Police forces (Paramilitary Constabularies/Gendarmeries/Border Guards, etc.) have often provided the majority of the armed force in Aid to the Civil Power operations - riot control, internal security, border guard, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency - with the Military reinforcing the Police as, if, necessary. Look at the great empires of modern times - Britain and Russia especially - and you will see that large numbers of paramilitary police troops engaged in all aspects of low intensity conflict, from the various Imperial police and constabulary forces scattered across the former British Empire, to the Russian use of KGB and MVD troops to keep restive populations under control. In more cases than not, the military played second fiddle to the police, and this makes clear sense, as it is the police, not the military, who actually have to hold ground and the population residing within. The lack of an effective police force usually results in failure, as the military rarely possesses enough troops to physically occupy and control what the police cannot.

Perhaps the "best" models for this might be the paramilitary police forces of the Raj, and those in Malaysia (both in the Malayan Emergency and in the Borneo Confrontation); Rhodesia's police forces might also be useful here. The failures of paramilitary police forces, such as in Afghanistan, graphically illlustrate the difficulties of waging and winning a COIN campaign in the absense of an effective police force. If military force may often amount to a fist into water in COIN, paramilitary police, conversely, may act as a sort of sponge, soaking up the insurgency's armed strength. The military is potentially useful, often even necessary in COIN; but effective paramilitary Police, who live amongst and know the people and land intimately, are utterly essential. The Police are the cake in COIN; the Military is the icing.