Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Group (TMAAG)

[SWJED]

Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Group (TMAAG) by Brigadier General Thomas M. Jordan (USA Ret.) at SWJ Blog

With the newly released publication of its principal operational manual, FM 3.0, the Army defined the principal conceptual underpinnings which will drive operational concepts over the next 10-15 years. The latest edition recognized the importance of understanding the complexity of the operational environment, and the nature of persistent conflict where the application of the military element of power is just one of the key ingredients necessary to achieve success. In light of this understanding, the Army adapted and raised the importance of stability operations onto an equal footing with combat operations. While the Army has made some important changes in training to implement this idea, the pending HQDA approval and resourcing decision of the Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Group (TMAAG) design and implementation strategy represents a visible and demonstrable investment in resources that reinforces the Army commitment to building partnership capacity (BPC) in an uncertain world. The proposed implementation strategy would establish one TMAAG for USARSO in FY10 (EDATE: 16 Oct 09) as proof of principle (PoP). The PoP would test the concept and make appropriate refinements as part of the overall determination to resource additional TMAAGs.

TMAAG’s origin was the Army’s “Unified Quest 2007” series of seminar wargames that supported the Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA’s) annual study plan. One of the resulting insights was a potential gap in the Army’s ability to meet Combatant Commanders' daily operations requirements regarding theater security cooperation, military engagement, and Building Partnership Capacity (BPC). The CSA directed TRADOC, and in turn, the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas as the lead to develop an operational concept and organizational solution to the perceived gap...

[Ken White]

has to wonder why it will take so long to get to a proof of principle test...

I know why, I just don't agree it's necessary and I know it can be short circuited IF the right people want to do that. Obviously they don't. Which is not good...

[max161]

concept in its current form saying that it is not an Army requirement.

[Old Eagle]

That's the rumor floating around here. -- See post on "outsiders view" (or whatever). That piece just gets scarier and scarier.

[Ken White]

Posting rules preclude what I'd like to say. Sheesh.

[Old Eagle]

In the CSA's defense, TMAAG scratched only a small part of the security force assistance itch, and at substantial cost. TMAAG was Army only, Phase zero only, tactical only, training only, foreign militaries only. It still may have been a step in the right direction. The key now is to see how the USG develops the required capabilities and capacities to successfully engage with foreign security forces in order to build partner capacity.

The true SFA requirement is
joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational
across all phases of operations
from the ministerial/institutional level down to the individual soldier/policeman, border guard, etc
includes organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising (incl combat, if necessary) those forces
includes military, police, paramilitary and infrastructure forces

The argument that "we'll never do another Iraq" is irrelavent. We need to actively build partner capacity before things "go south", but also to build potential coalition partners for future operations.

[SWJED]

The Army's TMAAG by Colonel Robert Killebrew, USA (Ret.) at SWJ Blog.

The Chief of Staff of the Army's recent decision not to field the proposed Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Groups (TMAAG) was the right one. Regardless of which party wins the general election this fall, future U.S. national security strategy will include increased assistance to allies fighting against radical Islamic aggression. Whether called "building partnership capacity" or some other acronym, the essential idea will be to help other states fight their own wars, rather than providing U.S. combat forces as a first resort. The Army's TMAAG was an effort to get out front of this emerging strategy, but it was taking the wrong route...

[Tom Odom]

First, to provide manpower for future advisory efforts, the Army should begin enlarging its inventory of mid-grade officers and NCOs. The Service can get a twofer by re-filling vacant TDA school slots for platform instructors and doctrine shops, as well as elsewhere in the force, positions now occupied by contractors or civil servants. An enlarged officer and NCO corps is not unnecessary overhead, as some have thought, but a national asset, particularly in these times. Assignment to Milgroup duty should once again become a routine assignment for successful officers, who would carry experience in first-line U.S. units out to host countries, then return to their mainstream careers (incidentally with area expertise in critical regions).

I can only say that if a frog had wings he wouldn't bump his butt on the ground...

Tom

[Ken White]

I hear what Killebrew is saying and he makes one particularly valid point; primacy of the Ambassador in-country. That's the only minor flaw in the T-MAAG concept and it can be addressed; we sure cannot afford, personnel wise, to go back to the full-bore MAAGs of the 60s.

He's off base with the MilGroup fill idea. The T-MAAG was a way to address that and negate or at least overcome to an extent Tom's point -- what Killeberew says isn't going to happen...

Easier to have the requisite skills in a holding pattern to dispatch to the Country Team OnO than it will be to dig 'em out of the system. Ad hoc is ad hoc...

I do believe I see Phase Alpha of the senior leadership fast shuffle...

[Tom Odom]

I hear what Killebrew is saying and he makes one particularly valid point; primacy of the Ambassador in-country. That's the only minor flaw in the T-MAAG concept and it can be addressed; we sure cannot afford, personnel wise, to go back to the full-bore MAAGs of the 60s.

He's off base with the MilGroup fill idea. The T-MAAG was a way to address that and negate or at least overcome to an extent Tom's point -- what Killeberew says isn't going to happen...

Easier to have the requisite skills in a holding pattern to dispatch to the Country Team OnO than it will be to dig 'em out of the system. Ad hoc is ad hoc...

I do believe I see Phase Alpha of the senior leadership fast shuffle...

Thanks Ken! Most folks don't understand the role of the Ambassador or the country team and it is important that we emphasize and teach it.

You are correct in saying that I see a refill of the various TDA slots with O4s and senior NCOs as unlikely. But I also see it as an inherent waste of talent that is desparately needed in the tactical world -- including advisors. Ibelieve that the US Army has made a tradition of wasting the rank of MAJ rather than targeting that rank for future duties. I served as a CPT in TDA slots teaching and writing as a FAO--it helped me to do that as it related to my work as a FAO. But I also saw any number of MAJs occupying slots simply because someone said the job required an O4 when it really did not require a Soldier. Today we are critically short MAJs and PPT slide master slots for O4s are not critical needs --if they ever were. What has long bothered me is a good maneuver company commander--if he commands "early" --will wait 14 years or so before he commands a maneuver battalion. I still see great potential value for MAJs commanding companies but at this stage and time, that too is a frog with wings idea. But MAJs can command MiTTs and they can advise host nation maneuver commanders and commanders of US partner units.

Best

Tom

[Old Eagle]

I wish Bob would get out to the embassies in some of the countries we need to engage in.

Right now, BY LAW, the SAOs are limited in size to 6 folk, except where expressly authorized to be bigger. Not goin' down that MAC-V rabbithole again.

In some of the countries, the security assistance function is actually performed by a Foreign Service Officer as an additional duty.

All that said -- as I posted elsewhere -- TMAAG did not scratch the itch, for many of the reasons that Bob Mentions.

[Ken White]

Tom said:

But I also saw any number of MAJs occupying slots simply because someone said the job required an O4 when it really did not require a Soldier. Today we are critically short MAJs and PPT slide master slots for O4s are not critical needs --if they ever were. What has long bothered me is a good maneuver company commander--if he commands "early" --will wait 14 years or so before he commands a maneuver battalion. I still see great potential value for MAJs commanding companies but at this stage and time, that too is a frog with wings idea. But MAJs can command MiTTs and they can advise host nation maneuver commanders and commanders of US partner units.

Too true. Lot of sharp Majors object to their misuse...

Old Eagle said:

All that said -- as I posted elsewhere -- TMAAG did not scratch the itch, for many of the reasons that Bob Mentions.

True but scratching with no fingernails is better than not scratching at all. We probably don't have enough Backscratchers to issue widely...