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Thread: The Emerging "Neocon" Alibi on Iraq

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    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    El Salvador, Grenada and Panama though I would mention that each of those had its own batch of surprises; they were small scale so the surprises were not major.

    Bosnia, possibly -- but if so, it would seem the calculus was flawed (based on length of mission). Kosovo would appear to be not an example on several levels...

    Note though my caveat in the original question; "...the commitment of troops in any thing more than token numbers? (emphasis added / kw).

    Far more important than that issue, I think, is my follow on question; how do we get that -- "the threat from X justifies the costs and risks of dealing with it using method Y." -- to happen routinely?

    I fully understand most of the parameters in strategic decision making -- and am more conversant than I wish to be with the domestic political dimension -- but there should be a way to force that issue on reluctant Administrations (not to mention Congress. Shudder... ) and hopefully to do so with knowledgeable and competent assessment of the costs and risks.

    I say hopefully because I also fully understand the great difficulty in such assessments and I would never expect perfection. War will never be fully predictable and the unexpected is the norm. I also say hopefully because of the equally great difficulty of getting knowledgeable and competent people involved in such assessments as opposed to getting the judgment from whoever happens to be in position at the time...

    I have watched us fail badly in such assessments too many time over the past 60 years or so and it would seem to me there has to be a better way. In the current situation, you guys came up with a pretty good assessment -- and it was essentially ignored. That, too has happened before -- numerous times.

    Goldwater-Nichols was not a panacea but it did slightly more good than harm; the errors in it should be fixed and some additions made to get a valid, comprehensive strategic process embedded -- one that will force sensible risk assessment, planning and force employment. Cap Weinberger tried but he relied on common sense to heed what he said. That wasn't enough, unfortunately.

    There oughta be a law...
    The Clinton administration had a pretty grim assessment of the threat from Saddam Hussein, but realized that the costs and risks of removing him by direct intervention outweighed the expected benefits. Multiple administration's made the same assessment on "roll back" of communism in Europe.

    There were a few people making that case in 2002. Zinni, for instance. While not actively engaged in the debate, that was my position.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    The Clinton administration had a pretty grim assessment of the threat from Saddam Hussein, but realized that the costs and risks of removing him by direct intervention outweighed the expected benefits...
    An alternative view is that the domestic political risk was excessive.

    With the exception of the Civil War and arguably WW II, every war in which we have been involved has been a war of our choosing. With the exception of Greece and Korea, and thus Truman, every operation since WW II in which we have been involved was effectively driven by and hobbled by domestic politics. In every case, the party not in the WH objected vociferously to the war and poor mouthed it for its entire length. The Kennedys went to Viet Nam to prove their anti-communist bona fides (and to boost the economy) as well as for ultra idealistic reasons; Johnson followed along and expanded for the very same reasons -- minus the idealism...

    And the Republicans were opposed.

    Fast forward to Kosovo, the Republicans were again opposed and fought it tooth and nail just as todays opposition is fighting Iraq. I believe domestic concerns cut more ice with Clinton that did a cost benefit analysis. Bush 41 demurred on going to Baghdad in 1991 ostensibly on a cost benefit basis though I would argue that it would have been far easier then than it was in 2003. In the event, domestic political concerns had a part in that decision as well. And he still didn't get reelected...

    But you know all that, sorry.

    The broader point, though, is that our political process and domestic politics have been the driver in our inability to do the analysis and make rational strategic decisions and I do not see that changing in the near term, desirable as it may be. In that sense, the assessments leading to this war differ little from that (or the lack of that...) of most of our previous wars -- and much as I agree with you on what should be done, I'm not particularly optimistic that it will be.
    ...Multiple administration's made the same assessment on "roll back" of communism in Europe.
    Due to fear of WW III. Probably logical. I'm not as forgiving of the four previous administrations from both parties that tried to overlook fundamentalist Islamic export of terror attacks worldwide instead of forcefully nipping it in the bud -- starting with the Tehran Embassy seizure. In the case of the Islamists, it boiled down to not understanding the enemy and fear of WW III was not an issue. That and domestic politics.

    In fairness to Clinton, at least, the capability to do some things that needed doing should have been available but did not exist. That's DoD's fault -- again under several Administrations. Yet again, domestic politics.
    There were a few people making that case in 2002. Zinni, for instance. While not actively engaged in the debate, that was my position.
    Nor was I actively engaged in the debate; and I partly agreed but partly disagreed with you and Zinni. Something needed to be done and I knew Afghanistan alone would not be enough. As I've often said, I wouldn't have done it the way it was done but it doesn't have to be my way to work. The biggest change I would have made would have been to wait until the second term while working harder on a coalition. My perception is that Bush, unsure he would get a second term at that point, decided to do something that he thought needed doing and that he feared a successor might not do. Domestic politics one more time...

    That's pretty much why we have never done the assessment you and I and a good many others believe is needed. How to force that to occur is a knotty problem indeed. It will not happen just because it should.

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