Ken, I don’t agree with the across-the-board categorization of analysts discounting HUMINT. There are elements within the military and the broader IC that have long understood and valued HUMINT collection. However, I have to say - excepting those areas - I agree with your point. My previous post really speaks to the ideal, and those elements I mentioned are really the only ones that tend to consistently approach the smooth workings that I tried to describe.
All of what you say is true, Ted. But I would add three small but central points:

a. The Post-Vietnam merger of the old Army Security Agency stove-piped structure with Military Intelligence meant largely that ASA took over tactical MI because it had an extant command structure that favored technical collection.

b. Flowing from above, the bias toward technical collection brought with it an inherent bias toward greater intelligence structure at all levels and rewarded those who stayed inside that structure with promotions. That is the reason most MI generals have never been battalion or brigade S2s. It is also the reason that then XVIII Airborne Corps commander LTG Gary Luck told us on the Certain Victory team that the Army had spent way too much on MI for what we got from MI. His G2 by the way as a newly crossed over ASA Major was my very first company commander and then MI battalion XO. He never served a day in a maneuver battalion or brigade and was tactically illiterate.

HUMINT is ---big surprise--human centric. That means the money costs are constant to sustain skills. MI had rather spend money building force structure. Funny MI is the same way toward sustaining tactical SIGINT language skills.

c. MI has never been focused on analysis because that too is a human-centric skill. Besides MI officers get to general by managing MI force structure, not serving as analysts. If they do become G2s at division and corps they manage analysts. More collection in terms of more collection means is always the goal.

Best

Tom