MCOs and SSOs in the 2008 edition of FM 3-0 Operations

[Norfolk]

Thanks for the response John, and I am quite humbled that you would even see fit to respond to my post in the first place. And it should go without saying that you rightly point out the critical differences between American and Commonwealth experiences and conditions - and the subsequent effects upon their respective definitions, concepts, and doctrines.

I am persistently bewildered by the lack of a full-fledged Aid to the Civil Power doctrine in the U.S., and this was a key motive for writing my previous post. The lack of said fully-developed Doctrine is what appears to be a critical factor in making for the inclusion of SSOs and their kind as full equals of MCOs in FM 3-0. Couple this to the potential for high levels or even over-committment (leaving aside present operations in Afghanistan and Iraq) to SSOs in the future (dependent of course upon decisions of national policy), and the U.S. Army may find itself partially converting into a Gendarmerie, to the detriment of its MCO capabilities. This is what worries me most about the new edition of FM 3-0 Operations, the door that it seems to open to a future in which the U.S. Army itself, as an institution, transforms - even if only partially - into something other than an Army per se.