The Emerging "Neocon" Alibi on Iraq

[SteveMetz]

These guys need to spend less time taking shots at each other and focus on Tenet and Powell.

Peter Feaver's essay in the Weekly Standard is much more useful contribution to the debate.

I'm thinking of emailing him directly. He wrote, "Despite strenuous efforts, war critics have not come up with well-substantiated cases of the administration saying something that it knew was not true or had no evidentiary basis for believing was true. Of course, there are many cases of the administration saying things that turned out to be not true. But moving the public from "you were lying" to "you were mistaken" would be significant progress. And moving it all the way to "you had understandable reasons for your policy" could be game-changing."

I think he is doing exactly what the administration did in 2002: deliberately making HALF a strategic argument. A complete argument is not simply saying "X is a threat" but to say that "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y."

[Ken White]

For Rank Amatuer:

Opinions are good, everyone should have at least one. Whether any you link address all the realities is immaterial, I suppose; long as they get a point or a few correct, there's always something to like...

For Tom Odom:

We can agree on the music quality -- and I've got a tin ear...

For Steve Metz (at last; I have an at least moderately substantive comment!):

"I think he is doing exactly what the administration did in 2002: deliberately making HALF a strategic argument. A complete argument is not simply saying "X is a threat" but to say that "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y."

I totally agree with you on both counts. I also acknowledge that in the case of Iraq (and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan) the argument was done exceedingly poorly if at all. Further, I'm trying to dredge up a memory of when the USA has ever really done that at all well? Can you think of any involving the commitment of troops in any thing more than token numbers?

My point is not to denigrate or challenge what you say, I do agree with you. It's just that my perception is that we do not do that very well. We certainly should, no question, however, indications lead me to believe it's sort of unlikely. Thus the follow on question is, I suppose -- how do we get that to happen routinely?

[SteveMetz]

For Rank Amatuer:

Opinions are good, everyone should have at least one. Whether any you link address all the realities is immaterial, I suppose; long as they get a point or a few correct, there's always something to like...

For Tom Odom:

We can agree on the music quality -- and I've got a tin ear...

For Steve Metz (at last; I have an at least moderately substantive comment!):



I totally agree with you on both counts. I also acknowledge that in the case of Iraq (and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan) the argument was done exceedingly poorly if at all. Further, I'm trying to dredge up a memory of when the USA has ever really done that at all well? Can you think of any involving the commitment of troops in any thing more than token numbers?

My point is not to denigrate or challenge what you say, I do agree with you. It's just that my perception is that we do not do that very well. We certainly should, no question, however, indications lead me to believe it's sort of unlikely. Thus the follow on question is, I suppose -- how do we get that to happen routinely?

I think in Bosnia, Panama, El Salvador, etc the expected costs and risks were weighed in the strategic decision.

[Ken White]

El Salvador, Grenada and Panama though I would mention that each of those had its own batch of surprises; they were small scale so the surprises were not major.

Bosnia, possibly -- but if so, it would seem the calculus was flawed (based on length of mission). Kosovo would appear to be not an example on several levels...

Note though my caveat in the original question; "...the commitment of troops in any thing more than token numbers? (emphasis added / kw).

Far more important than that issue, I think, is my follow on question; how do we get that -- "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y." -- to happen routinely?

I fully understand most of the parameters in strategic decision making -- and am more conversant than I wish to be with the domestic political dimension -- but there should be a way to force that issue on reluctant Administrations (not to mention Congress. Shudder... ) and hopefully to do so with knowledgeable and competent assessment of the costs and risks.

I say hopefully because I also fully understand the great difficulty in such assessments and I would never expect perfection. War will never be fully predictable and the unexpected is the norm. I also say hopefully because of the equally great difficulty of getting knowledgeable and competent people involved in such assessments as opposed to getting the judgment from whoever happens to be in position at the time...

I have watched us fail badly in such assessments too many time over the past 60 years or so and it would seem to me there has to be a better way. In the current situation, you guys came up with a pretty good assessment -- and it was essentially ignored. That, too has happened before -- numerous times.

Goldwater-Nichols was not a panacea but it did slightly more good than harm; the errors in it should be fixed and some additions made to get a valid, comprehensive strategic process embedded -- one that will force sensible risk assessment, planning and force employment. Cap Weinberger tried but he relied on common sense to heed what he said. That wasn't enough, unfortunately.

There oughta be a law...

[SteveMetz]

El Salvador, Grenada and Panama though I would mention that each of those had its own batch of surprises; they were small scale so the surprises were not major.

Bosnia, possibly -- but if so, it would seem the calculus was flawed (based on length of mission). Kosovo would appear to be not an example on several levels...

Note though my caveat in the original question; "...the commitment of troops in any thing more than token numbers? (emphasis added / kw).

Far more important than that issue, I think, is my follow on question; how do we get that -- "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y." -- to happen routinely?

I fully understand most of the parameters in strategic decision making -- and am more conversant than I wish to be with the domestic political dimension -- but there should be a way to force that issue on reluctant Administrations (not to mention Congress. Shudder... ) and hopefully to do so with knowledgeable and competent assessment of the costs and risks.

I say hopefully because I also fully understand the great difficulty in such assessments and I would never expect perfection. War will never be fully predictable and the unexpected is the norm. I also say hopefully because of the equally great difficulty of getting knowledgeable and competent people involved in such assessments as opposed to getting the judgment from whoever happens to be in position at the time...

I have watched us fail badly in such assessments too many time over the past 60 years or so and it would seem to me there has to be a better way. In the current situation, you guys came up with a pretty good assessment -- and it was essentially ignored. That, too has happened before -- numerous times.

Goldwater-Nichols was not a panacea but it did slightly more good than harm; the errors in it should be fixed and some additions made to get a valid, comprehensive strategic process embedded -- one that will force sensible risk assessment, planning and force employment. Cap Weinberger tried but he relied on common sense to heed what he said. That wasn't enough, unfortunately.

There oughta be a law...

The Clinton administration had a pretty grim assessment of the threat from Saddam Hussein, but realized that the costs and risks of removing him by direct intervention outweighed the expected benefits. Multiple administration's made the same assessment on "roll back" of communism in Europe.

There were a few people making that case in 2002. Zinni, for instance. While not actively engaged in the debate, that was my position.

[Ken White]

The Clinton administration had a pretty grim assessment of the threat from Saddam Hussein, but realized that the costs and risks of removing him by direct intervention outweighed the expected benefits...

An alternative view is that the domestic political risk was excessive.

With the exception of the Civil War and arguably WW II, every war in which we have been involved has been a war of our choosing. With the exception of Greece and Korea, and thus Truman, every operation since WW II in which we have been involved was effectively driven by and hobbled by domestic politics. In every case, the party not in the WH objected vociferously to the war and poor mouthed it for its entire length. The Kennedys went to Viet Nam to prove their anti-communist bona fides (and to boost the economy) as well as for ultra idealistic reasons; Johnson followed along and expanded for the very same reasons -- minus the idealism...

And the Republicans were opposed.

Fast forward to Kosovo, the Republicans were again opposed and fought it tooth and nail just as todays opposition is fighting Iraq. I believe domestic concerns cut more ice with Clinton that did a cost benefit analysis. Bush 41 demurred on going to Baghdad in 1991 ostensibly on a cost benefit basis though I would argue that it would have been far easier then than it was in 2003. In the event, domestic political concerns had a part in that decision as well. And he still didn't get reelected...

But you know all that, sorry.

The broader point, though, is that our political process and domestic politics have been the driver in our inability to do the analysis and make rational strategic decisions and I do not see that changing in the near term, desirable as it may be. In that sense, the assessments leading to this war differ little from that (or the lack of that...) of most of our previous wars -- and much as I agree with you on what should be done, I'm not particularly optimistic that it will be.

...Multiple administration's made the same assessment on "roll back" of communism in Europe.

Due to fear of WW III. Probably logical. I'm not as forgiving of the four previous administrations from both parties that tried to overlook fundamentalist Islamic export of terror attacks worldwide instead of forcefully nipping it in the bud -- starting with the Tehran Embassy seizure. In the case of the Islamists, it boiled down to not understanding the enemy and fear of WW III was not an issue. That and domestic politics.

In fairness to Clinton, at least, the capability to do some things that needed doing should have been available but did not exist. That's DoD's fault -- again under several Administrations. Yet again, domestic politics.

There were a few people making that case in 2002. Zinni, for instance. While not actively engaged in the debate, that was my position.

Nor was I actively engaged in the debate; and I partly agreed but partly disagreed with you and Zinni. Something needed to be done and I knew Afghanistan alone would not be enough. As I've often said, I wouldn't have done it the way it was done but it doesn't have to be my way to work. The biggest change I would have made would have been to wait until the second term while working harder on a coalition. My perception is that Bush, unsure he would get a second term at that point, decided to do something that he thought needed doing and that he feared a successor might not do. Domestic politics one more time...

That's pretty much why we have never done the assessment you and I and a good many others believe is needed. How to force that to occur is a knotty problem indeed. It will not happen just because it should.

[wm]

Note though my caveat in the original question; "...the commitment of troops in any thing more than token numbers? (emphasis added / kw).

Far more important than that issue, I think, is my follow on question; how do we get that -- "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y." -- to happen routinely?

I fully understand most of the parameters in strategic decision making -- and am more conversant than I wish to be with the domestic political dimension -- but there should be a way to force that issue on reluctant Administrations (not to mention Congress. Shudder... ) and hopefully to do so with knowledgeable and competent assessment of the costs and risks.

I say hopefully because I also fully understand the great difficulty in such assessments and I would never expect perfection. War will never be fully predictable and the unexpected is the norm. I also say hopefully because of the equally great difficulty of getting knowledgeable and competent people involved in such assessments as opposed to getting the judgment from whoever happens to be in position at the time...

Ken,
Wishful thinking on your part I believe. (And hope is not a plan )

America going to war (and not just sending in a few troops a la Grenada or Panama as an exercise of testosterone release) is, IMHO, the national equivalent of a domestic "crime of passion." We knee jerk and send the troops off somewhere because we react very much as a husband would should he come home and found the missus in bed with another man--no rational thought involved, purely a visceral reaction.

The low level troop commitments have less emotional motivation, but it is still present to some degree(as the "testosterone release" phrasing in my description above indicates).

If you want strong, "take charge"national leadership, I suspect you have to accept the propensity for irrational responses to major provocations as well.

[Ken White]

Ken,
Wishful thinking on your part I believe. (And hope is not a plan )

America going to war (and not just sending in a few troops a la Grenada or Panama as an exercise of testosterone release) is, IMHO, the national equivalent of a domestic "crime of passion." We knee jerk and send the troops off somewhere because we react very much as a husband would should he come home and found the missus in bed with another man--no rational thought involved, purely a visceral reaction.

The low level troop commitments have less emotional motivation, but it is still present to some degree(as the "testosterone release" phrasing in my description above indicates).

If you want strong, "take charge"national leadership, I suspect you have to accept the propensity for irrational responses to major provocations as well.

...I said this:

""The broader point, though, is that our political process and domestic politics have been the driver in our inability to do the analysis and make rational strategic decisions and I do not see that changing in the near term, desirable as it may be. In that sense, the assessments leading to this war differ little from that (or the lack of that...) of most of our previous wars -- and much as I agree with you on what should be done, I'm not particularly optimistic that it will be.""

My point in the last few posts on this thread was to (1) Agree with Steve that what he posits is what should be done. (2) Remind everyone that it has never really happened and is unlikely to. Much as we could all agree it should.

We just get to cobble stuff together and try to make it work out -- it's the American way...

[Rank amateur]

Thus the follow on question is, I suppose -- how do we get that to happen routinely?

War is a human endeavor. The more wars we lose, the more realistic we'll get about costs. The more we win, the more arrogant we'll become and we'll assume that the next war will be short and quick.

I think it's the same for everyone. Has they're ever been a dominant Army that didn't eventually over reach?

[Presley Cannady]

I think he is doing exactly what the administration did in 2002: deliberately making HALF a strategic argument. A complete argument is not simply saying "X is a threat" but to say that "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y."

Except in 2002 the Administration made a full strategic argument. Repeatedly. And since then, the President has consistently echoed the same piece: failure to disarm Iraq, by force if necessary, will non-negligibly risk a Baathist regime--or whatever follows should it collapse--offering Islamic terrorists material support to improve on the record of 19 hijackers armed with box cutters. That is, the death of three quarters of the number lost in Iraq in a single day and the evisceration of half an annual federal outlay --or a third to twice the cost of five years in Iraq (depending on whose numbers you go by)--in a single quarter.

As for Perle and Feith, after five years of having their names dragged through the mud for a post-war everybody including State agrees they weren't allowed to muck around with, I can understand some of their resentment.

[SteveMetz]

Except in 2002 the Administration made a full strategic argument. Repeatedly. And since then, the President has consistently echoed the same piece: failure to disarm Iraq, by force if necessary, will non-negligibly risk a Baathist regime--or whatever follows should it collapse--offering Islamic terrorists material support to improve on the record of 19 hijackers armed with box cutters. That is, the death of three quarters of the number lost in Iraq in a single day and the evisceration of half an annual federal outlay --or a third to twice the cost of five years in Iraq (depending on whose numbers you go by)--in a single quarter.

As for Perle and Feith, after five years of having their names dragged through the mud for a post-war everybody including State agrees they weren't allowed to muck around with, I can understand some of their resentment.

You've illustrated the crux of the administration's flawed argument: that the Hussein regime would or could provide WMD to terrorists. In other words, the argument pivoted on the probability of a regime which had never shown evidence of suicidal tendencies becoming suicidal.

Cogent strategy entails assuming some degree of risk when the anticipated costs of addressing the threat are greater than the probability of the threat coming to pass, or of the damage if the threat did come to pass. The administration skewed this logic by grossly overestimating the likelihood of a threat to the United States from Hussein, and grossly underestimating the expected costs of removing him by force.

I find the assertion that Feith "was allowed to muck around in" post-regime planning bizarre. If OSD wasn't who was? Do you seriously intend to make an argument that State somehow messed it up?

[Ken White]

You've illustrated the crux of the administration's flawed argument: that the Hussein regime would or could provide WMD to terrorists. In other words, the argument pivoted on the probability of a regime which had never shown evidence of suicidal tendencies becoming suicidal.

Cogent strategy entails assuming some degree of risk when the anticipated costs of addressing the threat are greater than the probability of the threat coming to pass, or of the damage if the threat did come to pass. The administration skewed this logic by grossly overestimating the likelihood of a threat to the United States from Hussein, and grossly underestimating the expected costs of removing him by force...

I'm aware the Admin said what you cite for public consumption. Do you personally think that any great number of the decision makers really put any stock in that? Do you think that had any significant place at all in the heirarchy of reasons for the attack?

[Rank amateur]

I'm aware the Admin said what you cite for public consumption. Do you personally think that any great number of the decision makers really put any stock in that? Do you think that had any significant place at all in the heirarchy of reasons for the attack?

I'm going to agree with Ken:

ut Rumsfeld wasn't interested in waging that kind of war. He saw the war not so much as a fight about Iraq as a demonstration of a new style of warfare—known as "military transformation" or "the revolution in military affairs"—that signaled how America would project power in the post-Cold War era. He saw, not incorrectly, a turbulent world of emerging threats, some in remote areas inaccessible from U.S. bases. The large, lumbering armies of old were not so suitable for such conflicts. Hence his emphasis on small, lightweight units of ground forces—fast to mobilize, easy to sustain—and superaccurate bombs and missiles to hit targets that only heavy artillery could destroy in decades past. With the Iraq war (and the Afghanistan conflict before it), he wanted to send rogue regimes and other foes a message: Look what we can do with one hand tied behind our back. If we can overthrow Saddam (and the Taliban) so easily, we can overthrow you, too.

It is no surprise, then, that Rumsfeld rejected the argument, made by several Army and Marine generals, that whatever happens on the battlefield, we'll need a few hundred thousand troops to impose order and help form a new Iraq. A large, lengthy occupation would have nullified his whole concept of new-style warfare and its vision of 21st-century geopolitics.

Rummy et al had a solid strategic agreement: take out all state sponsors of terrorism - high benefit - using a "transformed" military: low cost.

When it turned out that the strategic analysis was laughably wrong the spin doctors came up with arguments that were good enough to win the election, which was the spin doctor's job, but which were - as Steve points out - strategically ridiculous.

[Ken White]

[URL="http://www.slate.com/id/2186850"]I'm going to agree with Ken:

If you say so. I don't agree with Fred. Rarley do, he's a hack and you should cross check his stuff...

When it turned out that the strategic analysis was laughably wrong the spin doctors came up with arguments that were good enough to win the election, which was the spin doctor's job, but which were - as Steve points out - strategically ridiculous.

You might want to check your timing on what was said and when the election occurred. You might also contemplate how "laughably wrong" was the strategic analysis. Not Fred's version. He knows not one bit more than you or I do, perhaps less (seems that way sometimes). Rather on all the things that might have been analyzed.

[SteveMetz]

I'm aware the Admin said what you cite for public consumption. Do you personally think that any great number of the decision makers really put any stock in that? Do you think that had any significant place at all in the heirarchy of reasons for the attack?

Hard to tell. Ron Suskind, in The One Percent Doctrine, thinks they did. Personally I suspect that the President probably believed it. Some of his advisers may have been more coldly realistic, assuming that there was a political and psychological window of opportunity to remove a festering problem. I haven't been able to find any evidence, though, of a rigorous strategic assessment which weighed the potential risks and costs of military intervention against the expected utility.

I was always one of those who considered Hussein deterrable. He was prone to miscalculation, but that can be overcome through clarity of intent. More than anything, he valued his own survival and power. So long as we could hold those things as risk, he could be deterred.

The ONLY way the administration's argument held was if one or both of two things were true: 1) the costs and risks of removing Hussein by force were minimal; or 2) the future Saddam Hussein would be very different than the past Saddam Hussein and thus willing to risk his own survival and power in order to punish the United States.

Even before the intervention, I didn't see any reason to believe either of those.

[Ken White]

So much jabber and spin that it was and is very hard to sort.

I'm inclined to think that Saddam as threat was on the list but was down around number 12 or even lower. I think Bush was convinced that a message needed to be sent to the ME (not to Islam and not to Afghanistan; different things) and that Iraq was selected as being geographically central, relatively easy militarily, least likely to disrupt world oil supplies, having a despised dictator and thus likely to arouse the least angst in the rest of the world. I think the timing was mostly predicated on the fear that, if he, Bush, did not get a second term, his successor might not do what he thought needed to be done.

Thus, I think deterring Hussein was no more than a passing thought and removing him was not a significantly higher priority; it was merely a synergistic benefit. MBAs always look for synergies...

That and the Saudis probably saying "Look, if you Americans will get out of here, we'll go after our local bad guys and turn some things around." Plus the USAF really wanted to get rid of the Northern and Southern Watches...

I do agree with you on this aspect:

I haven't been able to find any evidence, though, of a rigorous strategic assessment which weighed the potential risks and costs of military intervention against the expected utility.

I suspect (hope???) an effort was made by the J3 and / or CentCom but that it got short shrift from the Administration who imposed their views on the cost / benefit based on flawed logic hubris and optimism as opposed to a rational assessment. However, it is possible if not probable that a better assessment was made in some measure and Bush decided to go anyway. I guess we'll find out in 2033.

[Presley Cannady]

You've illustrated the crux of the administration's flawed argument: that the Hussein regime would or could provide WMD to terrorists.

Could is easy to answer. Within days of 19 March 2003, only knowledge and precursors could be disseminated. Within months of the collapse of sanctions, as it concerns actual weapons, then yes. A single nuclear device outside of IAEA scrutiny would take minimum five years or more from the collapse of sanctions to complete if Iraq started standing up P1 aluminum centrifuge cascades from day one.

In other words, the argument pivoted on the probability of a regime which had never shown evidence of suicidal tendencies becoming suicidal.

That begs the question of whether or not a state that delivers the means or even a finished product to terrorists who then go on to use it against the US or her allies is necessarily committing suicide--particularly with WMD other than nuclear.

Cogent strategy entails assuming some degree of risk when the anticipated costs of addressing the threat are greater than the probability of the threat coming to pass, or of the damage if the threat did come to pass.

And in a perfect world, you'd have two clearly separated means enveloped by narrow variances. The question is what do you do when the variance is extremely wide or even unknown and there's not much obvious time for you to dig up more intel to thin it?

The administration skewed this logic by grossly overestimating the likelihood of a threat to the United States from Hussein, and grossly underestimating the expected costs of removing him by force.

I'd agree with you except for the adjective "gross" and for two reasons:

1. Iraq did not have expected stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, but according to the Survey Group final report the will to reacquire its capability and the industry and know-how to do so in a matter of months. This might have translated into increased breathing room for the United States to build a coalition. It also may have translated into increased breathing room for Iraq to isolate the US through declarations of compliance by UNMOVIC and the IAEA in much the same manner Iran is doing by standing up centrifuge cascades while making hay out of last year's NIE. To date, I've seen no one stand up and try to calculate the likelihood of either scenario beyond mutual appeals to incredulity.

2. A rogue state filling the vessel with fissile material traceable to its mines, breeders or known centrifuges, handing it to terrorists and sending them to the US to blow it up is definitely suicidal. It's also not the only means at her disposal.

I find the assertion that Feith "was allowed to muck around in" post-regime planning bizarre. If OSD wasn't who was? Do you seriously intend to make an argument that State somehow messed it up?

I'm speaking of the post-war itself, and pointing out that even Bremer characterizes Feith and his clique lost the argument on whether the US should assume the mantle of the occupying authority. It might've been a stupid position for him to take, but it disqualifies him as the father of what followed. This isn't to say that Feith, Policy and OSD don't bear responsibility. No one's out and out said it yet, but the more I read into the bickering and recriminations between ex-OSD and State officials, the more it jives with all the data and reporting on CPA's problems in staffing and budget accountability. Despite having its own line item in the supplementals, historians would do better to start with this question: "was CPA an interagency orphan?"

I don't know the answer to that question. I'm hoping you might.

[SteveMetz]

Could is easy to answer. Within days of 19 March 2003, only knowledge and precursors could be disseminated. Within months of the collapse of sanctions, as it concerns actual weapons, then yes. A single nuclear device outside of IAEA scrutiny would take minimum five years or more from the collapse of sanctions to complete if Iraq started standing up P1 aluminum centrifuge cascades from day one.



That begs the question of whether or not a state that delivers the means or even a finished product to terrorists who then go on to use it against the US or her allies is necessarily committing suicide--particularly with WMD other than nuclear.



And in a perfect world, you'd have two clearly separated means enveloped by narrow variances. The question is what do you do when the variance is extremely wide or even unknown and there's not much obvious time for you to dig up more intel to thin it?



I'd agree with you except for the adjective "gross" and for two reasons:

1. Iraq did not have expected stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, but according to the Survey Group final report the will to reacquire its capability and the industry and know-how to do so in a matter of months. This might have translated into increased breathing room for the United States to build a coalition. It also may have translated into increased breathing room for Iraq to isolate the US through declarations of compliance by UNMOVIC and the IAEA in much the same manner Iran is doing by standing up centrifuge cascades while making hay out of last year's NIE. To date, I've seen no one stand up and try to calculate the likelihood of either scenario beyond mutual appeals to incredulity.

2. A rogue state filling the vessel with fissile material traceable to its mines, breeders or known centrifuges, handing it to terrorists and sending them to the US to blow it up is definitely suicidal. It's also not the only means at her disposal.



I'm speaking of the post-war itself, and pointing out that even Bremer characterizes Feith and his clique lost the argument on whether the US should assume the mantle of the occupying authority. It might've been a stupid position for him to take, but it disqualifies him as the father of what followed. This isn't to say that Feith, Policy and OSD don't bear responsibility. No one's out and out said it yet, but the more I read into the bickering and recriminations between ex-OSD and State officials, the more it jives with all the data and reporting on CPA's problems in staffing and budget accountability. Despite having its own line item in the supplementals, historians would do better to start with this question: "was CPA an interagency orphan?"

I don't know the answer to that question. I'm hoping you might.

This is more of the same. Hussein "could have" done bad things without any cogent explanation of why he would have. The UK and France could launch a nuclear attack on the United States today, but we're not doing regime change there. Hussein did not use chemical weapons in 1991 because the costs of doing so were clearly communicated to him. The valued his own survival above all.

On CPA, it worked for OSD. Maybe not for Feith personally, but his attempts to blame State and CIA are pathetic. OSD, with Feith in the fore, lobbied to control the "post conflict" phase and then failed to prepare for it.

[Presley Cannady]

This is more of the same. Hussein "could have" done bad things without any cogent explanation of why he would have.

Why he would've is even easier. Because he's an evil bastard who hated America enough to inflict great harm on her: provided he could get away with it. And that's the only question: could he act in such a way that he believed put the US--for whatever reason--in a piss poor position to retaliate. I'm not prepared to argue that Hussein reached that conclusion--not in this thread. I'm just pointing out that the neoconservatives did issue--right or wrong, reasonable or paranoid--a full strategic argument.

The UK and France could launch a nuclear attack on the United States today, but we're not doing regime change there. Hussein did not use chemical weapons in 1991 because the costs of doing so were clearly communicated to him. The valued his own survival above all.

If Feith, Kagan, Perle or any of the other usual suspects was terribly worried about Hussein using WMD on the battlefield, they've kept their concerns pretty well hidden. On the other hand, there was a great deal of talk about Hussein arming terrorists. And I don't know a single neocon who's ever been so sophomoric as to argue that capability alone matters; more importantly, I've never even seen a critical coworker of the Vulcans leak a single off-handed comment that even came close to suggesting they might.

On CPA, it worked for OSD. Maybe not for Feith personally, but his attempts to blame State and CIA are pathetic. OSD, with Feith in the fore, lobbied to control the "post conflict" phase and then failed to prepare for it.

I'm still having trouble with the company chart here. The White House appoints Bremer as a special envoy to Iraq with authority over all diplomatic and humanitarian operations, then OSD taps Bremer as administrator for reconstruction activities the following week. CPA gets its own line in the supplemental, but I'm guessing those accounts are owned by DoD. And Bremer reports to Secretary Rumsfeld, but can't actually be fired by the guy? All this following the strangling of Rumsfeld and Feith's baby, ORHA, after the looting spectacle.

And State and CIA had nothing to do with this? That just doesn't add up. For that story to hold any water, Rumsfeld would've either had to have lost confidence in Feith by May 2003--which backs up Feith's story--or Bremer is seriously understating Feith's complicity in a piece aimed at defending himself from Feith's attacks. I'm not saying OSD didn't have anything to do CPA's failures; as you pointed out Bremer did own a hat nominally subordinate to Rumsfeld. On the other hand, it seems a far more likely story is that CPA was an interagency compromise acceding to State and CIA conservatism on political reconstruction. That's why I asked if CPA was an orphan, abandoned by an OSD who didn't want the responsibility of managing an occupation and by a State Department that for any number of reasons couldn't or wouldn't staff it with civil affairs professionals.

As a matter of fact, who was responsible for CPA hiring?

[SteveMetz]

OSD staffed ORHA and, to an extent, CPA. The "blame on State" line is pure ideological pap. Most of State's staff was rejected for ORHA. It didn't have the people to staff CPA at the level it needed to be.

You are right that the org chart was confused. Rumsfeld believed Bremer worked for him while Bremer believed he worked directly for the President. All of his resources, though, were coming through DoD.

On the argument on Hussein, you have simply asserted that he would do anything in his power to harm the United States. The problem is, there is not one whit of evidence for that. He was prone to miscalculation when American intentions were not clear, but not when they were. There is neither logic nor evidence to support the assertion that he hated the United States so much that he would have undertaken the great risk of providing WMD to terrorists. After all, he had WMD for decades and had NOT done so. So the crux of the administration's argument was that in his 60s, Saddam Hussein was suddenly going to change his behavior and undertake immense risk out of hatred for the United States. Believe what you want, but I find that ridiculous.