In driving through Afghanistan, one would often pass a poured concrete outpost that had seen better days, with a ragged Afghan flag flapping weakly overhead, absolutely in the middle of nowhere. In front, there invariably would be a pair of bored youths in a faded green uniforms, with dirty white caps pushed back on their heads. They would be sitting on old metal chairs, or perhaps lounging on a bunk bed pulled into any convenient shade, disinterestedly watching the sparse traffic. In Kabul, on the other hand, you would often see nattily dressed policemen congregated in groups - Suicide Circle seemed to be a favorite hangout - automatic weapons slung menacingly as they arrogantly strolled along. From time to time they would harangue some poor citizen, arms waving, for no readily apparent reason. Directing traffic or enforcing civil order seemed to be beneath their dignity.

Afghan police were divided into several personal fiefdoms - Border Police, Highway Police, National Police, etc. Almost all of these had been created from scratch or built on a bare and demoralized cadre that had survived three decades of violence. Almost without exception they were corrupt, ill-trained, ill-equipped, poorly disciplined and poorly motivated. There were a few bright spots, but they were candles in the wind.

Why were the police so singularly ineffective? I could go down all the usual paths about how their training was sketchy, about the byzantine organization, the lack of pay and resultant corruption, the poor state of their equipment, but I think these are fairly self-evident. US and NATO senior leaders certainly focused on these aspects, believeing that performance would improve if we could throw more money at the problem, buy more stuff, reorganize the ministries, hire more bodies. We did that, and things did improve over the course of a year, but the needle didn't move very far.

If I had been asked to design a police force for Afghanistan, I might have approached it differently. I would have asked myself how the society traditionally policed itself and tried to create a force that reflected this. I would have soon discovered that the type of police force optimal for rural Paktia would not have sufficed for a (relatively) modern city like Kabul. In Afghanistan, the police were divided along functional lines rather than geographic, which was a fundamental mistake.

Secondly, I would have concentrated my efforts in installing police forces where they might do some good. Too many police units were scattered in places where they could not function due to intimidation or direct violence. When they were placed there, they became in effect military units, and their whole raison d'etre disappeared. Moreover, they became distracters and we spent too much time bailing out the police when they were attacked.

Thirdly, I would have embedded trainers with police units. In fact, if I had the power, I would have seconded Western policemen to the Afghans - made them commanders, paymasters, trainers, and disciplinarians for their units. The ultimate goal would have been to grow natives capable of replacing them.

Fourthly, I would have invested much more time in training. We half-trained these guys (and that is a generous estimate) before dispatching them to Indian country because of the demand for bodies. It would have been so much more fruitful to put these guys through a real training program during the 'honeymoon' period in Afghanistan to create a trained cadre upon which to expand. How long did that need to be? I don't know, but if it had been two years, it would have been worth it.

Fifhtly, I would have focused their training and efforts on high-payoff activities. Remember, there is still no functional penal or justice system, so arresting malefactors doesn't actually produce much payoff. The police could have been gainfully employed in human terrain mapping, forensic investigations for intelligence value - something akin to what TF Phoenix was doing, and simple traffic control in places like Kabul.

In other words, a police force could have been - should have been - created that reflected the society it was immersed in, that filled a niche in the larger operation, that was not asked to do things it could not accomplish, and that felt itself as part of a shared effort. Instead, I suspect most of the Afghanis who wore the uniform believed they were expendable symbols whose sole function was to raise the flag over some besieged outpost every morning.

One last note is that crime in general - narcotics, customs evasion, trafficking, and the like - was generally ignored by our senior leaders. It rarely was briefed during the morning updates and in the US Army, it therefore received little attention by most of the staff. When they were considered at all, police units were thought of more as low grade force protection units.