Never even considered this!Originally Posted by marct
I think Cheaper is a lazy word, but I can't think of a better one. I guess I mean "some capability for less money".
The way I would look at this is, if it costs X to have 30 MBTs, procured, crewed and trained, can I get a greater capability, for less or the same money?
...and capability is not an ideal word either!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Wilf your gonna love this...how about what is the Effect you want to have on the enemy?
And that effect varies from place to place, and enemy to enemy.Wilf your gonna love this...how about what is the Effect you want to have on the enemy?
Sorry, but I'm not a particular fan of "one size fits all" forces, be they silver bullet forces or "war on the cheap" forces. If you go heavy, what is the cost in terms of time, money, etc. lost when you need to downgrade?
Slap, read Gavin's article a number of times. It's interesting, but not necessarily a catch-all. I also don't share your fascination with missiles, but that's a different story...
Seriously, there were some very interesting things that came out of Gavin's article and the later Howze Report. But the Vietnam experience also showed the value of having armor to back up those dragoons in choppers. Likewise, the "tyranny of terrain" turned out being exchanging one limitation (roads) for another (LZs)...and still telegraphed movements to the enemy.
Operationally, the most effective units in Vietnam were cavalry squadrons (divisional or the components of the 11th ACR)...combined arms units every one. Augmented with dismounted elements (an easy fix, really), they mustered a massive capability for their size and were in great demand throughout the region. Does this mean that they are what we need now? Not necessarily. Just pointing out that the "idea unit" often isn't something that planners can predict (Westmoreland, among others, tried to strip armor out of units coming to Vietnam and was later forced to reverse himself).
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Thank you!! I have to say, I was never impressed with the Gavin article. While some of the observation was incisive, he cherry picked the operational record to prove his point, and this has since been hijacked by the very agenda monkeys, I suspect Gavin despised. We also now know, some of what he stated as authoritative, is entirely false.
There is always the same old dichotomy of "better using what you have" and "using something better" - failure to understand this has lead to concepts like Manoeuvre Warfare, SBCT and ultimately FCS.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Steve, I don't believe in one stop shopping units either and I don't believe I said that but in the context of the Israeli conflict a Dragoon type unit would have be the better way to go. I am not fascinated by missiles I am an absolute Fanatic about themI was building Estes model rockets since I 10 years old. I hold the distinction of setting the playground on fire from the back blast.
I grew up with Missiles including living in Orlando,Fl. during the 1962 Missile Crisis and my parents retired from what was then the Glenn L. Martin Company now Lockeed Martin so I have been around what was known as the back lot where they tested them for sometime.
Wilf, you are quite right about the Agenda Monkeys he would have had no part of it. It was meant to be an illustration of what I think could be accomplished by Israel or anyone else for that matter if they were in that type of situation. Not sure what you mean about him being proven false?? If anything he has been proven right overtime.
I am not fascinated by missiles I am an absolute Fanatic about them
Missiles? I like missiles.
Last edited by selil; 05-04-2008 at 10:41 PM.
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Is that anything like "Mongo like candy."?
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
No worries, slap. Never thought you did...even if your missile fixation almost seems LeMay-ish....
Gavin had some good ideas, and many of the ideas put forward in the Howze report were never fully tested. I don't think he foresaw the LZ dependence because in the early stages I don't really think anyone understood just how much work would be involved lifting larger units via helicopter. I know none of the early airmobile folks really understood just how effective air cavalry would turn out to be...or how impressive it would be once it was combined with an armored ground element (the division cavalry squadron). It's a shame how quickly so many of those lessons were lost.
Missiles are good, like any other weapon, in their proper context. And even some they're not designed for...how many times have we been bitten in our institutional ass because someone forgot what the RPG can do? But if you're dealing with an opponent that doesn't have armored vehicles, missiles can become dead weight...or considered too valuable to use on anything other than a tank. Usually it sorts itself out.But it's also a good example of the situational aspects of conflict.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I merely meant that there are some statements that Gavin made, that I think events have proven to be incorrect.
Below is Singapore's ATGM vehicle with twin SPIKE LR fibre optic guided missiles. Combined with the 7.62mm MAG on the front, it's the embodiment of the old Soviet "Machine Gun Anti-tank Company". Each AT-Platoon is 10 vehicles. 2-3 platoons per AT Coy.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Wilf, uHH Doogies you just made my day....That is What I am talking about!!!!!!
Hi Wilf,
I've been thinking a lot about "money" in its different forms and functions recently. One of the key functions is as an "accountancy measure", which is where we usually see "cheap" and "expensive" show up as terms. The problem with that is that all accountancy measures are based on assumed relevance for accounting purposes and, these days, "risk" doesn't enter into many of these schemes as an assumption (outside of the blatant forms such as insurance).Never even considered this!
I think Cheaper is a lazy word, but I can't think of a better one. I guess I mean "some capability for less money".
In another thread, Norfolk used the term "Peace Dividend" which really highlights the problems with a lot of social accounting about the military - it's very short term.
Agreed, "capability" is not ideal
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
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