U.S. Captains Bear Weight of Iraq Strategy

[SWJED]

U.S. Captains Bear Weight of Iraq Strategy by Michael Kamber, International Herald Tribune.

During the war in Iraq, young army and Marine captains have become American viceroys, officers with large sectors to run and near-autonomy to do it. In military parlance, they are the "ground-owners." In practice, they are power brokers.

"They give us a chunk of land and say, 'Fix it,' " said Captain Rich Thompson, 36, who controls an area east of Baghdad.

The Iraqis have learned that these captains, many still in their 20s, can call down devastating American firepower one day and approve multimillion-dollar projects the next. Some have become celebrities in their sectors, men whose names are known even to children.

Many in the military believe that these captains are the linchpins in the American strategy for success in Iraq, but as the war continues into its sixth year the military has been losing them in large numbers — at a time when it says it needs thousands more.

Most of these captains have extensive combat experience and are regarded as the military's future leaders. They're exactly the men the military most wants. But corporate America wants them too. And the hardships of repeated tours are taking their toll, tilting them back toward civilian life and possibly complicating the future course of the war...

[Ranger94]

U.S. Captains Bear Weight of Iraq Strategy by Michael Kamber, International Herald Tribune.

We will do more good if we educate the Sgt's and below.

It is my understanding from my readings in SWJ and my experience in combat is that if tactical actions are elevated to 0-3 level (other than briefings) then I have failed as a Jr. COIN leader.

To put it another way, if I as a team leader or squad leader, if I fail to see the stratigic implications of a "shot fired" then I have failed.


Respectively,
RLTW SSG
I am still reading 3.24 and "Eating Soup...". and hoping I get it all

[Ken White]

to understand that...

[Ron Humphrey]

We will do more good if we educate the Sgt's and below.

It is my understanding from my readings in SWJ and my experience in combat is that if tactical actions are elevated to 0-3 level (other than briefings) then I have failed as a Jr. COIN leader.

To put it another way, if I as a team leader or squad leader, if I fail to see the stratigic implications of a "shot fired" then I have failed.


Respectively,
RLTW SSG
I am still reading 3.24 and "Eating Soup...". and hoping I get it all

Getting those in higher positions to buy off on the risk and subsequent necessity for occasional imperfection or mistakes not being the end of ones career for NCO's will be pretty hard to get. Officers already carry immense responsibility in their own jobs let alone in CI type environments. The'll have a hard time being comfortable with such a thing unless there is a good training and education base to show that those NCO's should be able to do it. Without that they will probably be wary of placing too much on their NCO's shoulders.
Just my thought but I could be wrong on this one as things may have changed in that respect in the last few years

[Ken White]

Getting those in higher positions to buy off on the risk and subsequent necessity for occasional imperfection or mistakes not being the end of ones career for NCO's will be pretty hard to get. Officers already carry immense responsibility in their own jobs let alone in CI type environments. The'll have a hard time being comfortable with such a thing unless there is a good training and education base to show that those NCO's should be able to do it. Without that they will probably be wary of placing too much on their NCO's shoulders.
Just my thought but I could be wrong on this one as things may have changed in that respect in the last few years

My belief is that they're dead wrong -- and while I acknowledge that attitude is probably quite prevalent today, it hasn't always been that way. Fortunately for the Army...

I also am sure that many more do not have that concern which is a good thing as my suspicion is that, as was true in Viet Nam and at other times (the average rifle company in the 82d in 1962 probably had 2.5 Officers, priority was to USAREUR), there'll be an Officer shortage and sooner rather than later.

Officers probably need to get used to the thought of having SFCs and SSG as acting platoon leaders. They'll do okay. I've seen SGTs as Acting PLs and one serving as a 1SG -- all of 'em did a good job. One gets responsible behavior when one expects it; if one expects poor performance, that's generally exactly what one will get. And certainly, IMO, deserves...

I spent over six years as a PSG, peace and war, had four Platoon Leaders and only one of them for eight months in 1961-2 at Bragg; none of the others were around for more than two or three months. Do the math on that. They only gave me a PL in Viet Nam after seven months without one when I got promoted and was getting transferred up to Brigade. I had two weeks to train him. He made Colonel so I guess we did okay. I made SGM in a little over 11 total years (there was a war on ), every stripe in a different unit, so I don't guess I screwed up too badly running Cav, Scout and Recon platoons on three continents.

[120mm]

Officers probably need to get used to the thought of having SFCs and SSG as acting platoon leaders. They'll do okay. I've seen SGTs as Acting PLs and one serving as a 1SG -- all of 'em did a good job. One gets responsible behavior when one expects it; if one expects poor performance, that's generally exactly what one will get. And certainly, IMO, deserves...

I'm currently reading the David Weber series on Honor Harrington. In the book, "In Enemy Hands" he quotes a mythical Fleet Admiral as saying: I'd rather be short-handed, than have incompetents running things.

Back when I was teaching ROTC, an Active Duty CPT and I would often sit around and shoot the #### about how a crappy officer actually made it HARDER for the NCO who was really leading the platoon to do his job.

And then, when you promote said crappy officer, he makes it hard for the NCO by being a crappy Company Commander.

While it's a lot easier to have an even marginally competent officer to pick up the slack, the bad ones are just bad and we should just give up trying to fill the slots.

[jcustis]

A very junior staff sergeant recently left my staff and checked in the the joint reception center at Camp Lejeune. Instead of heading to the unit he thought he was slated to go to, he was re-directed to one about to head over to Iraq, by way of a rotation at Mojave Viper...which started in 4 days.

When he called me while headed home on pre-deploy leave, he remarked with a laugh that he had been assigned the platoon commander slot for his company's 4th plt (yes Wilf, it seems some units are abandoning the 3x rifle plt, 1x wpns plt structure). I asked him where his platoon commander was, and how long he'd be working in the acting role.

"There is no lieutenant coming sir, it's all me. Isn't that pretty crazy?" he chuckled. I was thrown off guard at first, but I sat back and mulled over those words for moment and realized just how ignorant I was to presume that he had to have an officer holding the reigns. I'd trained him after all, and knew his capabilities.

I think you're spot on Ranger94. Both ends of the spectrum just need to reach that accomodation in terms of tactical judgment, responsibility, accountability, etc. Put another way, you've got to take the ball and run with it, but don't showboat into the endzone and drop it at the 1 yd line.

[Steve Blair]

there was a time not so long ago when a first sergeant could end up running the company because the three assigned officers were either on leave or detached duty. Sergeants actually took out extended scouting patrols, and corporals often did the same. Amazing sometimes how little we recall of our own history....

[Ron Humphrey]

there was a time not so long ago when a first sergeant could end up running the company because the three assigned officers were either on leave or detached duty. Sergeants actually took out extended scouting patrols, and corporals often did the same. Amazing sometimes how little we recall of our own history....

And not everyone likes the thought of that

[Ken White]

...
While it's a lot easier to have an even marginally competent officer to pick up the slack, the bad ones are just bad and we should just give up trying to fill the slots.

I've long said "Show me a poor officer and I'll show you an unfortunate guy who had a lousy NCO for his first Platoon Sergeant..."

And there are too many of those lousy dudes about. Fortunately, that's changing as a lot of the deadwood that got hired in the 1975-1985 time frame depart to retirement...

I realized reading my post from last night that it read like I was sniping at Ron. I was not. I fully understand how he feels and I know that many, maybe even most, would agree with him. I'm sympathetic, understand but do disagree with that approach.

My point, which I didn't make at all well was that it hasn't always been that way and that it doesn't need to stay that way.

In 1968, the average Bn Cdr in Viet Nam found he had few if any Captains and senior NCOs, he had a slew of brand new 2LTs and SGts. Good, dedicated kids who'd do anything -- but they didn't know much, so he had to watch them closely. He didn't break that habit when he got to be a General in the 70s and 80s. Unfortunately, all those 2LTs and SGTs thought they were supposed to act the same way as their mentor had so when they got to be senior in 90s and 00s, they kept micromanaging. It became embedded in the Army; total lack of trust. It's dangerous, an Army is built on trust. Or should be.

It wasn't always like that. Prior to 1968, there were micromanagers but they were rare and, far more importantly, they were actively discouraged (as opposed to recently when they have been encouraged). In 1966, my Bde Cdr, A senior BG had a standing night order "Wake me if all three Bns are in heavy contact." In late '68, the Division we were OpCon to had one also -- either the CG or one of the DCGs would be awakened if A Bn (out of 12 counting our OpCon) was in contact. yes, they were different people but the climate led to that glaring difference. Been downhill ever since

Climates can be changed.

I saw some briefing slides somewhere from COL Roper's last trip to Iraq. One bullet made me chuckle. It said; "Be prepared to delegate to the point of discomfort." Just so.

JCustis tells of the future; heed him. And don't fear it, it'll work. Has before...

[Ron Humphrey]

I've long said "Show me a poor officer and I'll show you an unfortunate guy who had a lousy NCO for his first Platoon Sergeant..."

And there are too many of those lousy dudes about. Fortunately, that's changing as a lot of the deadwood that got hired in the 1975-1985 time frame depart to retirement...

I realized reading my post from last night that it read like I was sniping at Ron. I was not. I fully understand how he feels and I know that many, maybe even most, would agree with him. I'm sympathetic, understand but do disagree with that approach.
..

I agree with you but I many times feel the need to portray what many who actually count ( as opposed to lil ol me) in the decisions have shown themselves to feel as that ultimately determines what happens.

[Cavguy]

I've long said "Show me a poor officer and I'll show you an unfortunate guy who had a lousy NCO for his first Platoon Sergeant..."

Ken,

Interesting historical background. We've spent a lot of time about the effect of OIF on officers, but what about our NCO development.

A question for you, and an observation.

You mentioned you made SGM in 11 years. One trend I noticed while in command was that we're again promoting rapidly not only in the officer corps but the NCO Corps. The average PSG has between 9-11 years of service these days when taking the job. Previously I would say it was 14-16 in the pre-2003 army. Same with 1SG's, now I'm seeing them as early as 13 years in. I felt very lucky, 2 of my 3 1SG's were both over 20 years with tons of experience.

This isn't to say that these people aren't capable and deserving. But I have noticed that the current PSG crop, and to a lesser extent 1SG crop, are competent, but not wise/experienced in the way I found my first PSG and 1SG. They tend not to mentor their PL's as well, or are much more reluctant to. They tend not to have as much of a mastery of the basics of their MOS - for example, proficency in tank gunnery. I see a few more 1SG's and PSG's with "no time for officers", creating a somewhat parallel chain of command/responsibility. Broad brush strokes, but a trend I am observing. Also with "automatic" promotions up to SSG, I'm seeing more deadwood creep upwards than would have before.

On the upside, we have combat seasoned NCO's who have led under great stress, can't underestimate the impact of that. And they're by in large doing a tremendous job under great stress.

So at the end of this - how did rapid promotions affect the NCO corps following Vietnam in the above ways? What can we expect or what should we watch out for?

[Vic Bout]

having come from a career field that in the last few years has been bringing kids (18X) off the street and turning them into overnight green berets. Sure the process is designed to assess and select only the best, but it's a system that turns out 21 year old staff sergeants with 3 or 4 years TIS as well. Not that we didn't see plenty of that in Viet Nam...but last time I checked my calendar said 2008. So the end-state is smart, fit, young soldiers with very little army-culture experience.

[Ken White]

get my ears lowered and swing by Lowe's.

Well, I first became a PSG with four years in the Marines but then a three year break before I entered the Army as a PV2. I ended up as a PSG three years later, I'll leave it to you to determine if that was seven years or three. Either way it was less than your today average. Different time...

I have to note that my rapid climb was due in large measure to being in Airborne and SF units the entire period. Those guys got promoted faster than did most of the Army during that period. That was also before the centralized boards at DA (with which my court martials might have had an, uh, adverse impact ). Having said that, I was faster than some, not as fast as others all due to a variety of factors. The DA board removed some inequities in the old system but they also added some new ones. One of the terrible flaws is that the current system rewards mediocrity; stay around, keep out of trouble and eventually you'll get promoted. Like Vic say, that was then, this is now...

There used to be a paragraph in AR 600-200 that said the central board will select and the individual will be promoted unless his commander writes a letter to have him removed from the list for cause. I used to tell evey Officer I could "When you get to be Chief of Staff, change that to read 'the indivdual will be promoted only when his commander writes a letter to approve that promotion.'" Rationale being commanders won't take the time to write a letter to remove a marginal gut, so they slip through until the Peter Principle strikes; conversely, they will make time to write a letter to promote the sharp guys.

Believe it or not, the foregoing isn't a digression, it's part of the answer to your question -- todays system rewards mediocrity.

Time in service is a major criteria for promotion today -- I submit it should not be; performance and potential (EVERYBODY gets promoted based on perceived potential. Well, theoretically, anyway) should be the sole criteria. some people are quite mature and capable at 18; others are still childish and insecure at 40. Five years of being a TC or a Squad Leader give a guy a whole lot more valid experience than the guy who spent three of those five years as a Recruiter or Drill Sergeant; yet the system says five years is five years and that to look at it otherwise is not 'fair.' My answer to that is that war is not fair. Unfortunately, my opinion doesn't sway the Per community or Congress...

It's like I said about Officers, same thing applies -- a round peg will fit in a square hole -- but it has to be smaller.

I cannot speak to the NCO Education system today other then to note that Hacksaw discussed it when I was lamenting about its poor quality based on my son's experience in the 90s and talking to others from the same period. If they've improved it and gotten a combat focus, good -- but six years and more ago it was a check the block effort and almost a total waste of time. your later NCOs may have suffered from that.

On Tank Gunnery, you hit on one of my pet peeves -- I was at Knox, as a DAC when OAFM created the Master Gunner program -- I violently disagreed with it then and I still do. Thus your PSGs knew little because it wasn't their job. If it had been, they would've all been Master Gunners. The Master Gunner program was a quick fix answer to declining NCO quality in the late 70s and it was, as usual, a poor band-aid that can't take water. I started out in life as a Tanker; gunnery is a PSGs job just as Tactics are the PLs job. The sad thing is that in mounted units in peacetime, Co / Trp and Bn / Sqn Cdrs get graded on maintenance and gunnery -- because they're hard numbers and 'objective' (what happens if I do Gunnery on a nice June day and you get a blustery March day is not discussed). All the foregoing was a digression of sorts, sorry...

There are always some NCOs who dislike Officers for a variety of reasons. Generally, there aren't that many and most NCOs understand why there are Officers and accept them pretty well. My observation has been that if there are as large number of 'Officer dislikers' in a unit, then there may be an Officer problem in that unit. Most NCOs realize they ain't edumacated but most are smart enough to know when they're being patronized or [1] misused; [2] inadequately or inefficiently used; [3] overused and they tend to react negatively. Alternatively, sometimes a senior NCO somewhere in the chain has an attitude and it pervades the unit. In any event, it's been my experience that if such a sensing occurs, a pretty thorough search for the root cause ought to be made.

Just before I retried from my retiremnt in 1995, a few of us were sitting around talking and an old Colonel mentioned that when he'd been a LT at Hood, the Div was on the way back in from an exercise and LTG Ulmer, then the III Corps commandante, stopped, told them to move ALL the Officers to a theater for an Officers call with him and let their NCOs bring the units back to garrison. A young LTC sitting there said "That was wrong" (of Ulmer's order) and an even younger CPT said "No way I'd ever do that." I'm uncouth so I just looked at both of them and said "That's dumb." The Colonel, who of course had been to Couth School, did far better. He looked at 'em, smiled and said "If you can't trust your NCOs, whose fault is that?"

As to the 'deadwood.' It occurs naturally in all societies and groups at all ranks. If the advancement process is skewed to produce more at any cost instead of holding to quality control, then it will float to the top. It has to be culled and thrown ashore. It's hard to do that today but not impossible. Command and Leadership IS hard work but it's imprtant. It is often difficult for those in the Army to remember that quality is more important than quantity.

Which leads me at long last to answer your final questions. Rapid promotions in Viet Nam didn't hurt that much; most of the folks thus promoted were okay. There were a few over warlike / zealous type who couldn't adapt to peace time but they left pretty quick; plus a few loser, most of whom got run out. What hurt the Army post-Viet Nam was the move to time in service as the arch criteria for NCO promotion -- a lot of folks who had hidden out for years suddenly got promoted and many were marginal. That was followed by an influx of sub-standard recruits in the 1970-80 period who were around for years and in some cases, were not too helpful. Many are just now retiring...

That led to things like the Master Gunner bit and Officers overly involved in training (allowing the NCOs who will ALWAYS take the "no sense in both of us doing this " route to sluff off) and we end up with a perfectly natural and predictable decline in NCO training ability. As my kid the former1SG says, "...they don't know how to do it because no one ever made them do it -- or even let them do it." He, by the way, did not and does not believe the 1SGs job is beans, bullets and paper -- he considered himself the most experienced guy in the Troop and so he was the 'Master Trainer.' Made sense to me. Officers direct training. NCOs do training -- or should.

Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future, said Nils. True dat. At a guess, I expect you'll see a continuing misuse of Officers and overlarge Staffs that keep them away from troops and, unless NCOES is radically changed from a few years ago, a decline in the ability of NCOs to act as trainers. Thus there will be pressure for Officers to oversee nut and bolt training which will be a mistake. If the Officer shortage gets significant at unit level (50:50 chance, I'd say), then you'll see NCOs step up and learn the job and do it. OTOH, if we continue to be over Officered then I'd expect a slight decline in NCO quality. If the system lets them do their jobs, they'll improve themselves. Too early to tell which way that'll go.

The high reenlistment rate today, particularly in the Combat Arms is likely to create a glut of SSGs soon unless HRC gets smarter than they've ever been before (an unlikley occurrence). If those guys come back to the peaceful US and the Army returns to its pre 2001 state, there will be hate and discontent and they won't reenlist again; then there'll be an NCO shortfall

All in all, the system will cope. There are enough lessons learned available to the Army leadership to stop most potential problems. Whether there's the vision to do that remains to be seen.

Sorry for the length, rather put too much in and let you throw out what you don't want than cut it too short to provide a reasonably decent answer.

[Norfolk]

From the article:

During the war in Iraq, young army and Marine captains have become American viceroys, officers with large sectors to run and near-autonomy to do it. In military parlance, they are the "ground-owners." In practice, they are power brokers.

"They give us a chunk of land and say, 'Fix it,' " said Captain Rich Thompson, 36, who controls an area east of Baghdad.

At the word "viceroy", my ears pricked up. This is very much the sort of thing that I have been watching and waiting to see develop in the U.S. Army and USMC. If the US Army and Marines were to take only one thing away from Iraq (and to a certain extent, Afghanistan), it would be this: that even (especially) the subaltern, or junior officer, would become fully self-aware and self-confident of his role and status as a de facto proconsul, the agent and executor of his nation's policy and strategic interests. This growing self-awareness and self-confidence of the junior and field-grade officer classes is very "Imperial", and in a good way.

Twenty years ago, even ten years ago, there would have been no shortage of officers intensely aware of the political nature and realities of war, and still more filled with initiative; but until the reality of massive and long-term SSO and COIN campaigns made a virtue of necessity, there had been a marked reluctance (which still remains in so many ways) for military professionals to in fact act in political fashions, for political ends. Afghanistan and Iraq have changed, and continue to change, this. Commonwealth Armies had to do much the same back in the days of the British Empire, as the comparatively rigid and "cog on the machine" mentality considered desirable for MCOs had to give way to more responsibility and more trust granted to field-grade and junior officers in order to get the job done. And if that meant that even a platoon commander had to wear the hats of diplomat, spy, engineer, mayor, and His Majesty's unofficially-official plenipotentiary, in addition to his military hat in order to get r' done, well, then that's how it would be done.

The ultimate disintegration of the Empire notwithstanding (nor the examples of the two World Wars, in which rather more automaton-like qualities were sought, or at least developed - with more or less predictable results), the concept of the officer as a political actor first, in the sense that he was first and foremost the agent of his Government's policies - being a soldier meant only that he specialized in the more violent forms of diplomacy and persuasion - worked well, on the whole. War, being an intrinsically political beast, is ultimately one or lost at the political level - even if that requires brute force to achieve. As such, the developing "politicization", used in this sense, of the Officer Corps in the USA and USMC is a welcome development. Nearly an entire generation of junior and field-grade officers have experienced this development, and for those who are able to remain in service, this may well go some way to breaking down the traditional, and unnatural, divide in the US between the political and the military.

The US, though not "Imperialist", is certainly an Imperial Power, and in Afghanistan and Iraq has had to assume much of the role and burdens of such. As an Imperial Power ipso facto, it denies what it is at its own peril; US officers need to be self-aware political actors, fully cognisant and involved in their "political" tasks, and always acting with a view to the achievement of their Government's political objectives, not just their assigned military objectives. The traditional American radical divide between politics and the military has got to end, and Iraq and Afghanistan is bringing it much closer to an end; in any case, it is a luxury that an Imperial Power can ill-afford. This article shows that it is in the process of ending.

[jcustis]

This is a stellar thread and one that dovetails into conversations I've had time after time at the ammo table, while sitting in the smoke pit, or while waiting in the turret to move to the SP and cross LD.

I've had the good fortune to work closely with some stellar NCOs who had their head set straight on their shoulders and were receptive to some of the things we discussed. Time after time, the issue of micro-management (and to a certain degree, micromanagement of safety) would come up and it became an awkward moment because we knew it was an important issue, but feelings were likely to get hurt. I like to walk through minefields though, so we usually found our way in the middle of one, throwing a lot of stuff out there to where I learned a lot in the process.

I think it's easy to say micro-management is bad because it stifles the NCOs being able to handle "their business". That was usually the going-in position from the NCOs, and I typically countered with something about the commander probably not feeling comfortable that the NCOs could handle the particular situation that in the end left everyone bent out of shape. Usually I'd throw out an example of a hazing incident, or how something put a commander's ass on the boss's radar screen because an NCO exercised poor judgment. We'd agree that those are things that are reasonable to give an officer the pucker, but then they'd counter that the Corps had gotten so risk-averse and zero-defect ridden that micro-management = a careerist.

I've come to realize over time that there are certain truths (and Ken has hit about every one), and I've seen it with my own eyes. I'll be the first one to admit that I've looked at a Marine and whispered to myself, "Jesus H Christ, you are some kind of f-ed up," only to kick myself because he WAS A MARINE UNDER MY COMMAND!

Better training is one solution, and that training needs to be applied to both enlisted and officer alike. What are other ways we can counter the insidious creep of micro-management? Heck, is micro-management solely in the eyes of the beholder and therefore subject to the adage, "well, it's kind of relative." Is it possible to be a careerist for the right reasons, or will you always sell a little of yourself in the process?

Before this ramble gets any worse, I think we need to go back (for sure within the combat arms) to a solid foundation on the Systems Approach to Training and Unit Training Management. A lot of folks know the words, but they have never been trained to be experts in the fundamentals. If we all were, and everyone simply did their job (and therefore didn't cause someone to do 10, 15, 20% more) as they were supposed to, we'd kick ass. This thread is causing some reflection, because I have to ask myself if I've done a good job of ensuring subordinates understand what it is I want them to do.

EDIT: My one last point is that although we have made outstanding strides in the Marine Corps with our resident formal schools programs and are putting out a much better product from the Advanced Infantry Training Center, we had better very quickly figure out how to open the tap a lot further.

We have kick-ass small unit leaders out there who are getting it done by doing it. They may not know all the new-fangled doctrinal terms behind it (and yes, we should hold them accountable for learning them), but they are currently on the streets and leading in the best locale we could hope for. When we hit the garrison years (and yes, they will come sooner than we expect), if we don't find a way to get more of these fine young men into formal schools, we will go back to the inverse relationship of officers being the lead trainers, allowing that space for sloughing off. I have to admit my own reservations when an NCO tells me that he did X, Y, and Z when he was in Iraq for the Xth time. I saw men who did X, Y, and Z piss-poorly during both of my deploys, so I tend to want to see something more concrete, and that's the stamp in his record jacket that says he graduated from a formal school. The great NCOs are going to be insulted when the young Lt (who is well trained but not experienced) comes in and thinks that things need to be done with the formality and efficiency that he is used to at the Infantry Officer Course. The slighted NCO is going to therefore reconsider the options of re-enlistment, or at least entertain the idea that he can make a go of it on the outside...and then we will have eaten our own.

Ken, you've got a PM that was prompted by this thread. Cheers.

[120mm]

I've long said "Show me a poor officer and I'll show you an unfortunate guy who had a lousy NCO for his first Platoon Sergeant..."

I was ROTC just a couple years ago, and we are commissioning kids who are functionally illiterate, have to get a PT waiver to get in the army and I swear some of them are borderline retarded.

There is no way that these folks will ever be anything but a drag on the system. The only way an NCO could improve their officership is to see that they were "accidentally" killed in the line of duty.

I had a series of lousy NCOs as a platoon leader and I survived. It wasn't pretty, but I'm still here. I don't put the burden of the Army's negligence in commissioning ####heads on the NCO corps.

[William F. Owen]

I was ROTC just a couple years ago, and we are commissioning kids who are functionally illiterate, have to get a PT waiver to get in the army and I swear some of them are borderline retarded.
.

...but everyone knows the solution. Creating good officers is not a mystery. If there are bad officers and NCOs, then we (the UK and US) just choose not to create good one.

We choose to have lower standards and poorer leadership. We know how to get excellent officers, but IF there are a large section of bad ones, then apparently someone has decided we don't want/need them.

[Steve Blair]

I was ROTC just a couple years ago, and we are commissioning kids who are functionally illiterate, have to get a PT waiver to get in the army and I swear some of them are borderline retarded.

We see this too.

I've been through three detachment commanders. One was fixated on numbers, and he commissioned some people who had no business being anything other than shift leaders at McDonald's (if that). But it was the numbers game. He could report X number of commissionees in a year...an increase of Y over last year. Then we got a commander who didn't care about numbers but did care about quality. Our numbers are down, but his commissioning classes are damned strong. We'll see where the new one goes....

But that's what happens when you start rating these programs based on numbers. It's easier to rate a detachment based on numbers than it is on quality of commissionees. So we tend to take the easy route. The Army unit at our campus recently got tasked to increase numbers, and you can bet they'll see a drop in quality soon.

I'd be interested to hear how Navy ROTC handles this sort of thing.

[Eden]

As a brand new cavalry platoon leader - 'H' series MTOE, real cav, not the poor substitute we have today - in 1983, the troop's senior NCOs were a mix of burn-outs and shake-and-bake Vietnam vets. By the time I took over my first company in 1986, the quality of NCOs was uniformly better - better trainers, better maintainers, better motivators - and continued to improve while I stayed with troops. I think this improvement was partly due to improved enlistment standards during the Reagan years and an improved NCOES. We were getting better material and it showed. When I went back to troops as S-3, XO, Bn commander 1996-2002, I still thought highly of the NCO corps, but I did note some disturbing developments.

First was the erosion of motivational skills. In the '80s we made it much easier to get rid of problem soldiers. This was a good thing because there were plenty of boys lined up at the recruiting station and you had to spend less time on the knuckleheads. But we were also getting rid of kids who, with a little more effort, might have made the grade. So a whole generation of NCOs grew up without being forced to 'motivate' somebody who you were stuck with. Call it the loss of 'wall-to-wall' counseling skills.

Second was an abdication of the sense of ownership we had with our problem children. The Army has created such a web of support groups for alcohol abuse, wife beating, financial idiocy, and the like, that our first line of defense became sending the soldier elsewhere when things went wrong. In fact, it has gotten to the point that trying to solve problems in-house is seen as malfeasance. NCOs are no longer fathers, big brothers, and priests; they are referral agencies, and both they and their soldiers are the poorer for it.

Third was a rise in - well, I won't call it careerism, but a heightened concern over 'careers'. I blame the explosion in sergeant major positions for this. Personally, I have never met a sergeant major at the brigade level or higher who added value to his unit. I am sure good ones exist, but for the most part they are part personnel clerk and part mafia don. Why we take our best NCOs and move them away from troops is beyond me. This from a guy who owes what limited success he had to several first sergeants and battalion command sergeants major. Anyway, I think the measure of success for an NCO has receded a little too far into the ether of higher headquarters.

Finally, one of my least favorite Army inventions - Sergeant's Time. For the uninitiated, this was setting aside four hours a week reserved for the NCO to train his soldiers on whatever he felt ws necessary. Of course, it should be the other way around. There should be four hours a week for the officers to train the troops on whatever they want. The presumption should be that sergeants are spending the other 56 hours on Sergeant's Time. And of course, Sergeant's Time had to be briefed to the officers and reviewed up to the brigade level, so the whole thing became a bureaucratic exercise, while implying that NCOs were not the unit's primary trainers. Of course, this horror is only a symptom of 'fill-in-the-white space' training briefings and micromanagement that ultimately weakens the corps it is meant to strengthen.

Don't get me wrong, we still have the strongest NCO corps in the world in terms of breadth and depth of quality. And I suspect that my largely peacetime experience doesn't reflect what is happening today. But my point for the younger members of the forum is that the culture of the military often works in mysterious and invisible ways.

As for the officer corps, my memory tells me that junior officers are pretty much the same as they have always been, but that quality is declining once you hit field grade. But when the promotion rate to Lt Col is in the 90's, what can you expect?