Listen Up Marines, We Belong at Sea

[Bill Moore]

Posted by major.rod

Second we didn’t place more than half of our combat units in the Guard because of the determination that we need to place large numbers of soldiers in harm’s way in a short period of time (e.g. 30 days). We learned during Desert Storm that even with 90 days of training our best Guard units were not prepared for high OPTEMPO operations and while the Guard has done a magnificent job in the low intensity conflict we have fought in for the last decade an unmentioned fact is the large majority of conventional guard units were given security type missions as opposed to the varied mission set typically assigned active formations.

Well said and factually accurate. Bob's proposal dismisses the view of deterence in my opinion, and while maintaining the force structure is expensive I suspect it is ultimately more cost effective than not deterring a conflict or launching into a conflict ill prepared which would not be acceptable to the American people. Bob still makes good points, but the reality concerning NG limited capabilities is ignored, and replaced with an illusionary history of Guard performance.

[Ken White]

Well said and factually accurate...

Not really all that factually accurate...

...the reality concerning NG limited capabilities is ignored, and replaced with an illusionary history of Guard performance.

In reverse order, it is somewhat illusionry but the capabilities issue is the crux of of the issue. The Marine Corps Reserve fields generally better trained units than does the Guard simply because the Marines are willing to devote more active personnel, time and money to their Reserve units. Still, the Guard offers a better and more timely deployment option than recruiting from scratch. It cannot compete with Active Component combat units at Bn and above though it generally can at Co level. Most Guard and Reserve CS/CSS units are as good or better than many AC units. It should also be borne in mind that not all AC units are good, much less superbly competent...

Peace and war, I've been in AC units that were as competent as anything I've seen or heard of -- I've been in others that had no business being deployed because they were incompetent or woefully undertrained. That includes conventional units and SF in both categories of performance.

Guard or AC, no difference in that aspect, some units are really excellent, many are not. They're marginal and -- usually -- just good enough. That's the design factor influenced by personnel rotations, anyone expecting more will be disappointed.

[Bob's World]

I owe more on this later (no time now) but a few clarifying points:

1. Of course AC units are better in general on any given day than RC units are. Pre-Mob that is. A few months into real combat both are equally experienced and awash in individual draftee replacements.

2. Desert Storm was a conflict of choice. A choice the people and Congress had far less than a constitutional say in due to the fact we had a war-fighting army sitting on the shelf. This was true in Vietnam, Grenada, the Balkans, Iraq, Afhanistan, etc, etc. We cannot begin to measure the damage this has done to our system of governance. We can however measure that none of those were essential operations that we had to win, or even fight for that matter.

3. 90 days is arbitrary as hell. Name the country that can put a sustainable military presence onto US soil in 10 times that amount of time. Just one. I'lll wait.

4. Ken is right, it was a hatchet job on the Georgia guard boys. AC later did the same thing to Guard units to keep them our of the CTCs as well. One Army, two standards. AC units go as they are, regardless of how well trained or if fully manned. Then the AC demands the Guard send 100% strength units andl then sends AC evaluators to assess their training readiness first. For CTC participation the AC evaluators deemed that for Guard units ALL LEADER TASKS WERE ALSO ESSENTIAL TASKS. Major Jones stood up and told a certain AC Colonel he was full of s$%&; but my generals meekly sat there and took it.

We've lost our historic perspective and we have lost our strategic perspective as well. AC vs RC silliness aside.

[Bob's World]

Posted by major.rod



Well said and factually accurate. Bob's proposal dismisses the view of deterrence in my opinion, and while maintaining the force structure is expensive I suspect it is ultimately more cost effective than not deterring a conflict or launching into a conflict ill prepared which would not be acceptable to the American people. Bob still makes good points, but the reality concerning NG limited capabilities is ignored, and replaced with an illusionary history of Guard performance.

Well said, certainly, but only factually accurate if assessed on a very very short memory/timeline. I would encourage people to study the entire history of the US Army. To study the thinking that went into our Constitution and the debates that took place. Any arguments framed solely in the context of our Cold War and immediate post-Cold war context are incomplete and biased by that incompleteness.

Some like to make the "first battles" argument, which is equally flawed unless balanced with the far more important "last battles" context. Yes we missed 3 years of WWI and another 3 years of WWII. Yes we struggled in our initial engagements once we finally built an army around our few active and guard divisions and deployed them while a draftee Army was built. But we were the force of decision and ended both conflicts on our terms with untold numbers of lives saved. Why could we do this? We could do it because of our geostrategic strength. The same geo-strategy that validates why we need a strong navy with a very important expeditionary peacetime role for the USMC.

This does not mean NO peacetime regular army, but it does mean we can have a much smaller one than we do today. We have many tools of deterrence, and the best ones are not land forces. Did our large land army deter Saddam from taking Kuwait? No.

But our large land army has allowed a long line of presidents to commit the nation to war without the cooling off period that the national debate centered around Congress having to authorize and fund the raising of an army provides. That is what our founding fathers intended. Argue with them, not me. I agree with them and I have heard no arguments or seen any facts to suggest that things have changed today so as to render their positions moot. We fight wars more often for emotion than for interest (think how many battle Cries begin with "Remember (insert emotional defeat here)" rather than with a statement of some vital national interest. That is how Americans are hard wired. All the more reason for a cooling off period. Just like we don't let Americans buy a gun in the heat of the moment. Yet we let our presidents start wars in the heat of the moment.

Decisions made post Vietnam are interesting, but not decisive, and not even close to the real reasons why we fight our wars with citizen soldiers in America. The self-serving active army wanted to put all the logistics in the RC and keep the sexy gun-fighting commands in the regular force. It was only the massive political clout of the Guard that forced them to leave combat units in the Guard; and then the Army broke itself so that it couldn't go anywhere or do anything without having to mob the reserves. This abuses the reserves for non-warfighting missions. We need a BALANCED and properly sized regular force. Not sure if the current adversarial process we use will or can produce such an army. But step one is to get the facts and the history straight, and that means all the facts and all the history, not just the past 60-70 years.

[major.rod]

Ken – I’ll have to respectfully disagree with the force structure argument. I don’t discount your point. There are political issues but they are not the determining force.

One may use AC prejudice to explain the over 90 days it took to certify the 48th. The fact remains the balloon went up in Sep 90 and four months later the 48th wasn’t ready. The fight was over FIVE months later.

Parochailism and budget battles aren’t the sole causes of the Guard’s inability to be ready to execute across the spectrum as an AC unit does. I’m no stranger to the Guard after spending every day of two years with an enhanced infantry bde. One could not find a better bunch of patriots but it’s INSANITY to expect a Guard unit to perform to the same level as an AC unit after all of less than 30 days of training a year or even after hooking it up to the premob firehose of training for another 30 days. Been there. It doesn’t work and so we do the best we can by limiting the mission set and getting guardsman capable to execute those missions. Much of this is not the individual’s fault. Leaders and staff just can’t master the skills in 60 days of training. Blaming budget and parochialism for a lack of time is just hubris.

“The 'fact' that Saudi oil is needed by the rest of the world does not give the US reason to insure its provision except for US domestic political reasons.” Uh what do we run our factories/cars on? Water? Japan was forced to initiate WWII for very similar reasons. It’s simply not a war of choice when a nation is facing financial ruin and the subsequent turmoil.

Ref the Marine size, “the Army goes out of its way to pick fights with them over inconsequential issues” Examples and how does that impact the size issue? The size of the Corps was written into law in 1952.

More importantly, why do we have a force of 250K marines when we can only float 30K?

I don’t understand the rapid rotation of key players comment. We have deployed units for almost twice the amount of time that their Marine counterparts deploy for over the last decade.

The Marines field generally better trained units? By what measure? The Marines deploy more active duty troops to train? Example? I’m pretty familiar with what the Army does in this regard. What’s the Marine model? I’d like to see your numbers also when it comes to money. BTW, Reserve Marines also train for less than 30 days a year.

Hi Bob –
1.A few months in combat does not prepare you to execute missions the same as an AC unit. A simple example would be if you are doing route security or base security you aren’t training to conduct an air assault or the priorities or work to stand up a COP.

2.Conflict of choice. Using your standard declaring war on Nazi Germany was a conflict of choice. The constitution says nothing about wars of choice nor does it say anything about the size of the Army. I reject the theory that a large Army means you have to fight. Considering the size of our standing Army since WWII and how much we’ve fought since then we aren’t doing so bad when you consider our first century and almost constant conflict with a very small Army (Rev War 1775–1783, Chickamauga Wars, Northwest Indian War, Tecumseh, the Creek War, War of 1812, Removal era wars, Second Seminole War, West of the Mississippi (1811–1923), Texas, Mexican-American War, Pacific Northwest, Southwest, California, Great Basin, Great Plains, Dakota War, Civil War, Sioux War of 1865 Black Hills War)

3.The world has a lot of input on whether a war happens or not and comparing WWI & II to today and the global interdependence we rely on is just faulty logic. (Our founding fathers may have been shocked by the Mexican American War) If you want to withdraw from the world to just our shores your approach makes sense but then again we don’t need much special ops except to organize the resistance when the enemy lands on the beach.

4.90 days isn’t arbitrary. OPLANS rely on synchronized deployment schedules and the enemy landing on our beaches isn’t the only threat we need to be prepared for unless you’re a Ron Paul isolationist.

5.Which leader tasks shouldn’t be essential tasks?

BTW, love your Einstein quote

[BayonetBrant]

One may use AC prejudice to explain the over 90 days it took to certify the 48th. The fact remains the balloon went up in Sep 90 and four months later the 48th wasn’t ready. The fight was over FIVE months later.

It's very easy to not certify someone when you're moving the standard on them. I've personally worked with people who were there at the time, on all three sides: the OPFOR, Ops Gp, and the SCARNG (1-263 AR was sent with the 48th BDE). Every one of them will tell you that the 48th was hitting ARTEP standards within about 30-35 days on being on the ground at NTC. Then the standards started changing, some of it based on "feedback" from the Gulf, some of it quite frankly just silly. There's not a single AC unit that was pulled out of Ft Hood, Ft Stewart, or Germany that was required to train a battalion-sized deliberate breaching operation; the 48th was required to execute it perfectly before they were signed off on it. They were no less ready than any AC unit that was sent. They were given a different standard of "ready".

but it’s INSANITY to expect a Guard unit to perform to the same level as an AC unit after all of less than 30 days of training a year or even after hooking it up to the premob firehose of training for another 30 days.

Strip out the time that AC units set aside for block leave, the CSM's rock-painting detail, funeral detail, red cycle, etc, etc, and boil down the actual number of training days that AC units get. It's probably a lot closer to the 30 days that ARNG units get than you realize. Oh yeah, as soon as an ARNG unit gets within 1 year of their deployment, they start pulling double drill weekends/month, sending folks off to individual schools, extended ATs, etc, so that your last year before your actual mob date, you've probably pulled closer to 75 days of training, minimum. More if you're a key leader or a critical MOS. Again, compare to the AC guys and you'll see the number of training days they are actually training start to converge.

90 days isn’t arbitrary. OPLANS rely on synchronized deployment schedules and the enemy landing on our beaches isn’t the only threat we need to be prepared for unless you’re a Ron Paul isolationist.

90 days is arbitrary. The OPLANS you reference are sequenced, but it's not like they're sequenced to seasonal weather patterns, or tidal variations. They're synchronized to arbitrary numbers. Change the OPLAN synch to 60 days, and suddenly you need ARNG units mob'ed in 60 days. Change the synch to 120 days, and presto! you give ARNG units 120 days to get out the door.
The 90 days isn't the arbitrary number; the decisions in the deployment plans from which those "90s" were derived was what was arbitrary.

[Ken White]

Ken – I’ll have to respectfully disagree with the force structure argument. I don’t discount your point. There are political issues but they are not the determining force.

They are not necessarily so now so far as I know -- they were then and I was peripherally involved. At that time (1978-84 -- and I was in the AC at the time or had just Retired and gone to work as a DAC) force structure decisions were made on AC and RC whims as well as on force requirements, recruiting capability and other factors. The 'one half' issue was designed to reduce the size of the Guard and it was budget driven. The fact that 'studies' and processes were and are used to 'justify' that is typical Army blast and cover. The Army is pretty good at feeding perceptions.

One may use AC prejudice to explain the over 90 days it took to certify the 48th. The fact remains the balloon went up in Sep 90 and four months later the 48th wasn’t ready. The fight was over FIVE months later.

Bayonet Brant answered this and did so accurately. Wes Clark kept screwing with the Bde at the NTC and the OCs insisted on a very unusual number of re-dos. The AC deliberately stalled to preclude the deployment. Your "fact" is predicated on that stacking of the deck.

Parochailism and budget battles aren’t the sole causes of the Guard’s inability to be ready to execute across the spectrum as an AC unit does...Leaders and staff just can’t master the skills in 60 days of training. Blaming budget and parochialism for a lack of time is just hubris.

You missed the point -- I essentially agreed with that paragraph. My point was just that PLUS the FACT that you can still deploy a Guard or Reserve unit faster than you can recruit a similar force off the street. One gets what one pays for. The design factor is adequate but the limitations are known and have been accepted. The only hubris in this exchange is your apparent AC uber alles attitude. No question that a Guard combat arms Battalion or above isn't equal to most AC Battalions or above most days -- but Bob's World is correct in that after 60 days or so in a real middle-sized or big war, you or anyone else would be hard put to tell what a unit's pedigree happened to be...

“The 'fact' that Saudi oil is needed by the rest of the world does not give the US reason to insure its provision except for US domestic political reasons.” Uh what do we run our factories/cars on? Water? Japan was forced to initiate WWII for very similar reasons. It’s simply not a war of choice when a nation is facing financial ruin and the subsequent turmoil.

We can disagree on that -- as well as on the 'fact' that "Japan was forced to initiate WWII for very similar reasons." Forced -- or elected. FDR gave them an excuse to do what they'd planned to do all along...

Not to mention that had we pursued Jimmy Carter's idea to achieve energy self sufficiency -- had he not been distracted by his own poor handling of the Tehran hostage action -- we'd have had fallbacks. We always have had, we just elect to take the easy and politically expedient way out. You're quite right in the avoiding financial difficulties and (political) turmoil, that always drives our train.

Ref the Marine size, “the Army goes out of its way to pick fights with them over inconsequential issues” Examples and how does that impact the size issue? The size of the Corps was written into law in 1952.

I'm well aware of the size requirements statute, I was in the Corps at the time. It was enacted due to Omar Bradley's efforts to get the Corps amalgamated into the Army -- Truman was supportive; Congress was not.

Inconsequential issues: Amalgamate the Marines. Size of the Guard and Reserve.

Consequential issues poorly handled: The replacement for the M4 Carbine issue (Barry McCaffrey owes the Army big time for that weapon...). MRAPs.

More importantly, why do we have a force of 250K marines when we can only float 30K?

Probably for the same reason we need an Active Army of 450-540K to field a force of 100+K -- and of course, the Army also is not dependent upon the Navy's provision of hulls and underway time to float folks...

I don’t understand the rapid rotation of key players comment...

Our terribly flawed 1918 personnel system (with 1945, 1950, 1065 and recent overlays...) now insists that we rotate everyone at two to four year intervals and that people must rotate through many jobs -- thus we develop a crew of Generalists who are jacks of all trades and masters of none. The problem is affecting the Army at all levels but my specific comment was directed at the senior leaders who interface with the Congress, one will start the battle in a fashion, his replacement picks up the Baton and changes tack while his replacement virtually does a 180 on the previous two -- lack of continuity in the fight is not helpful

We have deployed units for almost twice the amount of time that their Marine counterparts deploy for over the last decade.

That's a separate issue and a policy issue. The Marines have to cope with that Afloat issue and Navy steaming time, the Army does not. The important thing is that neither service obtains decent continuity in combat operations due to those short tours -- and a year is a short tour just as seven months is...

The Marines field generally better trained units? By what measure?

The Marines deployed Reserve Tanks and Tankers in M1s to DS/DS. What was it you said about the 48th?

The Marines deploy more active duty troops to train? Example? I’m pretty familiar with what the Army does in this regard. What’s the Marine model?

The Marine Corps assigns active duty Marines, Typically an Officer in the same rank as the Reserve unit Commander and a few Staff NCOs -- used to be about five per Company sized unit -- to assist in training and adminstration (a huge time and effort waster in Army RC units...) as well as to insure quality (The I-I Staff also gets inspected to make sure they're performing well). That's probably changed a bit (as has the Army in regard to RC training support) but I suspect the Marines still put more effort and more active folks on a per capita basis into it.

I’d like to see your numbers also when it comes to money.

No money numbers, purely anecdotal but based on over 50 years of close contact.

BTW, Reserve Marines also train for less than 30 days a year.

True -- but, as you know, in training for combat, quality counts. The Army suffers from that terrible Task, Condition, Standard BTMS foolishness...

IOW, the Army has a systemic problem that inhibit good training -- that's changing but far too slowly.

I know you addressed this to Bob but:

1.A few months in combat does not prepare you to execute missions the same as an AC unit. A simple example would be if you are doing route security or base security you aren’t training to conduct an air assault or the priorities or work to stand up a COP.

You're using Afghanistan / Iraq as models. Bad mistake. To quote Major Rod:

I also reject the common assumption that the next war is going to be like the last one.

Bob meant in medium or high intensity combat, not in the current environment.

2.Conflict of choice. Using your standard declaring war on Nazi Germany was a conflict of choice.

Well, yeah...

4.90 days isn’t arbitrary. OPLANS rely on synchronized deployment schedules and the enemy landing on our beaches isn’t the only threat we need to be prepared for unless you’re a Ron Paul isolationist.

True on that last item and I, for one, ain't a Ron Paulite -- but Brant's got that right also, the 90 days AND the synchronized deployments are arbitrary both have varied over the years depending upon the exigencies and can and will be again changed. Bet on it.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World

Well said, certainly, but only factually accurate if assessed on a very very short memory/timeline. I would encourage people to study the entire history of the US Army. To study the thinking that went into our Constitution and the debates that took place. Any arguments framed solely in the context of our Cold War and immediate post-Cold war context are incomplete and biased by that incompleteness.

I actually have studied our history and continue to do so. I don't disagree with the statement above, but counter with the simple fact that we're living in a post Cold War world, not in a pre Cold War world. Second, we weren't considered a superpower until WWII, and our role changed significantly at that point. I would like to rewrite history and erase any reference to globalization, American international responsibilities, etc., but that wouldn't reflect the world we actually live in.

We could do it because of our geostrategic strength. The same geo-strategy that validates why we need a strong navy with a very important expeditionary peacetime role for the USMC.

The CJCS might suggest this is no longer a valid argument and in future wars the homeland will be attacked. Can't recall where I saw the comments, but they were fairly recent. We still enjoy geostrategic advantages, but that won't protect us from long range missiles, terrorism, cyber, etc., of course I agree with you that large Army won't protect us from these threats either.

This does not mean NO peacetime regular army, but it does mean we can have a much smaller one than we do today. We have many tools of deterrence, and the best ones are not land forces. Did our large land army deter Saddam from taking Kuwait? No.

I agree we don't need a large Army to defend against these threats, what I disagree is your and Ken's statements about National Guard capabilities. It is the nature of the beast, I don't think it can be fixed, and that isn't directed against the soldiers in the NG, it is the reality that they forced to deal with and the unrealistic expectations we have of them.

We need a BALANCED and properly sized regular force. Not sure if the current adversarial process we use will or can produce such an army. But step one is to get the facts and the history straight, and that means all the facts and all the history, not just the past 60-70 years.

I suspect we all agree with this statement, but not only getting the history correct, but projecting future threats, which won't look like yesterday's threats.

[Ken White]

... that wouldn't reflect the world we actually live in... I agree with you that large Army won't protect us from these threats either...I suspect we all agree with this statement, but not only getting the history correct, but projecting future threats, which won't look like yesterday's threats.

All that...

This, however:

...what I disagree is your and Ken's statements about National Guard capabilities...

You do realize that Bob and I do not agree on Guard capabilities and prospects. I'm somewhere between the two of you.

It is the nature of the beast, I don't think it can be fixed, and that isn't directed against the soldiers in the NG, it is the reality that they forced to deal with...

If you mean they can never in peacetime or limited war reach the AC level of capability of combat units, I agree totally. If you mean that Bob's wrong and after 60 days or so in a big war, you couldn't tell the difference, I disagree. I've actually see it in Korea and you cannot tell...

...and the unrealistic expectations we have of them.

There we agree -- and you've summed it up nicely. The Guard is NOT supposed to a part time active Army; they are to comprise a limited capability force for State emergencies and a force in being that can expand the manpower of the Active Army given adequate training and time. The unrealistic expectations are the fault of many, to include the Guard themselves (and of Guardsmen like Bob) who try to make it into something it is not -- and was never intended to be.

It is what it is, it provides an acceptable, relatively low cost alternative to no reserve force at all. No more, no less.

[Bob's World]

Well much of this discussion is apples and oranges.

First, I spent nearly 8 years as a regular army officer, serving in a mech infantry unit in the waning days of our Cold War presence in West Germany, followed by my team time in 5th SFG, which included all of Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

With that experience under my belt I felt I had accomplished my military goals, having become a Green Beret and and commanded men in a combat zone, so I honored a commitment to my family and left the active force to pursue a civilian career. I went to law school and joined a Guard unit. The unit in my state was what we called an "Enhanced Infantry Brigade," one of 15 separate combat brigades established by the Army to receive extra training and serve as the initial units to be mobilized in time of war. For some three years I didn't get it. Things were so different in the Guard that it made no sense to me as a Regular. But I did not just observe it or attempt to train it. I owned it. I commanded, I took major staff positions, as a BN and BDE S-3, for example, and did my best to make these units as good as they could be. But here something I learned most regular officers don't have a clue about: AC Army is a training readiness organization. National Guard is a personnel readiness unit. The measure of success, and therefore the focus, of each organization is completely different. Why do some AC commanders conduct outrageous training events? Because their commander loves it and it gets them promoted. Why do some Guard commanders do outrageous recruiting or retention events (like a fraternity rush week)? For the same reason. As a Guard Commander you are judged by how many billets you fill, not by how your unit performs. A little fat? no worries. If you fire that overweight E-7 it is on you commander to go find a civilian, convince them to join, and then grow them up to be an E-7 someday. No AC officer has to worry about that.

So, I never claim RC units are as proficient as AC units; only that they don't have to be while in a pre-mob status. One reason they take so long to get up to mobilized status is that AC leaders don't know F-all about training Guard units and tend to just think of them as F'd up regular units. Our training doctrine is all written for AC units with the term "RC" sprinkled in here and there. METL is one's warfighting tasks. So like units in the AC and RC should have the exact same METL, yet too often we provide a dumbed down METL for the RC unit to train to. Wrong approach. What RC units need is the same METL, but they need to focus their pre-mob training on a solid foundation of fundamental skills. Best task I found in the ARTEP manual was "maintain opsec." Try to sell that to a general. I tried, and he thought I was on crack. He wanted to do movement to contact, attack and defend; just like the AC units. So we end up building a half-ass ability to do high echelon tasks with no foundation of core skills underneath it. Then, once mobilized, units need to start from scratch and go back to square one and build a foundation. Better if our RC units did nothing but focus on simple foundational skills for collective training at BDE and BN level until mobilized.

But go try to find guys who have commanded both regular army and national guard units. There aren't many. Guard generals don't understand the AC and vice versa.

But my concerns now, as a strategist, are way bigger than these training issues I wrestled with as a Major. Our national security is much more than just our military. It is our economy, our influence, our education, etc. If we focus on just one line of operation and build far too much military when it is truly not needed at the expense of every other line of operation we will fail as a nation. Bill is right about the small picture, but he is wrong about the big picture.

Wars are fought by 18 year old kids. Wars are fought by units that did not exist the year prior. Wars are fought by citizen soldiers. These little adventure of choice of the past 20 years? Those aren't wars. Combat? sure. Not wars. There is a big difference. Can America be attacked? Of course. But no one can bring war to America without giving us years of advance warning. (exchanging nukes is another matter, and no amount of army will help there).

Likewise we are better off when we cannot so easily bring war to others. Having a warfighting army on the shelf disrupts our system of governance and enables presidents to do what was never intended to be within their power to do. That is a fact. Will that mean that we would not longer be able to attempt to control everything in the world and bend it to our will? Yes, and that is not a bad thing.

[major.rod]

Bayonet Brant -

BN Breach - 3-5 Cav Kirchgoens Germany. We trained and were evaluated on a BN breach both before we left and when we got in country. There’s ONE BN that did it counter to your statement. I’m sure the four sister BN’s also trained the mission.

AC vs, Guard training OPTEMP comparison - The training optempo of guard units increases as well as those of the Army. I was the deputy for the Infantry school task force that did an analysis of yearly training before an AC unit deploys in ’05. If you are going to mention the new Guard approach to training you have to look at the Army’s also. Painting rocks, post support, etc. at most deduct four months of collective training. Units still do substantial training even in red cycle. Guard units don’t get a red cycle and having been with guard units I can tell you 25% of drills were devoted to the same kinds of BS. You can’t have different standards if you want to compare organizations. You make it sound like Guard units make the most out of the 30 days they train in a year. NOT true and I don’t think reciting a list that includes Christmas parties, classroom vs. field training etc. would be constructive.

Deployment and it’s impact on training - When the troops are needed on the ground impact deployment schedules slip but you’re fooling yourself if you think in today’s risk averse litigious environment that the Army is going to push a Guard unit out early rather than replace it with an AC unit.

Ken – General thoughts:

The Army is pretty good at feeding perceptions.

The AC isn’t the only organization good at molding perceptions.

Bob's World is correct in that after 60 days or so in a real middle-sized or big war, you or anyone else would be hard put to tell what a unit's pedigree happened to be…

well I guess we’ll need a middle or big sized war to bear that out.

Army picking fights with Marines – fights is plural, you listed one. : )

Army size – The Army provides it’s own support. The Marines do not e.g. Marines rely on the Navy for all medical care

Rotation issues - Army home station rotation policy has changed drastically since 911. Most Marine units deployed to OIF, OEF were deployed via air just like the Army. Float times were not an issue.

Marine over Army quality – Marine reserve tankers deployed. You mean the reserve tankers that had to be reinforced by Army AC mechanized forces? : )

Marine vs. Army commitment to training reserve units. I commanded the nine man AC training detachment for a guard separate infantry BN in 2000. I was backstopped by another 40 man Army detachment to assist on drill weekends. That would make the Army density of AC to guard an even higher proportion of five per unit. That is on top of Active component soldiers selected to serve full time in reserve components and in effect transfer to the Guard.

Granted my Air Assault example may apply to OIF OEF (but it none-the less applies). Bob’s observation “60 days and can’t tell the difference” has yet to prove itself out . The last time we deployed Guard units to a mid or big size fight and they did well was WWII and they trained as active duty units for over a year with huge influxes of active troops. You saw it in Korea? Where and when? I’d like to look at how much time they had to train up and record of performance.

BTW, I categorically reject your characterization of me as “AC uber alles”. Let’s refrain from simplistic attacks when we don’t have evidence to support our anecdotal positions? Having served shoulder to shoulder with Guardsman I can tell you they have my deepest respect and there are certain missions where Guard units are superior to their AC peer. Pulling a 40 hour week and trying to meet the unrealistic expectations the Army has for Guard units one weekend a month is an incredibly difficult row to hoe. There is ZERO doubt they are patriots. Let’s separate ego from capability?

Fuchs – yes, one of Germany’s great mistakes. It still takes two to fight and we didn’t have to “choose” to take on Germany on their home turf and first. That was our “choice”.

[BayonetBrant]

Bayonet Brant answered this and did so accurately

but Brant's got that right also

hey - two correct comments in one day!
I'm declaring success and heading out for a nap

[Fuchs]

2.Conflict of choice. Using your standard declaring war on Nazi Germany was a conflict of choice.

Check your history book (or wikipedia if need be). Hitler declared war on the United States himself. The U.S. merely confirmed that it was already at war with Germany.