MCOs and SSOs in the 2008 edition of FM 3-0 Operations

[Norfolk]

Thanks for the response John, and I am quite humbled that you would even see fit to respond to my post in the first place. And it should go without saying that you rightly point out the critical differences between American and Commonwealth experiences and conditions - and the subsequent effects upon their respective definitions, concepts, and doctrines.

I am persistently bewildered by the lack of a full-fledged Aid to the Civil Power doctrine in the U.S., and this was a key motive for writing my previous post. The lack of said fully-developed Doctrine is what appears to be a critical factor in making for the inclusion of SSOs and their kind as full equals of MCOs in FM 3-0. Couple this to the potential for high levels or even over-committment (leaving aside present operations in Afghanistan and Iraq) to SSOs in the future (dependent of course upon decisions of national policy), and the U.S. Army may find itself partially converting into a Gendarmerie, to the detriment of its MCO capabilities. This is what worries me most about the new edition of FM 3-0 Operations, the door that it seems to open to a future in which the U.S. Army itself, as an institution, transforms - even if only partially - into something other than an Army per se.

[Ken White]

illustrates that a difference in cultures is in part a contributor to to the issue raised.

Thanks for the response John, and I am quite humbled that you would even see fit to respond to my post in the first place. And it should go without saying that you rightly point out the critical differences between American and Commonwealth experiences and conditions - and the subsequent effects upon their respective definitions, concepts, and doctrines.

I'd only add to John's point by reminding that the British approach to Aid to the Civil Power was developed at home, refined by 200 years of the Raj -- and exported, very successfully, throughout the Commonwealth. It is a good and effective process and it is still successfully applied worldwide to this day.

Given our different history -- and in particular the fact that we only became a player on the world scene effectively after WW II -- we have of necessity opted for a different approach. I do not suggest it is wrong, simply different. I do think we are unlikely to adopt a more robust aid to the civil power approach for all the reasons cited above in the thread.

I am persistently bewildered by the lack of a full-fledged Aid to the Civil Power doctrine in the U.S., and this was a key motive for writing my previous post...

Said history strongly opposes such an approach.

We tend to cobble solutions together on the fly. We really do that rather well and while such approach is not for everyone, it generally works fairly well for us and I, for one, am comfortable with that.

The lack of said fully-developed Doctrine is what appears to be a critical factor in making for the inclusion of SSOs and their kind as full equals of MCOs in FM 3-0. Couple this to the potential for high levels or even over-committment (leaving aside present operations in Afghanistan and Iraq) to SSOs in the future (dependent of course upon decisions of national policy), and the U.S. Army may find itself partially converting into a Gendarmerie, to the detriment of its MCO capabilities. This is what worries me most about the new edition of FM 3-0 Operations, the door that it seems to open to a future in which the U.S. Army itself, as an institution, transforms - even if only partially - into something other than an Army per se.

So comfortable with it am I that while acknowledging that is a valid concern -- and I have agreed with Norfolk and Gian on that score repeatedly -- I'm not terribly worried by it because I have watched us lurch, nationally and militarily, too far in one direction only to realize we'd overdone it and then lurch back in the other direction (again, too far -- but that's the nature of the US... ). We, as Churchill famously said:

"You can always rely on the Americans to do the right thing - but only after they have exhausted all possible alternatives.'

I'm inclined to agree with Norfolk, elevating SSO to par with MCO is probably not totally smart -- the Troops will cope with whatever comes down the pike, however, the higher echelons do tend to get target fixation -- but we tend to adapt reasonably quickly and I truly do not believe anyone has lost sight of the fact MCO are, broadly, to counter existential threats while the SSO bit is simply a realistic look at the most likely set of scenarios over the next few years.

Thus I see it as merely adaptation to reality; acknowledge it bears watching so we don't go overboard; and have an abiding faith in the ability of the lower echelons to adapt to the requirements at hand in whatever form of action they are told to undertake.

We have, for example been little more than a Gendarmerie on numerous occasions in the past; we may not be cute but we are resilient...