The Emerging "Neocon" Alibi on Iraq

[SteveMetz]

Except in 2002 the Administration made a full strategic argument. Repeatedly. And since then, the President has consistently echoed the same piece: failure to disarm Iraq, by force if necessary, will non-negligibly risk a Baathist regime--or whatever follows should it collapse--offering Islamic terrorists material support to improve on the record of 19 hijackers armed with box cutters. That is, the death of three quarters of the number lost in Iraq in a single day and the evisceration of half an annual federal outlay --or a third to twice the cost of five years in Iraq (depending on whose numbers you go by)--in a single quarter.

As for Perle and Feith, after five years of having their names dragged through the mud for a post-war everybody including State agrees they weren't allowed to muck around with, I can understand some of their resentment.

You've illustrated the crux of the administration's flawed argument: that the Hussein regime would or could provide WMD to terrorists. In other words, the argument pivoted on the probability of a regime which had never shown evidence of suicidal tendencies becoming suicidal.

Cogent strategy entails assuming some degree of risk when the anticipated costs of addressing the threat are greater than the probability of the threat coming to pass, or of the damage if the threat did come to pass. The administration skewed this logic by grossly overestimating the likelihood of a threat to the United States from Hussein, and grossly underestimating the expected costs of removing him by force.

I find the assertion that Feith "was allowed to muck around in" post-regime planning bizarre. If OSD wasn't who was? Do you seriously intend to make an argument that State somehow messed it up?

[Ken White]

You've illustrated the crux of the administration's flawed argument: that the Hussein regime would or could provide WMD to terrorists. In other words, the argument pivoted on the probability of a regime which had never shown evidence of suicidal tendencies becoming suicidal.

Cogent strategy entails assuming some degree of risk when the anticipated costs of addressing the threat are greater than the probability of the threat coming to pass, or of the damage if the threat did come to pass. The administration skewed this logic by grossly overestimating the likelihood of a threat to the United States from Hussein, and grossly underestimating the expected costs of removing him by force...

I'm aware the Admin said what you cite for public consumption. Do you personally think that any great number of the decision makers really put any stock in that? Do you think that had any significant place at all in the heirarchy of reasons for the attack?

[Rank amateur]

I'm aware the Admin said what you cite for public consumption. Do you personally think that any great number of the decision makers really put any stock in that? Do you think that had any significant place at all in the heirarchy of reasons for the attack?

I'm going to agree with Ken:

ut Rumsfeld wasn't interested in waging that kind of war. He saw the war not so much as a fight about Iraq as a demonstration of a new style of warfare—known as "military transformation" or "the revolution in military affairs"—that signaled how America would project power in the post-Cold War era. He saw, not incorrectly, a turbulent world of emerging threats, some in remote areas inaccessible from U.S. bases. The large, lumbering armies of old were not so suitable for such conflicts. Hence his emphasis on small, lightweight units of ground forces—fast to mobilize, easy to sustain—and superaccurate bombs and missiles to hit targets that only heavy artillery could destroy in decades past. With the Iraq war (and the Afghanistan conflict before it), he wanted to send rogue regimes and other foes a message: Look what we can do with one hand tied behind our back. If we can overthrow Saddam (and the Taliban) so easily, we can overthrow you, too.

It is no surprise, then, that Rumsfeld rejected the argument, made by several Army and Marine generals, that whatever happens on the battlefield, we'll need a few hundred thousand troops to impose order and help form a new Iraq. A large, lengthy occupation would have nullified his whole concept of new-style warfare and its vision of 21st-century geopolitics.

Rummy et al had a solid strategic agreement: take out all state sponsors of terrorism - high benefit - using a "transformed" military: low cost.

When it turned out that the strategic analysis was laughably wrong the spin doctors came up with arguments that were good enough to win the election, which was the spin doctor's job, but which were - as Steve points out - strategically ridiculous.

[Ken White]

[URL="http://www.slate.com/id/2186850"]I'm going to agree with Ken:

If you say so. I don't agree with Fred. Rarley do, he's a hack and you should cross check his stuff...

When it turned out that the strategic analysis was laughably wrong the spin doctors came up with arguments that were good enough to win the election, which was the spin doctor's job, but which were - as Steve points out - strategically ridiculous.

You might want to check your timing on what was said and when the election occurred. You might also contemplate how "laughably wrong" was the strategic analysis. Not Fred's version. He knows not one bit more than you or I do, perhaps less (seems that way sometimes). Rather on all the things that might have been analyzed.

[SteveMetz]

I'm aware the Admin said what you cite for public consumption. Do you personally think that any great number of the decision makers really put any stock in that? Do you think that had any significant place at all in the heirarchy of reasons for the attack?

Hard to tell. Ron Suskind, in The One Percent Doctrine, thinks they did. Personally I suspect that the President probably believed it. Some of his advisers may have been more coldly realistic, assuming that there was a political and psychological window of opportunity to remove a festering problem. I haven't been able to find any evidence, though, of a rigorous strategic assessment which weighed the potential risks and costs of military intervention against the expected utility.

I was always one of those who considered Hussein deterrable. He was prone to miscalculation, but that can be overcome through clarity of intent. More than anything, he valued his own survival and power. So long as we could hold those things as risk, he could be deterred.

The ONLY way the administration's argument held was if one or both of two things were true: 1) the costs and risks of removing Hussein by force were minimal; or 2) the future Saddam Hussein would be very different than the past Saddam Hussein and thus willing to risk his own survival and power in order to punish the United States.

Even before the intervention, I didn't see any reason to believe either of those.

[Ken White]

So much jabber and spin that it was and is very hard to sort.

I'm inclined to think that Saddam as threat was on the list but was down around number 12 or even lower. I think Bush was convinced that a message needed to be sent to the ME (not to Islam and not to Afghanistan; different things) and that Iraq was selected as being geographically central, relatively easy militarily, least likely to disrupt world oil supplies, having a despised dictator and thus likely to arouse the least angst in the rest of the world. I think the timing was mostly predicated on the fear that, if he, Bush, did not get a second term, his successor might not do what he thought needed to be done.

Thus, I think deterring Hussein was no more than a passing thought and removing him was not a significantly higher priority; it was merely a synergistic benefit. MBAs always look for synergies...

That and the Saudis probably saying "Look, if you Americans will get out of here, we'll go after our local bad guys and turn some things around." Plus the USAF really wanted to get rid of the Northern and Southern Watches...

I do agree with you on this aspect:

I haven't been able to find any evidence, though, of a rigorous strategic assessment which weighed the potential risks and costs of military intervention against the expected utility.

I suspect (hope???) an effort was made by the J3 and / or CentCom but that it got short shrift from the Administration who imposed their views on the cost / benefit based on flawed logic hubris and optimism as opposed to a rational assessment. However, it is possible if not probable that a better assessment was made in some measure and Bush decided to go anyway. I guess we'll find out in 2033.

[Presley Cannady]

You've illustrated the crux of the administration's flawed argument: that the Hussein regime would or could provide WMD to terrorists.

Could is easy to answer. Within days of 19 March 2003, only knowledge and precursors could be disseminated. Within months of the collapse of sanctions, as it concerns actual weapons, then yes. A single nuclear device outside of IAEA scrutiny would take minimum five years or more from the collapse of sanctions to complete if Iraq started standing up P1 aluminum centrifuge cascades from day one.

In other words, the argument pivoted on the probability of a regime which had never shown evidence of suicidal tendencies becoming suicidal.

That begs the question of whether or not a state that delivers the means or even a finished product to terrorists who then go on to use it against the US or her allies is necessarily committing suicide--particularly with WMD other than nuclear.

Cogent strategy entails assuming some degree of risk when the anticipated costs of addressing the threat are greater than the probability of the threat coming to pass, or of the damage if the threat did come to pass.

And in a perfect world, you'd have two clearly separated means enveloped by narrow variances. The question is what do you do when the variance is extremely wide or even unknown and there's not much obvious time for you to dig up more intel to thin it?

The administration skewed this logic by grossly overestimating the likelihood of a threat to the United States from Hussein, and grossly underestimating the expected costs of removing him by force.

I'd agree with you except for the adjective "gross" and for two reasons:

1. Iraq did not have expected stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, but according to the Survey Group final report the will to reacquire its capability and the industry and know-how to do so in a matter of months. This might have translated into increased breathing room for the United States to build a coalition. It also may have translated into increased breathing room for Iraq to isolate the US through declarations of compliance by UNMOVIC and the IAEA in much the same manner Iran is doing by standing up centrifuge cascades while making hay out of last year's NIE. To date, I've seen no one stand up and try to calculate the likelihood of either scenario beyond mutual appeals to incredulity.

2. A rogue state filling the vessel with fissile material traceable to its mines, breeders or known centrifuges, handing it to terrorists and sending them to the US to blow it up is definitely suicidal. It's also not the only means at her disposal.

I find the assertion that Feith "was allowed to muck around in" post-regime planning bizarre. If OSD wasn't who was? Do you seriously intend to make an argument that State somehow messed it up?

I'm speaking of the post-war itself, and pointing out that even Bremer characterizes Feith and his clique lost the argument on whether the US should assume the mantle of the occupying authority. It might've been a stupid position for him to take, but it disqualifies him as the father of what followed. This isn't to say that Feith, Policy and OSD don't bear responsibility. No one's out and out said it yet, but the more I read into the bickering and recriminations between ex-OSD and State officials, the more it jives with all the data and reporting on CPA's problems in staffing and budget accountability. Despite having its own line item in the supplementals, historians would do better to start with this question: "was CPA an interagency orphan?"

I don't know the answer to that question. I'm hoping you might.

[SteveMetz]

Could is easy to answer. Within days of 19 March 2003, only knowledge and precursors could be disseminated. Within months of the collapse of sanctions, as it concerns actual weapons, then yes. A single nuclear device outside of IAEA scrutiny would take minimum five years or more from the collapse of sanctions to complete if Iraq started standing up P1 aluminum centrifuge cascades from day one.



That begs the question of whether or not a state that delivers the means or even a finished product to terrorists who then go on to use it against the US or her allies is necessarily committing suicide--particularly with WMD other than nuclear.



And in a perfect world, you'd have two clearly separated means enveloped by narrow variances. The question is what do you do when the variance is extremely wide or even unknown and there's not much obvious time for you to dig up more intel to thin it?



I'd agree with you except for the adjective "gross" and for two reasons:

1. Iraq did not have expected stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, but according to the Survey Group final report the will to reacquire its capability and the industry and know-how to do so in a matter of months. This might have translated into increased breathing room for the United States to build a coalition. It also may have translated into increased breathing room for Iraq to isolate the US through declarations of compliance by UNMOVIC and the IAEA in much the same manner Iran is doing by standing up centrifuge cascades while making hay out of last year's NIE. To date, I've seen no one stand up and try to calculate the likelihood of either scenario beyond mutual appeals to incredulity.

2. A rogue state filling the vessel with fissile material traceable to its mines, breeders or known centrifuges, handing it to terrorists and sending them to the US to blow it up is definitely suicidal. It's also not the only means at her disposal.



I'm speaking of the post-war itself, and pointing out that even Bremer characterizes Feith and his clique lost the argument on whether the US should assume the mantle of the occupying authority. It might've been a stupid position for him to take, but it disqualifies him as the father of what followed. This isn't to say that Feith, Policy and OSD don't bear responsibility. No one's out and out said it yet, but the more I read into the bickering and recriminations between ex-OSD and State officials, the more it jives with all the data and reporting on CPA's problems in staffing and budget accountability. Despite having its own line item in the supplementals, historians would do better to start with this question: "was CPA an interagency orphan?"

I don't know the answer to that question. I'm hoping you might.

This is more of the same. Hussein "could have" done bad things without any cogent explanation of why he would have. The UK and France could launch a nuclear attack on the United States today, but we're not doing regime change there. Hussein did not use chemical weapons in 1991 because the costs of doing so were clearly communicated to him. The valued his own survival above all.

On CPA, it worked for OSD. Maybe not for Feith personally, but his attempts to blame State and CIA are pathetic. OSD, with Feith in the fore, lobbied to control the "post conflict" phase and then failed to prepare for it.

[Presley Cannady]

This is more of the same. Hussein "could have" done bad things without any cogent explanation of why he would have.

Why he would've is even easier. Because he's an evil bastard who hated America enough to inflict great harm on her: provided he could get away with it. And that's the only question: could he act in such a way that he believed put the US--for whatever reason--in a piss poor position to retaliate. I'm not prepared to argue that Hussein reached that conclusion--not in this thread. I'm just pointing out that the neoconservatives did issue--right or wrong, reasonable or paranoid--a full strategic argument.

The UK and France could launch a nuclear attack on the United States today, but we're not doing regime change there. Hussein did not use chemical weapons in 1991 because the costs of doing so were clearly communicated to him. The valued his own survival above all.

If Feith, Kagan, Perle or any of the other usual suspects was terribly worried about Hussein using WMD on the battlefield, they've kept their concerns pretty well hidden. On the other hand, there was a great deal of talk about Hussein arming terrorists. And I don't know a single neocon who's ever been so sophomoric as to argue that capability alone matters; more importantly, I've never even seen a critical coworker of the Vulcans leak a single off-handed comment that even came close to suggesting they might.

On CPA, it worked for OSD. Maybe not for Feith personally, but his attempts to blame State and CIA are pathetic. OSD, with Feith in the fore, lobbied to control the "post conflict" phase and then failed to prepare for it.

I'm still having trouble with the company chart here. The White House appoints Bremer as a special envoy to Iraq with authority over all diplomatic and humanitarian operations, then OSD taps Bremer as administrator for reconstruction activities the following week. CPA gets its own line in the supplemental, but I'm guessing those accounts are owned by DoD. And Bremer reports to Secretary Rumsfeld, but can't actually be fired by the guy? All this following the strangling of Rumsfeld and Feith's baby, ORHA, after the looting spectacle.

And State and CIA had nothing to do with this? That just doesn't add up. For that story to hold any water, Rumsfeld would've either had to have lost confidence in Feith by May 2003--which backs up Feith's story--or Bremer is seriously understating Feith's complicity in a piece aimed at defending himself from Feith's attacks. I'm not saying OSD didn't have anything to do CPA's failures; as you pointed out Bremer did own a hat nominally subordinate to Rumsfeld. On the other hand, it seems a far more likely story is that CPA was an interagency compromise acceding to State and CIA conservatism on political reconstruction. That's why I asked if CPA was an orphan, abandoned by an OSD who didn't want the responsibility of managing an occupation and by a State Department that for any number of reasons couldn't or wouldn't staff it with civil affairs professionals.

As a matter of fact, who was responsible for CPA hiring?

[SteveMetz]

OSD staffed ORHA and, to an extent, CPA. The "blame on State" line is pure ideological pap. Most of State's staff was rejected for ORHA. It didn't have the people to staff CPA at the level it needed to be.

You are right that the org chart was confused. Rumsfeld believed Bremer worked for him while Bremer believed he worked directly for the President. All of his resources, though, were coming through DoD.

On the argument on Hussein, you have simply asserted that he would do anything in his power to harm the United States. The problem is, there is not one whit of evidence for that. He was prone to miscalculation when American intentions were not clear, but not when they were. There is neither logic nor evidence to support the assertion that he hated the United States so much that he would have undertaken the great risk of providing WMD to terrorists. After all, he had WMD for decades and had NOT done so. So the crux of the administration's argument was that in his 60s, Saddam Hussein was suddenly going to change his behavior and undertake immense risk out of hatred for the United States. Believe what you want, but I find that ridiculous.

[Ken White]

people of all ages and backgrounds and I can count on one hand the number of people who believed this:

...
...So the crux of the administration's argument was that in his 60s, Saddam Hussein was suddenly going to change his behavior and undertake immense risk out of hatred for the United States. Believe what you want, but I find that ridiculous.

was then or is now a real issue or had much to do with attacking Iraq...

[Presley Cannady]

OSD staffed ORHA and, to an extent, CPA. The "blame on State" line is pure ideological pap.

So where did the pressure to close the curtains on ORHA come from?

On the argument on Hussein, you have simply asserted that he would do anything in his power to harm the United States. The problem is, there is not one whit of evidence for that. He was prone to miscalculation when American intentions were not clear, but not when they were. There is neither logic nor evidence to support the assertion that he hated the United States so much that he would have undertaken the great risk of providing WMD to terrorists. After all, he had WMD for decades and had NOT done so. So the crux of the administration's argument was that in his 60s, Saddam Hussein was suddenly going to change his behavior and undertake immense risk out of hatred for the United States. Believe what you want, but I find that ridiculous.

Just to be clear, I'm not arguing that Hussein hated the United States so much that he'd clearly risk his life and regime attacking it. I'm also not arguing that Hussein in the 1980s had any intentions of biting the hand that fed him. I also don't argue that Hussein felt he had the freedom to use what little capability UNSCOM hadn't destroyed to attack the US. On the other hand, is it so ridiculous neocons worried about the yet to be quantified odds that Baathist Iraq, sitting on a post-sanction stockpile of chemical and biological weapons with maybe a few nukes to enhance his sense of self-inevitability, might find away to strike back at the guys who'd checked her ambitions for a decade and change.

[SteveMetz]

So where did the pressure to close the curtains on ORHA come from?



Just to be clear, I'm not arguing that Hussein hated the United States so much that he'd clearly risk his life and regime attacking it. I'm also not arguing that Hussein in the 1980s had any intentions of biting the hand that fed him. I also don't argue that Hussein felt he had the freedom to use what little capability UNSCOM hadn't destroyed to attack the US. On the other hand, is it so ridiculous neocons worried about the yet to be quantified odds that Baathist Iraq, sitting on a post-sanction stockpile of chemical and biological weapons with maybe a few nukes to enhance his sense of self-inevitability, might find away to strike back at the guys who'd checked her ambitions for a decade and change.

I think I'm not making myself clear. Any action in strategy must weigh expected benefits against expects costs and risks. Everything in Hussein's behavior indicated that the chances of him providing WMD was exceptionally small. It would have entailed immense risk and almost no benefit. Unlike, say, al Qaeda, he's never shown any inclination to undertake high risk/low benefit action. Therefore the chances of him doing it were slim.

Under the normal logic of strategy, that would have meant that the United States states should only have removed him for that reason IF the expected risks and costs of doing so were low. In other words, the magnitude of the threat should have determined the costs and risks we were willing to bear in order to address the threat.

The administration simply assumed away the costs and risks. If they ever did any serious, rigorous analysis of them, I haven't seen any indication of it. And they amplified the threat, mostly by the clever psychological ploy of intermingling discussions of 9/11 with discussions of Saddam Hussein. Normally--but not always--they didn't draw a direct connection. But over and over, they would mix the two topics in speeches and statements until, to much of the public, there was a connection.

In terms of ORHA becoming CPA, I don't know who approved the name change but it seems far fetched that State did given that DoD had been designated as the agency in charge of the process. DoD remained the lead agency until it was shifted to the NSC. State was never the lead agency from February 2003 until July 2005.