What are the SWC thoughts on policing in combat?

[Tom Odom]

Rob,

Good post as usual.

Much of our difficulty in understanding this is in our own culture--there is that word again--in that we as a military do not train, study, consider, much less talk about a paramilitary function of policing our populace. That drives us when we encounter a need to develop such a force, we turn to USAID as we did in Vietnam and the Congo. Ken can speak to the former; I studied the latter as part of what we did to control unrest in the Congo. In my look at it, the results were to say the least incongruous--a view echoed by MG (ret) DV Rattan when I interviewed him. He was in the Congo as a LTC logistics advisor. USAID literally hired former State Troopers and sent them to the Congo to train police. They went complete with Smokey the Bear Hats and "Where you From, Boy!?!" attitudes. It just did not work.

From where I sit we essentially did the same in Iraq--we hired Benard K out of NYC as a darling of Rudy G to advise us on how to rebuild (That word is inappropriate to say the least as Iraq's police were never built to do what Western police do) the Iraqi police.

I agree with Ken and Norfolk on the gendarmerie and national police model ala the Canadian Mounties. The problem we have is that we do not have a viable model inside the US military to draw on.

Going back to the Congo, by the time I joined Stan there in 1993, Zaire had multiple layers of police, paramilitary, military, and outright populace intimidation forces. Each had its own foreign sponsor and each acted somewhat in accordance with the tranferred values of the sponsor. For example, Egypt had long sponsored the Guarde Civile--modeled on Egypt's national gendarmeire. Israel had long sponsored the Division Speciale Du President as the guarantor of Mobutu's control. The GC and the DSP were in almost constant friction that could turn kinetic in a heartbeat. We even had a mini-war between cellular phone companies over who would control the Kinshasa market. The GC and DSP were on opposing sides and shot at each other as they attacked the competitor's base station.

In contrast, Rwanda had long had an army and a gendarmerie and when the rebels assumed control they fell in on that model and made it work--without outside advice.

Best

Tom

[slapout9]

Hi Folks, I am actually busy fighting crime in real time in my own little area so this will be short but I will put in more this weekend. I sent some stuff to Lawvol awhile back on this very subject. The first and most important is what is the law that you intend to enforce? How do you intend to communicate that to the target population? You need to do that first before you get to the what kind of super duper troopers you will need to enforce them

[jcustis]

Hi Folks, I am actually busy fighting crime in real time in my own little area so this will be short but I will put in more this weekend. I sent some stuff to Lawvol awhile back on this very subject. The first and most important is what is the law that you intend to enforce? How do you intend to communicate that to the target population? You need to do that first before you get to the what kind of super duper troopers you will need to enforce them

And this seems ot go back to the tell-all memo from that Dept State guy who aired the dirty laundry about the shortfalls of repairing the legal institutions. Great point slap...Without the strong basis for law and order resident on the books somewhere, what then forms the reference, or the standard?

That was one of my biggest complaints when I knew there were police trainers on the deck in Al Anbar in 2004. I asked myself how they could be possibly immersing their recruits in the whole range of skills, beliefs, and values to produce good law enforcement folks, when they themselves probably did not have a grasp on the laws in place or under draft. As a result, we had western practices being taught without the full consideration of the way things had been in Iraq. It worked great for mimickery, but the base wasn't solidly there.

[William F. Owen]

The first and most important is what is the law that you intend to enforce? How do you intend to communicate that to the target population? You need to do that first before you get to the what kind of super duper troopers you will need to enforce them

Well done Slap! beat me to it.

IMO, there is clear blue water between, Law Enforcement, aimed at "enforcing law" and national and/or internal security. The differentiation of roles should be clearly and obviously defined.

Police should never be given military tasks. Internal security forces are another matter, and IMO, should not be military. Their task is "Internal Security" and public order.

Bearing in mind most denizens of this here board are Yanks, I would have thought the State Trooper, National Guardsman and Federal authorities would provide a pretty good model.

....and VERY ANNOYINGLY (sorry to shout) it has just occurred to me that this thread may undermined my "one infantry model" which was one of the corner stones of my doctrine work. Thanks Rob!!

[Tom Odom]

Bearing in mind most denizens of this here board are Yanks, I would have thought the State Trooper, National Guardsman and Federal authorities would provide a pretty good model.

Only if we somehow mange to find a country whose traditions and values match our own. Barring that, these models are confusing at best. And as I said in my post above, we have in someways tried to impose these models with very little success and in some cases like the Cong a whole heaping plateful of defeat. Try explaining Posse Comitatus, State's Rights, or a governor's control of the National Guard in a place like the Congo. Add to that difficulty, the historical fact that the US in the past 5 decades has stood on the side of centralized power in that "country" when "states" like Shaba (AKA Katanga) sought complete and/or limited influence.

Agreed that we first have to define the goal. But also keep in mind that in 90% of the 3rd World (that is a SWAG by the way) militaries are not focused on external enemies but rather a combination of internal eneimies and external allies. While clear blue water between law enforcement and security is an admirable goal, the third world floats on muddy waters. Moreover, the blue water in the West has not been so crystal blue since 9/11.

Best

Tom

[Steve Blair]

I think that slap's answer contains much wisdom (as in what law are you working to enforce), but another component is an awareness of the culture you're advising (to including its history and customs when it comes to law and law enforcement). The US model is a poor one to export anywhere, because it is so deeply based on our rather unique structure and systems. Tom makes that point well, and also points out that the First World clarity between military activity and law enforcement is often absent in other regions.

As I recall, the RCMP was created to conduct what could be called "distant law enforcement" in regions that might not yet have any local government. A good US analogy might be the early function of the US Marshals, although that was often clouded at the marshal level by political appointees and such. The Texas Rangers also come close, but again their roles blurred in places and often crossed into purely military functions (the Red River War in 1874 provides some examples of this). The State Trooper model also breaks down to a degree, because each state maintains its own organization with varying levels of investigative power.

Law enforcement is pretty specialized work, and it becomes even more so when you have to tailor the package to fit the environment. The gendarme/constabulary model might be best for this, as it would be most open to changes and expansion or contraction depending on the local situation. It's clearly something that should be a dedicated function, possibly at the NG or AR level as Ken mentioned (although I also think it's something that should be multi-national whenever possible...at least in the planning stages).

My preference would be to go in with a gendarme model in hand, adjusted to fit local conditions and needs. Part of that package would be the development of local (village-level) forces to augment the larger structure (based on the nation or even provinces if necessary). Before deploying that, there would need to be agreement on the laws being enforced (as slap mentioned), as well as a tailored IO campaign to get the locals acclimated to the "new sheriff in town." This would require some advance planning (something we seem to be spotty at), and a willingness to adjust on the fly to remove things that don't work and add in elements brought in from the field (something we have been good at). As the local gendarme units become capable, we should phase out direct involvement, possibly refocusing at the local level if needed to make sure that the second level of "folks in blue" actually makes it to the streets.

Random thoughts, which might become more coherent once I have more coffee....

[marct]

Hi Folks,

As I recall, the RCMP was created to conduct what could be called "distant law enforcement" in regions that might not yet have any local government.

Pretty close, Steve. There was also a serious motive to project sovereignty into the former HBC lands that now make up Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, The NWT, the Yukon and Nunuvut. Here's a link to the RCMP history site that goes into some decent detail.

Slaps' points are crucial and need to be pulled out a bit.

1. The first and most important is what is the law that you intend to enforce?
2. How do you intend to communicate that to the target population?

These two questions alone show the differences between Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, you had operational local governments that were allies against the Taliban (e.g. the Northern Alliance, various local tribal leaders, etc.). Maybe not very operational, but...

This means that they already had legal systems in place and operational within their areas of control along with enforcement systems. They may not have been "real" for many Western countries, but the certainly existed. So, would they be thrown out in favour of an imposed "solution"? There are some pretty serious political implications to doing that.

Iraq was a different situation, at least initially, and based on conquest (excluding Kurdistan). Martial law could and should have been established, along the German Occupation model, from the very start, and the failure to do so has led to all sorts of problems. "Local" legal systems and enforcement systems evolved in response to the vacuum with all sorts of predictable results (i.e. hit squads, militias, etc.). Without a coherent, communicated and locally accepted legal system in place, the way was open for local soi disant powerbrokers to create their own.

The implications for rule of law and policing are pretty clear - rule of what law? Policing by what means? Also the inevitable conflicts between local "legal" systems and those produced by the central government and/or any proconsuls, etc.

[William F. Owen]

.
While clear blue water between law enforcement and security is an admirable goal, the third world floats on muddy waters. Moreover, the blue water in the West has not been so crystal blue since 9/11.

I submit that the important thing is that we know what the goal or desired end state looks like. Sure there are going to be areas of ambiguity, but I see most of those as easily solved.

My direct experience of the third world (though less considerable than your own) is that you cannot compensate for stupidity, bigotry, corruption and greed.

[Tom Odom]

I submit that the important thing is that we know what the goal or desired end state looks like. Sure there are going to be areas of ambiguity, but I see most of those as easily solved.

My direct experience of the third world (though less considerable than your own) is that you cannot compensate for stupidity, bigotry, corruption and greed.

And I agree with you for the most part. Where the disconnect crompts up is defining who are "we". In my experience, we too often define we as only us--the foreigners making or attempting to influence the decision rather than really looking at the issue from both sides.

Just as an example, the US I-MET program with the Rwandan government pre-genocide concentrated on military law and civilian rule. We--the US--hosted a military law symposium in early 1994 and the attendees were then current members of the GOR and the Rwandan military including the gendarmerie. Everyone listened as US intructors lectured on how important adherence to law was, MG Dallaire as UNAMIR 1 Force commander spoke. Later the students all talked together and drank soft drinks. It was almost a "kumbaya" experience. Just weeks later, many of those same students from the government sode were hip deep in genocide and the other students --the rebels-- were hip deep in fighting to stop them. The "we" in this was just us; we did not really include the Rwandans from either side in that we.

To finish the story though, later when I came in as DATT and we restarted I-MET with the funds still in the pot, I got to send a team of former rebels now Rwandan army and gendarmerie to the States to the Naval law school for a semniar. As part of that schooling, the students visited various prisons and later their instructors raved over their attentiveness. One instructor told us that the head of the Rwandan students turned to him in such a visit and asked, "You mean we cannot beat them?"

That student later became Rwandan Ambassador to the United States. I felt like then and I stell believe that "we" in that case had actually defined our goals collectively.

Best

Tom

In the below pic, then MAJ Frank Rusagara (2nd from left) and another RPA officer have a post seminar beer with two FAR officers. Frank is now a BG and commandant of the Rwandan Military Academy.

[wm]

Tom, Slap, Eden,

I think all three of your posts are great real world examples that reinforce what I was trying to say in my metaphor for the different cultures applying to each rotary out there.

Wilf,
You can still have one infantry--you will just have to accept that all of its members may not wear green jackets or be part of the Rifle Brigade.

[Tom Odom]

Tom, Slap, Eden,

Thanks mate!