Cordesman so right, yet so wrong

[William F. Owen]

• Vastly cheaper to use infantry and irregular forces than
conventional forces, progressively easier to given such forces more
advanced weapons.

I got this from Anthony H. Cordesman "lessons from the Lebanon," that Steve linked somewhere.

There are two important point to my mind.

a.) The premise is, on one level, essentially correct, and extremely useful. - yet utterly misleading.
b.) I strongly suspect Cordesman has no idea why this is the case. He just felt it was. - otherwise he would have expressed it very differently.

There are real possibilities for "Infantry Centric" forces over "Classic Combined Arms."
The war in the Lebanon gave a nano-second snap shot of why.

IMO, this has nothing to do with "Irregular" or even "infantry" Forces, being "cheap." It's about leveraging resources for maximum benefit, and squeezing out capability from necessity.

Again, I feel this is what the USMC, "Distributed Ops" managed to get wrong, and the essential utility of examining such ideas has got lost on the "go light, SOCOM, wood-ninjas" groupie fan club, that is so in love with form over function.

[William F. Owen]

It is Cheaper and more efficient to incrementally upgrade (light/conventional) infantry forces with vehicles (including armour), ATGMs, MANPADS, and fire support than it is to hold conventional combined arms forces

This is essentially my statement and what I think Cordesman could have said.

Anyone got a view on this? Always embarrassing to have to bump-start ones own thread but I feel my initial post may have killed any useful input.

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

It is Cheaper and more efficient to incrementally upgrade (light/conventional) infantry forces with vehicles (including armour), ATGMs, MANPADS, and fire support than it is to hold conventional combined arms forces

This is essentially my statement and what I think Cordesman could have said.

Honestly, I have to wonder at the accounting used for deciding "cheaper". Sure, maintenance costs are lower, but what is the immediate reactive ability in comparison, because social accounting for military force should always be negative accounting, i.e. "what will it cost us if we do not have X?" As for "efficient", again, I have to wonder. Will there be sufficient time for the upgrading and associated retraining?

[William F. Owen]

Honestly, I have to wonder at the accounting used for deciding "cheaper". Sure, maintenance costs are lower, but what is the immediate reactive ability in comparison, because social accounting for military force should always be negative accounting, i.e. "what will it cost us if we do not have X?" As for "efficient", again, I have to wonder. Will there be sufficient time for the upgrading and associated retraining?

Never even considered this!

I think Cheaper is a lazy word, but I can't think of a better one. I guess I mean "some capability for less money".

The way I would look at this is, if it costs X to have 30 MBTs, procured, crewed and trained, can I get a greater capability, for less or the same money?

...and capability is not an ideal word either!

[slapout9]

...and capability is not an ideal word either!

Wilf your gonna love this...how about what is the Effect you want to have on the enemy?

[Steve Blair]

Wilf your gonna love this...how about what is the Effect you want to have on the enemy?

And that effect varies from place to place, and enemy to enemy.

Sorry, but I'm not a particular fan of "one size fits all" forces, be they silver bullet forces or "war on the cheap" forces. If you go heavy, what is the cost in terms of time, money, etc. lost when you need to downgrade?

Slap, read Gavin's article a number of times. It's interesting, but not necessarily a catch-all. I also don't share your fascination with missiles, but that's a different story...

Seriously, there were some very interesting things that came out of Gavin's article and the later Howze Report. But the Vietnam experience also showed the value of having armor to back up those dragoons in choppers. Likewise, the "tyranny of terrain" turned out being exchanging one limitation (roads) for another (LZs)...and still telegraphed movements to the enemy.

Operationally, the most effective units in Vietnam were cavalry squadrons (divisional or the components of the 11th ACR)...combined arms units every one. Augmented with dismounted elements (an easy fix, really), they mustered a massive capability for their size and were in great demand throughout the region. Does this mean that they are what we need now? Not necessarily. Just pointing out that the "idea unit" often isn't something that planners can predict (Westmoreland, among others, tried to strip armor out of units coming to Vietnam and was later forced to reverse himself).

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

Never even considered this!

I think Cheaper is a lazy word, but I can't think of a better one. I guess I mean "some capability for less money".

I've been thinking a lot about "money" in its different forms and functions recently. One of the key functions is as an "accountancy measure", which is where we usually see "cheap" and "expensive" show up as terms. The problem with that is that all accountancy measures are based on assumed relevance for accounting purposes and, these days, "risk" doesn't enter into many of these schemes as an assumption (outside of the blatant forms such as insurance).

In another thread, Norfolk used the term "Peace Dividend" which really highlights the problems with a lot of social accounting about the military - it's very short term.

The way I would look at this is, if it costs X to have 30 MBTs, procured, crewed and trained, can I get a greater capability, for less or the same money?

...and capability is not an ideal word either!

Agreed, "capability" is not ideal . If we go back to accountancy measures, you could take the cost of unit X and Unit Y, figure the difference to upgrade X to Y in terms of both material cost (purchasing equipment, etc.), training cost, training time (not usually included) and associated risk of not having unit Y during the time to retrain in terms of potential loss. That's only first order accounting . If you want to get into second order effects, look at changes in retention rates based on moral loss, etc.

[slapout9]

I will later on, at my day job now. For starters just read General James Gavin's famous magazine article from 1958: "Where is our Cavalry and I don't Mean Horses". A Dragoon force...mobile infantry or more important missilemen. is what was and is needed.

[Ken White]

It is Cheaper and more efficient to incrementally upgrade (light/conventional) infantry forces with vehicles (including armour), ATGMs, MANPADS, and fire support than it is to hold conventional combined arms forces

That's a totally true statement and it can also be said that it will work.

The problem as always is in the details -- combat use of vehicles of any type pose maintenance and tactical use issues that normally dismounted troops have difficulty with. Conversely, mounted folks in the dismounted role have tactical problems and logistic issues. If you really want to have fun, put a Mech unit in Choppers for an air assault; seen that -- it's hilarious...

So, I guess the ol' bottom line is, yeah you can do that -- but should you?

Which goes back to Steve's and every Military School's 'depends on the situation...'

[slapout9]

After we came of alert for the 73 Yom Kipor (spell) war the causality estimates for the 82nd were as high as 80%! Bad stuff so General Krosen decided that we needed a better way to fight and we began a series of exercises to prepare us in Retrograde Operations and what does that look like. Hizballah(spell) fought their war almost exactly as the 82nd would have right down to the use of motorcycles. In fact that may be where they learned it from. Our Battalion commander had to carry around a bunch of Arab colonels and a General and show them how we would do it as some type of an exchange program that happened after the war. He was none to happy about it either.

Once a missile has been developed that can be launched by a single infantryman and penetrate any Armored vehicle, that is a game changing event. Everything is nothing but a platform to launch a missile from the soldier to an ICBM...Shoot-Move-and Communicate. Soldiers should ride as close to the objective as they can get to save their energy. Once at the Objective they can dismount and fight fresh and they shouldn't have to carry all that stuff with them. Nothing but ammo,water and a radio...put the camping gear on a vehicle.

[SethB]

Slap, I believe that was in large part the goal of the SRATS program.

I don't know if it will work. That's not my rice bowl, so to speak. I do know that you can build that vehicle, or one that looks and functions identically, entirely from parts built for offroading.

[slapout9]

Hi SethB, Of course it will work. We proved it clould work as along time racing fan mostly NASCAR but also BAJA 500 now the 1000 fame. This is 1960's technology and very well proven. As part of our Ops they pulled ever Gamma Goat they could find which pretty much did the same thing as the STRATS but not as cool looking.


You may not be old enogh to know what a Gamma Goat is so here is a link. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ioK6s...eature=related

[Distiller]

That's a totally true statement and it can also be said that it will work.

The problem as always is in the details -- combat use of vehicles of any type pose maintenance and tactical use issues that normally dismounted troops have difficulty with. Conversely, mounted folks in the dismounted role have tactical problems and logistic issues. If you really want to have fun, put a Mech unit in Choppers for an air assault; seen that -- it's hilarious...

So, I guess the ol' bottom line is, yeah you can do that -- but should you?

Which goes back to Steve's and every Military School's 'depends on the situation...'

The universal infantry. Everybody can swim, run, fly. Is desireable, might even be do-able to an extent, but I think only in a professional force. Coming back to my 8/9 men standard formation hobbyhorse. And such a universal infantry can only be applied strictly to infantry, not cavalry.
In the case of the U.S. at least the USMC and Army infantry formations could be made compatible, maybe even unified. Would increase the pool of available manpower.

It was mentioned before - training. How do you train these people without actually having the weapons? It might only be cheaper in the longer run if you use virtual training.
But you need to have the weapons anyway, as there probably will be no time to buy them in case of war.

And mechanized units: At least when it comes to IMVs I think it would be possible to use a non-organic approach. Mobility companies serving various infantry battalions.


@ that Singaporean buggy: Never liked putting high-value toys on unprotected vehicles. Shrapnels and branches can damage that stuff. And when it rains it's also not good. Better take a Toyota Hilux and seat six missilemen on the flatbed instead of mounting the stuff on the buggy. And that buggy is very military, doesn't blend in very well. And terribly mobile it is neither - can't swim for example.

About the usefulness of light vehicles see South Africa's wars.

[Ken White]

The universal infantry. Everybody can swim, run, fly. Is desireable, might even be do-able to an extent, but I think only in a professional force. Coming back to my 8/9 men standard formation hobbyhorse. And such a universal infantry can only be applied strictly to infantry, not cavalry.
In the case of the U.S. at least the USMC and Army infantry formations could be made compatible, maybe even unified. Would increase the pool of available manpower.

Technically achievable but perhaps not advisable. While universal infantry can be had, it would suffer from the problem of all compromises -- sacrifices great in some things for barely adequate in others.

I don't have a problem with US Army and Marine squads being identical but unlike you, I'd go the other way; having worked with Army 9 and 11 man Squads and the Marines 13 man Squad, the latter is far superior in firepower, flexibility and far most importantly in full combat, staying power.

It was mentioned before - training. How do you train these people without actually having the weapons? It might only be cheaper in the longer run if you use virtual training.
But you need to have the weapons anyway, as there probably will be no time to buy them in case of war.

True on the latter point and on the use of virtual training, it has merits and benefits but there's no real substitute for actually doing things on the ground in all types of terrain and weather. Got to get dirty to do it right. Virtual is just a bit too easy...

And mechanized units: At least when it comes to IMVs I think it would be possible to use a non-organic approach. Mobility companies serving various infantry battalions.

We tried that in the late 40s and early 50s. Didn't work too well, the mobility APC folks tended to think and act like taxi drivers -- who didn't want to go into bad neighborhoods -- and the tactical commanders never got enough experience to properly employ the vehicles and get full benefit of their combat power capability. Maintenance was also a major problem, a driver and a vehicle commander are not enough people to take care of a track (or even a multi-wheeled vehicle).

@ that Singaporean buggy: Never liked putting high-value toys on unprotected vehicles. Shrapnels and branches can damage that stuff. And when it rains it's also not good. Better take a Toyota Hilux and seat six missilemen on the flatbed instead of mounting the stuff on the buggy. And that buggy is very military, doesn't blend in very well. And terribly mobile it is neither - can't swim for example.

About the usefulness of light vehicles see South Africa's wars.

Light strike vehicles have pluses and minuses just like any other piece of kit; they aren't for everywhere or everything. All goes down to "what works?"

ZA is a unique theater, they had and did a lot of good stuff but it was purpose designed for a specific environment; giving optimum performance. Having to be prepared for world wide employment significantly complicates both the equipping and training requirements. It's doable, just a little more difficult.

And unfortunately as is always true, politics (in and out of the forces) complicates everything...

[Sabre]

I think that Mr. Cordesman discounts the principle that the enemy is also capable of thinking and reacting.

I basically took the quote to mean, that if you are starting an armed force from scratch (Hezbullah), the first thing that you need (and the best bang for your buck) is well-trained, well-equipped infantry, and then you can add capabilities

Taken to a logical extreme, if a power decided to make every single member of its armed forces a foot-mobile infantryman, then their enemies could (and would) adapt, and make at least some of their forces into motorized units, which could be ripped through by light armored dragoons or cavalry, which in turn could fall prey to combined arms: heavy armor, fire support, and air power. This begets exponentially increasing logistics, "lines of communication" and "soft targets". Tanks grouped into large combined arms units stab through lines to strike at those.

Could a large body of well-trained infantry stop a mechanized strike, while still keeping casualties to a low level that is on par with how easily and cheaply (in terms of casualties) a US mech brigade could?

An Israeli armored force, given the objective of Beirut, and the level of training that they had say, a decade ago, would have made it through the Hezzies in 2006. Will we always be in a situation where we can afford to allow an enemy force through to a city?

Thus, I don't think that it is quite as applicable to a superpower's military. If you are supposed to do everything, as certain militaries are expected to, then you will need constituted units that train consistently to perform the different missions... which will lead to some degree of specialization out of sheer necessity.

After all, where would these incremental additions come from?
Presumably, we would already have the equipment procured and on-hand, which at the very least means that we need maintainers and trainers (along with spare parts, etc), the equipment will still require *some* upkeep. The Soviets were much-maligned for not training on their equipment as much as the Western armies did, during the cold-war.

Some missions (not all, some) are better performed by a mechanized force. It not only takes training and practice, it also takes the institutional knowledge that is only built up in leaders over time (which, as of yet, is still not adequately captured in FM's, FMFM's, ARTEP standards, etc).

I've always been partial to the USMC MEU concept... I have always thought that was a fantastic way to think about, and put together, a battalion-size combat team.

[William F. Owen]

@ that Singaporean buggy: Never liked putting high-value toys on unprotected vehicles. Shrapnels and branches can damage that stuff. And when it rains it's also not good. Better take a Toyota Hilux and seat six missilemen on the flatbed instead of mounting the stuff on the buggy. And that buggy is very military, doesn't blend in very well. And terribly mobile it is neither - can't swim for example.

Having examined this vehicle in detail and talked to the crews, let me address a few issues. It is a mobility system. - so better than walking. It is not an armoured vehicle. It enables an ATGW platoon to do things THEY COULD NOT, if they did not have this vehicle. There have much better mobility than an SUV. Better power to weight and lower ground pressure. No, it can't swim, but you can lift it with UH-60 or smaller helo, and you can float is easily on a raft, if needed.

We tried that in the late 40s and early 50s. Didn't work too well, the mobility APC folks tended to think and act like taxi drivers -- who didn't want to go into bad neighborhoods -- and the tactical commanders never got enough experience to properly employ the vehicles and get full benefit of their combat power capability. Maintenance was also a major problem, a driver and a vehicle commander are not enough people to take care of a track (or even a multi-wheeled vehicle).

...but, the Royal Marines are doing this, and it works very well. If you have the right training all the problems go away.

[Ken White]

...but, the Royal Marines are doing this, and it works very well. If you have the right training all the problems go away.

from Lympstone?

Last time I checked, RM training was the lengthiest in the OECD. Can / will everyone be willing to spend that much time and money on training? Is the RM doing that because that's the way they want to operate or because they can't afford more Vikings?

Either way, it's more than a training issue. As I said, it can be done -- but it is a compromise and proficiency in something gets sacrificed for flexibility achieved. Up to the individual armed force to make the choice.