It seems there are some conflating issues here: historic precedence, inter-service rivalries, vested interests, budgeting issues, resource shortfalls, long-term force structures, near v far capability development, doctrine and operational effectiveness.

We should not be surprised that there is a genuine concern that if the 'Army' is given ownership/responsibility of a capability with theatre-wide utility it may not be employed optimally, especially in European countries with small armies with less vision than the USA. SFs demonstrate the point from the reverse angle - they are a Theatre asset but are quick to point out their strategic credentials - overwhelmingly manned by the Army but functionally separate. Troops should have their own ISTAR assets. Period. But Reaper must be able to operate across the entire battlespace, and if necessary in gorrillas. For that reason alone it needs to be operated by people who can integrate it anywhere in the AOR and who understand airspace and packaging issues. If we apportion ownership on the basis of 'customer' then the Army would own JSTARs/Nimrod R/Harrier et al.

Personally, I don't especially care who 'owns' a capability as long as it is used properly. We seem to forget that there should only be one campaign in theatre - the Joint Campaign, owned by the Joint Commander. The assets in his AOR are his and should be used in accordance with his priorities - compare the negative comments from Lt Gen Franks (VII Corps) about CENTAF in DESERT STORM with the positive ones from Gen Schwarzkopf. The case for LCC ownership of 'everything' is naturally fuelled by the ongoing COIN efforts, but the imperative for a truly Joint approach and the correct allocation of responsibility (for a capability) to component attributes is amplified by the potential for state v state war, which would seriously expose structural fudges made on the basis of current ops.