Effects Based Operations (EBO) - is it valid?

[Cavguy]

Since coming to my most recent job I've been a witness to some heated statements about Effects Based Operations from lots of intelligent people. It seems there are three camps - those who think it is the best thing since sliced bread, those who think it's a concept that briefs well but is intellectually bankrupt in application, and those (like myself) who get lost because we don't understand the arguments.

I will state up front I have done no detailed reading or research on EBO and understand only the outlines of it. I understand it competes with and/or is compatible with Center of Gravity analysis, which I am very familiar with.

What intrigues me is that a number of the smartest COIN thinkers I know are completely opposed to EBO as a model, usually spouting extremely dismissive comments. I also noticed that EBO proponents tend to argue that if we all just moved to EBO, the war would be over.

So I'm asking the community the following:

• Is there a good overview/primer (short) on EBO?
• Where has EBO been effectively used? Are there case studies? Why do the advocates think it is superior?
• What are the intellectual/application flaws of EBO? I see a lot of complaints, but no one has explained to me why it is the devil's creation.
• Should or should it not be used by forces as a planning model?

Genuinely interested in the feedback.

[SteveMetz]

Since coming to my most recent job I've been a witness to some heated statements about Effects Based Operations from lots of intelligent people. It seems there are three camps - those who think it is the best things since sliced bread, those who think it's a concept that briefs well but is intellectually bankrupt in application, and those (like myself) who get lost because we don't understand the arguments.

I will state up front I have done no detailed reading or research on EBO and understand only the outlines of it. I understand it competes with and/or is compatible with Center of Gravity analysis, which I am very familiar with

What intrigues me is that a number of the smartest COIN thinkers I know are completely opposed to EBO as a model, usually spouting extremely dismissive comments. I also noticed that EBO proponents tend to argue that if we all just moved to EBO, the war would be over.

So I'm asking the community the following:

• Is there a good overview/primer (short) on EBO?
• Where has EBO been effectively used? Are there case studies? Why do the advocates think it is superior?
• What are the intellectual/application flaws of EBO? I see a lot of complaints, but no one has explained to me why it is the devil's creation.
• Should or should it not be used by forces as a planning model?

Genuinely interested in the feedback.

A few years ago, I proposed an EBO way of thinking about COIN based on psychological effects. (Of course, that certainly does not invalidate your point that "the smartest COIN thinkers...are completely opposed to EBO as a model). See pp. 25-26 of my 2004 SSI study. I initially developed this off the top of my head at a TRADOC workshop. The JFCOM rep there (an Air Force guy) nearly had an orgasm. I'm a bit surprised that it hasn't gained any traction, but I haven't been pushing it much.

[Eden]

I recently prepared a lesson plan on the Effects Based Approach to Operations - note the subtle difference from Effects Based Operations - using JFCOMs Commanders Handbook for an Effects Based Approach to Joint Operations. It is pre-doctrinal and I have heard it is being pulled, but it is a good guide to generally accepted tenets.

I added in my own caveats, having been a planner at the joint level and seen its application in Afghanistan in CJTF76 and ISAF.

* Requires deep systemic understanding. The first principle is that you must have an almost zen-like understanding of the operational environment, which we generally don't.
* Requires clear, consistent, genuine objectives. Another thing we are not generally good at.
* Systems are reactive. You can't just apply effects without changing the systems; unless you are extremely good at monitoring the operational environment, you will not recognize that the system you are attempting to affect (economic system, IED network, guerilla army, etc) has fundamentally changed and the actions you select are no longer having the desired effect.
* Subject to wishful thinking. Hoo, boy, is it ever. "If we do this, this will happen", announces the expert. And he will not be budged in the face of evidence.
* Same action can produce different effects. As someone said, Iraq is not one war but many. Repairing an electrical line causes joy in one neighborhood, anger in another. Easy to paralyze yourself through analysis.
* Post hoc, ergo propter hoc. We often mistakenly link cause and effect.
* There is a reason we have a box to think in. EBO often leads to a violation of the simplicity principle.

In ISAF you had a Joint Effects Cell that handled assessment, formulated deisred effects, ran the targeting cell, maintained the Prioritized Effects List, did senior level engagements, and chaired the Effects Working Group. They were segregated from the planners and the J3, which led to disconnects. Effects were not properly integrated into planning products, and the J3 became a competitor for resources with the JEC Chief, who outranked him. In CJTF 76 there were - in effect, ahem - two effects cells. One handled non-kinetic effects through CA, IO, PSYOPs, etc., while the other handled kinetic effects. To my mind this defeats the purpose of EBO, but these cells were more or less executors rather than directly integrated into planning or operations. In sum, I have yet to see anybody get it right.

As for the concept as a whole, well, we've been doing effects based operations for a long time. You can tell a cavalryman to 'Screen PL Red' or you can give him a desired effect: "Enemy ground forces unable to recon beyond PL Red". To my mind, EBO tends to overcomplicate what is already a very complex business. It is supposed to enhance unity of effort, but I have found that it actually detracts from it. Moreover, it only exacerbates our proclivities for vague guidance, detailed matrices, and huge target lists.

On the other hand, it is a useful way to think about what you want to accomplish, and it can be an aid to imaginative planning. In summary, I would use it as a planning tool but put it away once you are ready to actually write an order.

[Tom Odom]

On the other hand, it is a useful way to think about what you want to accomplish, and it can be an aid to imaginative planning. In summary, I would use it as a planning tool but put it away once you are ready to actually write an order.

And that is critical! Otherwise the tape loop just recycles, again and again....and again.

[Cavguy]

* Requires deep systemic understanding. The first principle is that you must have an almost zen-like understanding of the operational environment, which we generally don't.
* Requires clear, consistent, genuine objectives. Another thing we are not generally good at.
* Systems are reactive. You can't just apply effects without changing the systems; unless you are extremely good at monitoring the operational environment, you will not recognize that the system you are attempting to affect (economic system, IED network, guerilla army, etc) has fundamentally changed and the actions you select are no longer having the desired effect.
* Subject to wishful thinking. Hoo, boy, is it ever. "If we do this, this will happen", announces the expert. And he will not be budged in the face of evidence.
* Same action can produce different effects. As someone said, Iraq is not one war but many. Repairing an electrical line causes joy in one neighborhood, anger in another. Easy to paralyze yourself through analysis.
* Post hoc, ergo propter hoc. We often mistakenly link cause and effect.
* There is a reason we have a box to think in. EBO often leads to a violation of the simplicity principle.

Eden,

Great observations. I just finished a conversation with Hacksaw about it, he said almost the exact same things. It seems the "Joint" concept of EBO tends to assume/require a depth of understanding of the environment that is simply unrealistic - i.e. if I do A, B will happen. And that's given your assumptions about the environment are valid, we understand the model, and we have enough understanding for it. Given the "assumptions" going into OIF, I can see why the critics of EBO are legion.

Hacksaw also noted that EBO has great appeal to the "process" mindset, those that like preplanned fires, assessments, and mathematical models to define environments. My experience with COIN and human interaction, not to mention "Black Swans", tend to make me skeptical.

As for the concept as a whole, well, we've been doing effects based operations for a long time. You can tell a cavalryman to 'Screen PL Red' or you can give him a desired effect: "Enemy ground forces unable to recon beyond PL Red". To my mind, EBO tends to overcomplicate what is already a very complex business. It is supposed to enhance unity of effort, but I have found that it actually detracts from it. Moreover, it only exacerbates our proclivities for vague guidance, detailed matrices, and huge target lists.

On the other hand, it is a useful way to think about what you want to accomplish, and it can be an aid to imaginative planning. In summary, I would use it as a planning tool but put it away once you are ready to actually write an order.

Maybe Wiif was on to something talking about various "definitions" of EBO. I have little problem conceptualizing it at the tactical level. And as you've said, I've been doing it for years but not calling it EBO. Figuring out what I want to achieve, focusing all lines of operations to achieve it, developing some way to measure the impact, and adjust the strategy accordingly. Or as Tom says, D3A.

I'd venture that's what my company did in Tal Afar and BDE did in Ramadi.

I guess the hardest part is understanding what needs to be done, and measuring the right things. If my operational goal doesn't address the root causes in COIN (i.e. approaching from my POV rather than the populations), all the EBO won't help if the enemy is playing baseball while I'm playing football. That's where COIN IPB comes in.

Am I (sort of) tracking?

Also, I noted some traffic when GEN Mattis took over JFCOM that it was to be the death of EBO for awhile, he wasn't a fan. I also saw an Army position paper somewhere admonishing TRADOC not to use EBO, that it was not army doctrine or an approved program, only a Joint methodology. However, I'm thinking that was about the high level EBO you define, not tactical level EBO concepts like Tom is describing.

Sounds like we have a terminology problem, like Wiif noted.

[William F. Owen]

As for the concept as a whole, well, we've been doing effects based operations for a long time.

To quote Professor Chris Bellamy, "when were Operations, ever not effects based?"

EBO is either new or old wine in new bottles. If it is the later, then why the new bottle?

[William F. Owen]

• Is there a good overview/primer (short) on EBO?
• Where has EBO been effectively used? Are there case studies? Why do the advocates think it is superior?
• What are the intellectual/application flaws of EBO? I see a lot of complaints, but no one has explained to me why it is the devil's creation.
• Should or should it not be used by forces as a planning model?

Genuinely interested in the feedback.

Oh well... goodbye sleep!

One problem with EBO is that it is many different things to many different folks. 3 years ago, when I spoke at an EBO conference, I had amassed some 7 differing and even contradictory definitions.

My personal experience of arguing against EBO is that it's defenders keep morphing it into something else, every time an argument comes up short. The other propensity they have is to label existing and well understood concepts as being examples EBO, when they are clearly not.

The acid test I use it to read any document that advocates EBO, and the cross out the words "Effects Based." If the meaning or sense does not change, or becomes substantially different from the accepted norm, then why include the words?

[Tom Odom]

Cav,

I distinguish EBO at the tactical level versus what is played at the strategic and operational levels as EBO. We have been involved in this realm down here since 2001; even before then we used targeting as a way for recocking operations.

Regardless of whether you call it EBO, EBP, full spectrum operational planning, D3A, or pancakes, our goal in using it is in line with the same goals as D3A. that is to decide what to targert, find the target, synchronize lethal and non-lethal operations delivered against the target and assess the results.

The key goals are to fuze lethal and non-lethal operations and assess results against objectives to reach the desired endstate. Where and why I diferentiate between this tactical application versus strategic is that the latter is very much tied to the idea we can collapse an enemy if we just kill or bomb the right thing at the right time.

For reading look at:

CALL Newsletter 03-23 Targeting CMO
CALL Handbook 04-14 Effects Based Operations from Brigade to Company
CALL Handbook 05-19 A Special Study on the Effects based Approach to Military Operations
CALL Special Study 07-02 The Brigade Planning Process
CALL Special Study 07-03 The Battalion Planning Process

We now have a new targeting CD that we are developing that should be available soon to you guys.
Best
Tom

[William F. Owen]

CALL Newsletter 03-23 Targeting CMO
CALL Handbook 04-14 Effects Based Operations from Brigade to Company
CALL Handbook 05-19 A Special Study on the Effects based Approach to Military Operations
CALL Special Study 07-02 The Brigade Planning Process
CALL Special Study 07-03 The Battalion Planning Process

Anything open source? I am very much in the market for useful ideas, but there doesn't seem to have been much new since Foch and his Staff Collage Lectures of 1911.

[Tom Odom]

They are all FOUO

[Tom Odom]

I guess the hardest part is understanding what needs to be done, and measuring the right things. If my operational goal doesn't address the root causes in COIN (i.e. approaching from my POV rather than the populations), all the EBO won't help if the enemy is playing baseball while I'm playing football. That's where COIN IPB comes in.

Absolutely and it is all about targeting the effort against the correct things. That is nothing new but when you get into the realm of non-lethal IO synchronization of that effort with lethal operations becomes critical. What happens when we separate the tactical IO effort from the tactical maneuver effort? We get a desynched result and one often working at cross purposes. that was our experience in trying to develop Tac IO TTPs separate from "real operations". They got shoved aside, marginalized, or completely ignored. As you know better than most that is not a good thing in COIN.

best

Tom

[Hacksaw]

Cav,



For reading look at:

CALL Newsletter 03-23 Targeting CMO
CALL Handbook 04-14 Effects Based Operations from Brigade to Company
CALL Handbook 05-19 A Special Study on the Effects based Approach to Military Operations
CALL Special Study 07-02 The Brigade Planning Process
CALL Special Study 07-03 The Battalion Planning Process

Tom,

I think CALL was directed to yank anything with EBO in it... May or may not apply to last two, but the first three ought not be available unless i'm mistaken. The reason being the directive CAV guy notes...

CAVGUY... In response to did I get it about right Yes grasshoper

Live well and row

[Tom Odom]

Tom,

I think CALL was directed to yank anything with EBO in it... May or may not apply to last two, but the first three ought not be available unless i'm mistaken. The reason being the directive CAV guy notes...

CAVGUY... In response to did I get it about right Yes grasshoper

Live well and row

Nope

04-14

05-19

They are no longer in print but are available online.

07-2 and 07-3 are still available in print as well as online.

[slapout9]

[*]Is there a good overview/primer (short) on EBO?[*]Where has EBO been effectively used? Are there case studies? Why do the advocates think it is superior?[*]What are the intellectual/application flaws of EBO? I see a lot of complaints, but no one has explained to me why it is the devil's creation.[*]Should or should it not be used by forces as a planning model?[/LIST]

Genuinely interested in the feedback.

Cavguy, yes there are several encluding one I helped a SWC member with, but I am busy as he....for the rest of this week. So check this weekend for details. PS. EBO is now called SBW Slapout Based Warfare that's a joke everyone calm down. Later