U.S. Captains Bear Weight of Iraq Strategy

[SWJED]

U.S. Captains Bear Weight of Iraq Strategy by Michael Kamber, International Herald Tribune.

During the war in Iraq, young army and Marine captains have become American viceroys, officers with large sectors to run and near-autonomy to do it. In military parlance, they are the "ground-owners." In practice, they are power brokers.

"They give us a chunk of land and say, 'Fix it,' " said Captain Rich Thompson, 36, who controls an area east of Baghdad.

The Iraqis have learned that these captains, many still in their 20s, can call down devastating American firepower one day and approve multimillion-dollar projects the next. Some have become celebrities in their sectors, men whose names are known even to children.

Many in the military believe that these captains are the linchpins in the American strategy for success in Iraq, but as the war continues into its sixth year the military has been losing them in large numbers — at a time when it says it needs thousands more.

Most of these captains have extensive combat experience and are regarded as the military's future leaders. They're exactly the men the military most wants. But corporate America wants them too. And the hardships of repeated tours are taking their toll, tilting them back toward civilian life and possibly complicating the future course of the war...

[Ranger94]

U.S. Captains Bear Weight of Iraq Strategy by Michael Kamber, International Herald Tribune.

We will do more good if we educate the Sgt's and below.

It is my understanding from my readings in SWJ and my experience in combat is that if tactical actions are elevated to 0-3 level (other than briefings) then I have failed as a Jr. COIN leader.

To put it another way, if I as a team leader or squad leader, if I fail to see the stratigic implications of a "shot fired" then I have failed.


Respectively,
RLTW SSG
I am still reading 3.24 and "Eating Soup...". and hoping I get it all

[Ken White]

to understand that...

[Ron Humphrey]

We will do more good if we educate the Sgt's and below.

It is my understanding from my readings in SWJ and my experience in combat is that if tactical actions are elevated to 0-3 level (other than briefings) then I have failed as a Jr. COIN leader.

To put it another way, if I as a team leader or squad leader, if I fail to see the stratigic implications of a "shot fired" then I have failed.


Respectively,
RLTW SSG
I am still reading 3.24 and "Eating Soup...". and hoping I get it all

Getting those in higher positions to buy off on the risk and subsequent necessity for occasional imperfection or mistakes not being the end of ones career for NCO's will be pretty hard to get. Officers already carry immense responsibility in their own jobs let alone in CI type environments. The'll have a hard time being comfortable with such a thing unless there is a good training and education base to show that those NCO's should be able to do it. Without that they will probably be wary of placing too much on their NCO's shoulders.
Just my thought but I could be wrong on this one as things may have changed in that respect in the last few years

[Ken White]

Getting those in higher positions to buy off on the risk and subsequent necessity for occasional imperfection or mistakes not being the end of ones career for NCO's will be pretty hard to get. Officers already carry immense responsibility in their own jobs let alone in CI type environments. The'll have a hard time being comfortable with such a thing unless there is a good training and education base to show that those NCO's should be able to do it. Without that they will probably be wary of placing too much on their NCO's shoulders.
Just my thought but I could be wrong on this one as things may have changed in that respect in the last few years

My belief is that they're dead wrong -- and while I acknowledge that attitude is probably quite prevalent today, it hasn't always been that way. Fortunately for the Army...

I also am sure that many more do not have that concern which is a good thing as my suspicion is that, as was true in Viet Nam and at other times (the average rifle company in the 82d in 1962 probably had 2.5 Officers, priority was to USAREUR), there'll be an Officer shortage and sooner rather than later.

Officers probably need to get used to the thought of having SFCs and SSG as acting platoon leaders. They'll do okay. I've seen SGTs as Acting PLs and one serving as a 1SG -- all of 'em did a good job. One gets responsible behavior when one expects it; if one expects poor performance, that's generally exactly what one will get. And certainly, IMO, deserves...

I spent over six years as a PSG, peace and war, had four Platoon Leaders and only one of them for eight months in 1961-2 at Bragg; none of the others were around for more than two or three months. Do the math on that. They only gave me a PL in Viet Nam after seven months without one when I got promoted and was getting transferred up to Brigade. I had two weeks to train him. He made Colonel so I guess we did okay. I made SGM in a little over 11 total years (there was a war on ), every stripe in a different unit, so I don't guess I screwed up too badly running Cav, Scout and Recon platoons on three continents.

[120mm]

Officers probably need to get used to the thought of having SFCs and SSG as acting platoon leaders. They'll do okay. I've seen SGTs as Acting PLs and one serving as a 1SG -- all of 'em did a good job. One gets responsible behavior when one expects it; if one expects poor performance, that's generally exactly what one will get. And certainly, IMO, deserves...

I'm currently reading the David Weber series on Honor Harrington. In the book, "In Enemy Hands" he quotes a mythical Fleet Admiral as saying: I'd rather be short-handed, than have incompetents running things.

Back when I was teaching ROTC, an Active Duty CPT and I would often sit around and shoot the #### about how a crappy officer actually made it HARDER for the NCO who was really leading the platoon to do his job.

And then, when you promote said crappy officer, he makes it hard for the NCO by being a crappy Company Commander.

While it's a lot easier to have an even marginally competent officer to pick up the slack, the bad ones are just bad and we should just give up trying to fill the slots.

[jcustis]

A very junior staff sergeant recently left my staff and checked in the the joint reception center at Camp Lejeune. Instead of heading to the unit he thought he was slated to go to, he was re-directed to one about to head over to Iraq, by way of a rotation at Mojave Viper...which started in 4 days.

When he called me while headed home on pre-deploy leave, he remarked with a laugh that he had been assigned the platoon commander slot for his company's 4th plt (yes Wilf, it seems some units are abandoning the 3x rifle plt, 1x wpns plt structure). I asked him where his platoon commander was, and how long he'd be working in the acting role.

"There is no lieutenant coming sir, it's all me. Isn't that pretty crazy?" he chuckled. I was thrown off guard at first, but I sat back and mulled over those words for moment and realized just how ignorant I was to presume that he had to have an officer holding the reigns. I'd trained him after all, and knew his capabilities.

I think you're spot on Ranger94. Both ends of the spectrum just need to reach that accomodation in terms of tactical judgment, responsibility, accountability, etc. Put another way, you've got to take the ball and run with it, but don't showboat into the endzone and drop it at the 1 yd line.

[Ken White]

...
While it's a lot easier to have an even marginally competent officer to pick up the slack, the bad ones are just bad and we should just give up trying to fill the slots.

I've long said "Show me a poor officer and I'll show you an unfortunate guy who had a lousy NCO for his first Platoon Sergeant..."

And there are too many of those lousy dudes about. Fortunately, that's changing as a lot of the deadwood that got hired in the 1975-1985 time frame depart to retirement...

I realized reading my post from last night that it read like I was sniping at Ron. I was not. I fully understand how he feels and I know that many, maybe even most, would agree with him. I'm sympathetic, understand but do disagree with that approach.

My point, which I didn't make at all well was that it hasn't always been that way and that it doesn't need to stay that way.

In 1968, the average Bn Cdr in Viet Nam found he had few if any Captains and senior NCOs, he had a slew of brand new 2LTs and SGts. Good, dedicated kids who'd do anything -- but they didn't know much, so he had to watch them closely. He didn't break that habit when he got to be a General in the 70s and 80s. Unfortunately, all those 2LTs and SGTs thought they were supposed to act the same way as their mentor had so when they got to be senior in 90s and 00s, they kept micromanaging. It became embedded in the Army; total lack of trust. It's dangerous, an Army is built on trust. Or should be.

It wasn't always like that. Prior to 1968, there were micromanagers but they were rare and, far more importantly, they were actively discouraged (as opposed to recently when they have been encouraged). In 1966, my Bde Cdr, A senior BG had a standing night order "Wake me if all three Bns are in heavy contact." In late '68, the Division we were OpCon to had one also -- either the CG or one of the DCGs would be awakened if A Bn (out of 12 counting our OpCon) was in contact. yes, they were different people but the climate led to that glaring difference. Been downhill ever since

Climates can be changed.

I saw some briefing slides somewhere from COL Roper's last trip to Iraq. One bullet made me chuckle. It said; "Be prepared to delegate to the point of discomfort." Just so.

JCustis tells of the future; heed him. And don't fear it, it'll work. Has before...