while easing up on the population. (You don't need to control them anymore.) Sooner or later everyone figures out some way they can live together.

In an ideal situation, that would happen -- what do you do if, as in both the Philippines and Malaya, the bad guys are sort of 'on again - off again?' Do you start 'stabilizing' when they slack off --and then stop when a few of them stir up hate and discontent in one small area of the country? How long does that 'figuring out' take? Do you do nothing until there's tranquility to get a functioning government and services during that time?

I've seen no evidence that trying to stabilize a population, before you control it - before it has been cleansed of insurgents - can be successful. (But I am sure that if such evidence exists, someone will bring it to my attention and it won't be the first time that I've been wrong.)

I gave you three -- four counting Greece -- and there are others.

I suggest that you're confusing population control with stability. I suggest that the reason for similar confusion here is because you guys are too darn nice. You want to liberate and stabilize. You don't want to control. But that's the way it works. The iron fist comes first, then you can wrap a velvet glove around it. (If you wrap the velvet glove around it too soon, the iron fist becomes less effective.)

I suggest that you just proved you don't know what you're talking about.

You've just gotten it totally backwards -- you're the one advocating population control. As you said above and I again quote:

"The actual process is relatively straight forward. Control the population. That takes away the bad guys "cover." You kill some of the bad guys. Some put their guns away and pretend to be civilians. You make sure the bad guys can't pick up the guns they've hidden, while easing up on the population. (You don't need to control them anymore.)"

You said that, I didn't.

Stability negates the need for control.

I'm saying you cannot do what you suggest. First, you can't control all of anyone's population, absolutely impossible to do. Second, in a large nation, no other nation is likely to have the available manpower to even attempt control the population (how many people would it take to control 25M Iraqis in an area the size of California?). Thirdly, if you go into full combat only mode -- as we did in Iraq early on -- all you'll do is antagonize the relatives of those you kill -- and you will kill people that do not need to be killed with that approach. Lastly, to provide stability and ongoing effort is generally required and you cannot start it when it's peaceful and stop it at a hint of violence; it has to be an ongoing effort.

I have no problem using force, not a bit -- but promiscuous use of excessive force does more harm than good. I think you might want to do a little more research, perhaps...

You are correct on one thing in that last paragraph. "...You want to liberate and stabilize. You don't want to control." Not due to being too nice, that's a really, really bad misapprehension. The Armed forces don't want to 'control' (though that's a bad word if you'll give it some thought) or do stability ops because they're tedious, thankless and an absolute pain to do. Not to mention they take a long time (waiting for everyone else to "...figure (sic) out some way they can live together.")

Then this:

To make sure that the violence doesn't come back. (While my definition may be wrong, it is logical consistent.) First you stop the violence. Then you use different TTPs to make sure it doesn't come back.

Logical? If you say so...

I'd be really interested to know what you propose to do to make sure the violence doesn't come back. Seriously.

Your plan is excellent -- what, precisely do you call what you're doing with those different TTPs?

Yes, but only in the area where the violence breaks out. (The population has proven that they can't be trusted with their new freedom, so you reestablish control.)

There you go again with that control you say I'm advocating. Heh.

It's just like retreat/advance. Some troops can be advancing, others retreating. That doesn't mean a single soldier/unit/platoon can do both at the same time.

I'm sorry but I truly do not understand what you're trying to say here. Could you amplify that a bit?

[Rob Thornton]

What about “stabilization” as a political objective to which military means independent of, or along with other elements of national power are applied? The resulting “stability operation” might have components of offense & defense, lethal and non-lethal in support of “stability” as an objective. The environmental conditions (METT-TC) within which the operation takes place drives the use of force.

It gets beck to my hangup on the word “operation” which means it is not just a set of tasks within a mission statement, but is term used to define the nature of an operation that may include the full spectrum of operations.

I’d also bring up that we use the word “stability” allot with regards to bilateral, and regional objectives. We say we want “regional stability in the ME” and that drives strategy and operations. The idea of “stability” I think fits how we see ourselves in the world from a strategic perspective (others may not) in that it creates conditions for potential political redress at a number of levels - and take some of the tension out of the bow string.

Marc, I enjoyed the post on “regular” and “traditional” – what are your thoughts on the word “stability” as to how it fits in western sense of culture?

Best, Rob

[Rank amateur]

You've just gotten it totally backwards -- you're the one advocating population control. As you said above and I again quote:You said that, I didn't.

Stability negates the need for control.

I don't. Kilcullen does.

The key activity is to stand up viable local security forces in partnership with Iraqi Army and Police, as well as political and economic programs, to permanently secure them.

them = the population in an area.

Stability is not the key activity. Again, according to Kilcullen. Of course, I'm just a amateur theorist, talking about COIN theory. That's all I can do. But if you want to convince me personally that the theory doesn't work in reality, you'll need to come up with a better example than the successes of Vietnam. (I could be wrong, but I'm not accepting anything there as successful.) Besides I seem to remember you saying that Vietnam was fought as a land battle not a counter insurgency.

In an ideal situation, that would happen -- what do you do if, as in both the Philippines and Malaya, the bad guys are sort of 'on again - off again?' Do you start 'stabilizing' when they slack off --and then stop when a few of them stir up hate and discontent in one small area of the country?

Works for me. (You only stop in that one small area. Just like a platoon can temporarily retreat while the brigade is advancing.) It doesn't mean that my definition is wrong - or that Kilcullen is wrong - it just means that COIN is a lot harder in practice than theory.

The Armed forces don't want to 'control' (though that's a bad word if you'll give it some thought)

I agree but that's what the experts say is necessary. (According to Google the word Kilcullen and population control is on the net 281 times)

I'm saying you cannot do what you suggest.

That why I am highly skeptical of our ability to win in Iraq, even if we adopt a new field manual and a new strategy.

I'm sorry but I truly do not understand what you're trying to say here. Could you amplify that a bit?

Just because some people are sleeping and some are awake, doesn't mean they're the same thing. Just because some are doing stability and some are fighting doesn't mean they're the same thing. (Which goes back to the original argument - way back when - that my definition must be wrong becaise I define them as two separate things, but they can't be people are doing them at the same time.) So, my definition could be wrong, but if it is it's not because they are both happening at the same time.

Thirdly, if you go into full combat only mode -- as we did in Iraq early on -- all you'll do is antagonize the relatives of those you kill

Right, but according to the theory, if you control the population the relatives can't pick up arms, or at least the ones that do end up dead.

Stability negates the need for control.

I believe this is what we tried in Iraq for the first few years. Rebuild the economy, turn the lights on, everything will stabilize, people will stop shooting at us because they're happy. Didn't work.

Maybe Dr. Metz can jump in, but I believe this is more or less the belief that he felt needed to be changed when he started writing about COIN in 2004. (Don't worry steve. I'll still buy your book if you tell me am completely out to lunch.)

I'd be really interested to know what you propose to do to make sure the violence doesn't come back. Seriously.

When I was in grade 7, I bloodied a kid's nose. No one bothered me again. Once people know they can't hide in the population they are easily deterews by "the visible presence of kinetic weapons and a demonstration of the will to use them if necessary."

[Ron Humphrey]

If we step back from the context of operations in another place and simply use somewhere close to heart like home.

1- Do you suppose that government entities provide safety, security, empowerment, assistance, enhanced stability, and Kinetic operations against elements who choose to threaten that stability, safety, etc at the same time.

As this is a somewhat rhetorical question I have but one more

Why would it be any less important , let alone possible for the military to do the same in counter insurgency ?

[Ken White]

I don't. Kilcullen does.

Then either he's wrong or it's taken out of context. As I said, it is not possible to control the population in any mid size nation. Over 1.5M allied troops in Viet Nam, a population of 15M in an area the fourth of the size of Iraq and the population was never controlled.

In both nations -- most nations -- all most people want it to be left alone to get on with their lives. Only a small percent will engage in an insurgency; they need controlling or killing -- every one else needs to be left alone within reason.

Stability is not the key activity...

Over course it's not. it's not even an activity -- it's a goal. operations of VARIOUS types are conducted to attain that goal.

...Again, according to Kilcullen. Of course, I'm just a amateur theorist, talking about COIN theory. That's all I can do. But if you want to convince me personally that the theory doesn't work in reality, you'll need to come up with a better example than the successes of Vietnam. (I could be wrong, but I'm not accepting anything there as successful.) Besides I seem to remember you saying that Vietnam was fought as a land battle not a counter insurgency.

I don't really care if you're convinced or not, I'm merely pointing out that your theory is mssing a couple of points.

As to Viet Nam, you'd be wrong. you've been reading to much left wing scholarship and revisionist history (in fairness, there's a lot of bogus right wing stuff out there as well). For a pretty balanced account of what happened after the media lost interest in Viet Nam, check this out LINK. It tells of the success of the effort after we stopped fighting a land war in Europe. The land war phase was 1962-68, seven long years of doing the wrong thing by the command and many -- not all --units. The book at the link portrays the last three years when the right things were done, when it was a COIN operation fighting an insurgency and working to attain stability at the same time. That stability was achieved and it lasted for two more years before the North launched a major conventional attack on the South.

Works for me. (You only stop in that one small area. Just like a platoon can temporarily retreat while the brigade is advancing.) It doesn't mean that my definition is wrong - or that Kilcullen is wrong - it just means that COIN is a lot harder in practice than theory.

It is far harder in practice than in theory -- as are most things. I said you were wrong in my previous comment but I was not clear that referred only to your comment on my being confused. The rest of your stuff wasn't right or wrong, it was your opinion. You and Kilcullen are entitled to your opinions and they are no more right or wrong than are my opinions. Though mine are backed with more than theorizing...

I agree but that's what the experts say is necessary. (According to Google the word Kilcullen and population control is on the net 281 times)

Typical metric, proves nothing. The key is in what sense or context does he use that phrase. I don't know and don't really care. I know what I've done and I have a broad idea of what he's done. He's a smart guy. so am I. We can differ. I'm not an expert and I'm broadly distrustful of those that are purported to be...

That why I am highly skeptical of our ability to win in Iraq, even if we adopt a new field manual and a new strategy.

We were never going to 'win' in Iraq. Never were and never will. All we could -- and can -- hope for is an acceptable conclusion. That's all anyone can hope for in any insurgency (and Saddam told us before we went that's what we would face). Nobody wins or loses, they just get a decent ending. That's all the Brits got in Malaya, an acceptable conclusion. That's all we got in the Philippines.

Just because some people are sleeping and some are awake, doesn't mean they're the same thing. Just because some are doing stability and some are fighting doesn't mean they're the same thing. (Which goes back to the original argument - way back when - that my definition must be wrong becaise I define them as two separate things, but they can't be people are doing them at the same time.) So, my definition could be wrong, but if it is it's not because they are both happening at the same time.

Well, you got there, part way, anyhow. To get all the way there, just realize they are both happening at the same times, with different people doing different things. Something like the Venn diagram below.

Right, but according to the theory, if you control the population the relatives can't pick up arms, or at least the ones that do end up dead.

How did that theory work out in Iraq -- or Afghanistan? Both places where it's being applied. As I said, it is impossible to control an entire population. also recall that in both cultures, we very wisely allowed folks to keep weapons for self defense.

I believe this is what we tried in Iraq for the first few years. Rebuild the economy, turn the lights on, everything will stabilize, people will stop shooting at us because they're happy. Didn't work.

Yes and no. You have a point but that's where another theory met reality. Don't you hate it when that happens?

Maybe Dr. Metz can jump in, but I believe this is more or less the belief that he felt needed to be changed when he started writing about COIN in 2004. (Don't worry steve. I'll still buy your book if you tell me am completely out to lunch.) ...When I was in grade 7, I bloodied a kid's nose. No one bothered me again. Once people know they can't hide in the population they are easily deterews by "the visible presence of kinetic weapons and a demonstration of the will to use them if necessary."

Hate to tell you this nut there's a difference between the 7th grade and people with guns; particularly when they're 18 or 19 and immortal.

How do you keep the bad guys from hiding in the population? Really. That's the question.

[Rank amateur]

Ron, apparently we rounded up a bunch of Arabs after 911 without warrants, so I guess you can say that domestically we have perceived the need to control certain elements of the population and have done so.

[Rank amateur]

I don't know and don't really care.

I guessed as much. (That's why I didn't dig up the precise quote.)

portrays the last three years when the right things were done, when it was a COIN operation fighting an insurgency and working to attain stability at the same time. That stability was achieved and it lasted for two more years before the North launched a major conventional attack on the South.

I have a theory as to why that is strategically irrelevant. If I'm ever able to articulate it, I'd be honored if you would attack it.

Hate to tell you this nut there's a difference between the 7th grade and people with guns; particularly when they're 18 or 19 and immortal.

People are people. You can make people put their guns down. It happens all the time. The crazy ones might not, but we have more bullets than they have crazy people. The trick is to make sure that the angry people don't follow the crazy ones. Making them put down their guns is the first step. Then you give them a decade or three to work out their anger because like you said before, as long as there is shooting, the number of angry people is going to grow.

We were never going to 'win' in Iraq. Never were and never will. All we could -- and can -- hope for is an acceptable conclusion. That's all anyone can hope for in any insurgency (and Saddam told us before we went that's what we would face). Nobody wins or loses, they just get a decent ending. That's all the Brits got in Malaya, an acceptable conclusion. That's all we got in the Philippines.

In a nutshell, I think that if you map out what we consider acceptable and what all the various parties in Iraq consider acceptable there is no place where all the parties overlap: no solution that is acceptable to everyone.

Again, I hope to articulate this more coherently in the future.

How do you keep the bad guys from hiding in the population? Really. That's the question.

As I understand the theory, you force the population to choose sides. What happens if they choose the bad guys is left unsaid, but fairly obvious.

Also, unless I completely missed the boat, I believe that is one of the questions that Rob and his new team are supposed to answer, so maybe I should defer to him.

[selil]

Ron, apparently we rounded up a bunch of Arabs after 911 without warrants, so I guess you can say that domestically we have perceived the need to control certain elements of the population and have done so.

There is so much wrong with this statement from false conclusions to gross inaccuracy it is surreal.

[Ken White]

I guessed as much. (That's why I didn't dig up the precise quote.)

Prescient .

However, in getting to that, you forgot this exchange:

Stability is not the key activity...

"Of (sic) course it's not. It's not even an activity -- it's a goal. operations of VARIOUS types are conducted to attain that goal."

That's really the issue, is it not?

I have a theory as to why that is strategically irrelevant. If I'm ever able to articulate it, I'd be honored if you would attack it.

The whole Viet Nam war was strategically irrelevant so I'm likely to agree with you rather than attack your theory.

People are people. You can make people put their guns down...

No you can't -- you can make them hide them and use them rarely but enough will cheat that you'll always have a problem.

... It happens all the time.

It does? Name me a place where it's been truly successful.

The crazy ones might not, but we have more bullets than they have crazy people. The trick is to make sure that the angry people don't follow the crazy ones.

Shoot too many crazy ones who are cousins of angry ones in the ME and wathc what happens.

Making them put down their guns is the first step. Then you give them a decade or three to work out their anger because like you said before, as long as there is shooting, the number of angry people is going to grow.

What if you do not have three decades or even one?

In a nutshell, I think that if you map out what we consider acceptable and what all the various parties in Iraq consider acceptable there is no place where all the parties overlap: no solution that is acceptable to everyone.

Well, of course not. That's always true of any situation from Iraq to social security to where my wife and I went for dinner to who the nominees for Prez will be. The key point is that the solution is acceptable to most and is flexible enough to minimally irk those who object. Will we get there? Don't know, I think probably so but it isn't over yet.

Again, I hope to articulate this more coherently in the future.

Looking forward to it.

As I understand the theory, you force the population to choose sides. What happens if they choose the bad guys is left unsaid, but fairly obvious.

That's the trouble with theories. It never seems to occur to the theorists that people have choices and may not adhere to either side. I'd submit they generally will not. It is absolutely stupid to force people to 'be with us or against us.' That's true internationally and locally. If it was wrong for W. to say that to the world, why would it be right to say it a nation full of people? Dumbb -- with two 'b's.

It's wrong in an insurgency -- as I said, most of the population will just want both sides to go away and leave them alone. The goal should be to make the other side go away so you can go away and leave the folks happily alone. Any other course is doomed to failure at worst and to have massive problems at best.

As an aside, re: your other comment:

"Ron, apparently we rounded up a bunch of Arabs after 911 without warrants, so I guess you can say that domestically we have perceived the need to control certain elements of the population and have done so."

You do realize we and most of the world have locked people up under those circumstances for centuries -- and will almost certainly continue to do so. I think it's a human, protect the organism thing...

I'd also suggest that, per your weapon and population control idea -- we probably got a few that needed getting, almost certainly got a bunch that did not need to be gotten -- and missed a bunch we should have gotten.

Theories and Gurus sorta stumble when reality crunches.

[Surferbeetle]

Rob,

Interesting topic. You have been on a roll that last few days.

Here is my stab:

Warfare is attempting to impose one's will upon another who opposes it.

The term Irregular Warfare, betrays a western bias in that attempts to define a 'regular' and 'irregular' way to wage warfare. The Geneva Conventions link and the Law of Land Warfare link were part of my, and many others, western training in how to wage 'regular' war.

My observation of diplomatic operations, information/media operations, military operations, economics/business ops, and just plain old biology (viruses, fungi, bacteria, plants, reptiles, animals, and people) shows me that living things rarely limit themselves to 'regular' warfare as defined by the Geneva Conventions and the Law of Land Warfare.

The term Stability Operations implies operations undertaken in a fluid environment to provide stability. The assumption based upon my training and experience (WM you express it well when you describe definitions for this discussion as relative) is that they are population focused. Rank Amateur, Ken White, and Ron Humphrey all touch on points that I would like to expound upon with regards to Stability Ops.

1) Rank Amateur takes the high/optimistic road, and if I may paraphrase, suggests Stability Ops during wartime need to take into account that given enough time people will work through their anger. This is a flawed analysis. In both literature and historical works 'man's inhumanity to man' has been well documented. On a personal level Rank Amateur, war changes people permanently, some parts for the better and some for the worse. The literature and history are true, however even though the language/reference points of these mediums attempt to accurately describe the process they are unable to fully convey living through it.

2) Ken, if I may paraphrase again, suggests that the USMC three-block war is relevant for Stability Ops. Since he is a fan of metrics, lets briefly touch on calculus, with which newton showed us how to quantitatively measure things/life as they change. This is a long way of saying that although we try and freeze time to understand and describe things, many things are in fact occurring simultaneously. The three-block war is an applicable way to describe the simultaneously occurring things that happen in war.

3) Ron Humphrey touches upon the ability/or lack of ability of the state to provide Stability Ops. I would suggest that this is a daily concern of any state in peacetime, low intensity conflict, or war (ie the full spectrum of the human condition). I would also suggest that this discussion is of particular relevance for the states of Iraq and Afghanistan as realtime case studies of states involved in Irregular Warfare.

In short, the three block war concept describes Stability Operations and Irregular Warfare, both of which are normal parts of the human condition.

Regards,

Steve

[wm]

I doubt that there is a linear progression between combat operations and stablization ops, which is what Rank Amateur(RA) seems to be advocating, and what Ken White (KW) seems to be denying. However, I also think KW's assertion that both are occurring simultaneously is not completely accurate. Rob's point about stability seems very much on the mark. It is probably more correct to say that combat ops and stablilzation ops are two sides of the same coin (no pun intended here), which have a goal of maintaining or restoring stability (also known as peace in some circles).

For some reason, I seem to be infected with medical metaphors at present. I am not a doctor nor have I played one on TV. But I have stayed in Holiday Inns.
Doctors both stabilize patients and treat patients, often, but not always, simultaneously, and often, but not always, using different procedures. One goal of patient stablization is to try to ensure that they don't die on the table while the docs are trying to treat the cause of the problem--for example, they keep pumping blood into the patient (stablization) while they are figuring out which artery has been cut and then suture it back together (kinetic intervention or treatment). Sometimes however, I suspect that stablizaing the patient is also treatment--as when aspirin is administered to a person with a fever. Maybe I'm applying the wrong analogy, but it sure seems to me that peace is the political analogue to biological health.

By the way, for those who hold to the linear process model, stablilization need not be the last step in the process. I suspect it also applies in Phase 0 of any operation as a means of trying to avoid have to make a major commitment to kinetic operations (AKA putting a lot of boots on the ground/aircraft in the sky and having them release a lot of metal from their various bullet throwers, bomb bays, and wing pylons at what are probably poorly discriminable targets). Also, I suspect that you can do stablization at home as well as in foreign countries--Guard missions that include post hurricane relief ops to New Orleans, guarding civil rights marchers on their way to Selma, and patrolling the streets of Watts after "race riots" come to mind as examples.

[slapout9]

This thread is close to one we had awhile back about declared and undeclared warfare. Relative to Systems Thinking you should start with the highest organiztion and work down. In this case it is the US government and the Constitution. In our system their are 2 types of Wars declared and undeclared. Declared War by it's very nature is defined..it has a limit...usually based upon conventions,treaties,laws,etc. Undeclared war by it's very nature is not well defined. Based upon this, Irregular Warfare belongs underneath undeclared War and Stablilty ops would be underneath that in the sense that stableizing something does not automatically mean killing or destroying but by the very nature of it being a subset of Irreagular warfare it could include that as part of the operation.

[marct]

Hi Rob,

I’d also bring up that we use the word “stability” allot with regards to bilateral, and regional objectives. We say we want “regional stability in the ME” and that drives strategy and operations. The idea of “stability” I think fits how we see ourselves in the world from a strategic perspective (others may not) in that it creates conditions for potential political redress at a number of levels - and take some of the tension out of the bow string.

Marc, I enjoyed the post on “regular” and “traditional” – what are your thoughts on the word “stability” as to how it fits in western sense of culture?

Well, quote he looking up from his Oxford Etymological Dictionary, the word derives from Latin stabilis - "standing firmly" - and remains pretty much with the same meaning through Old French and Middle English. What is interesting is that it has shifted somewhat over the past 100 or so years from standing firm to something closer to "unchanging". I suspect that part of the shift came about as a reaction to both the sweeping effects of nationalism and the encroaching discussions on evolutionary theory, but that's just a guess.

If we look at some of the sideband connotations, there are some really weird ones. First, it is associated with a firmly fixed social pattern - a "stable system" as it were - rather than either a homeostatic or adaptive one. While here are associations with fixed social systems, there's nothing about the content of those systems except for a long temporal depth to them; I'd toss it out as about 500+ years for an oral culture and longer for a literate culture.

Remember in that 10 questions paper when I was talking about the difference between a required institution and a desired one (aka function vs. form)? There has to be some way for a group to achieve certain basic needs but how they do it may be radically different. So, I would argue that a "stability operation" may be viewed as a way of tinkering with social and cultural institutions.

The second weird sideband connotation is when the term gets applied to a linear process. First off, there will probably be a lot of disagreement as to what the end state should be. Most democracies have handled that by having a fairly stable (constant) method of deciding desired end states while keeping the discussion of what is and is not an acceptable end state somewhat fluid or dynamic. Then again, most tribal societies have also developed "stable" institutions at that level; they're called feuds and they all include ways to end feuds.

Shifting out of theory and into reality, there are some other questions about "stability" and "stability operations" that are, I think, important to ask. What is the required end state of the people conducting those operations? Will "imposing" that end state lead to greater or lesser social stability? Given that we operate in a globally interconnected system, what are the states "at home" that contribute to the "instability" abroad that the operation is supposed to "fix"?

[Rob Thornton]

Marc - Thanks! That provides perspective to ask another question - albeit a broader one.

Shifting out of theory and into reality, there are some other questions about "stability" and "stability operations" that are, I think, important to ask. What is the required end state of the people conducting those operations? Will "imposing" that end state lead to greater or lesser social stability? Given that we operate in a globally interconnected system, what are the states "at home" that contribute to the "instability" abroad that the operation is supposed to "fix"?

(bold added by me)

Aside from the excellent piece of advice "first do no harm" (which could be viewed from a first, second or third person perspective with regard to the consequences of interaction, what are the thoughts about countering agents of "instability" which are not normal, or routine parts of an organic system or culture? Consider for example, the introduction of kudzu, scotch broom or Japanese beetles to consider it as part of a biological, eco-system type intrusion? (don't we have a new SWC member scientist type named Margaret from Georgia? Don't be bashful, here is something you can help with)

What happens once that "intruder" plugs into the system - how does its presence change it? We might also could consider "resettlement" and "human migration" to fall into this, as well as transnational crime, and pandemics. What about when multiple agents of "instability" converge, or gain synergy from each other, or create new conditions from which change the environment to be attractive and accommodating to other agents of instability, what about their effect as accelerants?

Dave Kilcullen raised an interesting point about war and counter-war which relates.

I think there is also a relation between how these agents of instability change the nature of "regular" and "irregular"

Slap's points about systems, is also relative (and nobody probably needed me to point that out), but I'd like to take a slightly different tack on that as well and think about how agents of instability move between systems - be they closed or open - maybe consider the actual means they use to do so, and the ways they take advantage of the means (again - all disciplines welcome to chime in - biological, economic competition, computer viruses, people, crime, politics, etc.)

Best, Rob

[slapout9]

Hi Rob, that is why I think the paper that Tom Odom talks about on "Compund Warfare" is so important. IMHO it is one of the most important papers ever written because it shows you how to win by combining regular and irregular organizations based upon the situation. Whole lot of systems theory in that paper as to how an organization should adapt in order to survive.

[marct]

Hey Rob,

Sorry about the rather rambling reply - I hadn't had enough coffee yet . Last night I hosted the monthly get together of the Carleton U. Counter-Terrorism Discussion Group. Outside of the great wide-ranging discussions, we have this tradition of trying out new red wine....

What happens once that "intruder" plugs into the system - how does its presence change it? We might also could consider "resettlement" and "human migration" to fall into this, as well as transnational crime, and pandemics. What about when multiple agents of "instability" converge, or gain synergy from each other, or create new conditions from which change the environment to be attractive and accommodating to other agents of instability, what about their effect as accelerants?

Funny you should mention resettlement and human migration . That was one of our discussion topics last night, and it's also an area I've been working in for 7-8 years now. I'm actually writing a white paper right now on immigrant integration that is using a lot of ideas that I worked out when thinking about COIN.

How a system is changed depends on a number of factors, but the modeling of such system changes, at least in terms of biological populations, has been worked out for quite a while (see, for example, Lotka's Elements of Mathematical Biology). It becomes a question of competition within a specific environmental niche, and it can be theoretically modeled using evolutionary theory (Wm. Calvin's 6 Essentials gives a really nice model).

I think there is also a relation between how these agents of instability change the nature of "regular" and "irregular"

Yupper, 'cause they change the competitive pressures within any particular resource niche. "Regular" is really shorthand for "what we have always done and tends to be homeostatic and based on perceptions, while "irregular" is shorthand for "what we are forced to do even though we don't like it - it ain't natural!" . In a non-combat example, we can see a lot of this being discussed in Ohio surrounding the economy and, specifically, jobs.

Marc