Listen Up Marines, We Belong at Sea

[Bill Moore]

Marines for small wars and the Army for big wars is grossly oversimplified and a terrible construct in my opinion to design force structure. Several other aspects must be considered, one of them is the duration of a conflict, whether big or small. Another thought, while war is far from being an anachronism, but we have many security interests beyond war that will require the military to develop new capabilities that have little to do with war. Furthermore we are pursuing a strategy of engagement and deterrence to hopefully avoid, but more realistic, reduce the occurrance of war. All of these should impact force design. Furthermore the bifurcation of roles for what type of war each service should be designed to fight tosses our joint doctrine out the window. I suspect we'll see the services advocate for specific service roles that may be illogical in an effort to protect budgets instead of doing the right thing which is designing the right joint force capabilities. The Marines clearly have some unique capabilities that will likely be employed several times between now and 2030, but one of them is not a unique capability to fight small wars.

[slapout9]

What if the Navy doesn't want the Corps? I mean look at the Navy now. Need some hostages rescued from darkest Africa.......call the Navy SEALS. Need some ornery Pirates taken care of......call the Navy SEALS. Need an international Terrorist killed inside somebody Else's country.......call the Navy SEALS.

The Marines became a completely separate service by law if I am not mistaken.......so maybe the Navy may not want them back after all they could use that money for other primary Naval ships instead of having to invest so much in huge amphibious operations they may never happen again. The Corps may have a real problem.

[Bob's World]

Size has always been a poor characteristic to define wars by, as it offers few clues as to what type of conflict it is, and thereby what types of approaches or forces are most likely to achieve the desired effects.

We need a force designed for the world we live in today, and one designed also to deter the types of threats we see in the future. This is why we sustained a war fighting army through the peace of the Cold War. With the adoption of a containment strategy we also adopted the geo-strategic reality of our allies - which means we surrendered the geo-strategic advantages of our own. We need to understand that. We need to think about what type of decisions that drove, why it drove them, and what, if any, of that thinking is still valid to our situation today.

Nuclear forces and capabilities exist not to be used. Their function is purely that of deterrence of other nuclear states, and so need to be kept to the minimum amount necessary to perform that function. I suspect we could find additional savings there.

Land forces are to seize and hold ground. They do not offer much of a deterrent effect, IMO. Nations like those of the Eurasian landmass have a geo-strategic challenge that the US does not. Good fences make good neighbors, and in many cases no such "fences" exist. Said another way, the US possesses a geo-strategic advantage that others do not. Geo-strategy has become a neglected art. Some, like George Friedman, are notable exceptions, but by in large the US today looks at the world as if we were still defined by the geostrategic realities of our Cold War mission, allies and opponents.

I don't think we need a USMC sized, trained organized and equipped to re-fight the battle of Iwo Jima. Nor do I think we need a US Army sized, trained organized and equipped to re-fight Desert Storm or Iraqi Freedom (both conflicts of choice, not necessity).

We need to stop building forces and arguments on invalid arguments and assumptions. We need to do our strategic homework free of the inertia and bias that dominates our "strategic" thinking today.

But DC is a land of inertia. DC is a land of bias. Good Cold Warriors dominate the scene, though they now vie for space with those who see "terrorism" in every national movement or non-state organization that dares to challenge our interpretation of what "right" looks like. QDR is certainly not an unbiased assessment. It is a competition of service advocacy framed by a crossfire of formal and informal policy advocacy advancing some line of inertia and bias or another.

That dynamic is unlikely to change much. But we can lay a better strategic foundation to build upon. That is within our power to do, yet no one is doing it. Not at Defense. Not at State. Not at any of the many think tanks (so far as I have seen). Everything needs to be on the table as we look at who we are, who we want to be, and the world we will do that within. Sacred cows will be slaughtered and new ones will emerge.

Personally, I think we can do very well with a much smaller Army. I think that much of our peacetime expeditionary work can be done by SOF and USMC forces tailored for that role. I don't think there is a large demand signal for "building partner capacity" or "counterterrorism" either one. Some demand to be sure, but it is one that is best seen as narrowly defined and limited to avoid the dangers associated with excesses on either line of operation. We don't need a navy designed to patrol the brown water of the world, nor to go head to head with China of their coast. Similarly our tactical air power needs to be designed for the tactical air missions we live with, not the ones Air Force general fantasize about. But first we need to wipe the strategic slate clean, roll up our strategic sleeves, and do our strategic homework.

[gute]

Personally, I think we can do very well with a much smaller Army. I think that much of our peacetime expeditionary work can be done by SOF and USMC forces tailored for that role. I don't think there is a large demand signal for "building partner capacity" or "counterterrorism" either one. Some demand to be sure, but it is one that is best seen as narrowly defined and limited to avoid the dangers associated with excesses on either line of operation. We don't need a navy designed to patrol the brown water of the world, nor to go head to head with China of their coast. Similarly our tactical air power needs to be designed for the tactical air missions we live with, not the ones Air Force general fantasize about. But first we need to wipe the strategic slate clean, roll up our strategic sleeves, and do our strategic homework.

Completely agree and this could be forced on the Army and Marine Corps, depending on the next election, with sequestration or the economy.

What is your strategic assessment?

[Morgan]

I don't think there is a large demand signal for "building partner capacity" or "counterterrorism" either one.

Perhaps we can substitute "building partner capacity" (BPC) for a large standing Army......reduce the Army to 400,000 (the worst-case scenario according to the CNAS report, as I recall) and the USMC to 100,000 (maybe less) and we will still have an active land combat force of 500,000 (do we want to go smaller?).

The active duty force would become a bit more specialized (I know many strongly disagree with this), particularly within the Army and even Marines, while the generalists would be maintained in our reserve forces. Through BPC, the Army (and USG in general) would develop allied forces who bear the brunt in any flare-up of any land-based hybrid threats we expect as part of the norm during this century and the Marines & SOF handle CT, A2AD, UW, DA, anything that might fall under the moniker "small war" (as in wars/ conflicts of very limited duration with narrow, well-defined objectives).

[Bob's World]

If partners feel they need additional capacity, they are fully capable of developing the amount and type they need.

This idea that we will train others to go out and do our fighting for us smacks a bit too much of several failed empires who have gone before us. The reality is that if we stop trying to exert so much control over situations that have so little impact upon our our truly vital interests, we will find that we have excess capacity in spades.

As to your proposed numbers for the Army and Marines, it is well to remember that these are two very different organizations with very different missions. Just because we often use them in the same manner does not make them the same. They have unique constitutional foundations, and the Marines have a much more active peacetime engagement role than the Army does. Marines exist to conduct short duration expeditions as needed; while Armies exist to fight long duration wars. Why would we keep 4 times the warfighting force in times of peace?? Better to sustain more Marines and accept the risk of cutting more Army. We need to be smart, not fair.

Start point to getting to smart solutions is to take on the strategic questions first. We need a new foundation of thought for how we view the world and our role in it. Then we need to design institutions, policies and forces to implement the same. This is what we did to implement containment, and now it is long past time to go through that same degree of overhaul yet again.

[Bill Moore]

Bob,

I agree we have collectively over stated the demand signal for "build partner capacity", and I believe we are fooling ourselves if we honestly think we can outsource our fighting. To some extent we can, but we can use IMET, and small footprint training elements on the ground to help partners develop specific capabilities and capacities. We don't need capacity building BDE's in my opinion unless we foresee more OEF-As and OIFs.

If partners feel they need additional capacity, they are fully capable of developing the amount and type they need.

You know that this statement is not true in many cases.

This idea that we will train others to go out and do our fighting for us smacks a bit too much of several failed empires who have gone before us. The reality is that if we stop trying to exert so much control over situations that have so little impact upon our our truly vital interests, we will find that we have excess capacity in spades.

This is valid and deserves further discussion. More thoughts later, household six is issuing orders, I have run :-).

[gute]

This is valid and deserves further discussion. More thoughts later, household six is issuing orders, I have run :-).

Now, that's funny. I refer to my better half as Gunny - she sounds like one at times. Course, she is married to a full grown kid.

IMO this is gonna be settled by economic disaster in this country.

[Fuchs]

What if the Navy doesn't want the Corps? I mean look at the Navy now. Need some hostages rescued from darkest Africa.......call the Navy SEALS. Need some ornery Pirates taken care of......call the Navy SEALS. Need an international Terrorist killed inside somebody Else's country.......call the Navy SEALS.

The Marines became a completely separate service by law if I am not mistaken.......so maybe the Navy may not want them back after all they could use that money for other primary Naval ships instead of having to invest so much in huge amphibious operations they may never happen again. The Corps may have a real problem.

Their problem is that their huge amphibious force was originally invented for War Plan Orange and there is most likely no such thing in the files right now.


The Marines will probably have a panic phase after OEF-A, but all services have that from time to time.
The Army switched its panic mode on and feared "irrelevance" after the disaster in Albania, for example.
The navy got increasingly uneasy about its lack of prominent employment during the occupation of Iraq.


Sooner or later U.S. politicians will play some adventure games anew and send the marines to demolish something and all the fears about budgetary future will be gone again.

[gute]

What if the Navy doesn't want the Corps? I mean look at the Navy now. Need some hostages rescued from darkest Africa.......call the Navy SEALS. Need some ornery Pirates taken care of......call the Navy SEALS. Need an international Terrorist killed inside somebody Else's country.......call the Navy SEALS.

The Marines became a completely separate service by law if I am not mistaken.......so maybe the Navy may not want them back after all they could use that money for other primary Naval ships instead of having to invest so much in huge amphibious operations they may never happen again. The Corps may have a real problem.

Why have SEALS if you have Marines? I know, I know, they ain't going anywhere after killing OBL. Maybe the USMC becomes the Spec Ops side of the Navy - SWCC, SEALS, MSOBs. The Army has Delta, SFGs, 160th and the Rangers. The Navy has the Marine Corps.

Unlikely.

[Fuchs]

I never understood the SEALs.
There's little infantry competence in the navy (counting USMC as not-navy), so where do they recruit personnel with already basic infantry skill from?

Furthermore; why do they seem to be a "1st mass, 2nd mass, 3rd mass" tactics outfit and still be considered "special"?

[gute]

I never understood the SEALs.
There's little infantry competence in the navy (counting USMC as not-navy), so where do they recruit personnel with already basic infantry skill from?

Furthermore; why do they seem to be a "1st mass, 2nd mass, 3rd mass" tactics outfit and still be considered "special"?

The infantry skills are taught after Buds. Some were prior service Marines. These are high functioning, self motivated dudes. I don't understand the reference to 1st mass, 2nd mass, third mass - what does it mean?

[jcustis]

I don't know if we can accomplish an unbiased strategic review that achieves the appropriate end.

I'm putting odds on the US dropping JDAMs or firing missiles into Iran before February of next year anyway, so any review will be tilted for a good 5-7 years if not longer.

[Fuchs]

The infantry skills are taught after Buds. Some were prior service Marines. These are high functioning, self motivated dudes. I don't understand the reference to 1st mass, 2nd mass, third mass - what does it mean?

Massing of bullets and men appears to substitute for tactical finesse in what's been published about SEALs, and this has also been the impression of some people who know more than what's been published.

[gute]

Massing of bullets and men appears to substitute for tactical finesse in what's been published about SEALs, and this has also been the impression of some people who know more than what's been published.

I don't have much experience dealing with SEALS other than playing one on T.V.

[jcustis]

I never understood the SEALs.
There's little infantry competence in the navy (counting USMC as not-navy), so where do they recruit personnel with already basic infantry skill from?

Furthermore; why do they seem to be a "1st mass, 2nd mass, 3rd mass" tactics outfit and still be considered "special"?

I'm scratching my head about the "mass" comment as well. There are not enough SEALs to really mass anywhere. Have they experienced missteps and problems that exploded into a situation larger than the size of the original element that ran into trouble? Sure did, but their numbers employed on missions have always been relatively small.

Furthermore, they really don't need infantry competence for most of the missions they are assigned these days, at least not in a classical use of the word infantry.

Swimming, special recce, direct action, etc. can benefit from an infantry background, but it is by no means a prerequisite.

[Fuchs]

That's relative to the geography and OPFOR in question.

About 30 men raiding a single house at the same time is an application of "mass".
One could claim it's about "surprise" as well (as the quantity allows for reaching all rooms quickly), but it's still not exactly intricate tactics.

[jcustis]

That's relative to the geography and OPFOR in question.

About 30 men raiding a single house at the same time is an application of "mass".
One could claim it's about "surprise" as well (as the quantity allows for reaching all rooms quickly), but it's still not exactly intricate tactics.

When you have the time and resources to employ against a single structure in a rolling hard hit, why wouldn't you use mass? It certainly allows you to dominate an objective, do what needs to be done (including TSE) quickly, and then get off the objective in good order.

I agree that it's not intricate tactics. I've seen it done surreptitiously by a rifle squad in Iraq, and the tgt presented as much physical threat to the raiding force that many HVTs did, yet those special ops HVT tgts consumed a hundred-fold more resources to go after. TTPs are 't the point of this thread though.

SEALs have a role to play. I think as with all special purpose forces, they should stick to that role or risk the deleterious effects of mission creep, but they are very good at certain things--frogmen being a prime example.

[ganulv]

I never understood the SEALs.

I guess my understanding is that the Navy had the UDTs which morphed into the SEALs during the U.S. involvement in Vietnam (a couple of Vietnam veterans have made an association between the SEALs and the Mekong Delta to me, I don’t know if that’s historical memory or solid historiography). Perhaps nowadays it is more helpful to think of the SEALs as part of the Navy’s contribution to USSOCOM than as part of the Navy?

There's little infantry competence in the navy (counting USMC as not-navy), so where do they recruit personnel with already basic infantry skill from?

I imagine there are a few sailors who joined the Navy looking to be SEALs, didn’t make it through BUDS (no shame in that), and are now scraping paint somewhere in the Indian Ocean for the duration of their enlistment contracts.

[Steve Blair]

I guess my understanding is that the Navy had the UDTs which morphed into the SEALs during the U.S. involvement in Vietnam (a couple of Vietnam veterans have made an association between the SEALs and the Mekong Delta to me, I don’t know if that’s historical memory or solid historiography). Perhaps nowadays it is more helpful to think of the SEALs as part of the Navy’s contribution to USSOCOM than as part of the Navy?

The morphing began before Vietnam, actually, although the Navy kept UDTs around (and continues to do so). Kennedy's push for SF had something to do with that growth, so the link between SEALs and the Mekong Delta is pretty accurate as far as it goes when you consider the historical context of the association.