Effects Based Operations (EBO) - is it valid?

[Cavguy]

* Requires deep systemic understanding. The first principle is that you must have an almost zen-like understanding of the operational environment, which we generally don't.
* Requires clear, consistent, genuine objectives. Another thing we are not generally good at.
* Systems are reactive. You can't just apply effects without changing the systems; unless you are extremely good at monitoring the operational environment, you will not recognize that the system you are attempting to affect (economic system, IED network, guerilla army, etc) has fundamentally changed and the actions you select are no longer having the desired effect.
* Subject to wishful thinking. Hoo, boy, is it ever. "If we do this, this will happen", announces the expert. And he will not be budged in the face of evidence.
* Same action can produce different effects. As someone said, Iraq is not one war but many. Repairing an electrical line causes joy in one neighborhood, anger in another. Easy to paralyze yourself through analysis.
* Post hoc, ergo propter hoc. We often mistakenly link cause and effect.
* There is a reason we have a box to think in. EBO often leads to a violation of the simplicity principle.

Eden,

Great observations. I just finished a conversation with Hacksaw about it, he said almost the exact same things. It seems the "Joint" concept of EBO tends to assume/require a depth of understanding of the environment that is simply unrealistic - i.e. if I do A, B will happen. And that's given your assumptions about the environment are valid, we understand the model, and we have enough understanding for it. Given the "assumptions" going into OIF, I can see why the critics of EBO are legion.

Hacksaw also noted that EBO has great appeal to the "process" mindset, those that like preplanned fires, assessments, and mathematical models to define environments. My experience with COIN and human interaction, not to mention "Black Swans", tend to make me skeptical.

As for the concept as a whole, well, we've been doing effects based operations for a long time. You can tell a cavalryman to 'Screen PL Red' or you can give him a desired effect: "Enemy ground forces unable to recon beyond PL Red". To my mind, EBO tends to overcomplicate what is already a very complex business. It is supposed to enhance unity of effort, but I have found that it actually detracts from it. Moreover, it only exacerbates our proclivities for vague guidance, detailed matrices, and huge target lists.

On the other hand, it is a useful way to think about what you want to accomplish, and it can be an aid to imaginative planning. In summary, I would use it as a planning tool but put it away once you are ready to actually write an order.

Maybe Wiif was on to something talking about various "definitions" of EBO. I have little problem conceptualizing it at the tactical level. And as you've said, I've been doing it for years but not calling it EBO. Figuring out what I want to achieve, focusing all lines of operations to achieve it, developing some way to measure the impact, and adjust the strategy accordingly. Or as Tom says, D3A.

I'd venture that's what my company did in Tal Afar and BDE did in Ramadi.

I guess the hardest part is understanding what needs to be done, and measuring the right things. If my operational goal doesn't address the root causes in COIN (i.e. approaching from my POV rather than the populations), all the EBO won't help if the enemy is playing baseball while I'm playing football. That's where COIN IPB comes in.

Am I (sort of) tracking?

Also, I noted some traffic when GEN Mattis took over JFCOM that it was to be the death of EBO for awhile, he wasn't a fan. I also saw an Army position paper somewhere admonishing TRADOC not to use EBO, that it was not army doctrine or an approved program, only a Joint methodology. However, I'm thinking that was about the high level EBO you define, not tactical level EBO concepts like Tom is describing.

Sounds like we have a terminology problem, like Wiif noted.