IW and Stability Operations - in your own words - what is the difference?

[Ken White]

I also think KW's assertion that both are occurring simultaneously is not completely accurate.

is ever completely accurate. War is too chaotic to codify and define precisely. We can have fun trying but we will not succeed.

Doctors both stabilize patients and treat patients, often, but not always, simultaneously, and often, but not always, using different procedures. One goal of patient stablization is to try to ensure that they don't die on the table while the docs are trying to treat the cause of the problem--for example, they keep pumping blood into the patient (stablization) while they are figuring out which artery has been cut and then suture it back together (kinetic intervention or treatment). Sometimes however, I suspect that stablizaing the patient is also treatment--as when aspirin is administered to a person with a fever. Maybe I'm applying the wrong analogy, but it sure seems to me that peace is the political analogue to biological health.

Good analogy. Simultaneous efforts in different directions by the same actors (Doctors) and / or others on the team...

Sort of like pursuing an irregular or other war while attempting to stabilize the nation through various means. Frequently including Band aids...

I'd add that the hippocratic oath model, 'first do no harm,' is at best extremely difficult to accomplish and at worst a wishful dream if war of any type at any level is involved. War is by nature harmful and you absolutely cannot clean it up. The worst mistake we, the US have made in recent years (1950 forward) is to try to fight wars and do minimal harm in the process. Going light inevitably, without fail, always (I'm into triple redundancy...) increases own and other casualties and lengthens combat time. Always.

Rank amatuer said above we were too nice -- I disagreed on the premise that he was talking about the Armed Forces. We aren't nice, we do what our civilian masters say. They are too nice (left handed compliment), seriously. Unfortunately, that attempt to be nice sends a message. To the western mind, it's that we're really basically nice guys who want to be loved -- to everyone else in the world, it's a sign of major weakness. The unnecessary debacles of the handling of Viet Nam, Tehran, Beirut and such sent a message that we did not intend -- that we're not up to the tough stuff. We are now paying for that utter stupidity.

There's always a time to play nice -- unless force is involved; then to play nice or attempt to is to invite a disaster. Fortunately, we're pretty good at cobbling together band aids and fixes to prevent total melt down -- but we lose too many good kids in the process...

I digress...

Irregular Warfare is indeed a western construct and is not an applicable term to either the Asian or Middle Eastern forms of warfare and those forms do differ in considerable detail. Still it is a handy term and there's no reason not to use it to describe, to western minds, a form of conflict.

Irregular Warfare (and / or other types of warfare) and Stability Operations may be simultaneously conducted. Or they may not be. Or there may be a time phased melding. I believe that METT-TC applies in that determination...

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Ken,

I'd add that the Hippocratic oath model, 'first do no harm,' is at best extremely difficult to accomplish and at worst a wishful dream if war of any type at any level is involved. War is by nature harmful and you absolutely cannot clean it up.

I should have qualified it a bit, I was thinking about the decision to commit military force in the first place - provided somebody has left you an option, which may not always be so. I think once you cross that line, be prepared for all that comes with it - doesn't mean you have to go there, but you don't want to be unprepared to if the enemy does. We should not try and change the nature of something to suit our objective - we've suffered from that one before.

With regard to the other elements of power in more benign conditions, the operations to encourage, facilitate, or reinforce stability might be pure DIE with no apparent M, the state in question may just not be at that point where using "M" is reasonable, required, or for some other reason, palatable (lots of room under that one). Or maybe the M piece is limited to the indirect - such as facilitating/encouraging regional alliances or collective security, providing intelligence, etc.

I need to think on it some more, but every policy action I think needs to be weighed not only for its immediate value, or value in providing what looks like a painless solution (at least for the politics of the day), but it also needs to be weighed against our long term objectives and beyond a bilateral perspective. I know, hard to do, not really in our strategic culture, not aligned with our political process of reinventing the wheel every 4-8 years, but it might be a good way to work toward increased stability and developing options, as opposed to having to respond in a strategic knee jerk fashion.


Best, Rob

[Ken White]

I should have given your earlier comment more thought, then I might have realized that your meaning was in whether to commit or not.

You said two things (among many over the days...) that I think bear repetition:

"...I was thinking about the decision to commit military force in the first place - provided somebody has left you an option, which may not always be so. I think once you cross that line, be prepared for all that comes with it - doesn't mean you have to go there, but you don't want to be unprepared to if the enemy does. We should not try and change the nature of something to suit our objective - we've suffered from that one before."

Amen. We really need adherance to that sage advice and to this:

...every policy action I think needs to be weighed not only for its immediate value, or value in providing what looks like a painless solution (at least for the politics of the day), but it also needs to be weighed against our long term objectives and beyond a bilateral perspective.

Now, if we can just get the politicians to pay attention...

[marct]

Now, if we can just get the politicians to pay attention...

And Stan calls ME a hopeless romantic ! Unfortunately, I doubt that any politician will think beyond their next election and, in the US, the ones who don't have to think about the next election (aka year 6+ presidents) are, for all intents and purposes, isolated from having much real effect.

[Ken White]

1. Stop raining on my parade! (the truth hurts...)

2. Keep your Alberta Clippers up there in the Great White North -- it's 60 degrees Fahrenheit down here and we're cold! (Payback!!!)

(Unfortunately, I'm afraid you're correct...)

[Rank amateur]

As an aside, re: your other comment:You do realize we and most of the world have locked people up under those circumstances for centuries -- and will almost certainly continue to do so. I think it's a human, protect the organism thing...

I certainly didn't mean to imply that we were worse than anyone else.

Anyway, here is how msNBC described it.

"His name is Ali Partovi. And according to the Department of Homeland Security, he is the last to be held of about 1,200 Arab and Muslim men swept up by authorities in the United States after the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks."

I agree with you that war is chaotic and destructive (which is why it shouldn't be entered into lightly, and if you do it, you need to win.) Other than crimes against humanity - which can happen without a war - nothing that happens during a war really bothers me. Not even friendly fire: fog of war etc. Except for one thing, when one of our guys is killed building a school, paving a road or handing out candy. To me, that is avoidable and means someone has screwed up somewhere.

As always, you earned your right to disagree. I, on the other hand, just happened to be born in a country with free speech.

"...I was thinking about the decision to commit military force in the first place - provided somebody has left you an option, which may not always be so. I think once you cross that line, be prepared for all that comes with it - doesn't mean you have to go there, but you don't want to be unprepared to if the enemy does. We should not try and change the nature of something to suit our objective - we've suffered from that one before."

I think you need to hold the people who screwed it up accountable: even if you voted for them. (If you give a politicain a free pass, you know that the next one in line is going to feel entitled to another free pass in the same situation.)

Name me a place where it's been truly successful.

Right here. The Brits left and we only use them for peaceful purposes. Except for the criminals, but there are criminals everywhere: always will be.

What if you do not have three decades or even one?

If you can't do the time, don't do the crime.

I'm likely to agree with you rather than attack your theory.

Just wanted to save that for future reference.

that given enough time people will work through their anger. This is a flawed analysis.

All wars come to an end. We eventually decided that a Communist Vietnam wasn't the end of the world. Although, I will admit to poor word choice. "Anger" wasn't the right term. Sooner or later everyone eventually agrees that negotiation is better than war. (Even when we nuked Japan, we still had to negotiate with them.) I'm not a biblical scholar but I know that even though Pilate could have anyone he wanted crucified, he still needed to negotiate with the locals.)

Warfare is attempting to impose one's will upon another who opposes it.

I don't think I'd agree. If you accept "politics by other means" then the objective is to get a better political settlement. As per above, you never get 100% of what you want. Even if you drop a nuke, your auto workers can end up getting laid off because of Japanese car companies.

[Ken White]

I certainly didn't mean to imply that we were worse than anyone else.

Didn't think or mean to impute that you did so imply. My point was that is not an aberration or a new, specific to the 'GWOT' thing; here or any where else in the world.

I agree with you that war is chaotic and destructive (which is why it shouldn't be entered into lightly, and if you do it, you need to win.)...

I agree with you. Now which of us is going to get the Politicians to wake up and get real?

...Except for one thing, when one of our guys is killed building a school, paving a road or handing out candy. To me, that is avoidable and means someone has screwed up somewhere.

Not sure how you avoid that. Roads need to be built; having Schools is a good thing -- somebody's gotta do it. If the bad guys appear while either of those things is being done, a fight is likely -- no different from a fight started by an attack on a resupply convoy or an attack on a combat outpost...

Candy handout by American troops has a long and mostly honorable history; the Troops do it on their own -- even when they're ordered not to do it. Thus, I'm not sure why those three things (or somewhat similar things) being done and resulting in a death are any worse than any other reason...

I think you need to hold the people who screwed it up accountable: even if you voted for them. (If you give a politicain a free pass, you know that the next one in line is going to feel entitled to another free pass in the same situation.)

I agree with that but I'd strongly suggest they be held accountable for what they screwed up and not for the screwups of others or their subordinates who screwed up. That only seems fair. For example, the invasion of Iraq was done fairly well; the subsequent 'occupation' and the unnecessary insurgency were the fault of, respectively, unelected Generals and to a lesser extent, equally unelected Intell Community types. If you have a way to "hold them accountable" let me know what it is and I'll jump on that bandwagon.

[Rank amateur]

Ken

RE: where the buck stops.

I agree with Truman.

[Ken White]

They're all pathetic and say stuff like that but rarely follow through. He wasn't much better than any of the others.

Still, accept that the premise is valid. That means you vote against Bush. Wait, he's not running. What to do...

Seriously; you can obviously believe that and act on it. Fine with me (my general rule is to vote for the least bad candidate and to vote out incumbents, all party immaterial) -- however, you do realize that if I'm correct and the Intel Community and the Generals bear considerable responsibility for their errors, your solution does not fix that problem and it will just recur...

Edited to add:

Some how I missed part of your response above; three items:

Re: "Right here. The Brits left and we only use them for peaceful purposes. Except for the criminals, but there are criminals everywhere: always will be." Obviously you missed the period 1861-65 or had no history classes and are unaware that there are probably more firearms than there are people in this country. We're a lot of things, disarmed is not one of them. So, that won't work. Find me another nation that has effectively totally disarmed the populace -- and Criminals count, the tool is the object, not the user.

Re: "If you can't do the time, don't do the crime" -- nice juvenile and facile answer but sometimes things happen due to gross miscalculations. One can play 'Who's to blame for this?' all day long; doesn't change reality

Re: "Just wanted to save that for future reference " Your preorgative -- one would hope you would use it in context...

[Rank amateur]

Your preorgative -- one would hope you would use it in context...

I've learned you that you do whatever you can to get a tactical advantage: especially when you're outgunned.

Re: the president. About 80 percent of the stuff he - or she - does is BS but the other 20% is really important. I don't care what party the president is in, just whether that 20% works or not.

Re: juvenile: Other than Afghanistan, all our COIN missions are optional and retreat isn't the same as defeat. If success requires at least a decade, and we're not prepared to stay a decade than engaging means almost certain failure.

[Ken White]

I've learned you that you do whatever you can to get a tactical advantage: especially when you're outgunned.

it's always a prob...

Re: juvenile: Other than Afghanistan, all our COIN missions are optional and retreat isn't the same as defeat. If success requires at least a decade, and we're not prepared to stay a decade than engaging means almost certain failure.

Afghanistan is optional, totally, as well. Iraq was not intended to be a COIN job; something changed in May 2003 and we turned from an imminent departure to staying. Thus far, I haven't been able to find out what that was. Could speculate but not here.

That decade bit is Kilcullen and Co. blather -- it's not written in stone, the length can vary depending on many parameters; Kenya only took a nominal seven years, 1952-59 but most of the the actual fighting was confined to 1954-57. Greece also took only three -- conversely, the Philippines took over 15 in total; ten is just an average. Nothing in war is ever certain and the unexpected is always right around the corner...

No, retreat is not the same as defeat -- yet, it can send a message that is better not sent. For example we retreated in front of ME attacks from 1979 until 2001, over 20 of them with the Tehran Embassy seizure and the several messes in Beirut simply encouraging them to keep at it. We weren't defeated but we were embarrassed and looked weak. To the ME, that is an open invitation to attack. They do not fight like we do and they do not think like we do -- they aren't wrong, just different.

Each successive turning of the other cheek only emboldens them. Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton all erred significantly in that regard -- you don't like where we are; they're the folks you really need to be upset with. They are the reason we're in the ME (Afghanistan is NOT in the ME), the current Admin is merely the reason the place in the ME is Iraq. I'd submit that if one has to be there in a combat mode, Iraq is easily the easiest and best place to be...

You have to tailor your tactics and your parameters to your enemy. You do not need to fight the way he fights but you have to know how he fights and you should be very careful not to send the wrong signals. We did that for almost 30 years and are paying the price for doing so. We could leave Iraq and do it fairly quickly. I'll flat guarantee you that if we do it too quickly we'll have to go back and it will be far worse.

[Presley Cannady]

Iraq was not intended to be a COIN job; something changed in May 2003 and we turned from an imminent departure to staying. Thus far, I haven't been able to find out what that was. Could speculate but not here.

Would certain resignation threats be part of that story?

[Ken White]

speculation...

[Global Scout]

Marc sort of mentioned it in one of his posts here, but words not only have meaning, they shape the way we perceive and explain the world. Imagine a doctor from the 16th century and a doctor from the 21st century explaining the life cycle of a disease. The doctor from the 16th century would not only be limited by available knowledge, but by his vocabulary. Not only do we have more knowledge, we have developed additional terms that explain certain phenomena that simply were inconceivable previously. More to the point, words shape the way we define problems (whether simple or complex), to include the nature of war and how we should respond to it.

After several false starts, under GEN Abrams the Army seemed to have finally relearned that war is not simply war, but that the nature of war varies greatly, as does the way we should wage it. If the book, “Army at Dawn” is considered credible, than at the start of WWII we had officers who didn’t see the value of armor, and sincerely believed they could defeat Rommel’s armor with horse Calvary. This further illustrates our reluctance to change, thus true leaders are those who have the ability to push past these self imposed cultural constraints that limit how and what we think (we’re more like Mao’s communist puppets than we want to admit).

Whether or not irregular warfare is old term in a new dress is not important, what is important is that our Army as a whole didn’t understand the underlying concepts of IW, so therefore resurfacing the term was critical in facilitating a needed cultural change within the Army to enable it to adapt to the type of war it is fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Terms can help facilitate a more accurate understanding of the problem, which is the first step to effectively solving any problem. Is the term IW needed? Definitely!

I’ll take a stab at further mudding the waters by attempting to explain away the apparent conflict between irregular warfare and stability operations.

In short irregular and conventional warfare are broad strategic approaches to solving a problem with armed force. In conventional warfare the objective is defeating the enemy’s fielding armed forces and/or forcing their leaders (usually state leaders) to capitulate by targeting their national infrastructure. In irregular warfare the objective is controlling (which means influencing) the populace. There is a gray area in the middle where there is some overlap, but if one attempts to control the populace with conventional warfare they will fail unless they identify the entire populace as hostile and target them for genocide or dislocation.

To further complicate the matter, unconventional warfare tactics such as guerrilla warfare and sabotage can be used to support conventional warfare. If the focus is on defeating fielding enemy forces or coercing/killing their leadership versus controlling the population, then it is still conventional warfare. An interesting note is that the first Special Forces qualification course was called the PSYWAR course for psychological warfare (or political warfare). At least at one time we understood the true nature of this type of warfare.

Moving on to stability operations, FM 3-0 states we do offensive, defensive, and stability operations in both conventional warfare and IW. This is overly simplistic, but it does clarify that stability operations are an operation, not a strategic approach in itself. It further states there must be a degree of peace (stable to unstable peace) before we can conduct stability operations, which may mean we need to first conduct offensive operations to clear an area, then defensive operations to provide security for the populace while concurrently conducting stability operations in the areas secured.

Stability operations can be conducted in numerous situations, including counterinsurgency operations, peace enforcement operations, humanitarian assistance operations, etc. The objective is to establish, or re-establish a safe and secure environment and facilitate “essential” services. The military’s role can range from providing logistics to security to actually providing the services as a stop gap measure.
Stability operations, if successful, create a window of opportunity for effective political intervention. They are not an end in themselves.

Since most of us are focused on COIN currently (a mission within the scope of IW), stability operations are a supporting operation to help establish conditions to effect government control of an area. As stated earlier there are two types of control, coercive and legitimate. If the situation warrants the government conducts defensive operations (coercive control of the populace), then they strive to achieve legitimate control as quickly as possible with stability operations and other political activities.

[William F. Owen]

For myself, I'm suffering from the component of the terms themselves - IW contains the term "warfare", which to me means a "way" or manner of waging war. E.G. – “irregular” could mean something out of character to the norm - which could mean everything from the type of means used to wage the war that then drive irregular tactics, operations and strategy, or just an "irregular" use of the "regular" means to wage war.

Stability Operations sort of hits me the same way - the key word being "operations" which to me indicate a type of undertaking to achieve an objective - in this case "stability" of something - a state, an area, a group, a problem, etc.

Sorry to CPR this thread this far back, but this really bugs me. Forgive me for repeating what others may have said, and I may have missed.

a.) Irregular warfare is so named because one party to the conflict is "irregular" in nature. The Colonial Revolt against the Crown was partly "Irregular", and fought by Irregulars. -and some of them were very annoying types as well! The oppsite of Irregular is not Conventional. It is Regular. The opposite of Conventional is.... UNconventional.

b.) IMO, Conflicts can only usefully be defined by Aims and Means. COIN is actually an accurate term -Countering Insurgents-. If you can usefully and accurately define an "insurgency" then we are on our way.

c.) A Stability Operation is about creating Stability, but so is every legitimate conflict. Conflict must create a better peace. Even when groups aim at creating "instability" they do so to create circumstances under which they can prosper and gain eventual stability.

d.) Stability is relative, not absolute. Stability will mean different thinks to different folks. Providing security creates a degree of stability.

The problem is that military thought (as I have said many times before) is discussed as though spoken by Avril Levene, by randomly using nonsensical, definition free words, phrases and aphorisms like, 4GW, OOTW, Asymmetric (which is really stupid) and now Hybrid Wars.

Rant complete. Guns to rest. Secure from action stations. Systems to stand-by. Listening out.

[Ron Humphrey]

c.) A Stability Operation is about creating Stability, but so is every legitimate conflict. Conflict must create a better peace. Even when groups aim at creating "instability" they do so to create circumstances under which they can prosper and gain eventual stability.

d.) Stability is relative, not absolute. Stability will mean different thinks to different folks. Providing security creates a degree of stability.

Does conflict necessarily have to result in a "better" peace or can it result in a simple lack of further conflict do to one parties inability to continue effectively (at that time)?

Furthermore would this then lend to the transition to different types of conflict and thus the necessity to study and understand each in and of itself?

Finally isn't it human nature that we require definitive separation of styles of warfare in order to understand how to prosecute them effectively. in other words whether they are truly different or not matters not so much as how we approach them differently.

[Steve Blair]

Does conflict necessarily have to result in a "better" peace or can it result in a simple lack of further conflict do to one parties inability to continue effectively (at that time)?

Furthermore would this then lend to the transition to different types of conflict and thus the necessity to study and understand each in and of itself?

Finally isn't it human nature that we require definitive separation of styles of warfare in order to understand how to prosecute them effectively. in other words whether they are truly different or not matters not so much as how we approach them differently.

To me, the answer is "of course" to both questions. There are many historical examples of a conflict not resulting in a "better" peace (World War I springs immediately to mind, but there are many other examples as well). The question of a "better" peace also raises the complementary question: better for whom?

And I agree that it is part of human nature to want to "label" things to aid in discrete study and (possibly) understanding. It also allows us to select the proper tools for an undertaking. Assuming that we would do this for all activities other than war doesn't really get us anywhere. The trick is to determine when labeling (or anti-labeling) has gotten in the way of actual understanding. I mention anti-labeling specifically, because I think over-simplification can be as big a problem as over-detailing.

[William F. Owen]

The trick is to determine when labeling (or anti-labeling) has gotten in the way of actual understanding. I mention anti-labeling specifically, because I think over-simplification can be as big a problem as over-detailing.

I concur. Taxonomies are extremely powerful and useful, but I don't think the "conflict" is the problem. I believe what we need to "label/define/quantify" is the enemy and how and why he fights.

[Ron Humphrey]

I concur. Taxonomies are extremely powerful and useful, but I don't think the "conflict" is the problem. I believe what we need to "label/define/quantify" is the enemy and how and why he fights.

Thats awful close to saying one requires Cutural Empathy in order to effecctively fight a war

[Rob Thornton]

Now that I've had a few weeks to think on it, I'm pretty comfortable with a kind of Vin Diagram that works for me (attached) The article Slap ref. that Tom pointed out was a good read (on Compound Warfare), and it just helped me frame it.

You (or your enemy) may begin by waging IW as your campaign because its all you can manage, or you might include it as part of a broader campaign if you can, or if called for - meaning you have the resources and believe that regular warfare by itself will not accomplish the objective, or will not accomplish it in the time or manner you desire. Additionally - along the lines of Mao - you might envision phases to your campaign that begin on the IW side using guerrilla tactics, but eventually take you to the regular side - there is probably a transition in there where you are doing both, or it could be that you have to take a step back. fig. 1 in the attachment

If you consider that there is an existing criminal element in every society that the irregular force can advantage them self to, or may have to contest with, or that can be seen as another complex actor - that becomes another bubble that I think deserves consideration - this may be a conglomerate, or it may represent the major criminal players, but more often they represent some level of influence and power, even if its unofficial. Some where in that model there is overlap to a degree - that probably has allot to do with the society in question, its norms, and the level of authority in which the criminal element must compete - e.g. how strong is the rule of law in populace in question and how far does it extend. fig. 2 in the attachment

I think the day to day actions of the population, particularly if there is a significant cultural gap we are operating in, adds to the complexity - even if its insignificant white noise, the effect obscures the activities of those elements conducting IW and the criminal elements pursuing their own goals, or goals in tandem with IW types. Regular forces (aligned with the irregular ones), while potentially standing out, can still benefit from confusion and discord where IW, Criminal activity and civilian activities coincide. fig. 3

For us, full spectrum operations - to include stability operations, cut across the Vin diagram. This is one of the primary reasons I think the Army non-concurred with the draft DoD dir 3000.08 on IW which would have supplanted DoD dir 3000.05 on Stab Ops. The two are different, and trying place Stability Ops in the IW bucket vs. acknowledging that it cuts across the full spectrum and must be considered and planned as such would constrain our thinking and lead to bad DOTMLPF outputs.

Again, nothing new here, just my way of framing it. Sometime I just need to work through things before I'm satisfied with an answer.

Thanks all, Best Rob