Indirect and Direct components to strategy for the Long War

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Steve,

Gotta agree with the terrorist argument here. You also need to consider the changing face of many of those organizations (after all, the anti-globalization folks were the first true trans-national terrorist group, and the majority of them come from pretty settled and stable regions).

A good point that both you and Eden raise. I'd bring up that while movements may originate and find purchase in more developed states, its also important to consider that state's ability to respond to it in terms of capability and capacity. Can the state mitigate the threat in such a way that public security or the perception of public security are not compromised to the point where the state's ability to govern is jeopardized?

Its probably also worth considering that in terms of consequences to surrounding states. If a terrorist movement originated in the past in a developed state because of one aspect - say politics, or religion, what effect did it have on its neighbors or the broader international community? How are the consequences and the means in which such a movement can now extend or cooperate with other movements (or state actors) and what does that mean? How does the access to a place that is unstable and ungoverned facilitate training and coordination by what once were more disparate groups, and what opportunities does that present them in terms of better safe havens? All of those get to the broader question of why we should identify a political objective that on its face may be at odds with how we have traditionally defined ourselves and our role, as well as the means and ways available or desirable to achieve those ends. Tough stuff to grapple with for sure, and this is a great place to talk about them.
Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

John, and others -

Sorry about the tech difficulties - anybody who needs to - just send me a PM with an email addy I can put an attachment to and I'll send them on.

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Hacksaw - good catch,

As I continue on this stream of consciousness... I heard rumor (probably in this forum) that ADM Mullen proposed as food for thought that we ought to have an Info Order with an OPS Annex as opposed to the other way around. There is probably way too many cultural hurdles to scale with that idea, but that is the kind of big idea that I expect from a CJCS. If you get past your initial gut reaction, you can easily so why that is a far more useful mental construct. Unfortunately it took a squid... god help us if they are going to do all our thinking.

I did not want to lose that thought you had in the post, it also deserves to be talked about - and gets to the question of narrative and actions very well.
Best Rob

[Rob Thornton]

I got to thinking about that one:

Will Rogers was asked how he would defeat the Nazi U-boat menace. "Simple", he said, "just raise the temperature of the Atlantic Ocean to the boiling point." The reporter agreed this would destroy all the enemy submarines, but wondered how Will would heat up the ocean.

In a way Rogers did hit upon an idea, and eventually we did did make a pretty "hot" environment for the U-boats to operate, the operationalization of it required improved ASW, convoy escort tactics, the development and fielding of some new technologies, and an increase in the sheer amount of shipping vs. the U-boat capacity to intercept and the and selective use of cypher effort to defeat German encryption to do so. Operationalizing it required multiple efforts along a variety of lines. Interesting comparison's have been made to the German use of U-Boats in the Atlantic vs. our sue of submarines in the Pacific - which in its own way could be used to consider approaches to the Operational Environment - but the differing contexts only allow you to get so far. I don't think Roger's explanation was anything new, maybe just his way of looking at it.

There might be some other parallels worth considering - but I'm not sure of their utility once you acknowledge that to devise a strategy is one part, but implementing or operationalizing it is another. Just creating the "means" to pursue a "way" that is in keeping with the "end" is proving to be a challenge.

Best, Rob

[marct]

Just creating the "means" to pursue a "way" that is in keeping with the "end" is proving to be a challenge.

You know, Rob, at the same time I really think it is necessary to consider the effects of the means on the end state. In some ways, this is just another restatement of the old question "do the ends justify the means?" but, I would suggest, that any means will influence the actor(s) and the ends. For example, think about the increase in airport security - one of the effects of the means chosen has been to decrease the likelihood of air travel.

Just a thought...

Marc

[Steve Blair]

You know, Rob, at the same time I really think it is necessary to consider the effects of the means on the end state. In some ways, this is just another restatement of the old question "do the ends justify the means?" but, I would suggest, that any means will influence the actor(s) and the ends. For example, think about the increase in airport security - one of the effects of the means chosen has been to decrease the likelihood of air travel.

Just a thought...

Marc

I agree completely. There are any number of historical examples to back up this idea, and it's well worth looking at.

[Rob Thornton]

If you change things blindly - to support a "way", you may be changing more then you know. While we can't read the future, we should at least consider it. This gets to a point I hoped I'd made early on (maybe in another thread) about identifying and understanding how things may have changed, and what that means. Mark O'Neill was surprised once that I'd quoted the former Aussie PM when he said, America's challenge is to be the global hegemon, without acting like it." I'm sure I butched that, but I think I've got the gist of it.

That "role" as one which might be acceptable to most Americans, is I think out of character with how we have traditionally viewed ourselves. I mentioned before that I believe 9/11 and the events which have followed it, have changed our conception of security that go far beyond the threat posed by AQ. The inter-connectedness piece was already occurring, but for the general public it was largely benign, even beneficial - MTV in multiple languages, global shopping, cheap manufactured goods. With 9/11 we started to take more serious not of Pandemics, Transnational crime, the ME, events in non-western parts of the world. The media picked up on it, and soon we started checking the labels on our tooth paste, children's toys and pet foods as well as looking at who was the fellow passenger in 15D. Our borders have certainly become a hot topic from terrorism, to narco - trafficking to economic security. I think there are also some interesting takes on internal questions such as the relationship to communications and school shootings, suicides, violent crime, etc. as well. Those are just a few examples, but I think it has caused us to reconsider our relationship to and within the world.

Its not the "western burden" argument at all. It is a question of how the state of the rest of the world effects us. Its not a simple of matter either, when I was growing up the perception from the general public was largely relegated to the Soviet Union and fear of nuclear brinkmanship - stoked by movies, books, songs, and the news. The Military had its doctrine and acquisitions geared largely toward the Fulda Gap. Now its much more diffuse, and I think from our NSS, to the QDR “shift our foot print” diagram, to the our recognition that our wars will be "among the people" we are only now starting to question on a national scale what that translates to in terms of strategic cultural change.

Adaptation is not going to be easy or smooth. There are going to be some real painful lessons as we adjust I think. It is a very interactive world and just because we think we have a good enough plan, and the tools in place to adjust to changing realities does not make it so – in other words its not enough to know “what” or “how”, but we must know “why” in order to assess strategic risk for changing or not changing. Other states and non-states, groups and individuals have their own goals, and perspectives and they have an increasing means to realize those goals in many cases.

The goal I think is to be anticipatory enough and to get it more right then wrong. Part of this I think is considering the "more" correct policy objectives as they relate to the way the world is and to how it may be changing, and then considering means and ways that are feasible, acceptable, and sustainable. We have to get beyond just identifying the world as uncertain, and that there are decades of persistent conflict ahead - that was useful to a point, now what?

At the same time, we have to keep from paining ourselves in a corner (Marc's airport ex. is a good example of a secondary effect), denying ourselves strategic and operational flexibility, and finally to keep ourselves from exposing some unknown chink in armor that exposes a critical vulnerability as we shift focus or effort.

A tall order for sure.

Best, Rob