What are the SWC thoughts on policing in combat?

[davidbfpo]

Very tempting to add a few lines from my armchair, but a long day and will return on Sunday. Plus need to get a "green light" from another lurker on the Rhidesian experience.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

I think that the real crux of the matter may not be in the "Policing" but in the Internal security bit.

The UK tried to develop an IS paramilitary force with the "Auxiliaries," in Ireland and it was an utter failure as they behaved somewhat worse than the SS. Critical point is that they were Auxiliary Policeman and did not come under military command or discipline (despite being 100% ex-British Officers). Thailand has very screwed up system of "Village Militias" - most of whom are not that good at what they are supposed to do.

Again, the size, shape and doctrine of an IS or "Gendarmerie" is not well researched or written about, but there is ample material to start.

IMO, and IS force should be a subset of the Police, not the Army. They are an enhanced Policing capability, not a military force. They might have a primary role as "Border Guard" - as in Israel.

The real problem is when it comes to "expeditionary IS," which is a pretty good oxymoron!

[Rob Thornton]

One of our SWC members "Katarina" did some good work on gendarmes, there was a hang up on getting it translated into English. I am hoping she will comment on this thread

My own experience with established, formal gendarmes is limited, I have some good friends I made the couple of years I lived in Madrid who were Guardia Civil - I also had some good friends who were Policia Nacional. This was back in 89/90/91 and the ETA was in full swing there. Each organization seemed to know its own lane very well, but also seemed to be able to coordinate as required. As pointed out, a number of states have gendarmes, or like organizations, some also have some history of expeditionary operations. The development of these organizations within those states reflect the security challenges the have faced in the past, as well as the conditions they currently exist in given their geography, their level of development, their political system and many other factors that might threaten stability, and RoL.

It was my limited knowledge of the Guardia Civil that got me thinking when as an advisor to an IA BN, that they could perhaps be more effective if manned, organized, trained and equipped less like an Infantry BN, and more in line with the conditions they were actually employed in (for those who have not seen it, take a look at SWJ Vol 8, or the CALL Newsletter that Tom Odom put together that include that article on "building indigenous security forces IAW METT-TC".) This is not to say that it was entirely appropriate to consider changing one organization to meet the capability gaps that perhaps should be filled by another, only that a capability gap existed, and it was perhaps overlooked because when we took on the task of SFA initially in Iraq, we may have not understood the emerging security conditions, how long they would exist, how they would develop, how the enemy would adapt, and what would be required from an Iraqi standpoint to gain and sustain domestic security and RoL. We had no recent point of reference we could or would acknowledge as relevant, and as such we may have taken a path with Iraqi SFA development that left a significant capability gap. We are having challenges developing the IP and to a lesser degree the IA, how might we have taken on developing something along the lines of a gendarme?

At a minimum, I think we need to understand the functions of these organizations in the greater context of those states' security sector, and the context of sustaining RoL. An understanding as such should help us better partner with them on a number of levels. Since there is no requirement or justification for developing a gendarme here in the United States (and to echo Ken, that is a good thing), a way to develop the capability to assess a potential partner's needs in this area (be there an established gendarme in need of rebuilding, or the need or the need to address the partner's security sector as a whole) might be to do some work in the "D" area of DOTMLPF, and establish some lateral communications with SMEs in existing gendarmes resident in states we have good relations with.

If a SFA FM or JP was to ever become a requirement, I could see the need for an early chapter on assessing the potential partner's security sector in terms of capabilities to meet the threats and with an eye toward establishing its place within that state's greater RoL context (Slap's point on "what is normal and appropriate" with regards to RoL, is a significant topic of discussion in the RoL community of interest). Follow on chapters might include introductions to the range of organizations/services that populate the broad nature of the security sector (Intelligence, LE, Mil, EPS, Paramilitaries, PMCs, etc) with examples on what types of security institutions "could" fit into a particular set of conditions given assessments made for sort, medium and enduring threats to that partner's ability to gain and sustain RoL. Subsequent chapters could discuss the nature of building the institutions and bureaucracies required to support those organizations and services (DOTMLPF), and also discuss how they fit within the broader context of governance - this last part is important since the idea is to support RoL, not overturn it. Finally, detailed chapters on the technical aspects of how to generate, organize, train, equip, rebuild and advise the various pieces of the security sector could be addressed.

Thoughts??

Best, Rob

[Norfolk]

Your proposed outline for a JP and/or FM for Gendarmeries and IS sounds very good so far Rob. Any chance you might become one of the doctrine writers for said proposed pub?

And of course, the first chapter should have slap's statement quoted in verbatim.

Before deliberating futher upon the outline, the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) website is modestly useful - I don't know how many SWC members have seen this, although I can think of a few who almost certainly have; it offers some brief info across a range of issues relating to domestic and foreign internal security and expeditionary operations. It also describes, in brief, the EGF mandate, authority, command and control structure and arrangements, foreign advisory, and strategic, operational, tactical, and missions and tasks. It is limited, but useful. And it probably represents the current cutting edge in thought and practice on the use of Gendarmeries, especially in FID operations.

It may make for a useful rule of thumb to consider that there are three basic types of lawfully constituted Armed Forces, all working together to establish, enforce, and preserve law, order, and security: Constabularies, Gendarmeries, and Militaries. Constabularies normally handle criminal matters - mainly civil matter involving little or no political component;
Gendarmeries normally handle order matters - those civil and military matters that involve a substantial internal political component; and Militaries, who handle matters with a substantial external political component.

This of course, is all METT-T dependent, as others have described. In wartime, Gendarmeries often find themselves tasked with having to deal with enemy military long-range patrol and SF teams whilst performing their usual domestic IS role- it just goes with the turf. Similarly, Gendarmeries may find themselves performing FID or FID advisoring missions in a foreign war. And finally, Gendarmeries may find themselves performing the civil Constabulary role in areas that are wild and unstable, and just one step removed from being bandit country, if not there already. And of course, in English-speaking countries, the Military steps in to perform much of the Gendarmerie role in support of the Constabularies (civil Police), while the latter often send teams to support the Military in FID and SSO tasks. Edited to Add: Gendarmes are ideal for operations aginast major organized crime, bandits, brigands, and coastal pirates - all are the matter of COIN and FID - as such, Gendarmes should accompnay Military forces on LIC, as necessary..

It may be necessary for English-speaking countries to rethink the Constabulary-Military dualism of their traditional security apparatus and form, or re-form, dedicated Gendarmeries with IS (both foreign and domestic), counter-intelligence, counter-terrorism, search-and rescue, border and coast guard, foreign advisory, and COIN roles. Some of the counter-terrorism, FID and advisory missions that Commonwealth countries assign to civil police or military units and that the US assigns to SF might be more appropriately handled by Gendarmes.

As to what national authority should oversee a Gendarmerie, while many Western European countries assign that to the Ministry of Defence, most other countries assign it to the Ministry of the Interior; personally, I suspect that a separate ministry for Gendarmeries and Counter-Intelligence, along Ministry of Interior lines might be best in theory, but in practice it would seem that the MoD approach has worked.

As a related aside, it is striking, and telling, that the EGF Expeditionary HQ is adjacent to the Herd's HQ in Vicenza.

[Rob Thornton]

Lots in there to think on if the requirement for an SFA FM or JP was decided upon.

Yes there is discussion about it - but no decisions as of yet. We would probably have a hand in it, but right now Joint SFA proponency (the specifics on who, and why, and what that would entail such as scope of responsibilities and authorities) has been discussed, but nothing I'm aware of has been decided on.

For now I think contemplating that excellent post of yours to include:

It may make for a useful rule of thumb to consider that there are three basic types of lawfully constituted Armed Forces, all working together to establish, enforce, and preserve law, order, and security: Constabularies, Gendarmeries, and Militaries. Constabularies normally handle criminal matters - mainly civil matter involving little or no political component;
Gendarmeries normally handle order matters - those civil and military matters that involve a substantial internal political component; and Militaries, who handle matters with a substantial external political component.

is a great place to start. I also want to spend some time on the link you provided, just quickly looking it over it seems very useful.

Many Thanks, Rob

[slapout9]

Hi all, to finish from Friday I finally found some of my notes from a similar offline request I had earlier with Lawvol awhile back. I thought that an MP force along with CID (criminal investigation division) and a JAG team would give you pretty much everything you needed. No since reinventing the wheel. All the MP manuals cover patrol,investigations,riot control,interment and resettlement and JAG can handle the lawyers and Judges part.

All the older LIC/COIN/SASO type manuals constantly talk about having extensive MP support. Besides the LE portion MP's can function as a light Infantry force to handle the heavy firepower situations that Rob talked about in his first post. If you read all the great masters Galula,Trinquier,Kitson,etc. they are always talking about Police type Operations so it would only make since to me that MP's be given a much larger role in planning right from the start.

[William F. Owen]

.

All the older LIC/COIN/SASO type manuals constantly talk about having extensive MP support. Besides the LE portion MP's can function as a light Infantry force to handle the heavy firepower situations that Rob talked about in his first post. If you read all the great masters Galula,Trinquier,Kitson,etc. they are always talking about Police type Operations so it would only make since to me that MP's be given a much larger role in planning right from the start.

Personally I see MP and IS troops as two very different things. Military Police are enforce military discipline and perform traffic control etc.

IS troops are augmenters to civil police.

[Ken White]

Personally I see MP and IS troops as two very different things. Military Police are enforce military discipline and perform traffic control etc.

IS troops are augmenters to civil police.

Totally correct and if as it appears, Slapout means use Host Nation MPs extensively in the COIN role, I'd disagree with him. If he means use MPs more extensively if we (the US) are doing the COIN effort, I'd agree because US MPs do have a field combat role as well as the duties you cite.

I also contend that since the US lacks a 'gendarmerie,' that some Guard and Reserve MP Bns could be simply and easily restructured and retrained (at far less cost and effort than building a new capability) to provide the advisers and trainers for Host Nation IS forces -- who should be, as you say, augmenters to the civil police (but I suggest as a totally separate and independent agency responding to the Home Office or Minister of the Interior of the nation and not directly to the Police who should have quite strong local control).

[slapout9]

Hi Wilf,Ken...I agree with both of you on the need for an IS/MI5/Constabulary/Gendamerie,etc. My comments were my rather lousy attempt to pull togather some ideas from a previous discussion about the subject . However CID agents and the use of new Army FM on Police Intelligence operations could provide a pretty good security sevice. There is another program being developed at Ft. Leanoard Wood similar to Human Terrain Mapping that may be promising...Ken check with your spies

[Rhodesian]

The Rhodesian Police Force, known as the British South Africa Police, were originally expected to police the early colony and protect the wider interests of the colonisers. Crime among the indigenous population was largely left to be dealt with within the traditional "laws" of the chieftains, until such time as that crime involved or affected the wider colonial authority. In those early days, it would not be unusual for the horse-mounted policeman to roam wide areas of the bush for many months at a time as he "patrolled" his "patch". As the colony took on a National look however, and towns, cities and other "normal" infrastructure was established, the need for a more formal looking and acting police force became equally necessary, and the BSAP with their particularly distinctive Khaki uniforms certainly became a very visible feature of Rhodesian society. Unless you were a criminal (or a member of the RLI ), they were a popular and particularly efficient outfit.

Originally the Rhodesian War was perceived by a section of the authorities to be a policing matter. However as time went by there appears to have been a great deal of disagreement between the Police and the Military as to exactly how the war should be prosecuted. The Police already had "contacts" on the ground embedded within the indigenous population, who were just as effective at identifying strangers within their midst, and just as happy to tip off their "handlers" for the usual rewards. The Police also had quite capable para-military units to deal with the better armed and more robust criminals, namely the Police Anti Terrorist Unit, the Support Unit, and later any number of reservists with mixed military experience. However as the war progressed, it appears also that the "hawks" within the Military (and ultra-conservative political figures) were certain that it could be won through military action rather than one of "policing." It has been argued, probably correctly, that the Military`s eventual dominance in the relevant decision making process on these matters, scuppered any real attempts at "policing" and negotiation, and the war effectively turned to a more hard-lined stance of kill and clean out. It can also be argued that the sheer numbers of enemy combatants involved eventually made the Military`s dominance in these affairs inevitable. Not to blow the trumpet, the Army proved itself particularly adept at kill rates, and absolutely hopeless at "hearts and minds," but whatever the case on the ground, matters were effectively concluded not by the actions of our "enemies," but more-so by the duplicity of our "friends." (My humble opinion)

The establishment of the Selous Scouts was, I believe, an extremely efficient solution to both the policing and military problems faced by the Rhodesian establishment with regard to insurgency. The Scouts were effectively a military wing of a broader Police/Special Branch/Intelligence organisation. As the numbers of cadres and sympathisers increased (coerced or not), so did Rhodesia`s problem of identifying guerrillas hidden amoungst the “civilian” population. The answer, in part, was to send in pseudo-terrorists, men that the villagers and guerrillas themselves would be unable to I.D. from the real deal. While Special Branch continued to manage the intelligence follow up of "contacts" etc, they were also liasing closely with these pseudo-terrs, whose specific role was to identify terror gangs so that the Rhodesian Light Infantry, and others, could chopper in, envelop, and kill them. Of course the Scouts were also involved in "black ops," to use an Americanism if I may, designed to sow confusion among the populace and enhance the propaganda standing of the Rhodesians. Mugabe has since regularly blamed the Scouts for all manner of nasty incidents during the war, however I know a number of ex-Scouts and SB members and for what it is worth, have no doubts that Mugabe has merely attempted to deflect attention that would otherwise portray his Glorious Revolution as being the blatant acts of terrorism most of it actually was. For most of us "Rhodies," his actions since, and now being highlighted by the information media, are merely a continuation of those he used during the war, just the breath-taking scale of them has increased enormously in the absence of the "policing" actions of the Rhodesians! Perhaps more fairly, we were all bad bastards in a nasty war, just that some of us were less bad bastards than the others? (I think I shall use that as my motto . . . .)

Very few members of the Rhodesian Army (none of the many I know anyway) have ever accepted that we lost the war, but rather that political events overtook us. I remember meeting a British Army Major who was completely amazed at the clean and efficient state of the towns and cities, the high moral of the Forces etc, who eventually asked, "Why the hell did you give up?" We spent many hours over more than just a few beers "discussing" the matter, which included restraining one of our corporals from giving him a hiding: I`m afraid a sentiment many would have agreed with. Perhaps the incident can in some small way portray just how effective the policing of the towns etc actually was? I remember down in our suburb there were only two events of any military interest. One was when some hardy fellows man-handled a recoilless rifle of some eastern european manufacture, and fired pot shots with it at our local police station from the relative security of the nearby bush. They missed however, making a few holes in the golf course beyond (which really did upset a few people!) The other instance was hearing five mortars being fired at a local bus depot. My old man and I were watching TV, we stopped to listen, remarked, "mortars," and carried on watching the program. Other than the spectacular success of putting an RPG7 or two into our capital`s main fuel depot, and a few bombs in shops, I am aware that the Police/Intelligence people prevented numerous attempted postal bombings. The only real attempted "attack" on the capital occurred some 30-50 kilometers from town, and resulted in literal record kill-rates for my own Battalion (RLI). The old man was also involved in that incident as a member of PATU, and related later how PATU and the Selous Scouts had played ping pong with them for a week, with both using RLI in Fireforce actions launched from a rugby field at Enterprise Country Club (I used to sport free-fall at this club some years later, and had many less-than-sober evenings with their farming community.) This area had been deliberately kept "quiet" to allow the terrs to enter it in large numbers, while all the time being monitored by the SB, Scouts and others, at which point the "exits were sealed," and we warmed up our choppers.

In summary, the Rhodesian War probably will not provide suitable comparison for "Policing" issues within Afghanistan or Iraq, given the destruction of the infrastructure that exists in those places. The initial dismantling of the security services in Iraq was in hind sight a mistake, but the subsequent fall out among what is after all just a tribalistic third-world population should really have been expected. I remain convinced that Selous Scout type ops combined with light heli-bourne and supported reaction troops would have a tremendous impact in the rural areas of both Afghanistan and Iraq, but less so in the built up areas where pseudo-ops etc may have a greater impact. I will leave this to those who know the situation better. Certainly placing lightly armed and trained police within a war zone would have its difficulties, but in "pacified" areas there may be some place for a para-military police force to hold sway - only if endemic third world corruption can be clamped on! Unlike Zimbabwe today, Rhodesia`s Police were thankfully corruption free, which enhanced their work greatly. They were without any doubt very organised and efficient, and helped make life quite "normal" for us in the `burbs. There were of course restrictions on movement after hours for the indigenous population, and the requirement for identification papers to be carried so that those "out of place" could be weeded out. After dark we often had armed "Dads Army" (older members of Police Reserve) patrolling the `burbs, spot checking on individuals and properties for anything suspicious. When I was about 15, a few of these nice old blokes came and checked on our house knowing that the old man was off on another bush trip, by rattling the burglar bars of my young sisters bedroom. They were apparently unaware that we had an FN 7.62 in the house and that I had been somewhat "drilled" to protect them - In the shadows of our security lights, the shape of their magazines was the only reason I didn`t shoot, but this incident would have been very unusual to be frank, as such was the sleepy nature of Rhodesian life in the "white" suburbs generally, that most people went about their daily business quite unarmed and indifferent. If anything, it was the thieving that drove everyone nuts! It was another story out on the farms of course, where shoot first and ask questions later was the unofficial norm.

I.R

[Rob Thornton]

I appreciate the details of your post. It helps me see the practical linkages in the security sector from military to the national and local police down to the individual protecting their own house. Were there any impediments to sharing intelligence and conducting joint operations, or was it pretty flat?
Best, Rob

[Rhodesian]

Rob

The Rhodesian Light Infantry acted in heli-bourne Commando role for most of the war, and worked very closely with the Selous Scouts who acted as our eyes and ears on the ground. However the entire operation would be handled by JOC, or Joint Operational Command, which effectively controlled all that went on within the area of their control, whether police, or military. It was usual however to declare areas where the Scouts were operating as "frozen zones," and we ended up calling the Scouts and SB within those areas, "Eskimos." Unfortunately due to map reading errors, very occasionally one or the other would stray into or out of the area and firefights would erupt between the two.

Originally the Police in general ran the show, but later the Military took over and within that command, intelligence was equally available to all. Great care was taken to ensure that we did not enter a combat zone with Scouts likely to be within the immediate kill zone. Frankly we wouldnt have been able or expected to tell the difference between the terrs and the Scouts, but they often gave us excellent O.P support from the nearby hills if they had hung around at all.

The RLI, and the Polce proper, to be blunt, did not particularly like each other very much, largely because we tended to be very aggressive by training and nature, and frequently ended up "breaking things" . . . .

I.R

[davidbfpo]

What are the thoughts in the SWC on: Policing in counter insurgency?

My response has taken a few interrupted days to assemble and are from an "armchair".

There is clearly an important role for a policing function in COIN, whether it has to be provided by a paramilitary body is a moot point.

On a side point Rob & SWJ: are there any examples of a successful COIN campaign, in modern times, say post-1945, where there was no police involvement?

It is possible, for short periods, for the military to have responsibility for policing; recovery after disaster or the breakdown of law and order come to mind. Often military support to the civil power (MACP) has been to guard key points and police stations to release police manpower. Certainly in Europe there has been a reluctance to deploy soldiers in direct confrontation with rioters and strikers for example.

In recent times when European states, like Italy and Spain have confronted low-level, occasionally lethal insurgencies, the military have been kept in the background if not excluded.

For many reasons the British experience has been that professional soldiers are reluctant and unsuitable police officers – the UK experience in Northern Ireland, in the early years of ‘The Troubles’ provides ample illustration. A “half-way house” was the joint patrolling, although protection and preservation of a civil image, rather than effective policing was the rationale, for example an infantry platoon deployed to enable a constable serving a traffic summons.

There was a large deployment of military police, two regiments strong, to provide policing at the start of "The Troubles" and my vague recollection is that there was some joint patrolling with the police. This period is commented upon in the many books on the period, before the “Ulsterisation” of the security forces, with the local police (RUC) taking back primacy and the expansion of the local Army regiment (UDR).

Even after this large and significant military resources continued to be deployed for decades, in both rural and urban areas. When the military requirement did reduce there remained a standby / reserve role, which included riot control; the intelligence function and technical support (EOD, helicopters etc).

In the COIN environment where the local police maybe weak or worse, what should happen first?

It is important to decide whether a completely new police needs constructing, in effect dismissing local history, or whether some local history can be incorporated. The last few decades have seen police reform across the globe, invariably after democratization and the end of colonial rule. Slight snag, many of these reforms were to “civilianize” the police and reduce the paramilitary element. Has anyone written on reversing this process?

Changing the colours of the uniforms may seem small, but it highly symbolic of the change. Training, personnel selection and a host of issues follow – particularly the overt regular carrying of rifles as distinct from pistols.

In a COIN situation, particularly where the insurgents are strong and able to attack the police the first priority is protection. Here is a dilemma: who does that? Secondly away from police stations what is done, including if police officers live locally and not in barracks with their families?

A locally recruited police or paramilitary force will have many problems in COIN. The police in theory are community based they come from the community and serve the community. In the UK much is made of building, if not creating, the confidence and trust of the community. Only then will the information flow and meet the concept ‘Only communities beat terrorism’.

It is a two way process are the police trusted? Can the other partners in COIN trust the police?

For sometime the police in Somalia continued to function after the end of dictatorial rule, despite the level of violence and retained respect. Somewhere I have a newspaper clipping of an attempt by the USA, using American police officers, to reform the Somali police.

The resilience of the police to survive violent times has appeared on SWJ, with an example from Afghanistan recently.

There are some police forces that have kept the paramilitary function within the police and others that have kept it separate.

Note India, which has numerous current and recently active insurgencies, is given little study and has tried to minimize the army’s role. Are there lessons to learn there? Try http://insurgencyresearchgroup.files...rations-v2.doc

I fear that Rob's question whether other nations would provide training support is dependent on political agreement. Europe has been spectacularly unsuccessful in Afghanistan, with police reform (although the USA paid the most, the EU was in the lead and Germany the leader). The Balkans are different, but there the threat to order from insurgency is absent. The Australian Federal Police are well known for their peacekeeping expertise, not COIN.

If others will not help, yes the USA and closest allies, will need to create alternatives. Whether this can be created from using reservists, who are police officers deploying in military units is a moot point.

davidbfpo

[Rob Thornton]

David, thanks for the thoughtful post. You raise some excellent points that provide solid context for thinking how others have tackled problems and conditions, and raise the question about how and why those states pursued the COAs they did.

You also raise some great points about the expectations involving partners to have the right combination of capabilities, capacities and supporting political conditions allowing them to shoulder a load - provided they see it in their interest.

Thanks, David - its always good to hear from you. I'll think on the questions you posed this weekend.

Best, Rob

[Treadhead]

Some tremendously good insights on here. I wish I had known of this forum prior to leading a TT in Afghanistan. At any rate, here is my two-cents on this topic. This is my first post so go easy on me!

Getting a viable local police force up and running in my AOR (Farah Province) was our biggest challenges. This was the case for three major reasons: 1)Manning/Equiping/Training - The regional training facility in Herat lacked the capacity to produce more than a few hundred poorly trained ANP officers a month and these went to districts throughout the west, from Baghdis in the north to Farah in the south. 2)The provinicial government had security agreements with local warlords and drug runners which often were in conflict with the ANP. Some of these arrangements were decades old and perpetuated some unhealthy relationships between former mujahidin brothers. 3)The lack of security in the districts was such that district centers were basically indefensible with the numbers of ANP which were assigned to them.
During my tour I saw some moves in the right direction. There was a new initiative - The Focused District Development Program - which was getting advisors down to the district-level where before they were only at the provincial-level. The program involves replacing existing local police with Afghan Constabulary Police (ANCOP) for a thirty day period while the local cops are trained/equipped at the regional training facility. In the meantime, a twelve-man police mentor team would assess the district's infrastructure and local government, assisted by the 5-shop bubbas from the local PRT. As envisioned, this program was tackling one district per region, per quarter. This is going to be too little, too late if it continues. What is needed is a simultaneous surge of police mentors to all of the at-risk districts in the country with a plan to maintain this assistance beyond a month or two.
The urgency of the problem is exacurbated by the lack of Afghan army formations. Without getting too specific I can say that the currently mandated endstrength for the ANA is absurdly low. This wouldn't be the case if there were an effective police force in place but there isn't. Not even close. In Farah, crime and the insurgency are one and the same. As it stands, the army (The guys I mentored) are doing all the policing to include static defense of district centers throughout the province. The ANA is Afghanistan's only functioning institution. It commands tremendous respect among the people and is viewed as far less corrupt than the police. Initially, we tried to conduct joint cordon and search operations with the police, employing the police in the search role. (Something which is vociferously advocated at Fort Riley.) What we found was that this usually threw the LNs into a panic and often encouraged them to invite local insurgent cells to attack us or to impede our egress with IEDs. The perception among them was that the ANP were more to be feared than the criminals and insurgents which operated in the area.
The dedicated police mentors I met - Dyncorps and Blackwater, primarily - were great Americans but were severely restricted in their ability to visit districts and were focused on true police skills when what was really needed was paramilitary training. My sister police mentor team was just fifteen guys and they were expected to cover down on eight districts in Afghanistan's third largest province.
The provincial governor was more than happy to suppliment the lack of ANP by employing local criminals as "security contractors". This served some limited objectives and helped create a perception of rule of law in some parts of the province but it also helped to legitimize corruption and extortion. The solution to this particular problem will have to find its solution at the MoI level. Don't hold your breath!
Keep the discussion going and watch the early bird. All this is getting ready to get really hot this summer.

John

[Ken White]

Keep on posting...

[slapout9]

Keep on posting...

Ditto John that was some good stuff.

[Norfolk]

Doctrine and Procedures for the Employment of The Multinational Specialised Units (MSU), The Carabinieri's GHQ, 2003:

The Carabinieri have experimented the original formula of the Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU) in the Balkans. The MSU is a police-type force specialised in military actions, attracting the attention of the International Community as a particularly efficient unit able to meet the most modern requirements from operations in reply to crisis.

Therefore, the Carabinieri have gained unique experience, becoming the reference organisation in the specific sector at international level, ensuring Italy the task of Lead Nation (LN).Legislative decree nr. 297 of 5th October 2000, referring to the reorganisation of the Carabinieri, mentions, among the other things, the military tasks including the participation in military actions abroad. With regard to that, Article 5, paragraph 2, establishes that the Carabinieri performs, in addition to the traditional tasks of fighting actions and military police, the special operation of “providing security and orderly life in common in the concerned action areas” in the framework of “operations for the maintenance and re-achievement of peace and the international security”. For a better comprehension of such special task, reference is to be made to article I, par. I, of the decree stating the nature and duty of the Force, which is a military Institution with armed force status in permanent service of public order security and with the general task of police. Thus, Article 5, par. 2, states the performance of a new and general military function, which can be defined of “ordinary police”. Such function is normatively different from the military police, which is ruled by article 6 of the decree, and has also to be conceptually and practically separated from the latter. These two functions do not replace each other, but integrate reciprocally. The law also implicitly distinguishes the operative instruments that the two functions are responsible for.

Therefore, the performance of the aforesaid function and the autonomous structure that it is based on are governed by the law, but also are the most efficient and effective method of full application of it.

More at the link. This document provides much of the doctrinal basis for the newly-activated European Gendarmerie Force's (EGF) rapid-deployment force at Vicenza, near the the 173rd Airborne Brigade's HQ. Para-military police forces oriented towards SSOs and COIN are becoming a growth industry in the EU.