ISR and business as usual

[Cavguy]

Slapout, of course UAV's are not new - that is not the point. The point is that until a few years ago, UAV's were more of a gimmick within the Army than a real capability. The Air Force not only developed a successful platform, but also the doctrine and technology to integrate that platform with the rest of the force.

Horse hooey.

UAV's have been at use in the Army since the late 90's integrated into the (now defunct) Force XXI development. They got extensive use in the Balkans when I was there, way before 9/11 made them famous.

I'm rather familiar with this issue. In Ramadi, my job was to oversee all the operations in our sector, ground, riverine, and air. We usually had three UAV's aloft at any given time - BN (Raven), BDE (Shadow or Scaneagle), and ocassionally a Predator, Hunter, or higher level UAV. I loved the BN/BDE UAV's, they were completely under our control (from a remote base in country) and the (enlisted) operators responsive to anything we needed them for. (besides their collection plan, such as "troops in contact" events)

I distinctly remember supporting a unit in a very heavy firefight in downtown Ramadi. A high-level UAV was overhead and offered to assist. I decided to accept and tap into their feed rather than re-task another bird. Imagine my frustration in trying to get the remote USAF operators to look at what we needed to observe. Instead the "pilot" did whatever he thought was best to observe, not what the unit wanted. As a result we lost PID on enemy we were trying to engage. (cooking up a strike) I called the UAV operators to register a "WTF?" and I was unceremonously told they were a strategic asset and didn't respond to BCT's, even with troops in contact. They were highly trained pilots and analyists and would decide what to observe. The downright arrogance still gets me worked up to this day.

You can't convince me that the USAF having control of the UAV's from Nellis is a good thing. The USAF may have developed some cool doctrine, but its UAV ops are anything BUT integrated with the ground force. I imagine this is the reason the army decided to get its own (rotary) air force, like the Marines - soldiers get left hanging to dry otherwise in the USAF priority scheme.

[Coldstreamer]

Entropy,

Good points about capability development, which I must say a glossed over to get to the nexus; it is a Land Centric Capabilty, and therefore to be properly integrated within Land Componency should be owned by the Army. A great deal of the backup R&D and systems support is provided by contractor, so that it less of an issue as may first appear.

Personally, I wouldn't have a great issue with ADA going to the AF, my enduring point being that logic and need should drive, not territorial vanity.

[Paul Smyth]

It seems there are some conflating issues here: historic precedence, inter-service rivalries, vested interests, budgeting issues, resource shortfalls, long-term force structures, near v far capability development, doctrine and operational effectiveness.

We should not be surprised that there is a genuine concern that if the 'Army' is given ownership/responsibility of a capability with theatre-wide utility it may not be employed optimally, especially in European countries with small armies with less vision than the USA. SFs demonstrate the point from the reverse angle - they are a Theatre asset but are quick to point out their strategic credentials - overwhelmingly manned by the Army but functionally separate. Troops should have their own ISTAR assets. Period. But Reaper must be able to operate across the entire battlespace, and if necessary in gorrillas. For that reason alone it needs to be operated by people who can integrate it anywhere in the AOR and who understand airspace and packaging issues. If we apportion ownership on the basis of 'customer' then the Army would own JSTARs/Nimrod R/Harrier et al.

Personally, I don't especially care who 'owns' a capability as long as it is used properly. We seem to forget that there should only be one campaign in theatre - the Joint Campaign, owned by the Joint Commander. The assets in his AOR are his and should be used in accordance with his priorities - compare the negative comments from Lt Gen Franks (VII Corps) about CENTAF in DESERT STORM with the positive ones from Gen Schwarzkopf. The case for LCC ownership of 'everything' is naturally fuelled by the ongoing COIN efforts, but the imperative for a truly Joint approach and the correct allocation of responsibility (for a capability) to component attributes is amplified by the potential for state v state war, which would seriously expose structural fudges made on the basis of current ops.

[Coldstreamer]

I'd go with that.

[slapout9]

It seems there are some conflating issues here: historic precedence, inter-service rivalries, vested interests, budgeting issues, resource shortfalls, long-term force structures, near v far capability development, doctrine and operational effectiveness.

We should not be surprised that there is a genuine concern that if the 'Army' is given ownership/responsibility of a capability with theatre-wide utility it may not be employed optimally, especially in European countries with small armies with less vision than the USA. SFs demonstrate the point from the reverse angle - they are a Theatre asset but are quick to point out their strategic credentials - overwhelmingly manned by the Army but functionally separate. Troops should have their own ISTAR assets. Period. But Reaper must be able to operate across the entire battlespace, and if necessary in gorrillas. For that reason alone it needs to be operated by people who can integrate it anywhere in the AOR and who understand airspace and packaging issues. If we apportion ownership on the basis of 'customer' then the Army would own JSTARs/Nimrod R/Harrier et al.

Personally, I don't especially care who 'owns' a capability as long as it is used properly. We seem to forget that there should only be one campaign in theatre - the Joint Campaign, owned by the Joint Commander. The assets in his AOR are his and should be used in accordance with his priorities - compare the negative comments from Lt Gen Franks (VII Corps) about CENTAF in DESERT STORM with the positive ones from Gen Schwarzkopf. The case for LCC ownership of 'everything' is naturally fuelled by the ongoing COIN efforts, but the imperative for a truly Joint approach and the correct allocation of responsibility (for a capability) to component attributes is amplified by the potential for state v state war, which would seriously expose structural fudges made on the basis of current ops.

Hi Paul, this is truly the issue and a truly Joint Approach is the only real solution or you will keep having the turf battles. In the Air, on the Land, in the Sea, Services responsibilities divided up that way is bound to lead to internal conflicts.

[Entropy]

Well said Paul. It's one reason I'm glad the predator and warrior programs are being combined into a joint program. Commonality in key systems is a good thing.

[Ken White]

It seems there are some conflating issues here: historic precedence, inter-service rivalries, vested interests, budgeting issues, resource shortfalls, long-term force structures, near v far capability development, doctrine and operational effectiveness.

Yes to that.

We should not be surprised that there is a genuine concern that if the 'Army' is given ownership/responsibility of a capability with theatre-wide utility it may not be employed optimally...

Yes to that -- if you mean concern by the USAF. The flip side of that is a resounding 'no.' The Army will have genuine and historically merited concern that theater wide use will not be optimal for support of troops in contact.

...Troops should have their own ISTAR assets. Period. But Reaper must be able to operate across the entire battlespace, and if necessary in gorrillas. For that reason alone it needs to be operated by people who can integrate it anywhere in the AOR and who understand airspace and packaging issues.

Agree and disagree. I have no quarrel with the USAF owning and deploying Reaper as it sees fit -- but I also strongly believe the Army should own and deploy Warrior as it sees fit and you did not add that caveat.

If we apportion ownership on the basis of 'customer' then the Army would own JSTARs/Nimrod R/Harrier et al.

True -- and an idea with some merit...

Personally, I don't especially care who 'owns' a capability as long as it is used properly.

I agree with that; the issue I believe is precisely who determines 'properly?'

...We seem to forget that there should only be one campaign in theatre - the Joint Campaign, owned by the Joint Commander. The assets in his AOR are his and should be used in accordance with his priorities - compare the negative comments from Lt Gen Franks (VII Corps) about CENTAF in DESERT STORM with the positive ones from Gen Schwarzkopf. The case for LCC ownership of 'everything' is naturally fuelled by the ongoing COIN efforts, but the imperative for a truly Joint approach and the correct allocation of responsibility (for a capability) to component attributes is amplified by the potential for state v state war, which would seriously expose structural fudges made on the basis of current ops.

Admirably 'joint.' However, as is true of any generalization, subject to caveats. Having experience with close air support with and without an overarching 'joint' air effort, I am in no doubt that the CAS is better without total consolidation and a Theater ATO. No doubt what so ever...

As to Frank's and Schwarzkopf's experience, that has much to do with the Air Component Commander. Some folks just do a better job than others...

On the entire topic of who owns and who uses what, Entropy also said:

As for integration with the ground force, that is a two-way street. There is nothing preventing the Army from buying as many ROVERs as it wants or integrating the datalink technology more directly into its weapon systems as the Air Force is currently in the middle of doing. The technology and architecture are there for the Army to exploit if it chooses to do so.

True statement -- it also, as does your opinion, neatlyelides the fact that all those ROVERs may not need a video of an area 200 km away while the boys in blue search for 'strategic' targets; that is no guarantee of coverage when and where needed, merely access to what ever the ACC or JFACC deems important to them at the time. Which may or may not be the pressing concern of the Theater Commander, much less the Ground Component Commander...

[slapout9]

Hi Ken, also the Air Force already has Global Hawk for their Strategic Stuff so why do they need to control the predator which has a good old Army missile on it. Hellfire-fire and forget


Link to how the Army figured it out a long time ago..enjoy
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NpFg9JVvyEE

And you damn right that's a Real Army Sergeant hosting the show!!

[Ken White]

Hi Ken, also the Air Force already has Global Hawk for their Strategic Stuff so why do they need to control the predator which has a good old Army missile on it. Hellfire-fire and forget

Link to how the Army figured it out a long time ago..enjoy
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NpFg9JVvyEE

And you damn right that's a Real Army Sergeant hosting the show!!

All those proponents of 'jointness' always forget that consolidation inevitably increases the bureaucratic quotient and promotes a 'one size fits all' approach which means compromises in mission accomplishment in the name of efficiency. No question that centralization increases efficiency -- there is also little doubt that it adversely impacts effectiveness. I'm inclined to opt for cops and forces that are effective more so than efficient -- not that there's much in the world more inefficient than a war anyway...

God knows what'll happen if the Navy buys Global Hawk for the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Mission System. Nobody on E-ring will speaking to anyone else, I reckon...

I guess with that mustache and all that hair, that young MSG was never in the eighty twice...

Thanks for the link.

[Merv Benson]

Most air Force missions are transient, i.e. they go from point A to Point B and back and sometimes spend a short time over a target. That is one reason why air power is a poor substitute for boots on the ground in an interdiction mission.

The Predator breaks that mold. It can lurk over a specific area without have to take a leak for several hours or days. For interdiction missions and for watching the MSR the Predator is an ideal compliment to the forces on the ground and it seems logical to me that those forces should be calling the shots.

There are probably other missions where it fits the Air Force MO better.

Another factor that fits into this debate is the Air Force's natural desire to control the air space. It does not want surprises for other air craft that are in that space. That is an area where the ground troops, with help from technology, need to find a way to cooperate. There has already been a heated debate on this with the smaller UAV's.

I am not sure I buy the Air Force argument about pilots. I think some experienced gamers would feel right at home with the joystick, in pretty short order. Give them some time in the simulator to make sure they are not going to crash and burn and I think they would have an abundance of pilots.

[Entropy]

Cavguy,

The "late 90's" wasn't that long ago and the Navy had the best UAV program before that which explains why they were the managers for Hunter, Pioneer and Predator under DARO.

The Air Force developed the Predator and turned it into a capable weapons and ISR platform that is integrated with other weapons systems. Yes the Army has UAV's and I'm sure you put them to good use, as you should. But unless I'm mistaken they are essentially just cameras in the sky. For example, can your mortar or arty teams use them to correct fire? Can they designate for your other weapons systems? Can your apaches get your video feed to develop SA when they're enroute to your tic? Unless I'm mistaken, the current crop of Army UAV's can do none of these things.

As for integration with the ground force, that is a two-way street. There is nothing preventing the Army from buying as many ROVERs as it wants or integrating the datalink technology more directly into its weapon systems as the Air Force is currently in the middle of doing. The technology and architecture are there for the Army to exploit if it chooses to do so.

In the meantime, the Army likes what the USAF made so much it wants to buy a bunch of its own predators (500!) which is fine by me.

And I'm genuinely sorry about your bad predator experience, there really is no excuse for that.

Coldstreamer,

One might argue that everything is ultimately land-centric

I postulated moving ADA to the AF in jest to simply make the point. Truth be told, however, a lot of pilots were more afraid of Patriot than the Iraqi air defenses - the capabilities of the system are such that the aircrew tends not to survive. As an intel guy I had to brief the location and status of the various Patriot batteries before each mission.

[Cavguy]

The Air Force developed the Predator and turned it into a capable weapons and ISR platform that is integrated with other weapons systems. Yes the Army has UAV's and I'm sure you put them to good use, as you should. But unless I'm mistaken they are essentially just cameras in the sky.

For example, can your mortar or arty teams use them to correct fire?

Yes, All of them can from Raven and above, I've done it.

Can they designate for your other weapons systems?

Some can, to different levels. All can spot designate in some method, and some can laser designate. Keeping it vague here.

Can your apaches get your video feed to develop SA when they're enroute to your tic?

If they have something similar to Rover installed, they could. All our UAV's can be received in Rover as well as Aircraft.

And I'm genuinely sorry about your bad predator experience, there really is no excuse for that.

No problem, wasn't you. But it happened more than once, and that's the worst case. I came off harder than I should, I do love the USAF, a USAF F-15E drop ended a bad firefight I was in once.

But the notion you can do COIN from the air with ISR, or even effeciently interdict the enemy, is a myth at the present time.

Case in point, the nation threw every surveillance asset it had, from satellites to aircraft to UAV's on a single stretch of road south of Balad to stop IED activity. Some months later, the program was cancelled because of outright failure.

Anyway, I was cranky posting at 2AM last night. Sorry for the harsh tone, I promise to play nice!

[Ken White]

how can that be? He spluttered...

[Cavguy]

Some quotes from Rick Atkinson's article linked above:

Read the whole thing.

IED Blitz would focus as many forms of surveillance as possible in a "persistent stare" at a bomb-infested 20-kilometer stretch of Route Tampa, just south of Balad on the road to Baghdad. The blitz would enlist satellites, U-2 spy planes, 14 Mako unmanned aerial vehicles, a pair of larger I-Gnat drones, and the Horned Owl, a Beechcraft turboprop airplane equipped with ground-penetrating radar used to assess whether road shoulders had been disturbed by digging.

Attacks had grown increasingly extravagant, with "daisy-chained" munitions that included as many as 22 artillery shells wired together to explode simultaneously in a 300-yard "kill zone." Intelligence analysts assumed that such ambush sites took hours or even days to prepare. On the basis of past attack patterns, they predicted that 60 IEDs would be planted in 75 days on this short segment of Route Tampa.

Hundreds of thousands of photographs would be snapped as part of a technique called "coherent change detection." Two images of the same scene taken at different times would be compared, pixel by pixel, to spot changes in the landscape -- such as the anomalies caused by an insurgent planting a bomb. Ground convoys could be warned, and, if the reconnaissance was nimble, hunter-killer teams could flush emplacers or triggermen.

The operation, estimated to cost at least $3 million, would be directed from Defense Department offices leased in Fairfax County.

Blitz began on Tuesday, Aug. 24, 2004. So brilliant were the digital color images that analysts could read the brand names on plastic water bottles littering the roadside. They could distinguish an apple from a pomegranate at a fruit stand.

What they could not see was a bomb or a bomber.

The most disheartening day came on Thursday, Nov. 4. By chance, virtually all surveillance assets -- satellites, U-2s, drones -- happened to be focused simultaneously on one small swatch of Route Tampa. Traffic appeared normal. Two hours later, another sequence of images revealed a scorched crater where a bag of artillery shells triggered by a detonation wire had just killed one American soldier in a truck and severed the leg of another. Dozens of photos showed the burning vehicle veer across the median, and rescue vehicles convene at the site. No images revealed the IED being placed, or the triggerman.

Analysts soon surmised that bomber cells around Balad in late summer had shifted "to a just-in-time device-placement method," as a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst put it. Instead of requiring hours or days to survey an ambush site and bury a device, "hasty emplacement" took two hours or less.

Blitz ended on Nov. 15. In 10 weeks, 44 IEDs had detonated or were discovered by ground clearance teams. Asked how many had been detected by aerial surveillance, the Air Force officer said, "To be honest with you, I can't say any of them.

"We had only a 20-kilometer stretch," the officer added. "There are thousands of kilometers in Iraq."

This is why I get nervous anytime someone tells me the tech in FCS or Air power will solve my problems through ROVER or any other gimmick. We focused almost national asset and tech available, plus hundreds of personnel on twenty klicks of road and were unable to stop or identify attacks.

[Coldstreamer]

Pull back to the Drop Ship and nuke them all from Orbit. Only way to be sure.

I'll try for something sensible tomorrow, possibly.

Tech gobbledigook just doesn't deliver the goods in COIN and insurgencies. That stretch of Tampa would have been better secured if all the money and talent had been diverted from model aeroplanes with cameras to a couple of good HUMINT teams who could have given proper warning of when the devices were laid, and led to strikes to arrest the insurgent cell commanders, who could then be sweated to spill the beans on their pals, and then reconciled to become stakeholders in a future they could contribute to.

Oops. Couldn't help myself.

[slapout9]

Pull back to the Drop Ship and nuke them all from Orbit. Only way to be sure.

I spilled some coffe reading that one.

[Entropy]

Cavguy,

To be sure there are limits to aerial ISR, just as any capability has inherent limits. There isn't a silver bullet here and the enemy gets a vote too as they learn our various capabilities and exploit their inherent weaknesses.

The good news is that the AF and Army seem to be trying to put aside the mutual distrust and both are making an effort to work together. Hopefully that continues.

Returning to the original point of this thread for a minute, the Air Force willl have to come to grips with how the UAV fleet fits into the service culturally. As long as UAV's are an ancillary job viewed as a distraction from the "real" job of flying manned aircraft, the service is gonna have problems. Most of these issues were identified almost ten years ago - it's sad that so little has been done to address the UAV cultural problems.

Pull back to the Drop Ship and nuke them all from Orbit. Only way to be sure.

lol