U.S. Captains Bear Weight of Iraq Strategy

[jcustis]

Second was an abdication of the sense of ownership we had with our problem children. The Army has created such a web of support groups for alcohol abuse, wife beating, financial idiocy, and the like, that our first line of defense became sending the soldier elsewhere when things went wrong. In fact, it has gotten to the point that trying to solve problems in-house is seen as malfeasance. NCOs are no longer fathers, big brothers, and priests; they are referral agencies, and both they and their soldiers are the poorer for it.

Amen. As with our master gunner woes, we are inclined to send a errant gunner to the debrief shack for remedial training via a "trained guy" and are poorer for not doing the remediation ourselves

[Ranger94]

All of the comments are great but most seem to resemble comments that could have been made prior to FM3.24. Debates about how to manage NCO/Officer relationships have gone on for years.

Norfolk's comments bring up the exact point of the article. But it is limited. We need to understand that an NCO will be a "...executor of his nation's policy and strategic interests".

Isn't this the point of Gen. Krulak’s "Strategic Corporal"? It is obvious that fictional Cpl. Hernandez is well trained in squad movement, est. a TCP, maintain security and report format. We have extensive training in Offense and Defense. At one point in Krulak's fictional mission, Cpl. Hernandez "know(s) better than any of (his squad)....the fate...of the entire multi-national mission hung in the balance".

How does he know this? Was it his own character? Was it training? Did his Lt give him that detailed a mission statement (task and purpose)?

In the article about the captains, Capt. Gilbert "ordered traffic control barriers....checked on refurbished water pumps...approved money...soccer uniforms..dropped off..."etc. At any given point he must have left an NCO in charge as he moved on to the next task. Did that NCO understand that a secure TCP could deteriorate to the point were his tactical decision could have strategic implications. If he did know, then how?

"Be prepared to delegate to the point of discomfort.” Micromanagement is not really an option in COIN, is it?

[Ken White]

...I think this improvement was partly due to improved enlistment standards during the Reagan years and an improved NCOES. We were getting better material and it showed. When I went back to troops as S-3, XO, Bn commander 1996-2002, I still thought highly of the NCO corps, but I did note some disturbing developments.

Yep, the army owes Shy Meyer a lot for the changed focus in recruiting. I also noted the downturn in the mid and late 90s and agree with all your reasons that occurred.

NCOs are no longer fathers, big brothers, and priests; they are referral agencies, and both they and their soldiers are the poorer for it.

Amen!

Personally, I have never met a sergeant major at the brigade level or higher who added value to his unit.

Having been both a Brigade CSM and a Brigade Ops Sgt, I can truthfully say I had more power to do good as the latter. Brigade and higher CSMs mostly have negative power. I have known a few who did some really good things (I wasn't one of 'em) but for the majority, I'm inclined to agree with your assessment. It's too personality dependent.

What CSMs exist for at those levels is to keep their Boss out of trouble on people (and unit) handling. Too many today seem to be too sycophantic to tell their boss what's right instead of what he wants to hear. I've been out of that loop for a while but visits to my kids when all three Boys were in and to the one still in seem to indicate that's still a problem.

Absolutely agree with your take on who's supposed to be training who and Sergeant's Time. What a yo-yo idea...

[Ken White]

...
How does he know this? Was it his own character? Was it training? Did his Lt give him that detailed a mission statement (task and purpose)?

In the article about the captains, Capt. Gilbert "ordered traffic control barriers....checked on refurbished water pumps...approved money...soccer uniforms..dropped off..."etc. At any given point he must have left an NCO in charge as he moved on to the next task. Did that NCO understand that a secure TCP could deteriorate to the point were his tactical decision could have strategic implications. If he did know, then how?

Hernanadez knew because he learned due to not being mishandled as you say in the next quote; Gilbert's NCO knew for the same reason.

"Be prepared to delegate to the point of discomfort.” Micromanagement is not really an option in COIN, is it?

Only if the boss is stupid...

Then you can be guaranteed that Hernandez and the other guy won't know...

[Charlie11]

You nailed the essence of NCO/junior officer relations in the transitioning H/J series army. As a young cav platoon leader in the mid-80s my junior NCOs were sharper than my platoon sergeant. He was a good guy - had the cleanest vehicles on post - but he was functionally illiterate and tactically deficient. My E5s and I just worked around him in a strange but effective manner. Those junior NCOs were platoon sergeants by the First Gulf War and were magnificent, sharper than anything but the most seasoned platoon leaders.

It all comes down to the quality of the incoming soldier and the experiences, mentoring, and responsibility they receive early in their careers. OIF and related operations would seem to provide tremendous opportunity for junior NCOs to exercise leadership and independence far beyond any garrison/NTC rotation reality that existed in the peacetime force. The danger of course is burning out these young warriors and losing them. Or losing them.

As for "Sergeant's Time," I'm just gonna let that old battle die...

Master Gunner? Training for Canadian Army Trophy we executed an abbreviated MG course taught by a mobile training team from Knox. I wondered then why this was not an automatic part of the armor/cav NCOES, a requirement for staff sergeant. The guys who had been to MG school acted like they some dark secret that only they could harness and control. I always just figured they liked being in the warm tower during winter gunnery rather than risk being on a track with a busted heater.

[clayton]

Steve Blair

I'd be interested to hear how Navy ROTC handles this sort of thing.

I guess it's time for someone who was in the Navy to sound off. Just a couple of impressions about this thread.

1. I don't think any one service has cornered the market on micromanagement. Many if not most of the issues covered in this thread could equally apply to the Navy. And, unlike the Army and Marine Corps, most of big Navy (surface and submarine communities) has not seen a major shooting war since WWII - so all those bad habits of garrison time are even worse in the Navy. Since my time in the mid to late nineties, there's been much talk of officers taking over many of the roles and responsibilities of the NCO's (or CPOs in our case). In fact, micromanagement of the JOs and CPOs was pretty rampant back then. The mid-90s also saw an exodus of junior officers in the Navy that, in my humble opinion, was in-part influenced by this negative command climate. I think some of these problems might have their origin in our broader society (I'm not trying to pass the buck of military stupidity). I do recall an interesting article in the Washington Post comparing the response to Katrina to the response to the San Francisco earthquake. The writer noted how the responders in San Francisco did not wait for orders or let red tape or bureaucratic inaction stop them from taking action. The author's point was that we've become a much more legalistic (and timid) society, who waits for direction and fears the repercussions of taking initiative. If you believe that point, then it's not a reach to assume that this attitude would creep into the military with increased micromanagement being one of the results.

2. The Navy's personnel system isn't much different or better than that of the other services. In my time, attrition was a four letter word. They worked to reduce attrition at boot camp and at OCS (though that wasn't a large source of officers). One of the results of the decline in boot camp attrition was that sailors who were unfit for the Navy were making it to the fleet (and would be kicked out from there). I believe at one point in the late 90s, roughly 40% of first term enlistees in SURFLANT (Surface Forces Atlantic) did not complete their initial term of enlistment. It's probably on the web somewhere in a news article for those more thorough than me. I was OCS and had family members in NROTC and the Academy. I don't think the NROTC experience was much different from Steve Blair's ROTC story. I did meet a number of NROTC graduates in the fleet who made you think they waived the requirement for a pulse at their initial medical screening.

The bottom line is that I think these problems are military-wide with some to much variation allowed for each individual service. Y'all might hate being compared to the Navy, but there are similarities. It could be worse - I could be in the Air Force telling you how great things are there.

[120mm]

Master Gunner? Training for Canadian Army Trophy we executed an abbreviated MG course taught by a mobile training team from Knox. I wondered then why this was not an automatic part of the armor/cav NCOES, a requirement for staff sergeant. The guys who had been to MG school acted like they some dark secret that only they could harness and control. I always just figured they liked being in the warm tower during winter gunnery rather than risk being on a track with a busted heater.

I'm glad to meet someone else who thought the Master Gunner was a problem. And it sucked so bad, they decided to do the "Master Fitness" thing army-wide.

So, everyone sends their PT stud to Master Fitness school, where they get smoked by other PT studs, so they can come back and injure a bunch of your people doing stupid stuff. I don't KNOW what they taught at either school, I'm sure it looked good on paper, but the folks sent never actually shared it with anyone else ANYWHERE I went....

Sorry for the hijack. You just hit a "sore spot" with the MG comment....

[Presley Cannady]

This might be nothing more than a fanciful brainbug, but wasn't the British Empire run for a century or more on the wits of junior officers and seasoned noncoms in the far flung corners of the world?

[davidbfpo]

This might be nothing more than a fanciful brainbug, but wasn't the British Empire run for a century or more on the wits of junior officers and seasoned noncoms in the far flung corners of the world?

As much as films, books and nostalgia may give that impression the British Empire was far more complicated. Yes there were areas, even countries, that in peace and war were run by a tiny handful of Brits, e.g. Sudan. Staying there this was after the disaster for prestige of General Gordon (British Army officer loaned to the Eygptians) and the large commitment many years later to restore Anglo-Egyptian rule, Kitchener and the massacre at Omdurman.

The civil factor was stronger than the military; often themselves young, training given and experience valued. The District Officer notably in Africa and the Political Agent in India, especially NW Frontier. The civil direction given was in very specific terms to a senior political appointee and cascaded down, until the arrival of modern, reliable communications from London.

Successes aplenty, also miserable failures: Afghanistan (Army destroyed), Bengal famines (during WW2), the fall of Malaya & Singapore, and the opening battles in the Boer War and Zulu War (illustrated by Zulu Dawn and Zulu films).

davidbfpo

[Tom Odom]

Successes aplenty, also miserable failures: Afghanistan (Army destroyed), Bengal famines (during WW2), the fall of Malaya & Singapore, and the opening battles in the Boer War and Zulu War (illustrated by Zulu Dawn and Zulu films).

And there was the Sudan where failures and success alternated to the point the Sudanese service became a separate branch of the Foreign Service.
Best
Tom

[davidbfpo]

Taken from an article in The Times (UK) today commenting upon the situation in Basra, Iraq by Professor Michael Clarke: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/com...cle3646296.ece

After the disastrous loss of the American colonies Britain built its empire, and its Commonwealth, on setting the rules, deploying few forces of its own and chancing its arm that it could keep order everywhere in a territory by demonstrating that it could keep order anywhere. It could do this only by having real influence at the political centre.

davidbfpo

[kaur]

I'm reading here last Economist and it contains 14-page special report about US. Among other interesting articles there is story "Power and peril"

The army is losing its best and brightest. West Point, the alma mater of American generals going back to Ulysses S. Grant, has seen a relentless rise in the number of officers who leave at the earliest opportunity. Whereas only about 35% of the West Point class of 2000 had quit after five years, for the class of 2001 the proportion rose to 46% and for the class of 2002 to 58%. Retention problems are particularly severe among captains and majors with 11-17 years' experience—the potential future military leaders. The army currently has only half as many senior captains as it needs, and forecasts that it will suffer from a shortfall of 3,000 captains and majors (out of a cadre of 52,000) until at least 2013. The maximum age for recruits has been raised to 42, and fitness and educational standards have been lowered.

[120mm]

I'm reading here last Economist and it contains 14-page special report about US. Among other interesting articles there is story "Power and peril"

I'm hip-shooting, here, but didn't U.S. Grant, W.T. Sherman and a majority of THEIR classmates quit after our first war of occupation in Mexico?

I wonder if there is the subject of a good paper, there.

[VMI_Marine]

Excellent thread. I had the privilege of working with two different organizations on this last deployment - an Army cav troop near Fallujah, and a USMC MiTT near Haditha. Both experiences were very instructive. The cav troop CO believed in enabling his subordinates, not micromanaging, and had some fantastic results. Each of his platoons was responsible for a village and the surrounding area, and the LTs and their NCOs did a great job of developing the LOOs in those villages. The NCOs, at least down to section leaders, often met with local personalities in the village, and had a great understanding of the nuances in each village.

When I moved out west, the MiTT in Haditha had been augmented with a reinforced platoon of Marines from a nearby infantry battalion. They put a squad of Marines with each IA company, and the squad leader became the advisor to the IA company commander. From what these sergeants told me, it was a rough start at first, since Iraqis place so little stock in NCOs. By the end of their deployment, however, these sergeants were advising Iraqi captains and majors on all sorts of tactical matters. On the one hand, it was pretty remarkable to see. On the other hand, it's a little sad that this is the first time I've seen that technique used.

[ODB]

Unfortunately the ones who need to advance to make real changes on a broader scale never get to that point, they are not political enough. IMHO we are not putting warfighters and trainers in these positions. Best CSM I ever had never made it above Bn.......CSM Donald Purdy......some may know the name.....any guesses on who the BN CDR was at the time? Time frame 1993-94

[Steve Blair]

I'm hip-shooting, here, but didn't U.S. Grant, W.T. Sherman and a majority of THEIR classmates quit after our first war of occupation in Mexico?

I wonder if there is the subject of a good paper, there.

Been done to a degree, although I can't remember the name of the book offhand. Sherman and Grant both quit for different reasons, and both had dreams of becoming financially successful in the civilian world. Didn't work out for either of them....although they did do a thing or two afterwards.

McClellan also left the army, although officers like Lee and Longstreet did not. Back then one of the main reasons seems to have been financial and family separation...more often the former than the latter if extant memoirs and the like are anything to go by.

[ODB]

Thought about startin a seperate thread with this, if others think as much please move it. After going through my hard drives I finally found this on the last one. IMO this goes along with many of the posts, thoughtsand feelings.

Purdy on Leadership

by Don Purdy
CSM, USA (Retired)
1) Some senior NCOs are nothing more than bootlickers, who sing the "Army of One" song to their superior officers everyday. Commanders need to hear the good, bad and the ugly, and then be given good solid recommendations. They need their senior NCOs to be TRAINERS. LEAD BY EXAMPLE. DO as the troops do. LEAD FROM THE FRONT. GET IN THE DIRT. This bull#### of "I have done that" is garbage. What you are doing now is what counts. Quit worrying about your next assignment. Focus on your mission now. Your mission is to train soldiers for war, and it's damned hard work. If you do it right you will leave the Army in worse shape physically than when you came in. BE HARD BUT FAIR. You must have MORAL COURAGE.

2) Training is just a word they can't spell. Chief trainer means chief bootlicker. TICKET PUNCHERS.

3) "Moral courage" means telling your commander what he wants to hear these days. I was condemned by my peers and superiors for speaking up, and telling it like it was. I was called a relic from the past that should be put in a glass case. I was focused on training for war not peace. Discipline was my watchword, and the soldiers did not decide what punishment was right or wrong where I served as CSM. I was the Chief Trainer. The buck stopped with me. I participated in all training and lead by example. I was told by a Division CSM that I would never serve above BN level because I was too intrusive. That means I scared commanders with the truth. The next thing he asked was why do you train with your soldiers? The question was shocking, but the answer was simple. When I speak everyone listens. That went over his head like a tent. I carried a rifle not a pistol, and I damn well knew how to use that weapon and my soldiers knew how to use their weapons as well.

4) Combatives are important. Boxing, wrestling, and bayonet fighting are not antiquated. CQB is just what it means, Close Quarter Battle. MOUT, Trench systems, and bunkers must be cleared, and you had better be aggressive and prepared to do bayonet or hand to hand fighting. When others were laughing at my unit for doing these, my soldiers were prepared and understood what "fix bayonets" meant. They were aggressive and well disciplined. Substandard performers were put out immediately. My First Sergeants were not mail men or chow deliverers; they were the Chief Trainers of their companies.

5) We trained for war not peace. Live fires were a priority, and were not canned. Leaders and soldiers had to react. Maneuver elements maneuvered, and had to rely on the SBF not to shoot them but only the enemy. Bayonets were fixed and there were dummy targets for the soldiers engage with those bayonets. Re-supply missions were planned and executed. The battlefield had to be policed of casualties, and equipment by any means available, even if it meant driving vehicles cross country, or physically carrying the wounded. Reload drills, dead gunner drills, and crew drills were executed over, and over, and over again. These were executed day and night. NODS went on your face when the sun went down. They weren't hanging around your neck. We executed live fires at night with NODS in the woods, and the live fires were not canned. Raids, ambushes, search and attack were all executed at night up to company size. This took us over one year to get to that level. Mortars could hit their targets. Units could move silently day or night, and didn't get lost. We did not rely on GPS. WE USED MAPS AND COMPASSES. We lived out of our rucksacks, slept on the ground, in all types of weather from the BN CMDR on down. Frostbite, and heat casualties were not common because we trained to live and fight in the same environment. We did not look like bums. We shaved every day, wore our equipment properly, camouflaged our faces (and hands when necessary), soldiers knew how to maintain themselves and their equipment in the field, and uniformity was important. Soldiers knew what a cat hole was and trash was carried in their rucks, not thrown on the ground or buried for the hogs to dig up. Uniforms were worn properly. The companies received one hot meal a day and understood how to conduct tactical feeding. Our cooks knew how to function in the environment. The combat trains did not live in tents. Their perimeter was secure, weapons were clean, and noise and light discipline were maintained. Cooks, clerks, and all other support personnel knew how to use their weapons, and were trained on basic Infantry skills. Misfires were damn well rare and punishment was swift when it did happen. We suffered no live fire deaths because we trained properly, and used good old-fashioned common sense. We never had the soldiers execute missions they were not properly trained for. The NCOs trained the soldiers; the officers commanded. Our motto was "what ever you do, do it right!" Rate of sick call in the field was almost zero. Morale was high because of good, hard leadership from the front, and realistic, tough training. We even executed a day of live fire training during support cycles. You need a strong CSM who understands discipline and training. He can talk it and walk it.

6) There is no such thing as a good field soldier. You are either a soldier or not a soldier. Everything from appearance to police call is important. This bull#### about my space and my rights is just that: BULL####. Barracks are not his or her home; it's a place for them to live. For saying this I was told I had a mess kit mentality. This individuality BS of "I need my own room" is garbage. We waste more money building these Condos so soldiers can feel good, and not be part of a team; its sickening. They should live in fire team bays. It builds cohesion. Key control alone is a nightmare. "Of course don't bother the poor soldier, just let him live like a pig. When he gets sick or you find out he or she is a drug dealer, blame
it on the NCO Corps even though you, the illustrious battalion commander and brigade commander, said 'leave the soldiers alone in their precious rooms.' " Soldiers are owed a place to sleep, their pay, and the best leadership and training that can be provided.

7) DISCIPLINE is the key. DRILL AND CEREMONY is the foundation of discipline. When I say fall in I want to hear your heals coming together. When I speak, you jump. All ceremonies should be executed with weapons so each unit can execute the 15-count manual of arms. Carrying a card around in your pocket does not develop good morals. Morals are developed through solid leadership not gimmicks and headgear.

8) You want to be politically correct, stay on the block. You want to be different or an individual looking to be a victim, stay on the block. If you're a pervert and proud of it, stay on the block. You want to be a soldier, then become part of a disciplined team. This is not a job, it's a profession. You're here to fight our country's war, not to be a gut-eating, self-serving individual. Senior Officers, and NCOs, I am telling you right now, if things don't change, you will have the blood of soldiers on your hands. There is an enemy out there who is determined, and he is not concerned about individual feelings, or time out. If you don't train them hard now, and demand from them now what in the hell do you think the enemy is going to do to them. If they can't take the heat in training, how are they going to take it on the battlefield? Technology, my ass, soldiers win wars. Be hard on them now or watch them die, or worse, break and run. BE HARD, BUT FAIR! Being fair does not mean they dictate punishment or babying them. A Russian General said "Hard on the training field, easy, on the battlefield". General Patton said "Leading from the rear is like trying to push spaghetti up hill." You want your soldiers to respect you not love you. When they look at you they should see a competent leader. The best compliment I ever received was from a soldier who was PCSing. I was a PLT Sergeant in the First Ranger Battalion. He said,"Sergeant Purdy, I hated to hear you come in, in the morning, and some times I just flat hated you, but I would follow you to hell with gasoline drawers on."

Everytime I find myself acting a little wayward I dig this up and it surely refocuses me.

[Schmedlap]

DRILL AND CEREMONY is the foundation of discipline. When I say fall in I want to hear your heals coming together. When I speak, you jump. All ceremonies should be executed with weapons so each unit can execute the 15-count manual of arms.

I'm a bit hesitant to question CSM Purdy, but this one kind of baffles me. What does the 15-count manual of arms - or even drill in ceremonies in general - have to do with discipline? My understanding of discipline has always been a melding of competence and integrity - knowing what is right and always doing what is right, even when you don't feel like doing it and you can probably get away with not doing it. Failing to conform in a formation makes you stick out like a sore thumb and the repercussions are fairly swift - is such conformity really discipline? Or is it just a survival mechanism?

[Ranger94]

I'm a bit hesitant to question CSM Purdy, but this one kind of baffles me. What does the 15-count manual of arms - or even drill in ceremonies in general - have to do with discipline? My understanding of discipline has always been a melding of competence and integrity - knowing what is right and always doing what is right, even when you don't feel like doing it and you can probably get away with not doing it. Failing to conform in a formation makes you stick out like a sore thumb and the repercussions are fairly swift - is such conformity really discipline? Or is it just a survival mechanism?

What is the primary purpose of drill (drill and ceremony)?
The purpose of drill is to enable a commander or noncommissioned officer to move his unit from one place to another in an orderly manner; to aid in disciplinary training by instilling habits of precision and response to the leader’s orders; and to provide for the development of all soldiers in the practice of commanding troops.
-Army Study Guide

[120mm]

I'm a bit hesitant to question CSM Purdy, but this one kind of baffles me. What does the 15-count manual of arms - or even drill in ceremonies in general - have to do with discipline? My understanding of discipline has always been a melding of competence and integrity - knowing what is right and always doing what is right, even when you don't feel like doing it and you can probably get away with not doing it. Failing to conform in a formation makes you stick out like a sore thumb and the repercussions are fairly swift - is such conformity really discipline? Or is it just a survival mechanism?

Drill and Ceremony teaches people how to "excel" without standing out.

My 14 year old daughter just joined the high school drill team, and she recently condensed this into it's essence: She likes drill team competitions, because it's the only "sport" where you "win" by not being the "star".