Indirect and Direct components to strategy for the Long War

[Steve Blair]

You know, Rob, at the same time I really think it is necessary to consider the effects of the means on the end state. In some ways, this is just another restatement of the old question "do the ends justify the means?" but, I would suggest, that any means will influence the actor(s) and the ends. For example, think about the increase in airport security - one of the effects of the means chosen has been to decrease the likelihood of air travel.

Just a thought...

Marc

I agree completely. There are any number of historical examples to back up this idea, and it's well worth looking at.

[Rob Thornton]

If you change things blindly - to support a "way", you may be changing more then you know. While we can't read the future, we should at least consider it. This gets to a point I hoped I'd made early on (maybe in another thread) about identifying and understanding how things may have changed, and what that means. Mark O'Neill was surprised once that I'd quoted the former Aussie PM when he said, America's challenge is to be the global hegemon, without acting like it." I'm sure I butched that, but I think I've got the gist of it.

That "role" as one which might be acceptable to most Americans, is I think out of character with how we have traditionally viewed ourselves. I mentioned before that I believe 9/11 and the events which have followed it, have changed our conception of security that go far beyond the threat posed by AQ. The inter-connectedness piece was already occurring, but for the general public it was largely benign, even beneficial - MTV in multiple languages, global shopping, cheap manufactured goods. With 9/11 we started to take more serious not of Pandemics, Transnational crime, the ME, events in non-western parts of the world. The media picked up on it, and soon we started checking the labels on our tooth paste, children's toys and pet foods as well as looking at who was the fellow passenger in 15D. Our borders have certainly become a hot topic from terrorism, to narco - trafficking to economic security. I think there are also some interesting takes on internal questions such as the relationship to communications and school shootings, suicides, violent crime, etc. as well. Those are just a few examples, but I think it has caused us to reconsider our relationship to and within the world.

Its not the "western burden" argument at all. It is a question of how the state of the rest of the world effects us. Its not a simple of matter either, when I was growing up the perception from the general public was largely relegated to the Soviet Union and fear of nuclear brinkmanship - stoked by movies, books, songs, and the news. The Military had its doctrine and acquisitions geared largely toward the Fulda Gap. Now its much more diffuse, and I think from our NSS, to the QDR “shift our foot print” diagram, to the our recognition that our wars will be "among the people" we are only now starting to question on a national scale what that translates to in terms of strategic cultural change.

Adaptation is not going to be easy or smooth. There are going to be some real painful lessons as we adjust I think. It is a very interactive world and just because we think we have a good enough plan, and the tools in place to adjust to changing realities does not make it so – in other words its not enough to know “what” or “how”, but we must know “why” in order to assess strategic risk for changing or not changing. Other states and non-states, groups and individuals have their own goals, and perspectives and they have an increasing means to realize those goals in many cases.

The goal I think is to be anticipatory enough and to get it more right then wrong. Part of this I think is considering the "more" correct policy objectives as they relate to the way the world is and to how it may be changing, and then considering means and ways that are feasible, acceptable, and sustainable. We have to get beyond just identifying the world as uncertain, and that there are decades of persistent conflict ahead - that was useful to a point, now what?

At the same time, we have to keep from paining ourselves in a corner (Marc's airport ex. is a good example of a secondary effect), denying ourselves strategic and operational flexibility, and finally to keep ourselves from exposing some unknown chink in armor that exposes a critical vulnerability as we shift focus or effort.

A tall order for sure.

Best, Rob