Thanks for the responses and also whoever moved the thread (I realized I posted in the wrong forum after the fact ).

Research done in the UK shows this to be very much in doubt. In WW2 Divisional HQs were much smaller, and did things far quicker using less people and resources. My understanding is that there is substantial evidence from both the UK and Sweden that higher levels of information actually slow down decision making and thus tempo. It has been further suggested that what increases really increased tempo is small thoroughly trained Divisional and Formation staffs. Not sure if this helps, but I can forward you a thesis that deals with this if you are interested.
I would appreciate that document. It seems to me that what you state suggests that information management depends on the competency of the decision maker involved. But if we're to assume that the decision-maker is a rational actor (I'm more or less required to use realism, or a modified version of it, as a theoretical framework), and everything else being equal, can we claim with any kind of confidence that the rapidity in which an actor turns around information from collection to application will be a decisive factor in political or military action vis-a-vis other actors? (Obviously I am not entirely familiar with the ins and outs of the intelligence cycle, so I must ask: is the pace of the intelligence cycle an indication of its effective use?) I recently read through Keegan's book Intelligence in War, and while he suggests that "exertion" (in the Clausewitzian sense) is the decisive factor in victory, I think he misses the underlying causes which brought the forces together at the decisive point. I suppose then, beginning with the idea that intelligence, in a broad sense, is necessary, I assumed that more of a good thing would automatically indicate a better thing. But I see why that may not be the case.

3. Depends (the classic answer) on the intel. If we had accurate info on WMD in Iraq in 2002 would we have gone to war? If we had accurate intel on Saddam's intentions prior to his 1990 invasion of Kuwait, could we have prevented it?
If we are to assume that a state's interests are permanent (for theoretical purposes), I think the next question becomes: does intelligence decrease uncertainty? Clausewitz called intelligence a "chasm" between conception and execution. And if we're also to assume that states are concerned with relative power and gains among them, can we say that a state with less certainty about another's behavior will be more likely to resort to violence in order to realize its interests? The classic "prisoners dilemma" suggests that if actors had knowledge of one another's intentions, they will cooperate.

I suspect the degree of relevance has much to do with the personalities of the state decisionmakers. By this I mean, how much access to intel the decisonmakers demand and how much use (read "opennness of mind to being persuaded by 'facts' delivered by strategic intel") they actually make of the intel provided.
This is the key problem in realist theory (which I'm using as a theoretical framework for my thesis). Other authors suggest however, realism can be modified from the state-centric focus to the nature of the faction, or factions, governing the country. But I'm trying to explore whether or not intelligence as a concept is inherent in the state consideration, determination, and pursuit of its interests. So while it can be said that interests determines friends and foes, realism asserts that states have the singular interest in their security and that politics is self-help. With that assumption, I will modify my question to: to what extent does strategic intelligence assist the state in discriminating between friend and foe?

What technology tends to do is create a series of information bottlenecks.
This is something I addressed a few pages into my paper when I came upon relating the nature of the political system to state decision making. It seems to me that while technology can enable more decisions to be made faster, it reduces the number of choices actually available because it simultaneously provides information which discredits options that might otherwise seem viable. This assumes of course that states are rational actors and will choose the option with the most utility as far as their interests are concerned.