Relationship between the political system and causes of war (questions)

[AmericanPride]

Hello all.

I'm currently in the process of doing a research paper for a class on war and peace. The quoted text below is my thesis. The basic premise is that the multi-polar political system has flooded the state actors with information. New technology also enables the participation of significant non-state actors, and more effective management of the information collected. As a result, the strategic aspects of intelligence will more directly influence all levels of decision making and execution ('strategic corporal'). The ways in which state actors discriminate information will dictate their actions. This creates the appearance that war has transformed, though its basic drivers remain the same.

Reviewing my thesis, I in my mind come to a resounding "duh, so what?" at the end. So my questions are:

(1) To what extent is strategic intelligence relevant to state decision making on war?

(2) In what ways has technology transformed, or modified, the relevance of intelligence, if at all? Does an increase in capabilities generate a proportional increase in dependence on the effects it enables?

(3) What is the link between the causes of war and intelligence? Are states more likely or less likely to enter conflict with more effective information management?

I've put together a list of 20 or so sources, so I'm currently wading through the waves of pages and concepts to connect all the components together. Thanks for any assistance.

The “transformation” of warfare, its increased intensity, and decentralization originates from the increased tempo of the decision-making process enabled by technology and facilitated by the factional nature of the modern political system. Underneath the masks of ideology and religion, the fundamental drivers and components of war remain the same. The concept of hard power, operationalized by the military as firepower and maneuver, remains essentially unchanged, but now existing in the modern context of a fragmented political structure. The notion of soft power arises from the complex dynamic of political, military, and economic interactions on multiple levels, shifting focus from dominance to influence, and an orientation on the effects that may be produced by a variety of compulsive means other than physical violence. For this reason, the nature of intelligence in war has undergone the most notable transformation. The capacity to make relevant decisions more rapidly than the adversary has become of extreme importance due to the fluid and mixed environment in which war and politics now exist. Information management which enables this capacity by increasing the tempo of the decision-making process will have a decisive impact on all levels of warfighting. This paper will focus on the strategic aspects of war where the political and military aims work in collusion, and why strategic intelligence will define the security challenges of the 21st century. The method in which state actors collect, evaluate, and apply strategic intelligence will decisively judge their fate.

[William F. Owen]

I note with interest your suggesting that information technology increases tempo.

Research done in the UK shows this to be very much in doubt. In WW2 Divisional HQs were much smaller, and did things far quicker using less people and resources. My understanding is that there is substantial evidence from both the UK and Sweden that higher levels of information actually slow down decision making and thus tempo.

It has been further suggested that what increases really increased tempo is small thoroughly trained Divisional and Formation staffs. Not sure if this helps, but I can forward you a thesis that deals with this if you are interested.

[John T. Fishel]

3. Depends (the classic answer) on the intel. If we had accurate info on WMD in Iraq in 2002 would we have gone to war? If we had accurate intel on Saddam's intentions prior to his 1990 invasion of Kuwait, could we have prevented it?

This leads to #1:

As a Lieutenant (back in the dark ages) I was a strat intel officer assigned to the Pentagon. We analyzed all kinds of info (political, economic, military, and informational - the classic instruments of power) from all sources for the decisionmaking political and administrative leadership. Responding to our analysis (I'm talking here about the entire intel community) they would use this as input to their policy decisions. Intelligence, of course, was not their only source of critical info. For non-denied areas, the media was often better informed than the entire intel community. This remains the case although, perhaps, the degree to which it is true may have changed. In addition to intel on friends and adversaries the decisionmakers have to take account of our own capabilities. For the military, this is coordinated through the 3 shop. As Graham Allison points out in Essence of Decision (if you haven't read it for pol sci you must ) Presidents are limited by the capabilities of their bureaucracies. Finally, recognize the wisdom of Clausewitz' (Saint Carl to the denisons of SWJ) in his one point of total consistency through all 8 books, that war is the continuation of policy/politics with the addition of other means.

I'll leave the other questions for others more current like Wilf.

Hope this was of some use.

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

@ Finally, recognize the wisdom of Clausewitz' (Saint Carl to the denisons of SWJ) in his one point of total consistency through all 8 books, that war is the continuation of policy/politics with the addition of other means.

@ I'll leave the other questions for others more current like Wilf.

@ - To paraphrase the excellent Colin S. Gray, "If Clausewitz didn't say it then it's probably wrong."

@ - actually all a bit above my pay grade, old Chap!

[John T. Fishel]

Wilf--

I thought you gave a really good answer to #2 - so I didn't touch it.

Regarding Saint Carl: Although I've used him for years and read in On War I had never read the whole thing until this semester when I assigned it to my course on War & conflict from ancient times to the present. Stupid me, I had to read it too! The Howard/Paret translation with essays by both along with Brodie and the latter's commentary is superb. Despite being written in great detail at the end of the Napoleonic era, it is surpising how well the examples hold up today. Unlike Sun Tzu, who writes in aphorisms, Clausewitz goes into excruciating detail and that is, I think, one of the real strengths of the work. The examples he chooses often are timeless. So, whoever said tha old dogs (like me) can't learn new tricks? (And if you are reading this Steve Metz, I will expect a remark to resemble since I just left myself wide open.)

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

Despite being written in great detail at the end of the Napoleonic era, it is surpising how well the examples hold up today. Unlike Sun Tzu, who writes in aphorisms, Clausewitz goes into excruciating detail and that is, I think, one of the real strengths of the work. The examples he chooses often are timeless.

Yes! Yes! Yes! This is why the old dead Prussian is so good (or "way cool"). The enduring empirical nature of his writing is excellent, and a thorough understanding of CvC leads you to so many other good things, as well as an ability to dismiss a lot of others.

I would strongly recommend reading Foch's Principles of War, 1903 English translation was 1918. Foch was a big CvC fan and it shows CvC in a more modern context. I think it excellent! One day I really need to examine if it truly is CvC in application, but my current understanding is that it is.

Warning: - Robert Leonhard, who I consider one of the best living Military minds is very down on Foch's book. Never asked him quite why, but I guess I should.

Sun Tzu? "A single hamster cannot defeat a bear, but many hamsters make a good meal"

[wm]

(1) To what extent is strategic intelligence relevant to state decision making on war?

I suspect the degree of relevance has much to do with the personalities of the state decisionmakers. By this I mean, how much access to intel the decisonmakers demand and how much use (read "opennness of mind to being persuaded by 'facts' delivered by strategic intel") they actually make of the intel provided. Sports analogy--suppose a football coach had a scout who reported, with some provable degree of accuracy, what plays the opposing football team would run next. Further suppose the coach chose not to believe the scout, chose to ignore the scout's input in his decisonmaking, and/or chose not to inform his own defense about what plays to call to counter what the opponent called.

2) In what ways has technology transformed, or modified, the relevance of intelligence, if at all? Does an increase in capabilities generate a proportional increase in dependence on the effects it enables?

Because of the availability of near instantaneous imagery as combat information, I suspect that operators place less reliance on having a trained "intel" guy provide assessments of what the bad guys are up to or may be planning.

(3) What is the link between the causes of war and intelligence? Are states more likely or less likely to enter conflict with more effective information management?

The decision to go to war probably has little to do with a rational risk calculus and/or the kind of cost-benefit analysis that you learn about in classical economics and political theory/international relations courses. I suspect what makes it seem so rational has to do with all the "Monday morning quarterback/post mortem" analyses done after the shooting starts.

States act based on their perceptions of reality. Insofar as intel may alter that perception of reality (for good or bad), the "go-to-war-propensity" pendulum could swing either way. See my response to 1 above.

I suspect that you might want to review the thread on the the neo-con alibi here among other threads (like the one on Iran Nukes NIE) to get more grist for developing an answer to this question. The bottom line from where I sit is that a state's leadership makes a decision to go to war and then tries to come up with reasons that enables it to justify that decision in the moral/legal context defined by Just War Theory's jus ad bellum conditions.