Sweet, sweet link, Kaur.Originally Posted by kaur
This is intriguing. Is there more?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Sweet, sweet link, Kaur.
Due to the fact, that my uploading speed is very low, i just can't upload Andre Beaufre's whole book "Strategy for Tomorrow". ... but you can borrow it form library or buy it
http://www.abebooks.com/servlet/Book...%3D69%26y%3D10
kaur, finally had a chance to sit down and read the PDF link on organization. Some really good stuff in there....liked the picture of dune buggy 120mm Mortar.
As we used to say in the old 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), Rat Patrol was a neat TV show but a terrible idea for an MTOE. When you plan mobility by lift aircraft requirements rather than mission requirements you wind up with silly things that don't have doors - or survivability. I can only assume that Singapore has no potential threats that possess indirect fire... or pointy sticks for that matter.
I did not review the mobile commando platoon doc, but I do remember that certain units were really good at rolling their little Ranger/SF jeep things at Yakima. Of course we were leaving dune buggies strewn about the landscape ourselves (hence the locally-fabricated break-away M2/MK19 mount!).
Little things like this are relatively useless, except in extreme environments where light forces need small vehicles to carry supporting equipment in places a full size vehicle cannot fit. Even then they are dangerous. The HUMMV works as a mobility platform because it has enough lateral stability to go around a corner without tipping over and can traverse relatively difficult terrain. Of course this does not make it a good weapons platform or survivable... just better than a M151 for running errands.
Last edited by Charlie11; 03-27-2008 at 12:50 AM.
Disagree. Light vehicles have a place and combat
uses -- and, in some cases, the lighter the better. A 151 (if one trains one's drivers...) is better than a HMMWV for many things. The American way of a bigger hammer is adopted because its easy to train for and we're lazy -- that doesn't mean that Americans can't be trained to use a little finesse; they can and they do it well if you train 'em right.
The key as is true in many things, is METT-TC. That simple.
agreed
Which is why I mentioned mission requirements as a primary consideration and gave an example of a situation that would call for such a vehicle. You are also correct that training is a critical factor.
Just be careful you don't wind up with this:
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washing...rps-jeep_x.htm
Tools for jobs. We overpay for most everything,
chop, channel and re-engine a 151 hull to fit in an MV-22 and we're gonna pay through the nose.
Almost as bad as paying over $3M for one of these LINK. Given a major war, probably lose fewer of the teeny weeny 1/4 tons than the other.
I don't know about "Rat patrols" but tactical ignorance of the correct way to employ equipment is always going to create problems.
Such vehicles are used in conjunction with dismounted and even armoured forces. They are a mobility system to enable the ability to disperse and concentration light anti-armour forces, while leveraging the advantages of air mobility and a vastly reduced cost, and logistic foot-print when compared with armoured forces.
Singapore can drop a 30 vehicle anti-armour screen 50km deep into Malaysia, pretty easily, or hold the same number of vehicles on the deck of small commercial freighter or move easily by wide body cargo jet.
I absolutely agree that such vehicles have less protection than a family car, but that is missing the point. You always trade security for activity, and such a system is not appropriate across entire the spectrum of environments and operations.
I have never seen any well-written tactical doctrine for employing such vehicles. In fact during my time in Singapore I did have some discussion as to writing some.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
If you can use Strix in 120 mm mortar buggy ...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oY9S-PcKLYs
The universal infantry. Everybody can swim, run, fly. Is desireable, might even be do-able to an extent, but I think only in a professional force. Coming back to my 8/9 men standard formation hobbyhorse. And such a universal infantry can only be applied strictly to infantry, not cavalry.That's a totally true statement and it can also be said that it will work.
The problem as always is in the details -- combat use of vehicles of any type pose maintenance and tactical use issues that normally dismounted troops have difficulty with. Conversely, mounted folks in the dismounted role have tactical problems and logistic issues. If you really want to have fun, put a Mech unit in Choppers for an air assault; seen that -- it's hilarious...
So, I guess the ol' bottom line is, yeah you can do that -- but should you?
Which goes back to Steve's and every Military School's 'depends on the situation...'
In the case of the U.S. at least the USMC and Army infantry formations could be made compatible, maybe even unified. Would increase the pool of available manpower.
It was mentioned before - training. How do you train these people without actually having the weapons? It might only be cheaper in the longer run if you use virtual training.
But you need to have the weapons anyway, as there probably will be no time to buy them in case of war.
And mechanized units: At least when it comes to IMVs I think it would be possible to use a non-organic approach. Mobility companies serving various infantry battalions.
@ that Singaporean buggy: Never liked putting high-value toys on unprotected vehicles. Shrapnels and branches can damage that stuff. And when it rains it's also not good. Better take a Toyota Hilux and seat six missilemen on the flatbed instead of mounting the stuff on the buggy. And that buggy is very military, doesn't blend in very well. And terribly mobile it is neither - can't swim for example.
About the usefulness of light vehicles see South Africa's wars.
Nothing new under the sun...
Technically achievable but perhaps not advisable. While universal infantry can be had, it would suffer from the problem of all compromises -- sacrifices great in some things for barely adequate in others.
I don't have a problem with US Army and Marine squads being identical but unlike you, I'd go the other way; having worked with Army 9 and 11 man Squads and the Marines 13 man Squad, the latter is far superior in firepower, flexibility and far most importantly in full combat, staying power.True on the latter point and on the use of virtual training, it has merits and benefits but there's no real substitute for actually doing things on the ground in all types of terrain and weather. Got to get dirty to do it right. Virtual is just a bit too easy...It was mentioned before - training. How do you train these people without actually having the weapons? It might only be cheaper in the longer run if you use virtual training.
But you need to have the weapons anyway, as there probably will be no time to buy them in case of war.We tried that in the late 40s and early 50s. Didn't work too well, the mobility APC folks tended to think and act like taxi drivers -- who didn't want to go into bad neighborhoods -- and the tactical commanders never got enough experience to properly employ the vehicles and get full benefit of their combat power capability. Maintenance was also a major problem, a driver and a vehicle commander are not enough people to take care of a track (or even a multi-wheeled vehicle).And mechanized units: At least when it comes to IMVs I think it would be possible to use a non-organic approach. Mobility companies serving various infantry battalions.Light strike vehicles have pluses and minuses just like any other piece of kit; they aren't for everywhere or everything. All goes down to "what works?"@ that Singaporean buggy: Never liked putting high-value toys on unprotected vehicles. Shrapnels and branches can damage that stuff. And when it rains it's also not good. Better take a Toyota Hilux and seat six missilemen on the flatbed instead of mounting the stuff on the buggy. And that buggy is very military, doesn't blend in very well. And terribly mobile it is neither - can't swim for example.
About the usefulness of light vehicles see South Africa's wars.
ZA is a unique theater, they had and did a lot of good stuff but it was purpose designed for a specific environment; giving optimum performance. Having to be prepared for world wide employment significantly complicates both the equipping and training requirements. It's doable, just a little more difficult.
And unfortunately as is always true, politics (in and out of the forces) complicates everything...
Having examined this vehicle in detail and talked to the crews, let me address a few issues. It is a mobility system. - so better than walking. It is not an armoured vehicle. It enables an ATGW platoon to do things THEY COULD NOT, if they did not have this vehicle. There have much better mobility than an SUV. Better power to weight and lower ground pressure. No, it can't swim, but you can lift it with UH-60 or smaller helo, and you can float is easily on a raft, if needed.
...but, the Royal Marines are doing this, and it works very well. If you have the right training all the problems go away.We tried that in the late 40s and early 50s. Didn't work too well, the mobility APC folks tended to think and act like taxi drivers -- who didn't want to go into bad neighborhoods -- and the tactical commanders never got enough experience to properly employ the vehicles and get full benefit of their combat power capability. Maintenance was also a major problem, a driver and a vehicle commander are not enough people to take care of a track (or even a multi-wheeled vehicle).
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Everyone in the RM still have to pass
from Lympstone?
Last time I checked, RM training was the lengthiest in the OECD. Can / will everyone be willing to spend that much time and money on training? Is the RM doing that because that's the way they want to operate or because they can't afford more Vikings?
Either way, it's more than a training issue. As I said, it can be done -- but it is a compromise and proficiency in something gets sacrificed for flexibility achieved. Up to the individual armed force to make the choice.
Looking at the half year it takes U.S. units to work up to standards before combat deployments I think that the teamwork thing between mot/mech/aerial mobility components and its perspective customers (infantry) would be manageable. Also nobody sees it as necessary for airbornes to have organic C-130s either. Of course money is the driver here.
Of course it's manageable - as I said, it's been done.
No question that all mode infantry is possible and that acceptable performance can be attained in all modes. The problem is that IMO, acceptable is okay but I prefer excellent performance if it's attainable -- and that is if units concentrate on their core tasks and doing them really well instead of getting to a fair performance level in many tasks.
For mechanized infantry with vehicle size constraints, 9 men is fine -- because the vehicle itself adds combat power and capabilities that compensate for the missing four men in the walking or airmobile infantry squad (where there is no added combat power).
This is one of those core questions, that like squad size, that IMO, comes from looking down the wrong end of the telescope.
Infantry should be optimised to operate dismounted. The vehicle is a means of support and enhance mobility - so t doesn't matter if its an APC, MRAP or LPV. Who crews the vehicle is not important. They just have to be good at their job.
MICV's turn the who issue on its head and at that point, you really don't have infantry anymore. Remember this thread is predicated on those things that effectively and easily enhance infantry - not manning the expensive toys the Generals want to play with.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
News about mortar buggy.
http://www.defensenews.com/osd_story...VSDS&i=3379541The 4x4 Spider Light Strike Vehicle, armed with a 120mm smoothbore mortar system, has been undergoing some modifications to make it lighter, said Tay King Penh, senior engineer, Singapore Kinetics' Engineering Development Centre, here at the Singapore Airshow.
Here are different buggy modifications.
http://www.stengg.com/upload/306MJIVTWhk0eRlE2kH.pdf
I don't think Mr. Cordesman is saying, "HEY Infantry rules, let's get rid of combined arms once and for all!"Vastly cheaper to use infantry and irregular forces than
conventional forces, progressively easier to given such forces more
advanced weapons.
What he may be saying by referencing cost is that infantry needs to be viewed and funded by the DoD and the US government as the most important part of the military. Maybe we don't need a new JDAM that is accurate to a half-meter vice one meter for eleventy billion dollars or a new plane to counter the imminent Chinese air invasion for a katrillion dollars a pop. Maybe we should just get the grunts the best gear and training we can, then worry about funding their supporting efforts.
I concur. What I take from it, is a bottom up approach to Combined Arms-full spectrum operations. The NATO concept of Combined Arms is still based on a WW2 model, that was itself evolved from WW1. I think there are better ways, especially when large tank formations, are far less of a problem or a likelihood!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks