Effects Based Operations (EBO) - is it valid?

[Eden]

I recently prepared a lesson plan on the Effects Based Approach to Operations - note the subtle difference from Effects Based Operations - using JFCOMs Commanders Handbook for an Effects Based Approach to Joint Operations. It is pre-doctrinal and I have heard it is being pulled, but it is a good guide to generally accepted tenets.

I added in my own caveats, having been a planner at the joint level and seen its application in Afghanistan in CJTF76 and ISAF.

* Requires deep systemic understanding. The first principle is that you must have an almost zen-like understanding of the operational environment, which we generally don't.
* Requires clear, consistent, genuine objectives. Another thing we are not generally good at.
* Systems are reactive. You can't just apply effects without changing the systems; unless you are extremely good at monitoring the operational environment, you will not recognize that the system you are attempting to affect (economic system, IED network, guerilla army, etc) has fundamentally changed and the actions you select are no longer having the desired effect.
* Subject to wishful thinking. Hoo, boy, is it ever. "If we do this, this will happen", announces the expert. And he will not be budged in the face of evidence.
* Same action can produce different effects. As someone said, Iraq is not one war but many. Repairing an electrical line causes joy in one neighborhood, anger in another. Easy to paralyze yourself through analysis.
* Post hoc, ergo propter hoc. We often mistakenly link cause and effect.
* There is a reason we have a box to think in. EBO often leads to a violation of the simplicity principle.

In ISAF you had a Joint Effects Cell that handled assessment, formulated deisred effects, ran the targeting cell, maintained the Prioritized Effects List, did senior level engagements, and chaired the Effects Working Group. They were segregated from the planners and the J3, which led to disconnects. Effects were not properly integrated into planning products, and the J3 became a competitor for resources with the JEC Chief, who outranked him. In CJTF 76 there were - in effect, ahem - two effects cells. One handled non-kinetic effects through CA, IO, PSYOPs, etc., while the other handled kinetic effects. To my mind this defeats the purpose of EBO, but these cells were more or less executors rather than directly integrated into planning or operations. In sum, I have yet to see anybody get it right.

As for the concept as a whole, well, we've been doing effects based operations for a long time. You can tell a cavalryman to 'Screen PL Red' or you can give him a desired effect: "Enemy ground forces unable to recon beyond PL Red". To my mind, EBO tends to overcomplicate what is already a very complex business. It is supposed to enhance unity of effort, but I have found that it actually detracts from it. Moreover, it only exacerbates our proclivities for vague guidance, detailed matrices, and huge target lists.

On the other hand, it is a useful way to think about what you want to accomplish, and it can be an aid to imaginative planning. In summary, I would use it as a planning tool but put it away once you are ready to actually write an order.