The Higher HQs as an Operational and Strategic Enabler

[Ken White]

I'd say there are at least two parts to that: the first might be whose responsibility is it by right?; the second might be whose is it by default, when the first is inadequate, or ambiguous, or simply left undefined? That can get tricky (political) real quick I think, and without commensurate authority that backs up the claim to responsibility the policy is left open to question, rebuke, and interpretation - its implementation can become one of willingness and produce ad hoc and uneven results.

Very true-- and the problem is, in many cases, yet again personality driven. If it is for example State's job to propose a policy and the NSC or President's job to announce or promulgate it and the GCCs job to execute it, what can and does happen is that the first two sluff or fail to do their part and the GCC can end up making policy by default, dragging the nation along with them in some cases. The GCC types are not inclined to endure a vacuum for long periods. Slippery slope and all that...

This brings up a host of other organizations from Service Title 10 responsibilities and functions, FORSCOM, HRC etc., to the role of the Joint Staff in supporting GCCs, to the role SOCOM plays in synchronizing GWOT efforts.

Quite correct -- and none of those are likely to sit on their hands well, either. My observation has been that all will do something, even if it's wrong.

I won't even address the Unity of Command problems that over activity at those levels can induce.

Is it mostly a matter of creating problems because either those HHQs don't know what they don't know, or is it they do know but don't care? I think its an important point, because if its the latter, then its a different type of friction to overcome.

Again in my observation, some of both -- personality dependent (and by that I mean not only the GCC Cdr but the appropriate Staff folks). It's also circumstance driven -- Centcom is unlikely to get in too much trouble outside Afghanistan and Iraq right now because of the heavy focus on those two theaters. SouthCom is probably really busy with Colombia, Venezuela and the Triangle -- but EuCom and PaCom have little to do. So-o-o-o...

ForsCom has always been a headquarters looking for a mission. One is confronted with the fact that a number of HHQs exist to justify Flag billets -- and that most FlagOs are not going to be content with doing little or nothing.

- first we have to look more then an inch deep at who we are selecting

Yea, verily...

[Eden]

During my year at the War College we had a dozen or so flag officers speak to us on various subjects. One viewpoint they all shared was the importance of a coherent, cohesive command structure. They also agreed that once you've screwed it up, it is almost impossible to fix. I suspect this means that they were uniformly concerned that we do a lousy job of setting up command structures.

I never really understood what they were talking about until I experienced life at first hand in a theater headquarters.

If you think about what a proper higher headquarters does for its subordinate units, you can then judge whether the current structure in CENTCOM adds value or not.

1. Provides guidance/orders and ensures the activities of the subordinate headquarters are coordinated and synergistic.
2. Weights the effort in accordance with national priorities by allocating scarce or centrally controlled resources.
3. Shifts resources between subordinates (or redefines their area of operations) as the mission dictates.
4. Ensures subordinates have the resources they need to accomplish their missions, or scales back their missions in light of acknowledged shortages.
5. Provides top cover so that subordinate commanders have only a single boss to respond to; also prevents subordinates from conducting end runs or direct liaison with NCA.
6. Trains, disciplines, cajoles, inspirits, and lends a sympathetic ear to subordinate commanders; removes incompetents as necessary.

I would say that CENTCOM does none of these well, and some not at all. Moreover, if they tried to do some of the above, they would meet strong resistance from subordinate, supporting, and service component commands.

Two last comments. Some would say that 'classic' unity of command principles don't apply at a certain level; I would dispute that. Finally, I do believe that personalities are much more important when large egos with multiple stars clash - especially when they come from different services. Does anyone think things would be different in CENTCOM if ol' H Stormin' Norman were in charge today?

[Tom Odom]

Does anyone think things would be different in CENTCOM if ol' H Stormin' Norman were in charge today?

Yes but not for the better. I say that because in writing Certain Victory on the 90-91 Gulf War we looked very closely at the roles of the UNIFIED Command and the component commands. In particular we struggled with the role of 3rd Army and its commander LTG Yeosock. In the end we saw 3rd Army for what it was: a buffer to keep the CINC off the back of the corps commanders--and General Yeosock said the same thing. This role was critical in the 100 hour ground operation because the difference in view between the CINC's view and what was actually happening on the ground was very large. The CINC was wrong. 3rd Army as a buffer kept him from playing corps commander.

In contrast, there was no buffer between the CINC and the ATO in the air operation. We had very good information about the CINC's penchant for restructuring the 72 hour ATO at the final briefing just to put his thumb print on it. He did and he screwed it up by changing targets at the last possible moment.

Good book on 3rd Army is COL Rick Swain's Lucky War. COL Swain was the Director of CSI when he was sent to theater as the historian for 3rd Army.

Best

Tom

[Ken White]

I agree with Eden and with Tom. Chuck Horner would also agree with Tom...

With respect to Tom's comment, I'd add that as Yeosock was ill, he was backed up by DA who pulled Cal Waller out of I Corps Command and rapidly sent him over to be Yeosock's Deputy commander and reinforce the buffer zone -- pure personality based decision (by Powell through Vuono, I'm sure) and a good one. They got someone who could deflect Norm.

All of which suggests to me that there's a happy balance somewhere between the Abizaid (and possibly Fallon) hands off approach and the Storming approach...

On the command relationships issue, I agreed with John that Goldwater-Nichols had done more good than harm -- but part of the harm that was done happens to be in that area as Eden says. G-N, again, makes the mistake of believing and inadvertently saying that all human pegs are interchangeable. Not a fatal flaw but a significant one.

[Tom Odom]

With respect to Tom's comment, I'd add that as Yeosock was ill, he was backed up by DA who pulled Cal Waller out of I Corps Command and rapidly sent him over to be Yeosock's Deputy commander and reinforce the buffer zone -- pure personality based decision (by Powell through Vuono, I'm sure) and a good one. They got someone who could deflect Norm.

thanks Ken! yes now that you mention that I remember Waller's name coming up in that buffer role...

Tom

[John T. Fishel]

Let me go back to a point I made smewhere - that G-N does not address a JFC that is really NOT subordinate to a regional unified command but, is, in effect, a theater in itself. Both Iraq and Afghanistan fit this as did MACV in the distant pre G-N past. It would help if the commands in both Iraq and Afghanistan were separated from CENTCOM but it would not fix the problem. Indeed, it is a social science law (I believe) that organizational change simply cannot fix anything. It can only make the job easier or harder.

Just because the chain of command in Iraq is not unified - who is in charge, Petraeus or Crocker? - doesn't mean it can't work. It appears that there is mutual respect between the two and they coordinate their actions effectively. Of course, I could be wrong about that having no direct access to either but the appearance is good. If so, then they have made a situation that lacks unity of command work. Would it be easier if oneof them were designated as "in charge." Probably. But it would still depend on the personalities as to how well it worked.

Final note: I agree with Tom about Rick Swain's Lucky War. Rick was also the embedded historian with Third Army/ARCENT.

[Ken White]

... It would help if the commands in both Iraq and Afghanistan were separated from CENTCOM but it would not fix the problem. Indeed, it is a social science law (I believe) that organizational change simply cannot fix anything. It can only make the job easier or harder.

Agree but I submit that it is in effect making the job harder; only very slightly, to be sure, however, why not make it easier instead of harder. Or at least let it be neutral...

Just because the chain of command in Iraq is not unified - who is in charge, Petraeus or Crocker? - doesn't mean it can't work. It appears that there is mutual respect between the two and they coordinate their actions effectively. Of course, I could be wrong about that having no direct access to either but the appearance is good. If so, then they have made a situation that lacks unity of command work. Would it be easier if oneof them were designated as "in charge." Probably. But it would still depend on the personalities as to how well it worked.

Not the issue I was addressing; my issues were CentCom force structure tampering, general intrusion, the JFACC -- and I'll add the not mentioned USSOCOM effort -- in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The remark above applies; it is in effect making the job harder; only very slightly, to be sure, however, why make it harder...

I certainly acknowledge that the SOCOM interface is not a significant problem at this time but my point is simply that it can be. This thread and you point out why. Personalities on either side of that divide...

Crocker vs. Petreaus at this point seems to me to be irrelevant -- though that does not diminish my generic if poorly stated concern about the Tribune like powers of the GCC Cdrs; sooner or later, one of them is going to be out in a bad position through that little design flaw (See MacArthur, D.).

[Germ]

Very true-- and the problem is, in many cases, yet again personality driven. If it is for example State's job to propose a policy and the NSC or President's job to announce or promulgate it and the GCCs job to execute it, what can and does happen is that the first two sluff or fail to do their part and the GCC can end up making policy by default, dragging the nation along with them in some cases.

Wow there are several discussions going on all at once here. A few thoughts:
*If it's not already old news, "Supreme Command" is one of the must-read treatments for this because today's senior mil-mil relationships are profoundly affected by the civ-mil relationships. The Michael Desch article "Bush and the Generals" from Foreign Affairs suggests the executive branch read one of the book's messages (ask questions) but not another (encourage healthy dissent).

*From the quote above, we could go down the rabbit hole of thinking personalities are a higher-quarters problem we'd like to eliminate. I think the problem stems from a failure to acknowledge that relationships are the biggest enabler of successful command, something to be cultivated, not eliminated. I further submit that one can find ample instances of command relationships being altered to suit personalities, and personalities being swapped successfully to suit command relationships.

*Way down there in the posts, one submission posited that aviators should not command ground troops. At the small unit level there's great cause for agreeing with that. The Marine experience in Iraq and elsewhere, however, demonstrates that aviators in tactical/operational command succeeded to the same extent that ground commanders succeeded. Before you say Marines are an exception, you might want to consider Nimitz's campaigning results in WWII, which look to the naked eye to be as good as MacArthur's.

*The previous post asks whether flatter is better. I submit that flat organizations require more individual discipline because they rely on command more than control. Ironically, I think when the dust settles on Iraq, we'll conclude that the more tiered organizations with most disciplined members (the uniformed services) could tolerate a flat structure better than flat organizations like USAID, USIP, etc., whose members are arguably a more diverse-thinking lot.

*NSC can only do what the President lets (or forces) it to do. Also, be sure to delineate between the NSC written large (cabinet members) from the NSC staff. If a State policy, staffed in front of the assembled cabinet members, doesn't get promulgated to the four corners of the executive branch, then our Secretaries are to blame. If the NSC staff fails to promulgate something, it's because the various Secretaries deny them access to the various branches, not because they won't try to spread the word. Either way, we come back to the Secretaries.

Thanks for allowing me to pitch in to your great discussion!

[Ken White]

...suggests the executive branch read one of the book's messages (ask questions) but not another (encourage healthy dissent).

Always a problem and generally personality dependent -- and an item over which little control is possible.

*From the quote above, we could go down the rabbit hole of thinking personalities are a higher-quarters problem we'd like to eliminate. I think the problem stems from a failure to acknowledge that relationships are the biggest enabler of successful command, something to be cultivated, not eliminated...

How can we eliminate personality? No way I can see. Yes, they are to be cultivated; the problem is that some egos get in the way and don't allow that to be done successfully.

... I further submit that one can find ample instances of command relationships being altered to suit personalities, and personalities being swapped successfully to suit command relationships.

Certainly. just not enough of either.

*Way down there in the posts, one submission posited that aviators should not command ground troops. At the small unit level there's great cause for agreeing with that. The Marine experience in Iraq and elsewhere, however, demonstrates that aviators in tactical/operational command succeeded to the same extent that ground commanders succeeded. Before you say Marines are an exception, you might want to consider Nimitz's campaigning results in WWII, which look to the naked eye to be as good as MacArthur's.

Marines aren't an exception and I were one. Aviators, like normal humans vary. Generically, they do not have the experience on ground combat to be the intuitive fighters they probably are in the air. They can and do successfully command -- whether they are good or great is the issue and I submit that we should strive for the great (with full acknowledgment that is unlikely to be attained). Re: Nimitz -- that's because he was smart enough to let his commanders do their job; in MacArthur's case, much of his success was due to Krueger.

*NSC can only do what the President lets (or forces) it to do. Also, be sure to delineate between the NSC written large (cabinet members) from the NSC staff. If a State policy, staffed in front of the assembled cabinet members, doesn't get promulgated to the four corners of the executive branch, then our Secretaries are to blame. If the NSC staff fails to promulgate something, it's because the various Secretaries deny them access to the various branches, not because they won't try to spread the word. Either way, we come back to the Secretaries.

Yep, personality dependent...

Thanks for allowing me to pitch in to your great discussion!

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