The security studies community has also been looking at the issue of the effects of the amount of force used in counterinsurgencies and stability operations. In the Summer 2004 edition of International Security, a Georgetown University professor examined the likelihood of military occupations succeeding based on an analysis of twenty-four historical cases. In the article, he touches upon some of the points made by people like William Owen and Ken White in this thread. Here is an example:
Occupations are more likely to succeed when they follow a destructive military victory that has eviscerated prewar political, economic, and social institutions. Such a victory increases the likelihood of success for two reasons. First, destructive military victory demonstrates that the pre-occupation regime can no longer deliver vital needs to the population, and thereby reduces the number of loyalists to that regime. Starting from a clean slate with no lingering elements of the pre-occupation regime, the occupying power is more likely to be able to convince the occupied population that the future under and after an occupation will be better than the bitter wartime past.Once the occupation begins strategies to eliminate the influence of the pre-occupation regime, such as denazification in post–World War II Germany, can clear the way for a successful occupation.
Second, if an occupied territory has been destroyed by war, then the population is more likely to accept the occupation as a necessary evil. Without the occupying power’s help, the country may never be able to rebuild....
The author does go on to list several important qualifiers to this statement. You do have to sort through the rather longish and dense article to get to some of the nuggets. Here is the link: http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/d...%20hazards.pdf