U.S. Captains Bear Weight of Iraq Strategy

[CommoChief]

All,

First thanks for the creation and maintenance of this site. I have been reading for some time and finally decided to post.
1. Promotions: My view of officer promotions is that we (the Army), as an institution, are making the worst decision possible. We are allowing the promotion of young officers who simply lack the ability to function as Captains. The criteria for promotion should be 'Captains command Companies'. If a BN CDR does not believe that a particular LT is going to be able to develop into a Company Commander that he would trust with the lives of his own children then do not allow this promotion to take place. The current policy of allowing a promotion at 38 months when coupled with the lack of OER accountability and sound mentoring from the CO and BN commanders is seriously flawed. Thankfully most of the 'baby Captains' realize they have been promoted not based upon their ability to perform at that grade but rather as a way of masking the attrition rate of more senior Captains. The incompetents, for the most part, are at least smart enough to realize it and continue to allow their NCOs to handle the day to day business. The competents, and there are more than a few, likewise continue to listen to their NCOs and their competent peers and competent young MAJ. The same holds true on the NCO side. The 'automatic' promotion is a problem only if we allow it to be. All that is required is for the leadership of the CO and BN, officer and NCO alike, to have the courage and tenacity to refuse to promote those who are not ready. The process involves holding leaders at all levels accountable for leadership development and mentoring. If a young subordinate has not made enough improvement, after being coached and mentored and counseled then the commander must do the paperwork to deny the promotion. Do not allow 'big army' to dictate who is going to be the future small unit leaders simply because the paperwork trail is hard and the BDE CDR or BDE CSM wants to know why 'x' number of NCOs were not reccomended for promotion.

2. Training: We have a generation of young Officers who have almost no experience in HIC. Shooting table 8 at Graf is not a substitute for a full up heavy force rotation at CMTC. How are these Officers supposed to be the lead trainers when they have almost no experience in gunnery or maintenance or manuever. This is going to hold true for the 'four year SSG' as well. This is going to require much involvement from folks who have that experience (informal training) or are school trained.

3. Experience: On the positive side of the ledger we have a vast amount of experience in actual combat operations as motorized and dismounted infantry. The actions on contact for a motorized or dismounted tank platoon are different than while mounted on tanks but the reporting proceedures and battlefield preperation is not. We can't forget that many of these lessons will carry over to HIC.

Solutions: If as a leader, you do not trust your subordinates enough to keep from micromanaging them why are they in the job in the first place? Find some competent hard charger, without regard to rank, and put them in the job. Many bruised egos will occur but this is far more preferable to allowing an incompetent subordinate leader to command troops in the field.

Sorry this went so long and for the tone but this is too important to 'play nice'.

[Tom Odom]

Solutions: If as a leader, you do not trust your subordinates enough to keep from micromanaging them why are they in the job in the first place? Find some competent hard charger, without regard to rank, and put them in the job. Many bruised egos will occur but this is far more preferable to allowing an incompetent subordinate leader to command troops in the field.

Sorry this went so long and for the tone but this is too important to 'play nice'

Well in the interest of playing nice, try introducing yourself here. Your ideas will have more traction,

Tom