It is Cheaper and more efficient to incrementally upgrade (light/conventional) infantry forces with vehicles (including armour), ATGMs, MANPADS, and fire support than it is to hold conventional combined arms forces
This is essentially my statement and what I think Cordesman could have said.
Anyone got a view on this? Always embarrassing to have to bump-start ones own thread but I feel my initial post may have killed any useful input.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Hi Wilf,
Honestly, I have to wonder at the accounting used for deciding "cheaper". Sure, maintenance costs are lower, but what is the immediate reactive ability in comparison, because social accounting for military force should always be negative accounting, i.e. "what will it cost us if we do not have X?" As for "efficient", again, I have to wonder. Will there be sufficient time for the upgrading and associated retraining?Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Never even considered this!
I think Cheaper is a lazy word, but I can't think of a better one. I guess I mean "some capability for less money".
The way I would look at this is, if it costs X to have 30 MBTs, procured, crewed and trained, can I get a greater capability, for less or the same money?
...and capability is not an ideal word either!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Wilf your gonna love this...how about what is the Effect you want to have on the enemy?
And that effect varies from place to place, and enemy to enemy.Wilf your gonna love this...how about what is the Effect you want to have on the enemy?
Sorry, but I'm not a particular fan of "one size fits all" forces, be they silver bullet forces or "war on the cheap" forces. If you go heavy, what is the cost in terms of time, money, etc. lost when you need to downgrade?
Slap, read Gavin's article a number of times. It's interesting, but not necessarily a catch-all. I also don't share your fascination with missiles, but that's a different story...
Seriously, there were some very interesting things that came out of Gavin's article and the later Howze Report. But the Vietnam experience also showed the value of having armor to back up those dragoons in choppers. Likewise, the "tyranny of terrain" turned out being exchanging one limitation (roads) for another (LZs)...and still telegraphed movements to the enemy.
Operationally, the most effective units in Vietnam were cavalry squadrons (divisional or the components of the 11th ACR)...combined arms units every one. Augmented with dismounted elements (an easy fix, really), they mustered a massive capability for their size and were in great demand throughout the region. Does this mean that they are what we need now? Not necessarily. Just pointing out that the "idea unit" often isn't something that planners can predict (Westmoreland, among others, tried to strip armor out of units coming to Vietnam and was later forced to reverse himself).
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Thank you!! I have to say, I was never impressed with the Gavin article. While some of the observation was incisive, he cherry picked the operational record to prove his point, and this has since been hijacked by the very agenda monkeys, I suspect Gavin despised. We also now know, some of what he stated as authoritative, is entirely false.
There is always the same old dichotomy of "better using what you have" and "using something better" - failure to understand this has lead to concepts like Manoeuvre Warfare, SBCT and ultimately FCS.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Steve, I don't believe in one stop shopping units either and I don't believe I said that but in the context of the Israeli conflict a Dragoon type unit would have be the better way to go. I am not fascinated by missiles I am an absolute Fanatic about themI was building Estes model rockets since I 10 years old. I hold the distinction of setting the playground on fire from the back blast.
I grew up with Missiles including living in Orlando,Fl. during the 1962 Missile Crisis and my parents retired from what was then the Glenn L. Martin Company now Lockeed Martin so I have been around what was known as the back lot where they tested them for sometime.
Wilf, you are quite right about the Agenda Monkeys he would have had no part of it. It was meant to be an illustration of what I think could be accomplished by Israel or anyone else for that matter if they were in that type of situation. Not sure what you mean about him being proven false?? If anything he has been proven right overtime.
Hi Wilf,
I've been thinking a lot about "money" in its different forms and functions recently. One of the key functions is as an "accountancy measure", which is where we usually see "cheap" and "expensive" show up as terms. The problem with that is that all accountancy measures are based on assumed relevance for accounting purposes and, these days, "risk" doesn't enter into many of these schemes as an assumption (outside of the blatant forms such as insurance).Never even considered this!
I think Cheaper is a lazy word, but I can't think of a better one. I guess I mean "some capability for less money".
In another thread, Norfolk used the term "Peace Dividend" which really highlights the problems with a lot of social accounting about the military - it's very short term.
Agreed, "capability" is not ideal. If we go back to accountancy measures, you could take the cost of unit X and Unit Y, figure the difference to upgrade X to Y in terms of both material cost (purchasing equipment, etc.), training cost, training time (not usually included) and associated risk of not having unit Y during the time to retrain in terms of potential loss. That's only first order accounting
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
I will later on, at my day job now. For starters just read General James Gavin's famous magazine article from 1958: "Where is our Cavalry and I don't Mean Horses". A Dragoon force...mobile infantry or more important missilemen. is what was and is needed.
I agree with Steve and Slapout
That's a totally true statement and it can also be said that it will work.
The problem as always is in the details -- combat use of vehicles of any type pose maintenance and tactical use issues that normally dismounted troops have difficulty with. Conversely, mounted folks in the dismounted role have tactical problems and logistic issues. If you really want to have fun, put a Mech unit in Choppers for an air assault; seen that -- it's hilarious...
So, I guess the ol' bottom line is, yeah you can do that -- but should you?
Which goes back to Steve's and every Military School's 'depends on the situation...'
After we came of alert for the 73 Yom Kipor (spell) war the causality estimates for the 82nd were as high as 80%! Bad stuff so General Krosen decided that we needed a better way to fight and we began a series of exercises to prepare us in Retrograde Operations and what does that look like. Hizballah(spell) fought their war almost exactly as the 82nd would have right down to the use of motorcycles. In fact that may be where they learned it from. Our Battalion commander had to carry around a bunch of Arab colonels and a General and show them how we would do it as some type of an exchange program that happened after the war. He was none to happy about it either.
Once a missile has been developed that can be launched by a single infantryman and penetrate any Armored vehicle, that is a game changing event. Everything is nothing but a platform to launch a missile from the soldier to an ICBM...Shoot-Move-and Communicate. Soldiers should ride as close to the objective as they can get to save their energy. Once at the Objective they can dismount and fight fresh and they shouldn't have to carry all that stuff with them. Nothing but ammo,water and a radio...put the camping gear on a vehicle.
Slap, I believe that was in large part the goal of the SRATS program.
I don't know if it will work. That's not my rice bowl, so to speak. I do know that you can build that vehicle, or one that looks and functions identically, entirely from parts built for offroading.
Hi SethB, Of course it will work. We proved it clould work as along time racing fan mostly NASCAR but also BAJA 500 now the 1000 fame. This is 1960's technology and very well proven. As part of our Ops they pulled ever Gamma Goat they could find which pretty much did the same thing as the STRATS but not as cool looking.
You may not be old enogh to know what a Gamma Goat is so here is a link. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ioK6s...eature=related
Last edited by slapout9; 03-21-2008 at 02:34 AM. Reason: add link
The universal infantry. Everybody can swim, run, fly. Is desireable, might even be do-able to an extent, but I think only in a professional force. Coming back to my 8/9 men standard formation hobbyhorse. And such a universal infantry can only be applied strictly to infantry, not cavalry.That's a totally true statement and it can also be said that it will work.
The problem as always is in the details -- combat use of vehicles of any type pose maintenance and tactical use issues that normally dismounted troops have difficulty with. Conversely, mounted folks in the dismounted role have tactical problems and logistic issues. If you really want to have fun, put a Mech unit in Choppers for an air assault; seen that -- it's hilarious...
So, I guess the ol' bottom line is, yeah you can do that -- but should you?
Which goes back to Steve's and every Military School's 'depends on the situation...'
In the case of the U.S. at least the USMC and Army infantry formations could be made compatible, maybe even unified. Would increase the pool of available manpower.
It was mentioned before - training. How do you train these people without actually having the weapons? It might only be cheaper in the longer run if you use virtual training.
But you need to have the weapons anyway, as there probably will be no time to buy them in case of war.
And mechanized units: At least when it comes to IMVs I think it would be possible to use a non-organic approach. Mobility companies serving various infantry battalions.
@ that Singaporean buggy: Never liked putting high-value toys on unprotected vehicles. Shrapnels and branches can damage that stuff. And when it rains it's also not good. Better take a Toyota Hilux and seat six missilemen on the flatbed instead of mounting the stuff on the buggy. And that buggy is very military, doesn't blend in very well. And terribly mobile it is neither - can't swim for example.
About the usefulness of light vehicles see South Africa's wars.
Nothing new under the sun...
Technically achievable but perhaps not advisable. While universal infantry can be had, it would suffer from the problem of all compromises -- sacrifices great in some things for barely adequate in others.
I don't have a problem with US Army and Marine squads being identical but unlike you, I'd go the other way; having worked with Army 9 and 11 man Squads and the Marines 13 man Squad, the latter is far superior in firepower, flexibility and far most importantly in full combat, staying power.True on the latter point and on the use of virtual training, it has merits and benefits but there's no real substitute for actually doing things on the ground in all types of terrain and weather. Got to get dirty to do it right. Virtual is just a bit too easy...It was mentioned before - training. How do you train these people without actually having the weapons? It might only be cheaper in the longer run if you use virtual training.
But you need to have the weapons anyway, as there probably will be no time to buy them in case of war.We tried that in the late 40s and early 50s. Didn't work too well, the mobility APC folks tended to think and act like taxi drivers -- who didn't want to go into bad neighborhoods -- and the tactical commanders never got enough experience to properly employ the vehicles and get full benefit of their combat power capability. Maintenance was also a major problem, a driver and a vehicle commander are not enough people to take care of a track (or even a multi-wheeled vehicle).And mechanized units: At least when it comes to IMVs I think it would be possible to use a non-organic approach. Mobility companies serving various infantry battalions.Light strike vehicles have pluses and minuses just like any other piece of kit; they aren't for everywhere or everything. All goes down to "what works?"@ that Singaporean buggy: Never liked putting high-value toys on unprotected vehicles. Shrapnels and branches can damage that stuff. And when it rains it's also not good. Better take a Toyota Hilux and seat six missilemen on the flatbed instead of mounting the stuff on the buggy. And that buggy is very military, doesn't blend in very well. And terribly mobile it is neither - can't swim for example.
About the usefulness of light vehicles see South Africa's wars.
ZA is a unique theater, they had and did a lot of good stuff but it was purpose designed for a specific environment; giving optimum performance. Having to be prepared for world wide employment significantly complicates both the equipping and training requirements. It's doable, just a little more difficult.
And unfortunately as is always true, politics (in and out of the forces) complicates everything...
I think that Mr. Cordesman discounts the principle that the enemy is also capable of thinking and reacting.
I basically took the quote to mean, that if you are starting an armed force from scratch (Hezbullah), the first thing that you need (and the best bang for your buck) is well-trained, well-equipped infantry, and then you can add capabilities
Taken to a logical extreme, if a power decided to make every single member of its armed forces a foot-mobile infantryman, then their enemies could (and would) adapt, and make at least some of their forces into motorized units, which could be ripped through by light armored dragoons or cavalry, which in turn could fall prey to combined arms: heavy armor, fire support, and air power. This begets exponentially increasing logistics, "lines of communication" and "soft targets". Tanks grouped into large combined arms units stab through lines to strike at those.
Could a large body of well-trained infantry stop a mechanized strike, while still keeping casualties to a low level that is on par with how easily and cheaply (in terms of casualties) a US mech brigade could?
An Israeli armored force, given the objective of Beirut, and the level of training that they had say, a decade ago, would have made it through the Hezzies in 2006. Will we always be in a situation where we can afford to allow an enemy force through to a city?
Thus, I don't think that it is quite as applicable to a superpower's military. If you are supposed to do everything, as certain militaries are expected to, then you will need constituted units that train consistently to perform the different missions... which will lead to some degree of specialization out of sheer necessity.
After all, where would these incremental additions come from?
Presumably, we would already have the equipment procured and on-hand, which at the very least means that we need maintainers and trainers (along with spare parts, etc), the equipment will still require *some* upkeep. The Soviets were much-maligned for not training on their equipment as much as the Western armies did, during the cold-war.
Some missions (not all, some) are better performed by a mechanized force. It not only takes training and practice, it also takes the institutional knowledge that is only built up in leaders over time (which, as of yet, is still not adequately captured in FM's, FMFM's, ARTEP standards, etc).
I've always been partial to the USMC MEU concept... I have always thought that was a fantastic way to think about, and put together, a battalion-size combat team.
I just can't resist pointing out perhaps the supreme irony of Cordesman's statement, which is that even if a "Western" style army were to just have infantry, I can't imagine that they wouldn't be backed up by high-tech ground attack aircraft. So the most cost-effective arm, the infantry, is (in such a scenario) married to the least cost-effective weapon, the modern fighter-bomber (in terms of impact on the ground). It's not that fighter-bombers aren't effective, it is that they are tremendously expensive, bloating severely the ratio of cost to effectiveness.
Yes, there are missions that an F-22 can perform better than any other platform. However, UAV's can now be deployed to even the small unit level, and there are plenty of fire support requirements that can be fulfilled by artillery - is an SDB really that much better than an Excalibur shell? Especially considering that a howitzer and crew is, quite literally, several orders of magnitude less expensive than a plane that may cost 100 or 200 million, with a pilot that costs millions to train, and then millions to keep trained, every year, a ground crew and support that can consist of a dozen personnel for each aircraft, and costs millions more to deploy and support in theater. I'm not advocating the dissolution of the Air Force, but for support of ground troops, artillery is just as capable in many (not all) scenarios, and much, much cheaper.
Yet, for some reason, some military analysts are in love with the idea of doing away with tanks and artillery completely... it's amazing that someone who is supposedly read-up history is then surprised when having a platoon of tanks to back up a infantry battalion in a fight, urban or otherwise, turns out to be very good idea. Just how many times do we need to relearn that one?
Heh. Fair question...
For as long as there are civilian 'military' analysts with no combat experience, I suspect.
The UK did a huge (IIRC still classified) study of 100 Infantry battle group attacks from 1943-45. It showed that support from as little as 6 tanks, meant an 85% chance of success.
The Falklands war showed the same thing.
Anyone who has really studied infantry knows, you need protected mobility, direct fire armoured support, and artillery/mortars to be a viable force, against any opponent.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
That's interesting. Recently I was looking at the 173d Airborne Brigade's website. Each infantry battalion now consists of six companies. And that's before attaching an artillery battery, etc.
I understand the necessity of combined arms but isn't there a risk that battalion combat teams will become so big with attachments that an LTC can't even fight his rifle companies effectively?
The MEU concept might be the answer, might it not?
Of course, there's no way that the Army will admit that it needs to copy anything from the USMC!
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
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