Cordesman so right, yet so wrong

[Cavguy]

No, I don't think that there is any danger of that - a battalion commander has a full staff, with two majors and several captains to help him handle all of the moving parts. Heh, I can't ever recall having read of/spoken to/seen a battalion commander that worried that he had too many troops or weapons for his assigned mission. Besides, many attachments are then tasked out to the line companies, so they don't really affect the battalion span-of-control - which in any case, I would argue is less and less applicable at the higher levels of organization.

Agreed. My BN in Tal Afar had six companies plus attachments without issue. RFCT in Ramadi had 9 battalions plus four IA BNs under its control, not to mention all the "eaches" in separate companies - everything from riverine units to postal.

Span of control never really seemed to hinder ops. Lack of proper resources could. Since COIN is relatively fixed, span of control is a lesser issue perhaps than in maneuver warfare.

[Richard W]

Frank Antenori was the "Team Sergeant" of an an American Special Forces "A Team" which deployed to the Kurdish area of Northern Iraq during Gulf War II. He wrote a book about his experiences titled Roughneck One Nine. Of possible interest to this thread is that the "A Team" went to war mounted in light, unarmored trucks. However they carried an amazing amount and variety of weaponry and electronics in their unarmored light trucks. They practiced relentlessly on firing ranges with all of their weaponry from pistols to very expensive missiles.

They were so confident in their weapons and equipment that prior to going overseas they determined in the event of making contact with Iraqi conventional forces that they would not run. Instead they would stand and fight (an "Alamo") and "pile them up". And indeed they did so. In an incredible fight against enemy tanks, motorized infantry and artillery. Now the "A Team" had incredible close air support. This, of course, counts for a lot. But just the same their battlefield accomplishment against a much larger and heavier force commands, in my opinion, respect.

Indeed it seems that the days of a conventional force successfully standing against and fighting a much smaller, Western military formation (supported by aircraft) are over. On the other hand if we look at what Islamic insurgent infantry (@ 3,000 in number and armed in the main with WWII technology and drawn from a part time militia) did to the IDF in southern Lebanon we may see the future of ground conflict between the West and the holy warriors of Islam. (See Drudge for links to Israeli papers wherein this campaign is still discussed by IDF veterans.)

It may be that Western infantry may at first have to fight essentially vehicle based battles against enemy conventional formations. These initial engagements may thenbe followed by extended foot engagements against enemy insurgent infantry.

Regards

Richard W

[Rex Brynen]

On the other hand if we look at what Islamic insurgent infantry (@ 3,000 in number and armed in the main with WWII technology and drawn from a part time militia) did to the IDF in southern Lebanon we may see the future of ground conflict between the West and the holy warriors of Islam.

Richard:

Hizbullah most decidedly was NOT "armed in the main with WWII technology" in the style of, say, the Taliban. On the contrary--and in addition to their small arms and MRLs--they were equipped with ATGMs, night-vision equipment, frequency-agile encrypted communications, public domain satellite imagery, probable MANPADs, and even UAVs and naval SSMs.

Indeed, by my quick and dirty count, ATGMs (some of them older-generation AT-3 Saggers, etc--but many others more modern TOW or AT-5 Spandrel/Konkurs, or very modern AT-AT-13 Metis-E and AT-14 Kornet-M) were the single largest cause of IDF deaths in 2006:

7% initial ambush (July 12)

38% ATGM direct fire
24% infantry direct fire
10% indirect fire (most of them one MRL attack)
6% antiaircraft fire
6% friendly fire/accidents
5% mines/IED
3% naval SSM

This is hardly your "normal" irregular force.

(Warning: I crunched the numbers very quickly one morning while posting to Abu Muqawama.. I should go back and recheck the data some time.)

[jmm99]

re: last Richard W posting

This post is limited to the following:

"On the other hand if we look at what Islamic insurgent infantry (@ 3,000 in number and armed in the main with WWII technology and drawn from a part time militia) did to the IDF in southern Lebanon we may see the future of ground conflict between the West and the holy warriors of Islam."

Some SpecOps guy, with combat experience, would have to address the rest.

I have read through this thread, your profile (which says naught) and your other posts. When IDF Lebanon "X" was on, every day I watched it on the 3 cable news outlets I have, followed it in Ha'aretz and the Post (Jerusalem), and read many analyses by Israeli and other commentators. That area of South Lebanon is of interest to me because of various events and characters from the Crusader Era.

But (and a big one), I have not been on the ground there; nor have I led an IDF or any other unit into combat. I will try to keep this to my perception of policy decisions.

A major component of that operation was agitprop offense by Hez; and agitprop defense by the IDF. The basic Hez line seemed (to me) to be something like this: "We are the protectors of So. Leb.; we are strong, dug-in and ready; we can beat the IDF man to man; and we are willing to die." Think Iwo Jima from the Japanese viewpoint ?

The Israeli policy (strategy ?) confused me. There was the massive "strategic" air campaign, hitting targets which might have been fine if the nominal Leb. government were the center of gravity ! Part of that (in stated IDF policy) was to cut the Hez supply and re-inforcement lines. Perhaps, but it also screwed up the escape routes for refugees (leaving a lot of "collaterals" in the OA); and hit a few villages which had to explained away.

On the ground, the IDF seemed content with targeted intrusions (which were generally successful in their limited objectives); but the media impression (to me) was not of the IDF doggie fighting upfront "man to man". It was of a lot of heavy IDF stuff blasting at the "poor", "patriotic" defenders of the villages - and of the Faith. There seemed a real IDF aversion to seeing its casualties appear on TV (except for those hit by the Hez rocket attacks, which were a sideshow).

Maybe, doing it "on the cheap" was also a factor - if so, the return rate on the savings account was pretty negative.

Perhaps, the IDF would have been better off (from an agitprop standpoint) by adopting a policy something like: "We are going to take on Hez man to man, regardless of casualties; we are in a battle for survival.". That would be the agitprop impression sought.

The reality, I suppose, might be to dismount the infantry; slowly move through the defensive posions; fix the Hez in their bunkers, and hit with close-in air and heavy stuff; bury them with demolitions and armored bulldozers (lots of combat engineer stuff).

Someone with combat experience and knowledge of IDF capabilities would have to comment on thit one - feasible or no ? It seems it could be a policy leading to very intense, but localized combat. An OA where you probably would not have too many media types !

I don't see that the Lebanon incident, in its military aspects, has much to do with "the future of ground conflict between the West and the holy warriors of Islam", as you put it.

[Richard W]

Rex Brynen:

Thank you for your kind reply.

I like to read online the Israeli papers. From my reading it is my impression that the average Israeli is not shy. There was and is an enormous amount of criticism in the press about the fighting in southern Lebanon. One of the criticisms that leaped out at me was that the enemy was armed in the main with WWII technology. (The author of that complaint counted the suit case sagger as essentially WWII technology.) I think he has a point. The very rugged Soviet Infantry and indirect fire weapons used by the enemy (AK 47, PKM, RPG, mines, and "Katusha" rockets) all have their roots in WWII technology. (I imagine a weapons expert might argue that technology like the UAV, the surface to surface missile and radio encryption also appeared in WWII. [My goodness Do you not watch the font of all wisdom the History Channel?]) I posted "in the main" because the IDF veterans writing to the Editors also claimed that some small, fire team size insurgent units were uniformed, armed and equipped just like the IDF.

The point that they were trying to make (and I obviously failed to do) was that technology counted for far less than in previous Arab - Israeli conflicts. (The IDF of course is very high tech. Prior to the fighting, reportedly, around 60% of the IDF budget went to the IAF.) The IDF veterans claimed that something went very, very wrong in southern Lebanon. Some even argued that the 1956 IDF would have had no trouble rooting out the insurgents.

Essentially they argued that the IDF had become "americanized". That it was no longer man centered but machine centered. An argument the Israeli scholar Van Crevald has been making for some years now (See his Fighting Power wherein he alleges that the WWII German Army had superior fighting power over the US Army because it was man centered while the US Army was machine centered.)

My guess is that the IDF veterans who wrote on this matter would be in agreement with your 24% casualty figure due to antitank guided missiles. They commented frequently on teh tacticla problems of dealing with antitank weapons. Like insurgents everywhere they used antitank weapons in the antipersonnel role. It works.

I did not think I said that this was a "normal irregular force" .My guess is that there is no such thing. However I am saying that it is significant that a part time militia armed in the main with WWII technology fought a 21st Century professional military armed in the main with the latest and best technology to a stand still.

I did not witness the fighting. I also never had an original idea in my life. But I think the IDF veterans are on to something. And other Islamic insurgents are watching.

Regards

Richard W

[Richard W]

jmm99:

Thank you for your kind reply wherein you posted in part: "I don't see that the Lebanon incident, in its military aspects, has much to do with "the future of ground conflict between the West and the holy warriors of Islam", as you put it".

Allow me to reply: I hope you are right. The Islamic insurgents won. A Western military was humiliated. The insurgents used cheap, readily available weapons, equipment and technology. The IDF used the very best and expensive gear available. Let us pray that this was an aberration. An abnormality, That the next time the IDF will rout the insurgents with ease using amazing technology and suffering very few casualties. Let us also pray that Islamic insurgents around the world did not learn anything from this campaign and that they too will soon fall to a bloodless, high technology, Western military offensive.

Regards

Richard W

[Rex Brynen]

...that one should be very careful in using terms like "Islamic insurgent infantry."

First, not all irregular or insurgent forces in Muslim majority countries are Islamist in orientation--they may organize around nationalism/ethnicity, tribe, region, ideology, class, and/or religion--and often a complex mixture of several of these.

Second, not all Islamist paramilitary forces look the same in organization, doctrine, or firepower--there are huge differences in the way that Hizbullah fights (and between Hizbullah pre-2000 and Hizbullah 2006), the way AQI fights (rarelay stand-up, lots of IEDs), the way the ICU fights in Somalia (lots of technicals, spray-and-pray), the Taliban, etc.

The only limited tactical/operational commonalities--and even here I think this is very limited--are that strong ideological motivation may have some implications for morale, unit cohesion, and penetration/HUMINT collection.

[Richard W]

Rex Brynen:

Thank you for your kind reply.

I am afraid that I am very old fashion in my thinking. People that walk and fight on foot I think of as "infantry" even if they are insurgents, guerrillas or bandits. (No doubt I was soon receive a strong letter from some military staff college on this subject.) I also fear that the diversity of the Islamic enemy is one of his many strengths. Western military forces appear, at least to my eye, as increasingly homogeneous. What one Islamic group learns from fighting a Western military formation can be easily adopted by another Islamic group. On the other hand the Western military machine has to adapt to each different Islamic group in turn.

Regards

Richard W

[Rex Brynen]

Richard:

You might also want to reconsider the term "Islamic enemy" which seems to label a large and varied global Muslim population as intrinsically hostile--including both the (AKP) government and 99.8% of the population of a major NATO ally (Turkey)!

In Afghanistan, the US faces Taliban insurgents who are militant Islamists (although that isn't the only bond that unites them). In Iraq, the US has faced--at varying times--insurgents who are radical Sunni Islamists, Iraqi nationalist-Shi'ite Islamists, and Iraqi nationalist Sunnis--while all the time allied to a predominately Shi'ite Islamist (SIIC, Dawa) Iraqi central government.

[Richard W]

Rex Brynen:

Thank you for your kind reply.

Since the Bolshevik revolution not all communist movements have been actively hostile to the West. However I think it is fair to say that all true communists have borne a certain dislike of the West. (Particularly communists who are tenured professors in Western Universities.) I think it was (and is) fair to describe communist movements which have borne arms against the West as "communist enemies".

Between 620 AD and 720 AD the followers of the Prophet overran about half of what was then called Christendom. Around 1071 the holy warriors destroyed the last professional Christian Army at Manzikert and took the Emperor prisoner. The holy warriors subsequently turned the Mediterranean into a Muslim lake. They fueled their economy with Western slaves. (I believe that the last slave raid into Ireland was around 1814) and generally maintained a military, technological and economic superiority over the West until the 17th Century.

It has been argued, I think correctly, that but for the Crusades and unexpected for victories at places like Tours, Lepanto and Vienna that the West would have become Islamic. [See the revisionist English historian Hilaire Belloc who by the way predicted in 1920 that the Islam would revive as a military power to challenge the West yet again.])

I think that under the circumstances described above that to describe an Islamic group which is bearing arms against the West as an Islamic enemy group or movement is accurate.

On the other hand I subscribe to the old fashion Western notion of "love thy enemy". I bear no hate to any follower of the Prophet. I ask God to bless all Muslims.

Regards

Richard W

[Rex Brynen]

Richard:

Implicit (or, perhaps, explicit) in your response is the idea that the "West" and "Islam" are mutually exclusive and enduring oppositional terms. I certainly don't see it that way--nor, I suspect, do many Muslim Canadians (or Americans). al-Qa'ida does, it is true. However, that is all the more reason not to buy into the clash-of-civilizations worldview, in my opinion.

Equally, while one could cite many examples of Christian Europe and the Muslim Middle East colliding, one could point to, I suspect, just as many cases of political alliances that cross-cut religious lines—and certainly far, far more cases where countries fought coreligionists. Indeed, Muslim-Christian difference has been a poor predictor of military confrontation in the broader Mediterranean world for a very long time.

Having said that, it really isn't my main point. Rather, I want to suggest that "Islamic insurgents" is not a very useful category, since it assigns political significance (or draws some inference about mobilization, operations, doctrine, or technique) from the religious affiliation of combatants who may be fighting in a variety of ways for a variety of causes. The term Islamist insurgent (or militant) is somewhat more useful, since it narrows the field down to those groups that emphasize a political message and popular mobilization around a particular highly political reading of Islam, and who conceptualize their political goals in religious terms. However, even here, there are Islamists, and there are Islamists—some militant, most not, and even the former variegated in many very important ways.

[William F. Owen]

Allow me to reply: I hope you are right. The Islamic insurgents won. A Western military was humiliated. The insurgents used cheap, readily available weapons, equipment and technology. The IDF used the very best and expensive gear available. Let us pray that this was an aberration. An abnormality, That the next time the IDF will rout the insurgents with ease using amazing technology and suffering very few casualties. Let us also pray that Islamic insurgents around the world did not learn anything from this campaign and that they too will soon fall to a bloodless, high technology, Western military offensive.

Whaoh there Cochise!

1. The IDF are not a Western Military. They are Middle Eastern. 95% are born in Israel. Israel is not a Western Nation. It's further East than Turkey or Egypt. What is more, the IDF bears no resemblance to the UK or US Armies, even though its linage is British.

2. The Insurgents had some pretty sophisticated ATMGs, which they knew how to use because all they had done for 3 years was practice using them on the the piece of ground where they lived. Generally, if they came up against IDF infantry infiltrating at night, they abandoned the ATGM posts and fell back to bunker systems, a great many of which were discovered and over run.

3. The IDF did not use the very best expensive gear available. This is plain wrong. Most infantry Battalions had pretty average gear, and in 2006 it hadn't changed much from what folks had in 1992, also in the Lebanon.

The problem for the IDF was not tactical. It was entirely operational and strategic. The tactical problems flowed down from that. It was the fact that they were given very silly missions and no resources to accomplish them. ROE was also a massive problem. Hezbollah had none and used the IDFs ROE against them.