The Higher HQs as an Operational and Strategic Enabler

[Rob Thornton]

With the resignation of ADM Fallon as the CENTCOM CDR, and the MSM's discussion about friction between ADM Fallon and GEN Petraeus, I began to think about the historical parallels and how the roles the personalities involved in leadership matter. Just the activity of waging war provides a level of friction that makes coordinating activities and understanding the situation and conditions to a degree where each higher level of HQs can best support the activities of the one below it a real challenge. If the personalities involved don't understand each other for whatever reasons, then more friction is induced, and overcoming inertia toward the policy objective becomes not only a matter of defeating your enemy, but countering the efforts (be they at cross purposes for whatever reason(s)) of the higher HQs.

Lots of speculation last week about who would succeed ADM Fallon, and the positions that might have to be filled as a result. There was also some (albeit less) discussion about what skills and attributes they would need with regard to CENTCOM as a whole, given the other challenges in the CENTCOM AOR.

There has not been a great deal of discussion at all about the skills and attributes of a potential CENTCOM CDR with regard to better supporting the two wars in the CENTCOM AOR. Is there just an assumption that the GCC should focus on everything but Iraq and Afghanistan, given the many other challenges in the AOR? A higher HQs of the scale of a GCC can potentially bring a great deal of support to activities within its AOR, provided there is good lines of communication between HQs, and that there is shared understanding of the importance of the political objective, the agreement all around about what is acceptable in terms of an outcome, and what are the potential consequences for other then agreed upon outcomes with relation to broader regional and international objectives.

At least a few historical examples come to mind with regard to the challenges of developing common visions at the strategic and operational levels. The relationships between Lincoln, Stanton, Halleck, Grant, Meade and Sherman provides some good reading, and I'd offer that relationships between the Allies around 1944 offer some good insights as well. Not all of the examples or instances are positive, they often highlight where because of personality, misunderstanding, or political expediency HQs at different levels created more problems then they solved.

The recent events in CENTCOM offer a starting place to think about the questions, the fact that the consequences are immediate only adds to the importance of the discussion. However, with operations going on all over the world, and the question of authorities and responsibilities as they relate to capabilities and capacities, or bilateral and multi-lateral the question will probably come up again sooner rather then later.

How could a higher HQs such as a GCC with 2 theaters of operation in its AOR better support the HQs charged with achieving policy objectives as they relate to those two wars?

For the large number of historians and history / poli-sci buffs in the SWC, what are the parallels available to talk about?

Best, Rob

[John T. Fishel]

Rob--

Good post. But the issue goes beyond higher to parallel and "=" but "subordinate" as I suggested in the other thread on Fallon. Similar situations existed in Vietnam where MACV was "subordinate" to CINCPAC. Unlike Iraq, COMUSMACV did not control the air or naval wars outside RVN. And the answer to the question of who's in charge was totally unclear.

In DS/DS borh CINCPAC and CINCEUR supported CINCCENT. But, early on, the Navy commander from PACFLEET attempted to say that he was "in support of" CINCCENT rather than OPCON. CINCPAC replaced him (presumably at Schwartzkopf's request). Schwartzkopf has an interesting quote that he "worked for" Powell where, by law, he worked for SECDEF Cheney. Still, the relationship was successful.

Perhaps, the most egregious violation of our own doctrinal command relationships came in Somalia during UNOSOM II. There, CINCCENT Gen. Hoar retained OPCON of all US forces sent to Somalia except the Log Spt Cmd. Tom Montgomery, Commander of US Forces - Somalia and Dep UN Force CDR, only had TACON of Bill David's Bde of the 10th Mtn Div which was the UN's QRF - and then only for routine training and bonafide emergencies. Montgomery never had any control over TF Ranger - Forces Command could veto a mission but had no control over it. Tom Daze and I cover this case extensively in my edited book, "The Savage Wars of Peace" Toward a New Paradigm of Peace Operations and I updated the story in my 2006 book (with Max Manwaring) Uncomfortable Wars Revisited.

Cheers

JohnT

[Rob Thornton]

John,
Thanks for posting. I'd done some reading a couple of years ago in a Joint Air-power class that brought into question the relationships between the then CONCPAC with MACV and the operational and strategic problems it engendered. I think there is merit in discussing that one more. What about commands inside MACV that were stood up to C2 or synchronize something that was identified as a shortfall. Do you know if there were events that pushed planners to ID them?
Ken, it'd be great to get your take on this as well.
Thanks to both of you, Regards, Rob

[Ken White]

personalities are the major factor in too many cases. The bad thing is that the major and obvious personalities may be almost peripheral. Staffs tend to be quite loyal to their bosses and can sway things. There is also the impact of inter service relationships. Both those things can have a more than significant effect.

Look at my favorite unnecessary battle, Peleliu. Nimitz ignored both Halsey and Spruance who argued it was totally unnecessary to accede to MacArthur who thought otherwise and he did so as much because he and Ernie King had stolen a lot of resources from MacArthur for over two years to build up the Pacific Theater to the detriment of MacArthur's SouWesPac Theater and Nimitz believed he owed MacArthur a bone or two. So the 1 MarDiv went in to make unnecessary history at great cost. So, Ernie King had an impact as did inter service relationships. MacArthur's direct line to DC probably contributed to the decision.

To re-emphasize John's Somalia example (I'm sure he knows far more than I do so he can correct me if my interpretation of what I've read and been told is off the mark). I'd put the mess down to four major items. First, TF Ranger repeated the same TTP over and over -- they became too predictable. Second, the lack of unity of command that John cites. Third, CentCom, as a result of having had Norm Schwarzkopf as CinC had learned to micromanage and they did that (to no positive effect I can discern). However, I think the most significant problem was Jonathan Howe, Adm, USN (Ret), former Bush 41 NSA and Clinton NSC staffer turned UN lead in Somalia (at the behest of Clinton); that and Bill's rather foolish eruption an order to "get Aidid..." which Howe ordered carried out over the objections of several. Thus, Centcom tried to act IAW the personality of their former Stormin' Commander and there's that direct line to DC again -- and this time wielded by a guy who wasn't nearly as smart as Douglas.

Turning to Viet Nam, it's no secret that Westmoreland and his staff did not get along at all well with III MAF -- and I'd suggest anyone who couldn't get along with Lew Walt has some problems -- or with FMF Pac. The FMF Pac CG from 62 to 64 was Brute Krulak. He made as lot of trips to VN and talked to Westmoreland on most of them. To little avail. Against the advice of his staff, Westmoreland did let the Marine CAP program continue and later grudgingly admitted it was 'ingenious.' It wasn't as great as some say but it did work and it was vastly better than anything the Army did much before mid-1968.

There weren't that many commands inside MACV, it was pretty much a book Joint Staff. Momyer, the 7th AF Cdr fought continual turf battles with the Army, Navy and the Marines and the SOF community had its moments of rebellion but by and large, there were no strategic problems in VN. In the SEA area, as John notes, there were big problems due to the disconnects and the fact that MACV would sometimes overflow the boundaries a bit. Laos was a separate story unto itself, of course. Thus, in effect there was no Operational problem, VN was the operational entity for MACV and the strategy had put them there. VN was virtually an annoying sideshow and resource drainer for PaCom (who had little or no Operational play in that theater), much as Afghanistan and Iraq are to CentCom today.

Westmoreland was not a strong leader but he did have a strong staff * . They fought III MAF to a standstill, talked to McNamara and Johnson's folks constantly, cutting their bosses nominal boss CincPac (Harry Felt until 64 and U.S. Grant Sharp from 64 until 68) out of the loop -- much as MacArthur's folks had done in WW II. So the personalities of Johnson, McNamara, the two Admirals and a far from pushy Westmoreland intertwined to produce a Staff-run war with a direct WH/E-Ring to Saigon interchange. Add to that the facts that PaCom is so big that micromanaging is difficult if not impossible and it had never learned to do that as a result of having Nimitz and a series of Admirals in charge. Admirals do not micromanage the way Army generals do. Still, here again, we have hidden players in the form of Krulak and the MACV Staff plus, yet again -- a direct line to DC.

To see how little some things change, look at Iraq. Sanchez, wrong man for the job -- but the system said he had to stay. Abizaid, not a micromanager, tolerated that and him for 18 months. Then Casey, wrong plan -- no change. To his credit (IMO) Abizaid tried to get CentCom out of micromanaging the theater and was sort of successful, they're better than they used to be but still interfere with subordinate commanders way too much. Now, they have Petreaus to deal with and that direct line to DC is allegedly again in operation (though I'm not sure I believe that)

So personalities are a huge part of it -- and all items and people that effect events are frequently (I'd even say usually) not terribly visible. Add in a direct line to DC and the thlot pickens...

Thus, my answer to your original question:

"How could a higher HQs such as a GCC with 2 theaters of operation in its AOR better support the HQs charged with achieving policy objectives as they relate to those two wars?"

would be to leave those tow theaters alone and let them do their job while concentrating on the rest of the AO -- acknowledging that both theaters adversely impact the GGC's ability to do that. That, as they say, is why those guys get the big bucks and a Gulfstream...

I take that route because indications lead me to believe that the direct line to DC as problem is unlikely to disappear.


* As an aside, then BG Hank Schweiter, ADCS G3 for Special Ops at DA in 1966 traveled to sunny Saigon to brief on a program DA wanted to institute. He started his briefing to ComUSMACV and the Staff assembled with "General Westmoreland, gentlemen. I'll start by noting that the MACV staff is now larger than the combined staffs of Eisenhower and MacArthur at the end of world War II..." The Pachyderms did not smile -- but some of us did...

I think there's also a significant message in that vis a vis command relationships, to wit; a proper sized staff is too busy to interfere, a too large staff absolutely will interfere because you have a bunch of smart, tough guys without enough to do.

[PhilR]

This is a very interesting topic and one worth discussion. It been my observation that we eventually get tactics correct, but dysfunctional HHQ relationships have long term negative consequences.
Rob posed the question of how the CENTCOM can best support the two subordinate warfighting commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan in accomplishing assigned policy goals. I'd turn the question around--do the two subordinates see themselves as accomplishing policy goals set by the national level and transmitted through CENTCOM? I'd submit that, in reality, each of these three commanders are fighting their own fights and consider the national level as their direct HHQ. I haven't seen CENTCOM given much latitude to provide significant direction to either of the commanders in Iraq or Afghanistan, except on the most routine of administrative and logistics issues.
This gets sticky because what's best to accomplish the immediate missions in Iraq or Aghanistan (in terms of resources or methods) may not be the best for the region. CENTCOM is the direct commander who should be managing and balancing the two fights--its not a case of micro-managing, but of make resource decsions where there may be a trade-off (BCTs in Iraq vs. BCTs in Afghanistan--also, there's only one JFACC for the theater; neither Petreaus or Neil owns any TACAIR outside of USMC MAGTF fixed wing) and providing left and right limits on issues that affect the whole region (Iran is an issue for Iraq, Afghanistan and the region as a whole).
The III MAF and MACV issue in Vietnam is an interesting historical note. While the Marines may have had it correct in their pacification approach, the reality is that they chose a strategy for their section of Vietnam that was totally out of sync with the rest of the theater, that had very different time and resource requirements--and they did this via a service chain of command that went from III MAF to FMFPAC to HQMC--with little regard for the joint commander. I'm not arguing right or wrong, but it was a heady bit of institutional insubordination.

[John T. Fishel]

most of your observations. Corrections: Jonathon Howe was Dep NSA under 41; went, as you say, to SRSG as Bill's condition for US support of UNOSOM II but did not pass go - return to NSC staff; it was Howe that insisted on the SCR that Albright pushed through on a weekend directing Forces Command to go after Aideed and, ultimately, brought forth TF Ranger.

I think your footnote observation is spot on.

Phil, it is hard to make the case in pre G-N times that the USMC was institutionally insubordinate when the law did not give either CINCPAC or COMUSMACV command over service forces. OPCOM (predecessor of COCOM) really gave little authority to a CINC or JFC and left the service chain of command as you state.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

This is a very interesting topic and one worth discussion. It been my observation that we eventually get tactics correct, but dysfunctional HHQ relationships have long term negative consequences.

I would also posit that the majority of HHQ are in fact quite dysfunctional and that personalities are a major contributor to that flaw. As I said, an overabundance of strong willed smart people with little to do...

... Rob posed the question of how the CENTCOM can best support the two subordinate warfighting commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan in accomplishing assigned policy goals. I'd turn the question around--do the two subordinates see themselves as accomplishing policy goals set by the national level and transmitted through CENTCOM?

Perhaps the policy goals and the combat goals differ? Been my observation that they generally do and that particularly applies to our IMO flawed GCC structure. The question really is who's in charge? The civilian leadership or the GCC CinC? Go to a given country and it's ironclad -- the Ambassador is in charge; enlarge it to a world region and suddenly the four button is in charge? Makes no sense and creates problems.

Regardless, we are where we are and we are fighting very small wars in two nations in a GCC region. Is the GCC's policy or the combat the most critical issue?

...I'd submit that, in reality, each of these three commanders are fighting their own fights and consider the national level as their direct HHQ. I haven't seen CENTCOM given much latitude to provide significant direction to either of the commanders in Iraq or Afghanistan, except on the most routine of administrative and logistics issues.

True and i obviously agree with that...

...This gets sticky because what's best to accomplish the immediate missions in Iraq or Aghanistan (in terms of resources or methods) may not be the best for the region. CENTCOM is the direct commander who should be managing and balancing the two fights--its not a case of micro-managing, but of make resource decsions where there may be a trade-off (BCTs in Iraq vs. BCTs in Afghanistan--also, there's only one JFACC for the theater; neither Petreaus or Neil owns any TACAIR outside of USMC MAGTF fixed wing) and providing left and right limits on issues that affect the whole region (Iran is an issue for Iraq, Afghanistan and the region as a whole).

It's McNeill and, as a non-fan of over centralized air operations I think he and Petreaus should have control of their own assets -- isn't there something about Unity of Command in the books somewhere? Regardless, its' that JFACC's job to support both. Period.

I'd point out that Centcom's inept diddling with BCTs here versus there and routinely forcing units who return to theaters to go to a completely different AO is sorta dumb. I'll also state that the coordination issues you cite are political and NOT military...

... The III MAF and MACV issue in Vietnam is an interesting historical note. While the Marines may have had it correct in their pacification approach, the reality is that they chose a strategy for their section of Vietnam that was totally out of sync with the rest of the theater, that had very different time and resource requirements--and they did this via a service chain of command that went from III MAF to FMFPAC to HQMC--with little regard for the joint commander. I'm not arguing right or wrong, but it was a heady bit of institutional insubordination.

I think John accurately responded to this. I'd also suggest the it was not insubordination, simply holding out quite strongly for what one believed and fighting off bureaucratic and parochial intransigence -- I though that's what we were all supposed to do. Nor will I mention that the rest of the theater was totally out of sync with reality...

Or that such is an example of the inter service difficulty bit. Fallon may or may not have intensely disliked Petreaus but he's unlikley to have talked to him the way some twit alleged he did -- not because four stars don't talk to other four stars that way, they do -- but they don't do it on an interservice basis. Just as Westmoreland tried to persuade Walt to cease the CAP -- but he would not order him to do so -- and Lew was only a three star at the time.